MAP Cyber Library

Tue, May 19th 2015, 1:02PM

middle east-asia project (map) ESSAY series

* INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH WEST ASIA: WHAT PATTERNS AND WHAT FUTURE?
REFUGEES ADRIFT? RESPONSES TO CRISES IN THE MENA AND ASIA 
RESPONDING TO NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE MENA REGION & ASIA
* GOVERNING MEGACITIES IN THE MENA AND ASIA
CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS IN THE MENA & SE ASIA
INFORMAL NETWORKS & POLITICAL TRANSITIONS IN THE MENA & SE ASIA  
* ALL ABOUT CHINA
CONTEMPORARY PATTERNS IN TRANSREGIONAL ISLAM
SECTARIANISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA
* GULF INVESTMENT: DESTINATION ASIA
* ISRAEL: THE FUTURE OF ASIA
* KOREA AND THE MIDDLE EAST: A WORLD APART?
“CIVILIANIZING” THE STATE
* PATHWAYS TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
* HARVESTING WATER & HARNESSING COOPERATION
* TURKEY FACES ASIA
* DUBAI — THE MIDDLE EAST-ASIA HUB
* SNAPSHOTS OF THE IRANIAN DIASPORA IN MALAYSIA


FULL TEXT ARTICLES: SEARCH BY COUNTRY

ALGERIA * AUSTRALIA  * BURMA / MYANMAR * CHINA * EGYPTGULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC) * INDIA * INDONESIA * IRANIRAQ * ISRAEL * JAPAN * JORDAN * LIBYA * MALAYSIA * OMAN * PAKISTAN * PALESTINE AND PALESTINIANS  *  PHILIPPINES  * QATARSAUDI ARABIA * SINAGPORE * SOUTH KOREA * SRI LANKA * SYRIA * TAIWAN * THAILAND * TUNISIA * TURKEYUNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE) * VIETNAM * YEMEN *


FULL TEXT ARTICLES: SEARCH BY TOPIC

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS * CROSS-REGIONAL DYNAMICS * CULTURE AND SOCIETY * ECONOMY, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTEDUCATION AND MEDIA * ISLAM AND ISLAMISM * POLITICS AND SECURITY * TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE * WOMEN


Algeria

AL-Tamimi, Naser. “China-Algeria Relations: Growing Slowly But Surely,” Al-Arabiya (March 26, 2014).
It has become clear that after the fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya and the continued instability in Egypt, China attaches great importance to developing relations with Algeria ... Today, Algeria is China’s top trade partner and the largest export market in Maghreb region (Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and Mauritania).


Zambelis, Chris. “China’s Inroads into North Africa: An Assessment of Sino-Algerian Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 10, Issue 1 (January 7, 2010).
The geopolitics of African countries such as Algeria, a country in North Africa that has traditionally enjoyed strong relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and whose strategic importance and regional profile have increased markedly of late, is key to grasping the dynamics that shape contemporary Sino-Algerian ties and China’s Africa strategy overall …


AUSTRALIA

Bubalo, Anthony. “So what? Matching policy to Australian interests in West Asia,” Lowy Institute Policy Brief (July 29, 2008). 
Since 2001 the weight of Australian interests in West Asia has increased substantially … There have already been some adjustments of Australian policy to account for these growing interests … But the evolution of policy has also been uneven, contingent and ad hoc. Often Australia is still using old policy approaches to deal with new and emerging sets of interests. It is time to renew Australia’s policy framework for West Asia.


Bubalo, Anthony. “Reinventing ‘West Asia’: How the 'Middle East and 'South Asia' Fit into Australia's Strategic Picture,” Lowy Institute Policy Brief (February 21, 2007). The purpose of this policy brief is to make a contribution to what is likely to be a gradual and fitful official reassessment of the Middle East and South Asia’s strategic importance to Australia over coming years. That is, to argue that as Australian policymakers incorporate these regions into the country’s strategic calculus they would do well to view them collectively rather than separately …


BURMA / MYANMAR

Bogais, Jonathan. Democracy Cannot Exist without Social Cohesion: The Myanmar Challenge. MAP Project (July 30, 2014). 
By emphasizing uniformity through laws to protect one class of race and religion, Myanmar legislators are advancing a device for oppression. If enacted, the Law on Protection of Race and Religion would not only breach international conventions; it would also preset the conditions for further sectarian violence.


Coates, Eliane. Sectarian Violence Involving Rohingya in Myanmar: Historical Roots and Modern Triggers. MAP Project (August 4, 2014). 
While the tangled roots of the Rohingya have played a critical role in the recent inter-religious violence between Rohingya and Buddhists, so too has the rise of Burman-Buddhist ethno-nationalism. This essay discusses the the salient narratives driving anti-Rohingya/anti-Muslim sentiments as well as the policies and reforms that have contributed to prolonging the violence.


CHINA

Al-Sudairi, Mohammed Turki. "Sino-Saudi Relations: An Economic History," Gulf Research Center (August 2012). 
Given that economic ties between Saudi Arabia and China have grown considerably in the last two decades with energy at the heart of the relationship, a new GRC Paper takes an in-depth look at Sino-Saudi economic relations starting from the late 1980s onwards. In addition to examining the oil and petrochemical partnerships spearheaded by Aramco and SABIC, the paper also includes wider issues such as the role played by Saudi corporate investors and Chinese companies operating in the Kingdom in cultivating this relationship. Besides, the paper highlights some of the comparative advantages and difficulties latent in the various sectors through which this engagement unfolds.


Abisellan, Eduardo Lt. Col. “CENTCOM’s China Challenge: Anti-Access and Aerial Denial in the Middle East,” Brookings Institution 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper (June 28, 2012).
… [D]espite the rebalancing of U.S. efforts away from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East today is fast becoming an arena for another “Great Game,” one that may inevitably pit the U.S. against China in a regional competition for influence and power. China, through its economic ties to the region, has already achieved influence parity with the U.S. Now it could very well leverage this growing influence to gain further concessions and achieve a future positional advantage to counter U.S. regional hegemony and naval supremacy in both the Middle East and within the Asia-Pacific region— all the way from the source of its energy supplies through its long and vulnerable sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and to home ports in China …


AL-Tamimi, Naser. “The Uncertain Future of China-Israel Relations,” Al-Arabiya (April 4, 2014). Despite this significant improvement in Sino-Israeli relations, there are issues that may limit their development.


AL-Tamimi, Naser. “China-Algeria Relations: Growing Slowly But Surely,” Al-Arabiya (March 26, 2014). It has become clear that after the fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya and the continued instability in Egypt, China attaches great importance to developing relations with Algeria ... Today, Algeria is China’s top trade partner and the largest export market in Maghreb region (Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and Mauritania).


Al-Sudairi, Mohammed Turki. “Among Old Friends: A History of the Palestinian Community in China,” MAP Project (March 2015).
Following the Bandung Conference in 1955, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) espoused―in an unusual contrast with other major powers of the “socialist” and “nonaligned” camps―a pro-Palestinian stance in its foreign policy toward the Middle East. This did not entail, however, any direct contact with the Palestinians, a development that did not appear until the mid-1960s emergence of a more autonomous and coherent Palestinian national movement embodied in the PLO. Contact prior to the establishment of formal channels of communication took place through a number of unofficial and semi-official conduits, ranging from the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), the Chinese embassies in Egypt and South Yemen after 1967, and the “underground” Communist networks (mainly Iraqi, Sudanese, and Yemeni) to such bodies as the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity and the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. These contacts enabled the PRC to eventually extend formal diplomatic recognition of the PLO in 1964, making it the first non-Arab country to do so.


Al-Sudairi, Mohammed Turki. Israel-Sino Relations Through the Prism of Advocacy Groups,” Al-Sabah Papers, No. 8 (November 2013). 
Advocacy for the state of Israel – in the sense of attempting to favourably shape public and elite perceptions and discourses about the Jewish state and the nature of its conflict with the Palestinians and the surrounding Arab states – has been, and continues to be, of pivotal concern to both the Israeli government and pro-Israeli organisations operating in the United States and elsewhere ... This paper discusses this advocacy in the Chinese context ... The subject matter is divided into two sections organised in a chronological fashion: the first section examines the early contacts between Jewish organisations in the US and Israel with Chinese scholars, focusing specifically on the indigenous development of Jewish studies in China in the 1980s and 1990s as an outcome of this initial contact. The second section examines the evolution of pro-Israeli advocacy in Chinese academia from 2000 onwards while placing it firmly at the backdrop of the larger changes sweeping organisational and conceptual approaches to Israeli advocacy amongst the global Jewish communities of the West. This section also looks at the discourses and rationale driving pro-Israeli advocacy in China.


Alterman, Jon B. “The Other Side of the World: China, the United States, and the Struggle for Middle East Security,” CSIS Report. March 14, 2017.
This report examines the ways in which the U.S. and Chinese governments have approached the Middle East and the Asian space leading to it and the implications that potential shifts would have not only for their bilateral ties but also for the future of geopolitics more broadly.


Alterman, Jon B. and John W. Garver. Vital Triangle: China, the United States and the Middle East (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2008).
… This study begins with an exploration of the Chinese perspectives on the China-Middle East-U.S. triangle, followed by the Middle East, and then those of the United States. A final concluding section points forward and offers a set of policy recommendations …


Andersen, Lars Erslev, Yang Jiang and Camilla Sørensen. “China and the Challenges in the Greater Middle East,” DIIS Conference Report (November 2015).
Is the balance of power between China and the US changing in the Persian Gulf? Will China’s increasing economic interest in the Gulf lead to a more activist Chinese foreign and security policy there? What are the expectations the Arab Gulf States have of China, and will China meet them?These questions have become still more urgent as China increases its influence in the Middle East as underlined by president Xi Jingping’s official visit in Cairo, Riyadh and Teheran this January with his vision of the One Belt, One Road plan.


Armijo, Jackie. Islamic Calligraphy in China: Images and Histories,” MAP Project (May 1, 2015). Given the prominence of calligraphy in the traditional arts of both the Islamic world and China, it is only natural that Islamic calligraphy plays an important cultural role in Chinese Muslim communities. The art form’s survival over the centuries in China, even during prolonged periods of isolation from the rest of the Islamic world, reflects the strength of Chinese Muslims’ religious traditions, as well as the critical function of the written word within these traditions.


Atli, Altay. Questioning Turkey's China Trade,” Turkish Policy Quarterly (January 2011), pp. 106-116. 
This essay focuses on Turkey-China economic relations between the two countries and suggests that four questions need to be addressed if Turkey is to develop its relations with China in a way that is not only beneficial but also sustainable and progressive in the long term. The essay concludes that there is evidence of progress in all of four areas, albeit some distance to go.


Beng, Phar Kim and Vic Y.W. Li. “China’s Energy Dependence on the Middle East: Boon or Bane for Asian Security? The China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2005), pp. 19-26. … [O]ne of China’s present acute pre-occupations is the stability and security of its energy supply, especially from the Middle Eastern region which currently supplies up to 57 percent of China’s overall oil usage/imports …

Bianchi, Robert R. “China, Islam, and New Visions of the Old World,” MAP Project (March 2015).
China is steadily reshaping the world’s political and economic landscape by connecting Europe and the Pacific through a series of transcontinental and transoceanic networks that will run across the major Islamic countries of Asia and Africa. The slogan that Beijing uses to promote these projects—“One Belt, One Road”—is a shorthand reference to the Silk Road Economic Belt (the overland routes through Central Asia and the Middle East) and the Maritime Silk Road (the sea lanes joining the Pacific and Indian Oceans with the Mediterranean). In fact, even these grandiose labels understate the true magnitude of China’s ambitions; the total number of planned mega-networks is not two, but seven—and still counting.


Bianchi, Robert. “Morsy in Beijing: Implications for America’s Relations with China and the Islamic World,” Middle East Insights, Middle East Institute (NUS), No. 75 (September 12, 2012).
... Egypt is joining a long line of regional powers in the Middle East and the Islamic world that are holding the United States at arm’s length while moving closer and closer to China ... The Obama-Clinton pivot to the Pacific is a belated answer to China’s westward expansion into what Americans had come to see as their zones of privilege in the Middle East, Caspian Basin, Central Asia, and the Indian Ocean. But bringing the battle to China’s shores merely makes Washington weaker without slowing Beijing’s momentum in economic and political expansion ...


Blumenthal, Dan. “Providing Arms China and the Middle East,” Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2005), pp. 11-19.
Chinese policy in the Middle East has grown more active over the past decade. With its overriding goal of securing oil and gas to fuel China's economic growth, the Chinese government has actively cultivated its relations with the oil-rich Middle East, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia. In their dogged pursuit of this goal, Chinese policymakers have been more than willing not only to undercut U.S. nonproliferation efforts but also to work closely with governments that export Islamism—despite Beijing's concerns about China’s own increasingly assertive Uighur Muslim population …


Brown, Tristan G. “Feasts of the Sacrifice: Ritual Slaughter in Late Imperial and 20th-Century China,” MAP Project (March 2015).
Muslims in imperial China did not necessarily have to worship at the altars of Chinese gods to exert their identities as upstanding local inhabitants, obedient subjects, or agreeable neighbors. As any child brought up on the story of God’s sparing of Ibrahim’s son knows, the followers of any god who pulls his weight in this world or the next are sometimes in need of a lamb or two ...


Bubalo, Anthony and Mark Thirwell. “Energy insecurity: China, India and Middle East oil,” Lowy Institute Issues Brief (December 14, 2004).
… The rapid expansion of their economies has seen China and India become voracious consumers of energy. Oil, much of it imported from the Middle East, has become an increasingly important part of their energy needs. … As a result, energy security has become a key foreign policy objective and, particularly in the case of China, is shaping their approach to the Middle East. This issue brief provides an overview of current energy demand trends and raises for discussion some of the potential longer term strategic implications of this growing dependence on Mid-East oil.


Burton, Guy. “China and the Jihadi Threat,” MAP Project (August 2016).
This essay discusses China's responses to the jihadi threat. It shows that Chinese strategies have been influenced by whether the terrorist threat is perceived to be domestic or foreign. Internally, the Chinese approach has focused on protection and policing, resulting in confrontation with the Uighur minority in the far western province of Xinjiang. Externally, it has been less confrontational, with a preference for political and peace-building approaches.


Butler, Lawrence. “Mosques and Islamic Identities in China,” MAP Project (April 2015).
The great trading routes connecting medieval Eurasia by land and sea brought Islam, like Buddhism centuries earlier, to China. Somewhere between 20 and 40 million Muslims—reliable data remains elusive—now live in China. They acknowledge a variety of official and unofficial ethnic identities due to the diverse origins of Islam in China as well as the complexities of modern Chinese ethnic policies. The architecture of China’s mosques, both historic and modern, reflects this diversity. This essay examines the development of mosque architecture in southern China, in the old central capitals, and in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region from earliest times up to the present. In the twenty-first century, modern construction techniques allow patrons to choose from a variety of styles and materials as they design mosques to reflect a particular version of Islamic identity.


Calabrese, John. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): Underway and Under Threat,” MAP Project (December 2016).
China is already Pakistan’s largest trade and defense partner. But the coming into operation of the CPEC lends a new meaning to, and could transform the relationship between these two “all-weather allies,” including insofar as their ties to the Middle East are concerned — provided that the territorial and maritime security challenges associated with the completion and use of this corridor can be satisfactorily addressed.


Calabrese, John. “Fate of the Dragon in the Year of the Red Fire Monkey: China and the Middle East 2016,” MAP Project (February 2015).
February 2016 marks the beginning of a new phase in the Chinese lunar calendar, drawing to a close a year marked by heightened risks and fortuitous gains in China’s efforts to secure its interests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This essay addresses three questions: How well has China adapted to the conflict and instability that have swept the region? And as we enter the Year of the Red Fire Monkey, what are the concerns that are likely to preoccupy Chinese leaders? What, if any, policy adjustments by Beijing, can realistically be expected in light of the current circumstances and uncertain prospects for the region and for China itself?


Calabrese, John. “China and the Arab Awakening: The Cost of Doing Business,” China Report, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2013).
The popular unrest that has swept the Arab World since January 2011― occurring as China entered a period of leadership succession  presented Beijing with domestic political and diplomatic challenges. This article examines how, and how well, China responded to the Arab Awakening at home and in the conduct of its diplomacy.


Calabrese, John.  “China and Iran: Mismatched Partners,” Jamestown Foundation Occasional Paper (August 2006).
China and Iran are important geopolitical actors as well as major players in the global energy market. In recent years, the Sino-Iranian relationship has broadened and deepened. Energy cooperation is the main axis around which this partnership revolves. As a result, China is a stakeholder in the outcome of the diplomatic crisis that has been brewing over the Iranian nuclear program. The relationship between China and Iran deserves careful scrutiny, not the least because their strategic motivations remain ambiguous and dealings with each other lack transparency …


Calabrese, John.  “Dueling Stakeholders in Iran’s Energy Projects,” Gulf-Asia Research Bulletin, 1 (April 2007), pp. 15–20.
In February 2004, Japan’s Inpex Corporation signed a preliminary accord with Iran to develop Azadegan, one of the world’s largest oilfields. The following October, the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) agreed in principle to join forces with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to develop the massive Yadavaran oilfield. Yet, more than two years later, neither of these headline-grabbing deals has been implemented. The twists and turns in bringing these proposed mega-projects to fruition lay bare a tangle of economic and geopolitical issues …


Calabrese, John.  “The Iraq Energy Factor in Sino-Japanese Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 7, No. 6 (March 2007).
Iraq could soon emerge as an important new focal point of intensifying Chinese and Japanese commercial diplomacy and energy rivalry, in spite of their extensive overlapping interests and mutually beneficial economic ties. It is difficult to determine whether friction over energy-related matters is a symptom or an additional cause of the strained relationship between China and Japan. What is indisputable, however, is that these energy concerns have become foreign policy priorities in both Beijing and Tokyo, spurred by the debate over “peak oil,” the spike in world oil prices and heightened concerns about possible supply disruptions …


Calabrese, John. “China and Saudi Arabia Extend Ties Beyond Oil,” China Brief, Vol. 5, No. 20 (December 2005).
Though initially slow to develop, Sino-Saudi relations today are multifaceted—expanding both in scale and in scope. China and Saudi Arabia lie at the center of a complicated set of cross-regional relationships. Saudi Arabia is a global oil superpower. China, having rapidly emerged as a major player in the international economy, is today the world’s second-largest oil consumer. Indeed, these countries might rightly be regarded not only as the twin engines of growing Gulf-Asian energy independence but of broader economic and geopolitical trends that are just beginning to take shape …


Calabrese, John. “The Risks and Rewards of China’s Deepening Ties with the Middle East,” China Brief, Vol.  5, No. 12 (May 2005).
China has raised its diplomatic profile in the Middle East and North Africa, successfully negotiating a number of big sticker long-term energy contracts in the region. What do these activities reveal about China's evolving role in world affairs and in Middle Eastern affairs in particular? And what do they portend for the United States? …


Calabrese, John. China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1998), pp. 351-366.
Energy cooperation is the dominant aspect of expanding relations between China and the Persian Gulf countries ... In pursuing its objectives in the Gulf, China has encountered as many challenges as opportunities -- in the form of regional crises and conflicts, as well as US pressure ...


Chang, I-Wei. “The Middle East in China’s Silk Road Visions: Business as Usual? MAP Project (April 2015).
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2013 proclamation of the Silk Road Economic Belt (“One Belt, One Road”) and Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road initiatives provided an overarching framework for understanding China’s strategic priorities over the coming decade. The land-based and sea-based Silk Roads will link Asia and Europe via the Middle East and Central Asia through a series of transcontinental railroads, pipelines, ports, airports, and other infrastructure projects.


Chang, I-Wei Jennifer. “China's Evolving Stance on Syria,” MAP Project (February 2013).
This article argues that Beijing’s policies on the Syrian uprising have been consistently and firmly against foreign military intervention and regime change in Syria.


Chen, James. “The Emergence of China in the Middle East,” Strategic Forum, No. 271 (December 2011).
… Whether measured in terms of economics, security, diplomacy, or soft power, China has become increasingly active in the Middle East over the last decade. Activity and increased presence do not automatically translate into actual influence (especially if defined in terms of getting other countries to take costly actions they would not otherwise undertake). However, China’s expanding interactions with Middle Eastern countries may eventually expand common interests or create dependent relations that increase Beijing’s regional influence …


Chen, John T. “When Islam Was an Ally: China’s Changing Concepts of Islamic State and Islamic World,” MAP Project (March 2015). 
For many at present, the phrase “China and Islam” connotes conflict and oppression. This is due to a preponderant focus on the security situation in the Muslim-majority northwestern province of Xinjiang. Chinese policies in Xinjiang—particularly restrictions placed on Xinjiang’s Turkic Uighurs regarding beards, veils, and fasting during Ramadan—have been perceived as targeting Muslims as Muslims, exacerbating the security concerns they were meant to address. Moreover, the pursuit of stability in Xinjiang has led the Chinese government to adopt an anti-terrorism rhetoric reminiscent of its American counterpart.


Chen, Yiyi. “Interview with Dr. Yiyi Chen on Hebrew/Jewish Studies in China and Sino-Israel Relations,” MAP Project (January 2013).
... some might find it surprising to learn that China was never hostile or belligerent towards Israel. China never rejected or even questioned the State of Israel’s right to exist ... [T]here is every reason to expect that Sino-Israeli relations will have a bright future.


Chen, Yiyi. “Will China Interfere in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict?” MAP Project (May 2015). In June 1954, the leaders of China, India, and Burma (now Myanmar) issued a joint statement affirming the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence―mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence―as the basis for conducting international relations. Since then, China has adhered strictly to the principle of non-interference in other countries’ domestic turmoil, as displayed prominently over the past several years in Beijing’s response to the Syrian civil war.


Chester, Sam. “China’s Relations with the Middle East: A Bibliography, 1950-2012,” MAP Project (January 2013).


Cieciura, Wlodzimierz.  “Bringing China and Islam Closer: The First Chinese Azharites,” MAP Project (April 2015). 
In the 1930s, several groups of Muslim students from China arrived to study at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. They were destined to play an important role in the history of modern Chinese Islam. These 35 Chinese Azharites, all but two from the Sinophone Hui community, helped China to establish lasting links with Egypt and other Muslim countries in the Middle East. They also left a considerable cultural legacy, including translations of crucial texts from both the Islamic and Chinese traditions.


Çolakoğlu, Selçuk. “Turkey and China: Seeking a Sustainable Partnership,” SETA, Brief No. 41 (January 2010). 
Turkey and China have forged a good economic and political relationship in the current decade. Both countries provide great economic, political, and strategic opportunities for each other in their own regions. Despite Ankara’s effort to push for a more integrated Uyghur community in Xinjiang under the Chinese Administration, the current difficulties transformed the issue into a problem area between China and Turkey. Turkey’s reiteration of its one-China policy may motivate China to display certain signs of improvement on the conditions of the Uyghur people. There is still considerable need to strengthen the relationship between Turkey and China and transform it into a strategic partnership. Realization of this prospect requires more systematic effort from both countries.


Dorraj, Manochehr and James E. English. “China’s Strategy for Energy Acquisition in the Middle East: Potential for Conflict and Cooperation with the United States,” Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 4, Issue 2 (2012), pp. 173-191.
In this article, the authors examine China's evolving energy strategy in the Middle East, particularly in the three countries that have the largest energy reserves and form the epicenter of the U.S.-China rivalry: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. With $3 trillion in foreign currency reserves, Beijing is increasingly using its cash to secure future long-term access to energy in the region. Through energy-backed loans, as well as upstream and downstream joint ventures, China’s policy banks and its national oil companies are pumping up the volume of oil and gas that will flow from the Middle East to the mainland in the 21st century. At the same time, Beijing is embedding itself deeply in the economies of these major oil-producing states through expanded bilateral trade involving multiple sectors of the Chinese economy. Beijing's monetary strength, coupled with its lack of military involvement and political baggage in the region, has China poised to benefit from its expansive access to the region’s energy resources. This article critically examines the political implications of China's energy acquisition strategy, the potential for conflict as well as cooperation with the United States, and the possibility of the realignment of great powers in the Middle East.


Dorraj, Manochehr and Carrie Liu Currier. “Lubricated with Oil: Iran-China Relations in a Changing World,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 15, Issue 2 (2008), pp. 66-80.
China and Iran are emerging powers with increasingly significant political and economic relations that have regional and global dimensions. In this article, we set out to explore the historical roots, evolution and development of this relationship with a particular emphasis on the period since the Islamic revolution of 1979 …


Dorsey, James. China in the Middle East: Embarking on a Strategic Approach,” RSIS Commentary  No. 183 (16 September 2014). 
As the United States becomes embroiled in yet another military intervention in the Middle East, China is embarking on a long-term approach to the region that would secure its access to resources and trade, and enable cooperation with the US on Chinese terms. The approach takes as its starting point that with US influence in the region in decline, political and economic indicators suggest that it’s just a matter of time before the pendulum swings in China's favour.


Dorsey, James M. China Needs to Change Mideast Foreign Policy," Bloomberg (February 27, 2012). China’s decision to veto a condemnation of Syria’s regime at the United Nations Security Council is just the latest signal that illustrates the need for a fundamental change in Chinese foreign policy ...


Feng, Chaoling. Embracing Interdependence: The Dynamics of China and the Middle East,Brookings Policy Briefing (April 2015). 
As interdependence in energy trade  between China and the Middle East deepens over time, their corresponding importance to each other in business and strategic relations will also increase. Careful planning and adaptation is therefore essential for both sides. Depending on the adaptive strategies each party undertakes, their comparative positions and relationships could differ in important ways.


Garver, John W. “Is China Playing a Dual Game in Iran?The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2011), pp. 75-88.
One aspect of China’s Iran policy suggests a sincere effort to uphold the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime in cooperation with the United States. Another suggests that Beijing believes a nuclear-armed or nuclear-armed-capable Iran would serve China’s geopolitical interests in the Persian Gulf region. Is China playing a dual game toward Iran? …


Dorraj, Manochehr and Carrie Liu Currier. “In Arms We Trust: the Economic and Strategic Factors Motivating China-Iran Relations,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2012), pp. 49-69.
This article examines contemporary China-Iran relations, focusing on the economic and strategic ties that have helped solidify the relationship since 1979. We begin with an overview of the arms and technology transfers that mark the early years of the relationship, analyzing the benefits each side gained from these transactions. In addition to discussing the short-term financial benefits behind forging stronger ties, we examine how the regional ascent of both states has also presented several long term factors that helped motivate their cooperation. These developments shed light on the important role the U.S. has played, both in terms of where it has tried to intervene and what success it has had influencing the Sino-Iranian relationship.


Fidan, GiraySino-Turkish Relations: An Overview,” MAP (October 4, 2013).
Since the West’s economic crisis in 2008, Turkey has been less keen to join the EU, and many Turks have begun to discuss the advantages of being closer to Asia, including China, the pivotal Asian force. China has been Turkey’s third-largest trading partner for ten years now, and this standing even excludes energy imports such as oil and natural gas. While both sides are intent on deepening relations in all aspects, some obstacles must be overcome in the near future, such as the trade deficit between the two countries, which leaves Turkey indebted to the powerhouse that is China to the tune of more than $20 billion annually.


Galal, Mohamed Noman. The Chinese Dream in a Civilization Perspective,” paper presented at the conference on "The World Dialogue on the Chinese Dream," Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Shanghai, December 7-8, 2013.
This paper discusses the evolution of the concept of the "Chinese Dream" (i.e. vision for the country), the national and international reactions to the Chinese Dream, as well as the prospects for its fulfillment. 


Gentry, James Brandon. “China's Role in Iran's Anti-Access / Aerial Denial Weapons Capability Development,” MAP Project (April 2013).
... China, and to a lesser extent, North Korea, have played a critical role in the development of Iran’s anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, supplying the Islamic Republic with a variety of weapons systems useful from an A2/AD standpoint ...


Gentry, James Brandon. “The Dragon And The Magi: Burgeoning Sino-Iranian Relations In The 21st Century,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly (November 2005), pp. 111-125.
Over the last several years, China and Iran have significantly strengthened their bilateral ties, reaching out to one another on issues ranging from energy and nuclear proliferation to trade, tourism, and military cooperation. With a relationship bolstered by a shared suspicion of U.S. interests, China’s ever-growing thirst for energy resources, and Iran’s desire to maintain its position as a Persian Gulf powerhouse, the Sino-Iranian partnership looks to move forward at a steady pace into the foreseeable future …


Gentry, James Brandon and Chris Zambelis. “China through Arab Eyes: American Influence in the Middle East,” Parameters (Spring 2008), pp. 60-78.
The significance of Beijing’s hosting of the second annual China-Arab Cooperation Forum—an event bringing together key envoys from 22 Arab nations under the auspices of the Arab League and their Chinese counterparts — went largely unnoticed in the western media. According to Chinese and Arab news reports, however, the conference, held in May and June 2006, was a success on many levels …


Gill, Bates. "Chinese Arms Exports to Iran,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 2, No. 2 (May 1998). 
Chinese arms exports to Iran have caused considerable concern within the international community, particularly for the United States. In conjunction with the U.S.-China summit of October 1997, China apparently took a number of steps to curtail sensitive transfers to Iran as part of a broader, more positive trend in Chinese nonproliferation policy. But numerous concerns persist that China continues to provide Iran with systems and technologies that contribute to further development of its cruise and ballistic missile capability, as well as to its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs …


Guo, Changgang. “Turkey: An Increasing Interest for Chinese Academia,”  MAP Project (October 9, 2013).
In recent years, Sino-Turkish relations have grown increasingly close. Sino-Turkish trade, for instance, saw a sharp rise from $4.87 billion in 2005 to $19 billion in 2012, a rise of 292.09 percent. In 2005, 44,077 Chinese citizens traveled to Turkey, and this number rose to 114,582 in 2012—a 159.96 percent increase. 2013 has seen such an overwhelming number of visits and travels to Turkey from China that the Chinese government has adopted some restrictive measures, such as limiting the number of delegations from various levels of government and universities that can make the trip.


Haddad-Fonda, Kyle. “Searching for Continuity in Sino-Arab Relations,” MAP Project (April 2015).
Too often, historians of Sino-Arab relations do not engage in a meaningful dialogue with the political scientists, economists, and anthropologists who are the most vocal commentators on China’s increasing role in the region. Today’s China, with its growing wealth and unprecedented ability to project political and economic power abroad, may appear at first glance to bear little resemblance to the China of the 1950s, when the Communist government of Mao Zedong was reaching out for the first time to the other countries of the developing world. Nevertheless, one can identify several continuities that have long informed China’s interactions with the Arab world. First, Beijing insists that its foreign policy is based on the same ironclad commitment to nonintervention in the affairs of other sovereign countries that it articulated in the 1950s. Second, China has long held special meaning for Arab politicians and intellectuals who wish to use the example of China to promote authoritarian order in their own societies. Finally, the Chinese government has relied on Chinese Muslims to mediate its relations with other Islamic countries for nearly a century. It is only by recognizing these longstanding hallmarks of Sino-Arab relations that commentators can fully appreciate the complexities of China’s interactions with the Arab world in the twenty-first century.


Harold, Scott and Alireza Nader. “China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations,” RAND Corporation (2012).
The partnership between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People’s Republic of China presents a unique challenge to U.S. interests and objectives, including dissuading Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability. This paper examines factors driving Chinese-Iranian cooperation, potential tensions in the Chinese-Iranian partnership, and U.S. policy options for influencing this partnership in order to meet U.S. objectives.


Hughes, Lindsay. “The Energy and Strategy of China-Iran Relations,” Future Directions International (November 19, 2015).
China’s interest in Iran may be best gauged by its energy imports from that country, but it would be short-sighted to see that aspect of its relationship as the sole reason for its interest. Beijing’s desire to improve its relationship with Tehran has as much to do with its strategic ambitions as with its desire for commerce and trade.


Ianchovichina, Elena, Maros Ivanic and Will Martin, “Implications of the Growth of China and India for the Middle East,” and North Africa,” Journal of Developing Societies, Vol. 2, No. 4 (October 2007), pp. 397-434.
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is expected to benefit more than most other regions from continued rapid growth in China and India. This paper analyzes the trade-related implications of this growth for the MENA countries using a global general equilibrium model, modified to take into account the focus of China and, increasingly, India on exports of manufactures from global production chains. We find that most of the gains to the MENA region come from improvements in the terms of trade, particularly linked to increasing demand for energy. Increased competition from China and India in third markets, coupled with increased domestic demand due to the terms of trade improvement, would reduce aggregate exports by MENA countries, although exports from the non-oil economies will likely expand. In the oil-exporting countries of the Middle East, Dutch-disease effects increase the importance of policies to promote adjustment to the changing world environment and to take advantage of the opportunities created by the growth of China and India.


International Crisis Group, "The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing," Asia Briefing No. 100, February 17, 2010.
Beijing is unconvinced that Iran has the ability to develop nuclear weapons in the short term and does not share the West’s sense of urgency about the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, despite the risks that this would present to China’s long-term interests. Moreover, it does not believe the sanctions proposed by the West will bring about a solution to the issue, particularly given the failure of this approach so far. And while Beijing has stated that it supports a “nuclear-free” Middle East, it does not want to sacrifice its own energy interests in Iran. However, if China finds itself facing unanimous support for sanctions from other Security Council members, it will delay but not block a resolution, while seeking to weaken its punitive terms …


Jaffe, Amy Myers. “Energy Security: Implications for US-China-Middle East Relations,” The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy (2004).
In the 1970s, as the West struggled with the nearly insurmountable challenges presented by two successive Middle East oil crises, the problem failed to grab the attention of Asian elites, with a few exceptions such as Japan. Many Asian powers, notably India, China, South Korea and Indonesia were energy self-sufficient and thereby naturally shielded from the economic and political dislocation with the West’s first big lessons in energy security. Thirty years later, the situation is quite different. Asian leaders are suddenly facing the same dilemmas seen in the West three decades earlier …


Janardhan, N. “Chindia: Cooperate, compete or confront?Khaleej Times, June 18, 2008.
Two great civilisations with different post-colonial development models, different social as well as political setups, different oriental attributes, and most importantly, different economies that together account for more than a third of the world's population — China and India (Chindia) — are not only consolidating their place in Asia, but also making their presence felt on the global stage …


Janardhan, N. “UAE-Sino ties: Full of energy for synergy,” Khaleej Times, November 7, 2007.
… The fact that Chinese President Hu Jintao visited the UAE in January this year and UAE Minister of Economy Sheikha Lubna Al Qassimi visited China three months later bears testimony to the current level of bilateral engagement between the two countries … The growing ties are anchored in complementarity of economic interests and driven by a rediscovery of ‘East-East’ relations …


Jiang, Xinhui. “From Nonintervention to What?: Analyzing the Change in China’s Middle East Policy,” MAP Project (July 2015). 
Though China still adheres to the principle of nonintervention, its unprecedented proactivity and break from its position to “pursue friendly, cooperative relations with all Middle Eastern countries” has already distinguished its behavior in the Syria crisis from its traditional stance.


Jin, Liangxiang. “Energy First: China and the Middle East,” Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2005), pp. 3-10.
China’s Middle East policy is undergoing a major shift. Traditionally, Beijing considered the region too distant for significant investment and instead limited its efforts to convincing Arab capitals to sever their ties to Taiwan and establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic … But Chinese passivity in the region may end in coming years, as the Chinese government's need to achieve energy security forces a more active policy.


Kaya, Karen. “Turkey and China: Unlikely Strategic Partners,” Foreign Military Studies Office  (Fort Leavenworth, KS: August 2013). 
In late September-early October 2010 Turkey and China held a bilateral military exercise in Turkey, the first such exercise that China conducted with a NATO member. This, coupled with the numerous high-level diplomatic and military visits between the two countries since 2009, has led to talk of a new “strategic partnership” between Turkey and China. While it is debatable whether the two countries are really at the level of a strategic partnership, the burgeoning Sino-Turkish relationship, which has remained unconsidered and understudied, is worth examining in order to assess the implications it may have for the U.S. and its defense community. This article analyzes the Turkey-China relationship in light of their strategic interests and discusses why it is unlikely that they will become true strategic partners, given the wide divergence between these interests. 


Kéchichian, Joseph A. “Saudi Arabia and China: The Security Dimension,” MAP Project (February 2015).
Political and security ties between Saudi Arabia and China have developed far more slowly than have their economic relations. This essay explores the security dimension of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and China, and attempts to shed light on the question of why Sino-Saudi cooperation in the security sphere has been very limited.


Kirk, Mimi. “Chinese Soft Power and Dubai’s Confucius Institute,” MAP Project (June 2015). 
The Confucius Institute of the University of Dubai is housed in a building named Masaood, a tall structure found off a dusty roundabout about two miles west of the airport. On the day I visit, the UAE is observing National Day, and near the building’s entrance Emirati flags wave in wind smelling of the grilled meat being served as part of a nearby celebration. Up on the fifth floor, where the Institute is housed, signage is in both Arabic and Chinese. Students learn various levels of Mandarin in pristine classrooms.


Kumaraswamy, P.R. “At What Cost Israel-China Ties?Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2006), pp. 37-44.
Israel’s military ties with China—especially the upgrading of Harpy surveillance aircraft—are undermining the Jewish state’s security …


Leverett, Flynt and Jeffrey Bader. “Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East,” The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2005-06), pp. 187-201.
Since 2002, the Middle East has become the leading arena for Beijing's efforts to secure effective ownership of critical hydrocarbon resources, rather than relying solely on international markets to meet China’s energy import needs. There is every reason to anticipate that China will continue and even intensify its emphasis on the Middle East as part of its energy security strategy. China will likely keep working to expand its ties to the region's energy exporters over the next several years to ensure that it is not disadvantaged relative to other foreign customers and to maximize its access to hydrocarbon resources under any foreseeable circumstances, including possible military conflict with the United States … If not managed prudently, this competition will generate multiple points of bilateral friction and damage U.S. strategic interests in the region.


Lee, Henry and Dan A. Shalmon. “Searching for Oil: China’s Initiatives in the Middle East,” Environment (June 2007).
In a world in which the supply of oil is limited by geology and politics, China’s determination to fuel its rapidly growing economy is seen by many as a looming source of conflict. It is not simply the geographic breadth of China’s initiatives that cause anxiety in Western capitals but also its willingness to enter into economic arrangements with “rogue” states …


Liu, Zongyuan (Zoe). “Rising Chinese Waves in the UAE,” MAP Project (August 2015). 
The flow of oil and gas from the Persian Gulf to East Asia has rejuvenated the ancient Silk Road, refashioning new networks of collaboration. The energy trade―the backbone of Sino-Middle Eastern ties―has provided the foundation for an increasingly diversified and robust set of relationships between China and the Gulf monarchies. The multidimensional strategic partnership between China and the UAE, in particular, is illustrative of this broader pattern.


Luft, Gal. “China's New Grand Strategy for the Middle East,” Foreign Policy (January 26, 2016).
Realizing that the Middle East is too important to be left to others — and that neglecting it could run to China’s peril — China is no longer willing to sit on the sidelines and watch the region descend into chaos ...


Ma, Haiyun. “Success of China’s Hui Muslims: Assimilation or Hyphenation,” MAP Project (November 2016). 
With the increased international media attention on the plight of the Uyghur Muslim minority in Xinjiang, Western news magazines have started to also focus on the Hui, or Chinese-speaking Muslims. Some of these accounts attribute the Hui's success to their assimilation into Han Chinese culture and society. This essay refutes this argument by highlighting the differences between the manner in which Uyghurs and Hui were incorporated into the Chinese state.


Mansour, Imad. “The GCC States and the Viability of a Strategic Military Partnership with China,” MAP Project (March 2015).
The term “strategic partnership” has been increasingly used in GCC circles to signify that relations with China are important and worthy of long-term investment. In a March 14, 2014 speech during his visit to Beijing, Saudi Arabia’s then Crown Prince Salman announced that “we are witnessing the transformation of the relationship with China to one of strategic partnership with broad dimensions, to the benefit of both our countries.” Saudi Arabia’s position was echoed by the emir of Qatar during a 2014 visit to China in which issues of common concern to all GCC states, especially combating terrorism, were discussed. Abdel-Aziz Aluwaisheg, GCC general assistant secretary for negotiations and strategic dialogue, has also noted that there is growing interest in the Gulf to develop a “strategic dialogue” with China.


Mao, Yufeng. Na Zhong: The Complex Perspective of a Patriotic Muslim Scholar,MAP Project (April 2015).
When Na Zhong, Professor of Arabic at Beijing Foreign Studies University, passed away in 2008, his funeral at the headquarters of China’s Islamic Association was attended by many notable Muslims and scholars of Islam. Biographies and reminiscences characterize him as both an accomplished Muslim scholar and a Chinese patriot. Indeed, Na Zhong’s accomplishments are impressive. He was among the founders of Arabic programs at National Central University (later Nanjing University), Yunnan University, and Foreign Affairs University (which later merged with Beijing Foreign Studies University). During his lifetime, he published dozens of volumes of original and translated works on Islamic civilization, the history of the Arab world, and the Arabic language. He was also patriotic, participating in many activities seen as advancing Chinese national interests in the Islamic world.


Matthews, Stephen P. “China’s new energy focus: strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia,” Energy Security: Implications for US–China-Middle East Relations, The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, July 18, 2005.
… While the new Chinese approach to energy security is taking place with a number of Middle East oil and gas producers … it is perhaps most significant in respect of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia …


Middle East Report (MERIP) Special Issue on China and the Middle East (Spring 2014).
“'Will China dominate the twenty-first century?'” So asks the title of one of the latest entries in an expanding canon on the subject. The question is of particular concern in Washington, because its premise is that the post-World War II 'American century' is coming to a close or perhaps already over. A corollary question is whether China covets the US role in the Persian Gulf and the surrounding region. The spring 2014 issue of Middle East Report zooms out to look at the historical and geopolitical aspects of Chinese ties to the Middle East and then zooms in to look at the economic, cultural and human interactions.


Pan, Guang. “China’s Success in the Middle East,” Middle East Quarterly (December 1997), pp. 35-40.
China is building closer ties to Middle Eastern states, exerting greater influence there, and finding that the region has a growing place in overall Chinese diplomacy. It has reached the point that not knowing China’s Middle East policies means not understanding Chinese diplomacy as a whole. Nor can one understand the Middle East without knowledge of that region's relations with China …


Pant, Harsh V. “Saudi Arabia Woos China and India,” Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2006), pp. 45-52.
In January 2006, Saudi king Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz al-Saud visited China and India, a trip some commentators labeled "a strategic shift" in Saudi foreign policy and reflective of "a new era" for the kingdom … Abdullah's travel was significant. His reception suggested both Chinese and Indian recognition of the House of Saud's role in regulating global oil prices and the impact that Saudi oil policy has not only on Western economies but on the Chinese and Indian economies as well. Riyadh's relations with Beijing and Delhi are not shaped by energy alone, however. There is a major political component to Saudi strategic thinking …


Payne, Jeffrey S. The GCC and China’s One Belt, One Road: Risk or Opportunity?,” MAP Project (August 2016). 
China's One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative does not provide an equal opportunity for all states, and, in the case of the Gulf, it is Iran that will likely benefit over all others. The states of the G.C.C. also factor into Beijing’s plan, just not to the same degree―and that is the problem. Yet, as this essay shows, using OBOR and existing comparative advantages will allow the states of the G.C.C. to balance Iran’s potential windfall.


Payne, Jeffrey S. “China’s Iran Bet,” MAP Project (June 2015). 
Iran offers a unique platform for China’s ambitions in the Middle East, and as such Beijing is willing to bet that the benefits of closer ties with Tehran will outnumber the costs. This analysis examines the calculations China is making regarding its relationship with Iran and argues that deepening bilateral ties reveal the centrality of Iran for China’s Middle East strategy.


Pember-Finn, Tom. “China and the Middle East: The Emerging Security Nexus,” Greater China (Summer 2011), pp. 37-46.
The paper analyzes the emerging security concerns that China is facing in the Middle East. Three pertinent case-studies are focused upon: the PRC’s interest in piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the situation in Xinjiang province and its resonance in the Middle East, and finally the PRC’s role in the Iranian nuclear crisis. This analysis of specific case studies, as opposed to a reiteration of general comments on China’s thirst for Middle Eastern oil, is seen as an important step in pursuing the study of China’s relations, especially with the Middle East, to stimulating new lines of enquiry. The paper considers the implications of these case studies with special reference to China’s economic and political security and finds developing concerns for China within these two sectors.


Qian, Xuming. The “'One Belt, One Road' Strategy and China’s Energy Policy in the Middle East,” MAP Project (May 2015). 
The genesis of the “One Belt, One Road” strategy—also known as the Belt and Road Initiative—can be traced to three noteworthy public events that occurred in rapid succession in the latter part of 2013. On September 7, in a speech delivered at Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev University, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed building the Silk Road Economic Belt. Addressing the Indonesian parliament on October 3, he recommended that China and Southeast Asian countries work together to revive the Maritime Silk Road. On October 24-25, at a work forum on “periphery diplomacy” held by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing, Xi stressed that China is committed to forging amicable and mutually beneficial relations with its neighbors, such that they will benefit from Chinese development and China will benefit from a prosperous neighborhood. In this way, the president conceptually linked the notion of the “Chinese dream” to regional development. This conference marked the official birth of China’s “Silk Road strategy.”


Qian, Xuewen. “China’s Energy Cooperation with Middle East Oil-producing Countries,” Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol. 4, No. 3 (2010), pp. 65-80.
China is rich in coal, but insufficient in petroleum and gas. The energy shortage is not a general shortage but a structural imbalance. In recent years, China's dependence on foreign oil supplies keeps increasing to meet the needs of China’s rapid economic growth. China’s top leadership, for this goal, has committed itself to energy diplomacy and vigorously promoted China’s energy cooperation with Middle East oil-producing countries. In the current conditions, carrying out energy cooperation with the Middle East oil-producing countries is inevitable and beneficial to China’s security. China and the Middle East oil-producing countries have maintained friendly and cooperative relations: mutual political, economic complementarities and cultural fusion, which create a favorable environment for cooperation for extracting and removing the Middle East oil.


Rakhmat, Muhammad Zulfikar. “China and the UAE: New Cultural Horizons,” MAP Project (March 2015).
Historically, promoting dialogue between people of different nations has been a way to build bridges of understanding between countries. For example, since 1946, the U.S. Fulbright Exchange has served to strengthen relations between the United States and other countries. Similarly, as the partnership between China and the UAE has grown significantly in recent years, both governments have come to recognize the importance of overcoming linguistic-cultural barriers. They have therefore worked cooperatively to increase the number of Emirati and Chinese professionals who are acquainted with each other’s societal norms and customs, methods of performing business, and national and institutional interests.


Rakhmat, Muhammad Zulfikar. “Exploring the China and Oman Relationship,” The Diplomat  (May 10, 2014).
China’s relations with the countries of the Persian Gulf have expanded considerably over recent years. Although ties between China and some of these countries have been well reported, China’s relationship with the Sultanate of Oman, the first country to deliver oil to China, has yet to be fully documented. Yet the two countries have ties that go well beyond oil cooperation.


Rubin, Barry. “China’s Middle East Strategy,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 3, No. 1 (February 1999).
The People’s Republic of China has neither strong historical ties nor long-standing strategic interests in the Middle East. Yet its relationship with the region is an interesting and increasingly important one … Three motives stand out in shaping Beijing's regional policy: ideology and self-image; economic profit; and that area’s direct or indirect effect on interests closer to home. Each of them has a number of aspects and implications, and all of them have evolved over time…


Russell, Richard. “China’s WMD Foot in the Middle East Door,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005).
China has an expanding body of strategic interests in the greater Middle East region. This is manifested in its security relationships with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan, which entail WMD and ballistic missile cooperation. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan are pivotal states in the region. They are increasingly likely to view China in coming years as an alternate source of security and as a counterbalance to American power. Over the past decade, Chinese diplomacy has produced an impressive array of bilateral and multilateral arrangements for curbing WMD and ballistic missile proliferation. But China’s strategic imperatives for access and influence in the greater Middle East will likely push Beijing to cut corners in the spirit, if not the word, of these international arrangements ...


Scobell, Andrew and Alireza Nader. “China in the Middle East: The Wary Dragon,”RAND  (2016).
China is becoming increasingly active in the Middle East, just as some regional states perceive a declining U.S. commitment to the region. This study examines China's interests in the region and assesses China's economic, political, and security activities in the Middle East to determine whether China has a strategy toward the region and what such a strategy means for the United States. The study focuses on China's relations with two of its key partners in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia and Iran. The study concludes that China has adopted a "wary dragon" strategy toward the Middle East, whereby China is reluctant to commit substantial diplomatic or military resources to protect its growing energy and other economic interests. China does not pose a threat to U.S. interests in the region, and the United States is likely to remain the dominant security actor in the Middle East for the foreseeable future. The study recommends that the United States adopt a two-pronged strategy where China and the Middle East are concerned. First, the United States should encourage China, along with other Asian powers, to become more involved in efforts to improve Middle East stability. Second, the United States should work to reassure Middle East partners of an enduring U.S. security commitment to the region.


Scott, Emma. “Defying Expectations: China's Iran Trade & Investments.” MAP Project (April 2016).
This essay examines China-Iran trade relations, as well as Chinese investments in Iran. Particularly, it asks whether the Chinese-Iranian stated ambition to increase the value of bilateral trade to $600 billion within a decade is attainable. Additionally, it identifies the factors responsible for the trade deficit in Iran’s favor, and shows that the pace of China’s foreign direct investment (F.D.I) in Iran is slowing in spite of absolute increases.


Scott, Emma. “Sino-Arab, Sino-Egyptian Relations: 60 Years On.” CCS Commentary (April 4, 2016).
This commentary shows that China–Arab relations are beginning a process of institutionalisation built on energy, infrastructure, and trade deals as well as on agreements in the field of culture.


Scott, Emma. “A Nuclear Deal with Chinese Characteristics: China's Role in the P5+1 Talks with Iran.”China Brief. Vol. 15(14), Washington DC, The Jamestown Foundation. July 17, 2015. 
Like many in the international community, Beijing welcomed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed on July 14 between the members of the P5+1 group (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia plus Germany) and Iran (Xinhua, July 14). As a new phase in Iran’s interaction with the world is about to begin, it is worthwhile considering the role China played and the possible future directions of China-Iran relations.


Scott, Emma. “China-Egypt Trade & Investment Ties – Seeking A Better Balance.” Policy Brief. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Centre for Chinese Studies. June 2015. Since 2013, a spur in high-level diplomatic exchanges led to the signing of numerous agreements, including a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement. Promises of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) into largescale transport and energy infrastructure projects have been cited. With the trade balance heavily tipped in favour of China, this policy brief identifies ways for Egypt to more broadly benefit from the relationship. 


Scott, Emma. “China’s One Belt One Road Strategy Meets the UAE’s Look East Policy.” China Brief. Vol. 15(11), Washington DC, The Jamestown Foundation. May 29, 2015. 
The UAE has become an important commercial focal point for Chinese companies, and the recent high-level diplomacy has showcased China’s intensions to strengthen further ties (MFA, February 14). Yet with the Emirates having own corporations integrated into the global economy, the feasibility of China’s plans to incorporate the UAE into its “One Belt, One Road” initiative has some limits despite the UAE’s “Look East” policy. 


Scott, Emma. “China's Silk Road Strategy: A Foothold in the Suez, But Looking to Israel.” China Brief. Vol. 14(19), Washington DC, The Jamestown Foundation. October 10, 2014. 
In order to ensure reliable access for Chinese commercial shipping from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, the Chinese government has adopted a dual-track approach, simultaneously expanding its interests in the Suez Canal corridor while also pursuing a land-based route through Israel ... These two routes position China to realize its goal of the two Silk Roads meeting in the MENA region.


Scott, Emma. “China Goes Global in Egypt: A Special Economic Zone in Suez.” Discussion Paper. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Centre for Chinese Studies. August 2013.
The Chinese government has been involved in shaping Egypt's special economic zones projects from the very beginning. The findings also show that the aims of Go Global policy are being realized through the Suez zone. The zone has potential; however, there exist a number of pitfalls of which China should be weary including over-expenditure and Egypt's domestic politics.


Shai, Aron. “The Evolution of Israeli-Chinese Friendship.” The S. Daniel Abraham Center  for International and Regional Studies. Research Paper No. 7 (2014).
The first part of this study reviews the historical background of Sino-Israeli relations. The second analyzes China-Israel bilateral relations since January 1992, when full diplomatic relations between the two countries were established. The third part examines some of the international perspectives that involve both China and Israel. The fourth part ventures a look into the prospects of future Sino-Israeli relations. It also attempts to substantiate how Israel should reexamine its China policy more consistently and regularly, in view of changes occurring in the international arena.


Shen, Dingli. “Iran’s nuclear ambitions test China’s wisdom,” The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2006), pp. 55-66. 
The Iranian nuclear case presents a challenge to China's leaders and an opportunity to demonstrate their ability to balance domestic interests with responsibilities as a growing global power. What considerations shape Beijing's decisions, and what will it do next? …


Shichor, Yitzhak. "Hobson's Choice: China's Second Worst Option on Iran," China Brief, Vol. 10, Issue 6 (2010).
... For years, the Chinese have used a variety of tactics to postpone resolution of the Iran nuclear ambitions and suffocate international attempts to force Tehran to abandon its nuclear program. Now, Beijing perhaps realizes that blocking sanctions could entail a war against Iran, an option that—from its own standpoint and that of the international community (including Iran)—is far worse ...


Shichor, Yitzhak. "Reconciliation: Israel’s Prime Minister in Beijing," China Brief, Vol. 7, Issue 2 (May 9, 2007).
 ... On January 11, 2007 Ehud Olmert ended his three-day official visit to China. His visit indicated that Beijing may now be willing to forgive (though probably not to forget) and turn to a new page in Sino-Israeli relations following over six years of a relative chill ...


Shichor, Yitzhak. “Mountains Out of Molehills: Arms Transfers in Sino-Middle Eastern Relations,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 2000).
Washington’s successful pressure on Israel to cancel the sale of the Phalcon early-warning plane to the People's Republic of China (PRC) has yet again highlighted the issue of Israel’s arms transfers to China and, indirectly, of Chinese arms transfers to the Middle East … The purpose of this article is to offer a rational, realistic, balanced and sober analysis of arms transfers in Sino-Middle Eastern relations …


Shichor, Yitzhak. “China’s Upsurge: Implications for the Middle East,” Israel Affairs, Vol.12, No.4 (October 2006), pp.665–683.
... Given China’s traditionally marginal role in the Middle East, what are the implications of its upsurge since the late 1970s for the Middle East in general, and Israel in particular? This is the main question addressed by this article and it will be explored at several levels: strategic, diplomatic, military and economic ...


Shichor, Yitzhak. "Competence and Incompetence: The Political Economy of China's Relations with the Middle East," Asian Perspective, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2006), pp. 39-67.
In Mao Zedong’s years China’s main interest in the Middle East had been to undermine the presence of foreign powers, considered a threat to its security. There had, however, been little that Beijing could have done as it lacked diplomatic relations, political influence, economic wealth and military capabilities. Since Mao’s death China has gradually become more active economically with the Middle East, primarily as a labor and arms exporter and as an oil importer. Yet politically, Beijing still plays a marginal role in the Middle East, giving priority to stability, a precondition for economic growth, and implicitly, grudgingly, and perhaps temporarily accepting Washington’s predominance in the region. Beijing’s increasing economic power has not yet been translated into political effectiveness.


Shichor, Yitzhak. "Disillusionment: China and Iran's Nuclear Program," CSIS Freeman Report (July/August 2006).
... China no doubt prefers good relations with Iran, the avoidance of sanctions, and the avoidance of force against Iran. But when push comes to shove, it is more important for Beijing to avoid worsening Sino-American relations.


Shichor, Yitzhak. "Hide and Seek: Sino-Israeli Relations in Perspective," Israel Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1994), pp. 188-208. 
Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of China and Israel were established as late as January 1992 ... Based on an already existing infrastructure, their quick progress is an outcome of an unofficial relationship that has been have been painstakingly promoted long before ...


Shichor, Yitzhak. “China and the Middle East Since Tiananmen,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 519 (January 1992), pp. 86-100.
By the late 1980s, the Middle East had become a solid base of operations for China's foreign policy in political, economic, and military terms. Put to the test of the Tiananmen massacre, the reliability of this base remained unshaken while China was trying to break through the Western-imposed isolation, paving the way for an eventual international rehabilitation. This was made possible following Iraq's violent annexation of Kuwait. China used the Persian Gulf crisis to restore its position as a great power whose cooperation is essential for settling outstanding regional problems all over the world. Consequently, China's strained relations with the West in general and the United States in particular have been gradually improving. At the same time, by insisting on a peaceful solution to the crisis, China has managed to maintain its image as the true representative of the Third World, having easy access to all parties concerned, friends and foes alike. [Full Text: JSTOR]


Shichor, Yitzhak. “China and the Gulf Crisis: Escape from Predicaments,” Problems of Communism (November 1991), pp. 80-90. 
... China's behavior in the Gulf crisis is already well documented. This article proposed to place this behavior within a historical context, underscoring the lingering influence of Maoism on China's response to international affairs ...


Shichor, Yitzhak. China and the Role of the United Nations in the Middle East: Revised Policy, Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 3 (March 1991), pp. 255-269.

... It is only since the early 1980s that China's post-Mao leaders began to reconsider their U.N. policy. By late 1985, a new Chinese attitude emerged that not only encouraged the U.N. to play a role in settling international conflicts but also stipulated that the PRC could and should contribute its due share, actively, in these efforts. This has been amply demonstrated during the recent Gulf crisis ... [Full Text: JSTOR]


Shichor, Yitzhak. In Search of Alternatives: China's Middle East Policy After Sadat, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 8 (July 1982), pp. 101-110.

... [Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat's assassination caused a significant change in Chinese attitudes towards the Middle East. In China's view the assassination provided fresh opportunities for Moscow, underlined Washington's 'short-sightedness' and exposed the shortcomings of the Camp David peace agreements. Under these circumstances the Chinese apparently decided to urge a quick settlement of local conflicts as a precondition to repelling the Soviets ...


Sun, Degang. China’s Soft Military Presence in the Middle East,” MAP Project (March 2015).
As a result of the growth of its comprehensive power, China today has two frontiers. One is the natural frontier of its sovereign territory; the other is an artificial frontier created by its overseas interests. By deploying a “soft” military presence overseas, specifically in the Middle East, China can protect its commercial interests while also providing public goods for the international community and minimizing the risk of damage to multilateral relations.


Thafer, Dania. “After the Financial Crisis: Dubai-China Economic Relations,” MAP Project (September 15, 2013).
Dubai is strategically located at a junction between Europe, Africa, and the Far East. For China, an emerging global leader in trade and international business, Dubai is a promising place in which to conduct business. Exploring Dubai-Sino economic relations beckons a more comprehensive understanding of both the level of Dubai’s economic diversification and the impact of the global financial crisis. Dubai’s private sector is extensively engaged in foreign trade, with an emphasis on the service industry. The service industry has three subsectors—tourism, finance, and real estate. Assessing the trajectory of China’s involvement in these three sectors of Dubai’s economy sheds light on how Dubai-Sino economic relations have been affected by the global financial crisis.


Ungor, Cagdas. “China Reaches Turkey? Radio Peking’s Turkish Language Broadcasts During the Cold War,” All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012), pp. 19-33.
A young socialist regime with few diplomatic ties in the 1950s and 1960s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) made significant attempts to reach foreign audiences through the use of mass media. Shortwave broadcasting was a particularly significant means of disseminating the PRC’s worldview abroad. Radio Peking’s Turkish language section, which was established in 1957 along with Arabic and Persian broadcasts, signaled China’s desire to reach countries in the Middle East. Predating official Sino-Turkish ties and providing a direct cultural link between China and Turkey at a time when few such channels existed, Radio Peking’s Turkish language broadcasts should be regarded as a significant aspect of Sino-Turkish relations during the Cold War years. Based on recently available Chinese language sources, as well as interviews with retired staff, this article examines Radio Peking’s Turkish language section with regard to its organization, program content and audience from 1957 to 1976. It is significant that the PRC regime continued its Turkish language broadcasts amidst various challenges, such as administrative instability, lack of trained personnel, poor technical equipment and unsatisfactory audience numbers …


Shichor, Yitzhak. "'Just Stand" and "Just Struggle': China and the Peace Process in the Middle East," The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 5 (January 1981), pp. 39-52.
The Egyptian-Israeli peace process has put China in an awkward position: on the one hand the process conforms to fundamental Chinese strategic interests in the area, as well as to long-held Chinese views about a possible settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict; on the other hand it is obvious that Egypt is almost completely isolated and, more important, opposed by most of the other Arab countries and particularly by the Palestinians whom the Chinese have always regarded as the key to any settlement ...


Tao, Zan. “An Alternative Partner to the West? Turkey’s Growing Relations with China,” MAP Project (October 25, 2013).
The relationship between Turkey and China has rarely been a point of focus for international observers in the early twenty-first century. However, the landscape has recently undergone a dramatic change, with increasing numbers of symposiums, forums, panels, articles, columns, think tanks, and researchers focusing on Sino-Turkish relations in China or in Turkey. The change is mostly due to the impressive rise of both Turkey and China as powers on the regional and global level, respectively. Today, Turkey is the sixteenth largest economy and China the second largest. At the same time, they are more ardently looking at and listening to each other.


Ungor, Cagdas. “Perceptions of China in the Turkish Korean War Narratives,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2006), pp. 405-420.
Turkey’s decision to enter the Korean War in the early 1950s was a major event in the republic’s history. As the country became a NATO member after the war, most scholars see this event as the beginning of a new era in Turkish foreign policy. This article argues that the Korean War has also been important in shaping the long‐term image of East Asian cultures and peoples in Turkish collective memory. The article’s main focus is on the Sino‐Turkish military encounter and the representation of China and the Chinese in the Turkish war memoirs, journals, and other narratives. This study also aims to discuss the critical role of these narratives in constructing a negative image for China while they created a favorable cultural stereotype for Koreans and Japanese.


Van Kamenade, Willem. “China vs. the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (July 2010), pp. 99-114.
If China, a major importer of Iranian oil and gas, were to go along with sanctions against the Iranian energy sector, it would indirectly sanction itself. But China’s motivations are more complex than simply its energy interests. Post-1949, China has been a longtime target of Western sanctions. Since 1989 to the present day, it has been under a transatlantic arms embargo, not as punishment for external aggression but for domestic repression. Although opposition to sanctions is a core principle of Chinese foreign policy, China does not want to be seen as the willing enabler of Iran becoming the tenth nuclear weapons power in the world. What is China’s role in opposing sanctions? And what role do stakeholders have in influencing China’s current policy?


Wen, Shuang. “The Strait of Hormuz: A Barometer in the Emerging US-Gulf-China Triangular Relationship,” paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Association for Asian Studies (2010).
This paper first describes the natural features and geopolitical importance of the Hormuz Strait, then it lays out the debates within China on how it can overcome its strategic weakness at the Strait. Lastly, it analyzes the positions of the US and Gulf countries. Due to the complex energy, political and military issues involved around the Strait of Hormuz, the paper, therefore, concludes that it can serve as an important barometer for measuring the power dynamics in the larger US-Gulf-China triangle.


Wu, Lei and Youyong Wang, “Comparative Analysis of China’s Energy Activities in the Middle East and Africa,” Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol. 3, No. 1 (2009), pp. 36-51.
The Middle East and African oil have now accounted for 70% of China’s total oil imports and will have to be China’s major sources of crude oil imports in the future, which means that Beijing will continue to emphasize its energy requirement activities and to forge closer energy cooperation with both regions. China’s energy activities in the Middle East and Africa have similar trade and investment patterns and also similar risks, the “Oil of Politics” such as the Iranian nuclear crisis and the Sudan/Darfur crisis will be the biggest challenges that Beijing faces in the Middle East and Africa …


Xu, Xiaoije. “China’s Oil Strategy Toward the Middle East,” The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy (September 2002).
China’s growing quest for energy security and its closer links with strategic energy regions, especially oil producers in the Middle East, are becoming increasingly important subjects for all the countries involved … Concerns have emerged from analysts in the OECD countries that Chinese growing dependency on the Middle East will stimulate competition with Japan and other major oil consumers in this aspect. This paper will explore further China’s new focus on and strategic intentions toward the Middle East. The strategic balance will also be addressed.


Yetiv, Steve and Chunlong Lu. “China, Global Energy, and the Middle East," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Spring 2007), pp. 199-218.
China has significantly enhanced its position and interest in the Persian Gulf region over the past 25 years, making it an important newcomer in regional dynamics. Evidence clearly shows that it has expanded, in some cases dramatically, its diplomatic contacts …


Zambelis, Chris.China and the Quiet Kingdom: An Assessment of China-Oman Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 15, Issue 22 (November 16, 2015).
Middle East specialists have often treated Oman as something of an afterthought: Oman’s historic stability and its characteristically quiet profile, despite its proximity to perpetual geopolitical flashpoints and its penchant for navigating some of the world’s most complex diplomatic fault lines, has relegated it to outlier status. This oversight belies Oman’s strategic importance and obscures the extent of China’s interests in Oman. In recent years, contacts between China and Oman have diversified beyond the energy sector, yielding notable developments on the diplomatic, military, and economic fronts.


Zambelis, Chris. “China and Qatar Forge a New Era of Relations around High Finance,” China Brief, Vol. 12, Issue 20 (October 19, 2012).
... A series of quiet yet important developments emanating from China’s relationship with Qatar—one of the region’s smallest countries in both population and area—is emblematic of the growing complexity of China’s role in the Middle East ...


Zambelis, Chris. “A New Egypt Looks to China for Balance and Leverage,” China Brief, Vol. 12, Issue 18 (September 21, 2012).
Occurring amid a groundswell of revolutionary activism in the Arab world, the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 heralds a new era for Egypt ... the decision by President Muhammed Morsi to travel to Beijing from August 28–30 on his inaugural state visit outside of the Middle East illustrates the central place China occupies in Egyptian strategy ...


Zambelis, Chris. “China’s Persian Gulf Diplomacy Reflects Delicate Balancing Act,” China Brief, Vol. 12, Issue 4 (February 21, 2012).
The diplomatic acrobatics and brinkmanship on display over Iran’s nuclear program are escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf to new heights, raising the stakes for all of the protagonists involved—including China. In this context, it is worth examining China’s position on the rapidly evolving events in the Persian Gulf …


Zambelis, Chris. “A Swan Song in Sudan and Libya for China’s ‘Non-Interference’ Principle,” China Brief, Vol. 11, Issue 15 (August 12, 2011).
… [I]t is worth looking beyond the energy and economic interests that underlie Beijing’s presence in the Arab world to examine its approach to handling some of the most contentious issues impacting the region, including the circumstances that culminated in the independence of Southern Sudan and the conflict in Libya … 


Zambelis, Chris. “Sino-Turkish Strategic Partnership: Implications of Anatolian Eagle 2010,” China Brief, Vol. 11, Issue 1 (January 14, 2011).
While China cooperates with NATO countries and other members of the international community in anti-piracy operations in the waters off the Horn of Africa, its participation in “Anatolian Eagle” marked the first time it engaged in joint air exercises with a NATO member … There are already signs that “Anatolian Eagle 2010” set a precedent for future joint military exercises, training, and other forms of cooperation between China and Turkey …


Zambelis, Chris. “Bloc Politics in the Persian Gulf: China’s Multilateral Engagement with the Gulf Cooperation Council,” China Brief, Vol. 10, Issue 19 (September 24, 2010).
… The multifaceted bilateral relationships that are being forged between China and the leading oil producers in the Middle East and, in particular, the Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia—China’s largest oil supplier—and Iran—China’s third-largest supplier of oil—reflect Beijing’s myriad stakes in the region …


Zambelis, Chris. “Shifting Sands in the Gulf: The Iran Calculus in China-Saudi Arabia Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 10, Issue 10 (May 13, 2010).
The fourth joint meeting on economy and trade convened by China and Saudi Arabia in January 2010 in the Saudi capital of Riyadh came and went without much fanfare. Yet the meeting between China, the world’s second largest and fastest growing oil consumer, and Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest producer of oil, cemented a burgeoning bilateral relationship that is attracting increasing international attention …


Zambelis, Chris. “China’s Inroads into North Africa: An Assessment of Sino-Algerian Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 10, Issue 1 (January 7, 2010).
The geopolitics of African countries such as Algeria, a country in North Africa that has traditionally enjoyed strong relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and whose strategic importance and regional profile have increased markedly of late, is key to grasping the dynamics that shape contemporary Sino-Algerian ties and China’s Africa strategy overall …


Zambelis, Chris. “Uighur Dissent and Militancy in China’s Xinjiang Province,” Sentinel (West Point), Vol. 3, Issue 1, (January 2010).
In July 2009, communal rioting unsettled the provincial capital Urumqi in China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region (XAR). The rioting, between Uighurs—a largely Sunni Muslim and ethnic Turkic minority group—and Han Chinese, highlighted the contentious position of ethnic Uighurs in China and the underlying tensions between Uighurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang in particular.


Zambelis, Chris. “Xinjiang Crackdown and Changing Perceptions of China in the Islamic World?,” China Brief, Vol. 9, Issue 16 (August 5, 2009).
Given the extent of the violence, the residual domestic impact of the riots on ethno-sectarian relations and stability in Xinjiang is cause for serious concern in Beijing.  Also, because of global media coverage of the hostilities, Beijing is wary about once again becoming the target of scrutiny by international human rights groups and major powers over its treatment of ethnic and religious minorities and political dissidents … In addition, because of the political sensitivities surrounding China’s treatment of its Muslim community, China is also worried that the recent crisis will tarnish its reputation in the Middle East and the greater Islamic world …


Zambelis, Chris. “China’s Palestine Policy,” China Brief, Vol. 9, Issue 5 (March 4, 2009).
… widespread popular opposition to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East coupled with feelings of nostalgia for a return of the revolutionary China of old, Arab and Muslim proponents of a greater role for China in Middle East politics see China’s rise as a positive trend, especially as it relates to the question of Palestine ...


Zambelis, Chris. “The Geopolitics of Sino-Syrian Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 8, Issue 20 (October 24, 2008).
… In accordance with Beijing’s strategy toward the Middle East, Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao’s January 2001 meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad helped initiate a new chapter in Sino-Syrian relations that would lead to the expanded trade and closer bilateral ties both countries share …


Zambelis, Chris. “The Iranian Nuclear Question in U.S.-China Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 7, Issue 23 (December 13, 2007).
On the surface, China’s recent decision to support a more stringent United Nations (UN) sanctions regime against Iran … represents a victory for U.S.-led diplomacy to compel Iran to abandon its alleged nuclear weapons program … Nevertheless, China continues to advocate for Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear power, and its strong ties to the Islamic Republic remain in place … Beijing’s relationship with Tehran is based on geopolitical and economic calculations …


Zambelis, Chris. “Public Diplomacy in Sino-Egyptian Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 7, Issue 7 (May 18, 2007).
… Sino-Egyptian relations are firmly rooted in the confluence of tangible mutual interests that encompass economics, geopolitics and security. Nevertheless, it is worth examining the nature of the rhetoric both sides use to characterize their rapidly expanding ties and better understand the trajectory of the Sino-Egyptian relationship. Doing so would provide insight into the power of effective public diplomacy. After all, like all forms of public diplomacy, Sino-Egyptian discourse is calculated to achieve specific objectives and to present a carefully calibrated image for international and domestic consumption …


Zhang, Mei. “China’s Interests in the Gulf – Beyond Economic Interests?” MEI (NUS) Perspectives, No. 4 (2009).
… This essay attempts to examine whether China’s primary interest in the Gulf is oil or beyond; and the factors that determine China’s Gulf policies. There are four sections in this essay. The first section briefly traces the historical relationship of China and the GCC. The second section analyses whether China’s primary interest in the region is economic. The third section identifies the main factors that may affect China-GCC relationship beyond energy. The final section concludes with some recommendations for a deeper bilateral relationship in the future …


EGYPT

Bianchi, Robert. “Morsy in Beijing: Implications for America’s Relations with China and the Islamic World,” Middle East Insights, Middle East Institute (NUS), No. 75 (September 12, 2012).
... Egypt is joining a long line of regional powers in the Middle East and the Islamic world that are holding the United States at arm’s length while moving closer and closer to China ... The Obama-Clinton pivot to the Pacific is a belated answer to China’s westward expansion into what Americans had come to see as their zones of privilege in the Middle East, Caspian Basin, Central Asia, and the Indian Ocean. But bringing the battle to China’s shores merely makes Washington weaker without slowing Beijing’s momentum in economic and political expansion ...


Bianchi, Robert. “Egypt's Revolutionary Elections,” The Singapore Middle East Papers, Vol. 2, Middle East Institute (NUS) (Summer 2012).
... The pluralism and fluidity of electoral competition exposed all of Egypt’s worst cleavages – class, religious, and regional animosities that authoritarian rulers had smothered and manipulated for three generations with little opportunity for genuine representation or independent negotiation. At the same time, however, the elections also revealed some striking and encouraging resources among Egypt’s new political elite, particularly a talent for compromise and an appetite for cooperation that could be indispensible in its efforts to draft a new constitution and to manage a contentious era of coalition government ...


Droz-Vincent, Philippe. Civilianizing the State: Reflections on the Egyptian Conundrum. MAP Project (May 14, 2014).
The military, though it has been the most powerful and influential actor during Egypt’s transition since 2011, is not the great deus ex machina of the Egyptian system. Rather, it is an actor that, since the fall of Mubarak, has managed to maintain some organizational coherence and legitimacy and has served as the convener for various and changing forces that are the crux of a new ruling coalition. Consequently, civilianizing the Egyptian state will require that security sector reforms be embedded in a broader set of political reforms.


Galal, Mohamed Noman. “Interview with Ambassador Dr. Mohamed Noman Galal of Egypt: Reflections of a Scholar-Diplomat on Arab-Asia Relations,” MAP Project (March 2013).
... To be sure, Asia is the home of great civilizations. It is also the continent of rising powers, dynamic economies, and nearly half of the world’s population. For these reasons, it only makes sense that Egypt continues seeking ways to expand its ties with Asian countries. It will take imaginative Egyptian leadership to accomplish this objective and, more broadly, to capitalize on the country’s location and to help unleash its people’s creative energy.


Jaraba, Mahmoud. The Egyptian Military’s Economic Channels of Influence. MAP Project (May 14, 2014).
Egypt’s new constitution grants the country’s generals greater autonomy and an increased formal political role. The draft authorizes military trials for civilians (Article 204) and ensures that the military’s budget be beyond civilian scrutiny. The most significant change is that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) will have the final say in choosing or dismissing the defense minister for two presidential terms (Article 234).


Scott, Emma. “China-Egypt Trade & Investment Ties – Seeking A Better Balance.” Policy Brief. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Centre for Chinese Studies. June 2015. Since 2013, a spur in high-level diplomatic exchanges led to the signing of numerous agreements, including a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement. Promises of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) into largescale transport and energy infrastructure projects have been cited. With the trade balance heavily tipped in favour of China, this policy brief identifies ways for Egypt to more broadly benefit from the relationship. 


Scott, Emma. “China's Silk Road Strategy: A Foothold in the Suez, But Looking to Israel.” China Brief. Vol. 14(19), Washington DC, The Jamestown Foundation. October 10, 2014. 
In order to ensure reliable access for Chinese commercial shipping from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, the Chinese government has adopted a dual-track approach, simultaneously expanding its interests in the Suez Canal corridor while also pursuing a land-based route through Israel ... These two routes position China to realize its goal of the two Silk Roads meeting in the MENA region.


Scott, Emma. “China Goes Global in Egypt: A Special Economic Zone in Suez.” Discussion Paper. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Centre for Chinese Studies. August 2013. The Chinese government has been involved in shaping Egypt's special economic zones projects from the very beginning. The findings also show that the aims of Go Global policy are being realized through the Suez zone. The zone has potential; however, there exist a number of pitfalls of which China should be weary including over-expenditure and Egypt's domestic politics.


Siddiqui, Fazzur Rahman. “Egyptian Revolution One Step Forward Two Steps Backward,” ICWA View Point (June 2012).
... While people were still dreaming of the success of the revolution, they have been once again pushed for a narrow choice where they have found themselves between a General and a Sheikh ...


Zambelis, Chris. “Egypt Turns Quietly to Asia,” MAP Project (February 2013).
Beneath the din and clamor of political clashes and violent street protests, Egypt has been quietly turning to Asia in the form of a flurry of diplomatic activity ...


Zambelis, Chris. “A New Egypt Looks to China for Balance and Leverage,” China Brief, Vol. 12, Issue 18 (September 21, 2012).
Occurring amid a groundswell of revolutionary activism in the Arab world, the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 heralds a new era for Egypt ... the decision by President Muhammed Morsi to travel to Beijing from August 28–30 on his inaugural state visit outside of the Middle East illustrates the central place China occupies in Egyptian strategy ...


Zambelis, Chris. “Public Diplomacy in Sino-Egyptian Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 7, Issue 7 (May 18, 2007).
… Sino-Egyptian relations are firmly rooted in the confluence of tangible mutual interests that encompass economics, geopolitics and security. Nevertheless, it is worth examining the nature of the rhetoric both sides use to characterize their rapidly expanding ties and better understand the trajectory of the Sino-Egyptian relationship. Doing so would provide insight into the power of effective public diplomacy. After all, like all forms of public diplomacy, Sino-Egyptian discourse is calculated to achieve specific objectives and to present a carefully calibrated image for international and domestic consumption …


GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC)

Ahmad, Talmiz. “The GCC-India Energy Equation: Changing Dynamics,” The Emirates Center for Strategies Studies and Research (February 2013).
“... India needs substantial investments in its energy and infrastructure sectors in order to modernize them so that they can facilitate economic activity at the desired level of efficiency. Investments on this scale can only come from the GCC countries which have the resources (as a result of high oil prices) and are looking to diversify their economic partnerships eastwards ...”


al-Tamimi, Naser. “GCC-Vietnam Relations: Hidden Potential,” MAP Project (December 2, 2013).
During the 1970s the Communist Party dominated almost all walks of life in Vietnam. This strict control, especially in regard to the economy, failed to achieve sustainable development. Vietnamese authorities then began to pursue a policy of openness to the outside world, and the Doi Moi, or “renovation,” was launched in 1986. As a result of this and other gradual reforms, Vietnam has become one of the fastest-growing economies in Asia, with annual GDP growth averaging 7.1 percent between 2000 and 2012—a rate that the country is expected to sustain over the next decade. In this context, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-Vietnam relations are promising and may develop steadily over the coming years.


Alpen Capital. “Trade and Capital Flows: GCC and India.” Report (May 2012).
"The GCC enjoys strong cultural and historic ties with India. Led by India’s economic liberalization after 1990 and the “look east” policy of the GCC in the recent decade, the trade relationship between the two economies has flourished. With both regions emerging as the fastest growing economies in the world, the mutual cooperation is expected to increase underpinned by the complementary nature of their economic profiles and the rising interdependency ..."


Devadason, Evelyn S., Ahmad Zubaidi Baharumshah and Thirunaukarasu Subramaniam.Leveraging Trade Opportunities with Non-Traditional Partners: The Malaysia-GCC Perspective,” Conference Paper (November 2011).
This paper examines the impact of economic factors on bilateral trade flows between Malaysia and the GCC through estimations of panel data using a gravity model. In particular, the paper compares the determinants of bilateral trade between Malaysia and two regions, the non-traditional Gulf alliance and the traditional ASEAN counterpart, to provide insights for leveraging opportunities through trade with the former. The gravity estimates imply the importance of size effects, similarities in GDP and differences in factor endowments as drivers of trade flows between Malaysia and the GCC, underlying the fact that inter-industry trade dominates these flows. The opposite holds in the case for the Malaysia-ASEAN trade. The Gulf region therefore provides opportunities for Malaysia to export quantity-based final (end-use) products and to diversify its exporting strategy away from quality-based parts and components.


Janardhan, N. “GCC-Singapore FTA offers hope amid crisis,” Khaleej Times, January 3, 2009.
As 2008 ended on a low amid a global financial crisis, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Singapore formalised in December came as a whiff of fresh air …


Janardhan, N. “The GCC-Iran Row,” Khaleej Times, January 30, 2012.
… As the economic balance of power shifts from West to East, it is certain to impact the political and security dynamics of Asia in the mid-to-long term. In this context, developing a robust pan-Asian cooperative approach is important. Since Iran and the GCC countries are permanent neighbours, it is in their best interests to resolve their differences through a win-win formula, however daunting it is …


Janardhan, N. “East-East opportunity,”  Khaleej Times, March 10, 2007.
At a time when the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are attempting multi-dimensional changes that bear the potential to transform the region and Asia is experiencing a renaissance, there exists an opportunity for synergy to accomplish optimum mutual benefits even beyond the economic realm.


Oommen, Ginu Zacharia and Kurshid Imam. “India’s ‘Look West’ Policy and Its Impact on India‐GCC Relations,” International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 6 (2010), pp. 71-105.
... The look west policy of India coincided with the ‘look east’ policy of Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries particularly in the aftermath of 9/11. The congruence of policy interest has resulted in the consolidation and 
diversification of political and economic relations of India and GCC countries ...”


Pradhan, Prasanta Kumar. “GCC-Iran Rivalry and Strategic Challenges for India in the Gulf,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January–March 2011), pp. 45-57.
The relations between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which are marked by competition and rivalry, have posed challenges for Indian foreign policy in recent times. The two sides have engaged in ideological conflicts over the Shia-Sunni divide, territorial disputes, presence of the US in the region, Iranian nuclear programme and Saudi-Iranian relations …


INDIA

Ahmad, Talmiz. “The GCC-India Energy Equation: Changing Dynamics,” The Emirates Center for Strategies Studies and Research (February 2013). 
“... India needs substantial investments in its energy and infrastructure sectors in order to modernize them so that they can facilitate economic activity at the desired level of efficiency. Investments on this scale can only come from the GCC countries which have the resources (as a result of high oil prices) and are looking to diversify their economic partnerships eastwards ...”


Alpen Capital. “Trade and Capital Flows: GCC and India.” Report (May 2012).
"The GCC enjoys strong cultural and historic ties with India. Led by India’s economic liberalization after 1990 and the “look east” policy of the GCC in the recent decade, the trade relationship between the two economies has flourished. With both regions emerging as the fastest growing economies in the world, the mutual cooperation is expected to increase underpinned by the complementary nature of their economic profiles and the rising interdependency ..."


Bubalo, Anthony and Mark Thirwell. “Energy insecurity: China, India and Middle East oil,” Lowy Institute Issues Brief (December 14, 2004).
… The rapid expansion of their economies has seen China and India become voracious consumers of energy. Oil, much of it imported from the Middle East, has become an increasingly important part of their energy needs. … As a result, energy security has become a key foreign policy objective and, particularly in the case of China, is shaping their approach to the Middle East. This issue brief provides an overview of current energy demand trends and raises for discussion some of the potential longer term strategic implications of this growing dependence on Mid-East oil.


Calabrese, John. The India-Saudi Arabia Strategic Partnership: A Work in Progress, The Diplomatist Magazine. Special Report on India and Saudi Arabia (2013).
The historic visit of King Abdullah to India in 2006 infused the bilateral relationship with a fresh momentum and, embodied in the Delhi Declaration, provided a road map for its further development. The reciprocal visit by Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh in February 2010, culminating in the Riyadh Declaration, elevated the relationship to a “strategic partnership” based on the strengthening of energy, economic, cultural, political, and defence ties. Since then, there has been notable progress on many fronts.


Calabrese, John. India and the Middle East and North Africa: A Bibliography, MAP Project (February 2013).


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. India-Iran Oil Trade Continues With Sanctions Regime, Oxford Analytica, August 13, 2012.
... India will decrease but not stop Iranian oil purchases and create its own provisions for shipping ...


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. "India Will Tread a Delicate Path on Iranian Oil Trade," Oxford Analytica, March 28, 2012.
... [S]triking a balance between Iran and the United States is proving difficult given India's rapidly rising energy needs and foreign policy imperatives ...


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. “India’s Approach to Sanctions on Iran,” e-International Relations, April 29, 2012.
In the past few years, the US-led international economic sanctions against Iran have inhibited Indo-Iranian energy ties considerably … Even as it publicly condemns U.S. sanctions, the Indian government is reportedly quietly urging the country’s refiners to gradually reduce their reliance on Iranian crude. The apparent contradiction between Delhi’s public defiance of the Western sanctions, and its quiet adaption to them, embodies the complex set of factors India’s leaders face in trying to balance New Delhi’s competing interests with the United States and Iran.


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. “India-Iran Relations: Progress, Challenges and Prospects,” India Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 4 (2010), pp. 383–396.
The current thrust in Indo-Iranian relations is just as old as the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s Indo-Iranian interests converged around a number of areas, namely, energy, Central Asia, terrorism emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan, security and domestic compulsions. It reached a peak during the period 2001–03 with the Tehran and Delhi declarations, which established a substantial set of framework for enhanced cooperation. Although India’s ties with Iran suffered with the Indo-US civil nuclear deal and New Delhi’s opposition to Iranian nuclear ambition, there’s little to indicate that the two countries are willing to abandon their mutually beneficial relationship. This article examines the nature and scope of Indo-Iranian relationship. It also reflects on the various challenges that this relationship faces in addition to the ‘US factor’ and analyses the future of Indo-Iranian ties in the context of ever-changing situation in their proximate neighbourhoods.


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. “India’s Approach to Sanctions on Iran,” e-International Relations, April 29, 2012.
In the past few years, the US-led international economic sanctions against Iran have inhibited Indo-Iranian energy ties considerably … Even as it publicly condemns U.S. sanctions, the Indian government is reportedly quietly urging the country’s refiners to gradually reduce their reliance on Iranian crude. The apparent contradiction between Delhi’s public defiance of the Western sanctions, and its quiet adaption to them, embodies the complex set of factors India’s leaders face in trying to balance New Delhi’s competing interests with the United States and Iran.


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. “India-Iran Relations: Progress, Challenges and Prospects,” India Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 4 (2010), pp. 383–396.
The current thrust in Indo-Iranian relations is just as old as the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s Indo-Iranian interests converged around a number of areas, namely, energy, Central Asia, terrorism emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan, security and domestic compulsions. It reached a peak during the period 2001–03 with the Tehran and Delhi declarations, which established a substantial set of framework for enhanced cooperation. Although India’s ties with Iran suffered with the Indo-US civil nuclear deal and New Delhi’s opposition to Iranian nuclear ambition, there’s little to indicate that the two countries are willing to abandon their mutually beneficial relationship. This article examines the nature and scope of Indo-Iranian relationship. It also reflects on the various challenges that this relationship faces in addition to the ‘US factor’ and analyses the future of Indo-Iranian ties in the context of ever-changing situation in their proximate neighbourhoods.


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. “India’s Iran-Israel Balancing Act,” e-International Relations, March 7, 2012.
Since establishing full diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv in 1992, India has sought to compartmentalize its relationships with Israel and Iran. However, maintaining this careful balancing act has become increasingly difficult as the Israeli-Iranian rivalry has intensified in recent years … Utilizing its unique position as a neutral partner to both countries, India should proactively seek to tamper down the growing animosity between Iran and Israel. This is not only the best way for India to protect its interests in these particular countries, but would also help advance New Delhi’s larger goal of becoming a prominent, independent player in global affairs … 


Desai, Ronak D. and Xenia Dormandy. “India-Iran Relations: Key Security Implications,” Policy Brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (April 2008).
While India and the United States have embarked on a campaign to strengthen their bilateral relations, as symbolized by the proposed U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal, it appears as though New Delhi has similarly begun to pursue a more robust relationship with another major power: Iran. The two states have recently expanded cooperation in a number of key areas, including counterterrorism, regional stability, and energy security. What are the implications of this “New Delhi-Tehran Axis” for the United States, and how should Washington respond to growing ties between India and Iran?


Feiler, Gil. “India’s Economic Relations with Israel and the Arabs,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) (July 2012).
…This paper examines India’s trade relations with Israel and the Arab countries of the Middle East. We shall examine the scope and depth of India’s commerce with Middle Eastern economies, and we shall depict the balance India must find between these two sets of relations, with a special focus on how the breakdown of the Arab-Israeli peace process influences India's economic and political relations with Israel and its neighbors …


Gupta, Ranjit. Interview: Jeddah, Saudi Arabia -- The Second Posting (1976-1978),” MAP Project (June 2013).
"... Soon after arriving, however, I was surprised to find out from long-serving local staff at the Embassy and a few Indians who had resided in Saudi Arabia for more than three decades that I was the first non-Muslim Foreign Service Officer to serve in the Indian Embassy in Saudi Arabia ..."


Gupta, Ranjit. Interview: Cairo, Egypt -- The First (1965-1968),” MAP Project (February 2013).
... Even before I left India for Cairo, I had the impression that there was a special relationship between India and Egypt. Indeed, within a few weeks of my arrival in Cairo, I found tangible manifestations that it was indeed so and discovered many more in due course ...


Gupta, Ranjit. Interview: Cairo, Egypt -- The First (1965-1968),” MAP Project (February 2013).
... Even before I left India for Cairo, I had the impression that there was a special relationship between India and Egypt. Indeed, within a few weeks of my arrival in Cairo, I found tangible manifestations that it was indeed so and discovered many more in due course ...


Gupta, Ranjit. "Long Term Challenges of Indian Foreign Policy: The Gulf and West Asia." Presentation delivered at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India, March 14, 2012.
... The indispensable and single most important ingredient for economic development is energy. India is not only energy deficient but India's dependence on imported energy resources, already very high, has been and will continue to increase steadily. India’s need to have assured, continuous and secure access to energy resources in incrementally increasing quantities while retaining strategic autonomy and avoiding strategic dependency on the source(s) of such energy resources must be an imperative objective. This attainment of this objective has to be one of the pre-eminent priorities of India’s foreign policy in the coming decades. This can only happen if there are symbiotic relationships where both sides, the buyer and the seller, need each other equally. India offers the oil producers and exporters an assured, large and growing market in closer geographical proximity to them than any other customer ... [P]aying high profile attention to the Gulf region must be one of India’s topmost foreign policy priorities ...


Hussain, Mushtaq. "India-Israel Relations: Towards 'Strategic Cooperation,'" MEI (Delhi) Occasional Paper,  No. 29 (January 2012).
Ever since the establishment of full diplomatic relations in January 1992, the Indo-Israeli ties have witnessed a tremendous growth. Most of this has largely been fuelled and dominated by India’s requirements for state-of-the-art military technology and hardware from Israel ...  Riding on this confluence of interests, both countries have managed to put aside the uneasy past, and develop a new level of trust and operational understanding ...


Janardhan, N. “UAE and India: Partnership for Progress,” Khaleej Times, November 23, 2010.
In Celebration of a Legendary Friendship is the title of a recent book commemorating age-old UAE-India relations. While there are no second thoughts about the validity of this spirit, the visit of Indian President Pratibha Patil to the UAE serves as a reminder that this time-tested bond, while rooted in the past, needs to recalibrate its approach, focus on the present, and evolve a vision for the future.


Janardhan, N. “Chindia: Cooperate, compete or confront?” Khaleej Times, June 18, 2008.
Two great civilisations with different post-colonial development models, different social as well as political setups, different oriental attributes, and most importantly, different economies that together account for more than a third of the world's population — China and India (Chindia) — are not only consolidating their place in Asia, but also making their presence felt on the global stage …


Ianchovichina, Elena, Maros Ivanic and Will Martin, “Implications of the Growth of China and India for the Middle East,” and North Africa,” Journal of Developing Societies, Vol. 2, No. 4 (October 2007), pp. 397-434.
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is expected to benefit more than most other regions from continued rapid growth in China and India. This paper analyzes the trade-related implications of this growth for the MENA countries using a global general equilibrium model, modified to take into account the focus of China and, increasingly, India on exports of manufactures from global production chains. We find that most of the gains to the MENA region come from improvements in the terms of trade, particularly linked to increasing demand for energy. Increased competition from China and India in third markets, coupled with increased domestic demand due to the terms of trade improvement, would reduce aggregate exports by MENA countries, although exports from the non-oil economies will likely expand. In the oil-exporting countries of the Middle East, Dutch-disease effects increase the importance of policies to promote adjustment to the changing world environment and to take advantage of the opportunities created by the growth of China and India.


Inbar, Efraim. “The Indian-Israeli Entente,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) (March 2004).
India and Israel both represent ancient civilizations and share a British colonial past. They were the first states to become independent (in 1947 and 1948, respectively) in the post–World War II wave of decolonization. Both were born out of messy partitions and have maintained democratic regimes ever since under adverse conditions. But despite the two states’ similarities, it took more than four decades for them to establish a warm relationship including full diplomatic relations, flourishing bilateral trade, and strategic cooperation. The strategic aspect of this relationship—a post–Cold War phenomenon—is the focus of this article. The rapprochement between India and Israel is an important component of a new strategic landscape in the greater Middle East that includes Central Asia and parts of the Indian Ocean littoral …


Janardhan, N. “Gulf security and India,” Khaleej Times, January 12, 2007.
While the relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and India are currently rooted in economic dynamics, it is not completely unrealistic to assume that the region would consider India as a more favoured partner if it is willing to address the Gulf’s security concerns as well…


Janardhan, N. “India-Saudi ties: From cold indifference to warm embrace,” Khaleej Times, January 20, 2006.
India’s relations with Saudi Arabia have been incongruent in the past. While political ties have been far from bonhomie as a result of Cold War alignments and Saudi-Pakistani affinity, economic cooperation took a more realistic form and flourished.


Janardhan, N.  “Gulf-India ties get a new lease of life,” Khaleej Times, September 3, 2005.
The foundation of relations between the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and India are strong enough given the historic links, presence of about four million Indians in the region, about $5 billion in annual remittance and a potential $15-billion-plus trade bill in 2005. Though both are beginning to see eye-to-eye politically as well, trade will remain the bedrock of their bilateral ties.


Kumar, Vikas. “India and Iran Meet in Chabahar: Reviving Old Ties -- Part One“India and Iran Meet in Chabahar: Why India? -- Part Two,” Future Directions International, October 2015.
India needs Iran to access Central Asia and Afghanistan and diversify its energy imports. Iran needs India to develop the transport infrastructure connecting Afghanistan and Central Asia to Chabahar and access cost-effective space, pharmaceutical and information technologies. What are the prospects for consolidating this relatuionship?

 

party is back in power and Iran is emerging from the sanctions after signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). So, will India and Iran manage to reset their relationship in this changed environment? - See more at: http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/associate-papers/2442-in...

Kumaraswamy, P.R. “Reading the Silence: India and the Arab Spring,” The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel (May 2012).
High political, economic, and energy stakes conditioned India’s nuanced response to the Arab Spring. Proud of its diversity, India’s foreign policy agenda has never been democracy promotion, and India was prepared to accept the choice of the Arab people to determine their leaders and political system within the norms of their respective societies. The geographically proximate region, especially the Persian Gulf, is vital for India. Hence, other than evacuation of its nationals, India’s reactions to the Arab Spring have been few and far between. And even these responses have been measured, underscoring Indian reluctance to take any stand. India has been extremely cautious about the developments in the Persian Gulf, hoping that the ruling regimes would survive …


Kumaraswamy, P.R. “The Friendship with Israel: India Squares the Circle,” MEI (NUS) Insights (June 2009).
The establishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel in January 1992 marked a new beginning in India’s Middle East policy. This was its most dramatic foreign policy move following the end of the Cold War … How did India square the past and pursue a more fruitful approach towards Israel? A modest attempt is made here to delineate some of the salient features of Indo-Israeli relations and the manner in which India handled its potential pitfalls.


Kumaraswamy, P.R. “India’s Persian Problems,” Strategic Insights (July 2008).
Either by design or sheer coincidence, Iran has emerged as the most hotly contested and controversial aspect of India’s foreign policy …


Maleki, Bahman. "Perspectives on India-Iran Relations,” MAP Project (November 13, 2013).
Iran-India relations are far-reaching and multidimensional. However, a variety of issues, including the upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa, U.S and Israeli influence over the region, Iran-Israel belligerence, and terrorism all constrain bilateral diplomacy.


Oommen, Ginu Zacharia and Kurshid Imam. “India’s ‘Look West’ Policy and Its Impact on India‐GCC Relations,” International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 6 (2010), pp. 71-105.
“... The look west policy of India coincided with the ‘look east’ policy of Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries particularly in the aftermath of 9/11. The congruence of policy interest has resulted in the consolidation and diversification of political and economic relations of India and GCC countries ...”


Pant, Harsh V. "India's Relations with Iran: Much Ado about Nothing," The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2011), pp. 61-74.
In the last few years, India’s policy toward the Middle East has often been viewed through the prism of Indian—Iranian relations. The international community, and the West in particular, has been obsessed with New Delhi’s ties to Tehran, which are actually largely underdeveloped, while missing India’s much more substantive simultaneous engagement with Arab Gulf states and Israel ...


Pant, Harsh V. “Saudi Arabia Woos China and India,” Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2006), pp. 45-52.
In January 2006, Saudi king Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz al-Saud visited China and India, a trip some commentators labeled "a strategic shift" in Saudi foreign policy and reflective of "a new era" for the kingdom … Abdullah's travel was significant. His reception suggested both Chinese and Indian recognition of the House of Saud's role in regulating global oil prices and the impact that Saudi oil policy has not only on Western economies but on the Chinese and Indian economies as well. Riyadh's relations with Beijing and Delhi are not shaped by energy alone, however. There is a major political component to Saudi strategic thinking …


Pant, Harsh V. “India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) (December 2004).
There has been a steady strengthening of India’s relationship with Israel ever since India established full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, despite Indian attempts to keep this flourishing bilateral relationship out of public view. A flourishing Indo-Israeli relationship has the potential to make a significant impact on global politics by altering the balance of power, not only in South Asia and the Middle East, but also in the larger Asian region, which has been in a state of flux in recent times. However, notwithstanding the convergence of interests on a range of issues between India and Israel, this bilateral relationship will have to be carefully managed because of a host of constraints which circumscribe this relationship. This study examines those factors which are bringing the two nations increasingly closer and the constraints that might make it difficult for this relationship to achieve its full potential.


INDONESIA

Al Qurtuby, Sumanto. Sectarian Conflict and Grassroots Peacebuilding in Central Java. MAP Project (June 27, 2014).
Religiously-inspired anti-pluralist actions, vigilante attacks, Islamist extremism, and terrorism—as well as a spectrum of ethnically, regionally, and religiously-based civilian groupings and paramilitary bands—have figured in Indonesian politics since the downfall of Suharto’s New Order dictatorial regime in 1998. However, not all areas of the country have experienced sectarian violence. Not all Indonesian Muslims are fanatics or zealots, nor are Muslim radicals the only agents of conflict. On the contrary, there are many instructive and inspiring examples across contemporary Indonesia of local leaders and communities that have produced and sustained religious harmony.


Alatas, Ismail Fajrie. Contemporary Indonesian Pilgrimage to Hadramawt, Yemen. MAP Project (October 24, 2014).
The past decade has witnessed a steady increase in the numbers of Indonesians embarking on pilgrimage (ziyara) to the Hadramawt valley of the former South Yemen. Despite the considerable presence of the Hadrami diaspora in Indonesia, the idea of a pilgrimage to Hadramawt did not really exist among Indonesian Muslims of non-Hadrami descent until rather recently.


Atlı, Altay.  Turkey and Indonesia: Historical Roots, Contemporary Business Links,” MAP Project (November 4, 2013).
Though sympathy between Turkey and Indonesia has a long tradition, in part based on their shared experience of being Muslim-majority countries that successfully executed anti-imperialist struggles, for years this sympathy has failed to translate into a closer relationship. This is now changing. New economic linkages and the relative absence of thorny political issues are bringing them closer together. As President Abdullah Gül stated during a meeting in Jakarta in 2011, “A new era is beginning with Indonesia.” Economic agents such as businessmen and entrepreneurs are the pioneers of this era.


Atlı, Altay. “Societal Legitimacy of the Military: Turkey and Indonesia in Comparative Perspective,” Turkish Journal of Politics, Vol. 1 No. 2 (Winter 2010), pp. 5-22.
... This article aims to identify and analyze the factors that influence the military’s legitimacy in society, comparing the cases of Turkey and Indonesia. Within this framework, six variables are taken into consideration: i) Historical foundations of the military; ii) Threat perceptions; iii) Civilian inefficiency; iv) Institutional structure of the military’s influence on politics; v) Internal cohesiveness of the military; and vi) Economic interests of the military.


Bubalo, Anthony and Greg Fealy. “Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia,” Lowy Institute Paper (March 14, 2005).
Against the background of the ‘war on terror’, many people have come to view Islamism as a monolithic ideological movement spreading from the centre of the Muslim world, the Middle East, to Muslim countries around the globe. To borrow a phrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadist who fought to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamists as fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan. This paper explores the truth of that perception. It does it in part by looking at the way Islamism has evolved in the Middle East. It then assesses the impact that Islamist ideas from the Middle East have had in Indonesia, a country often cited as an example of a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalised by external influences …


Bubalo, Anthony and Greg Fealy. “Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East and Indonesia,” Brookings Institution Analysis Paper (October 9, 2005).
Against the background of the ‘war on terror’, many people have come to view Islamism as a monolithic ideological movement spreading from the center of the Muslim world, the Middle East, to Muslim countries around the globe. To borrow a phrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadist who fought to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamists as fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan. This paper evaluates the truth of that perception …


Dewi, Miranti Kartika and Irwan Abdalloh. “Socializing Islamic Capital Market Products through Public Education Events: The Case of Indonesia,” MAP Project (February 2013).
The Islamic capital market (ICM) in Indonesia has experienced fast growth. This essay aims to portray milestones of the Indonesian ICM, development of Islamic securities instruments in the country, the public’s response to the ICM, initiatives to conduct the School for Islamic Capital Market (SICM), and the impact of SICM as education and socialization of the ICM.


Eliraz, Giora. “Activism and Engagement: Envisioning a Possible New Doctrine for Indonesia’s Middle East Policy,” MAP Project (July 2015). The Asia-Pacific region, exemplified by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, has been the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy, with relationships in the Middle East being of secondary importance. Nevertheless, Indonesia has worked for years to develop fruitful bilateral relations with Arab countries in the economic, religious, and educational spheres.


Eliraz, Giora. Reflections on the Post-Arab Spring Landscape by Sailing in Thoughts to Indonesia. MAP Project (October 2014).
While thick dust largely covers the political landscape of the Arab world, some insights for thinking about its future might be offered by examining the case of Indonesia, which surmounted deep political uncertainty and turmoil during the early years of the post-Suharto era.


Formichi, Chiara. Contemporary Patterns in Transregional Islam: Indonesia’s Shi‘a. MAP Project (October 30, 2014).
Representing about 1% of the country’s 200 million Muslims, Indonesia’s Shi‘a are but a small group in the overwhelmingly Sunni majority. These contemporary communities of devotees of the ahl al-bayt (“people of the house,” referring to the Prophet Muhammad, his daughter Fatima, her husband ‘Ali, and their sons Hasan and Husayn) explain their identities, albeit with differences, in transregional terms. Recently, this transregional focus has turned from South Asia toward the Islamic Republic of Iran.


Hadiz, Vedi. Islamic Politics in Indonesia: Domestic Challenges, Cross-National Inspirations. MAP Project (November 21, 2014). 
At the height of harsh authoritarian rule of the Suharto era, Islamic political activism was often the focus of the most intense of state repression. Because the Indonesian Communist Party had been destroyed in the 1960s, only Islamic organizations possessed the potential to mobilize substantial grassroots support. Thus, they were considered a particular threat to the centralized and rigid authoritarianism of Suharto’s New Order regime.


Hoesterey, James. Soft Islam: Indonesia’s Interfaith Mission for Peace in the Middle East. MAP Project (November 12, 2014).
Historians and anthropologists have focused on Muslim networks of scholars, merchants, and pilgrims that connect the Middle East with Southeast Asia. Especially with respect to the study of Islam in Indonesia, where political scientists and anthropologists approach Islam largely in terms of national politics and local cultures, this burgeoning body of literature on global Muslim networks offers both ethnographic insights into actual practices and an historical appreciation for the longue durée. The importance of this scholarship notwithstanding, much of this work focuses on formal networks of migration, trade, learning, and pilgrimage. In this respect, the cultural and political work of Islam has been largely confined to the study of either Muslim scholars or lay Muslims who participate in trade, travel, study, and migration. Here I shift the focus to a religious diplomacy tour that connected Muslims with states, citizen-believers, and global politics.


Pradhan, Prasanta Kumar. “GCC-Iran Rivalry and Strategic Challenges for India in the Gulf,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January–March 2011), pp. 45-57.
The relations between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which are marked by competition and rivalry, have posed challenges for Indian foreign policy in recent times. The two sides have engaged in ideological conflicts over the Shia-Sunni divide, territorial disputes, presence of the US in the region, Iranian nuclear programme and Saudi-Iranian relations …


Kersten, Carool. Religious Pluralism versus Intolerance: Sectarian Violence in Indonesia. MAP Project (July 7, 2014).
Religious pluralism has been under threat and sectarianism on the rise during the ten-year (2004-2014) tenure of outgoing president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Carool Kersten explains how local and regional authorities condone (and sometimes even stimulate) intimidation and hate crimes.


Ramakrishna, Kumar. The Role of Civil Society in Countering Violent Extremism Efforts in Indonesia. MAP Project (July 21, 2014). 
The Indonesian experience suggests that an over-reliance on hard power may actually be counter-productive, inadvertently strengthening rather than weakening the violent Islamist extremists. The author explains the need for an indirect strategy in which calibrated hard power is subordinated to and supplemented by softer measures aimed at diminishing the underlying conditions that give rise to violent extremism.


IRAN

Calabrese, John. Iran's Economic Outreach to Southeast Asia,MAP Project (November 2016).
This essay provides a brief overview of Iran’s relations with Southeast Asian nations during the sanctions period, looks at the initial results of President Rouhani’s October 2016 visit to the region, and considers the prospects for the further expansion of these ties.


Calabrese, John.  “Dueling Stakeholders in Iran’s Energy Projects,” Gulf-Asia Research Bulletin, 1 (April 2007), pp. 15–20.
In February 2004, Japan’s Inpex Corporation signed a preliminary accord with Iran to develop Azadegan, one of the world’s largest oilfields. The following October, the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) agreed in principle to join forces with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to develop the massive Yadavaran oilfield. Yet, more than two years later, neither of these headline-grabbing deals has been implemented. The twists and turns in bringing these proposed mega-projects to fruition lay bare a tangle of economic and geopolitical issues …


Calabrese, John.  “China and Iran: Mismatched Partners,” Jamestown Foundation Occasional Paper (August 2006).
China and Iran are important geopolitical actors as well as major players in the global energy market.1 In recent years, the Sino-Iranian relationship has broadened and deepened. Energy cooperation is the main axis around which this partnership revolves. As a result, China is a stakeholder in the outcome of the diplomatic crisis that has been brewing over the Iranian nuclear program. The relationship between China and Iran deserves careful scrutiny, not the least because their strategic motivations remain ambiguous and their dealings with each other lack transparency …


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. India-Iran Oil Trade Continues With Sanctions Regime, Oxford Analytica, August 13, 2012.
... India will decrease but not stop Iranian oil purchases and create its own provisions for shipping ...


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. India Will Tread a Delicate Path on Iranian Oil Trade, Oxford Analytica, March 28, 2012.
... [S]triking a balance between Iran and the United States is proving difficult given India's rapidly rising energy needs and foreign policy imperatives ...


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. “India’s Approach to Sanctions on Iran,” e-International Relations, April 29, 2012.
In the past few years, the US-led international economic sanctions against Iran have inhibited Indo-Iranian energy ties considerably … Even as it publicly condemns U.S. sanctions, the Indian government is reportedly quietly urging the country’s refiners to gradually reduce their reliance on Iranian crude. The apparent contradiction between Delhi’s public defiance of the Western sanctions, and its quiet adaption to them, embodies the complex set of factors India’s leaders face in trying to balance New Delhi’s competing interests with the United States and Iran.


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. “India-Iran Relations: Progress, Challenges and Prospects,” India Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 4 (2010), pp. 383–396.
The current thrust in Indo-Iranian relations is just as old as the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s Indo-Iranian interests converged around a number of areas, namely, energy, Central Asia, terrorism emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan, security and domestic compulsions. It reached a peak during the period 2001–03 with the Tehran and Delhi declarations, which established a substantial set of framework for enhanced cooperation. Although India’s ties with Iran suffered with the Indo-US civil nuclear deal and New Delhi’s opposition to Iranian nuclear ambition, there’s little to indicate that the two countries are willing to abandon their mutually beneficial relationship. This article examines the nature and scope of Indo-Iranian relationship. It also reflects on the various challenges that this relationship faces in addition to the ‘US factor’ and analyses the future of Indo-Iranian ties in the context of ever-changing situation in their proximate neighbourhoods.


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. “India’s Iran-Israel Balancing Act,” e-International Relations, March 7, 2012.
Since establishing full diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv in 1992, India has sought to compartmentalize its relationships with Israel and Iran. However, maintaining this careful balancing act has become increasingly difficult as the Israeli-Iranian rivalry has intensified in recent years … Utilizing its unique position as a neutral partner to both countries, India should proactively seek to tamper down the growing animosity between Iran and Israel. This is not only the best way for India to protect its interests in these particular countries, but would also help advance New Delhi’s larger goal of becoming a prominent, independent player in global affairs … 


Coleman, Bryan. In Japan's Return to Iran: Risky Business,”MAP Project (December 2016).
This essay discusses Japan’s long-standing energy dependence on the Middle East and the complications arising from it, with a focus on relations with Iran. More specifically, it looks at the risks and potential rewards of the revival and strengthening of Japan’s economic relations with Iran in the wake of the nuclear deal.


Desai, Ronak D. and Xenia Dormandy. “India-Iran Relations: Key Security Implications,” Policy Brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (April 2008).
While India and the United States have embarked on a campaign to strengthen their bilateral relations, as symbolized by the proposed U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal, it appears as though New Delhi has similarly begun to pursue a more robust relationship with another major power: Iran. The two states have recently expanded cooperation in a number of key areas, including counterterrorism, regional stability, and energy security. What are the implications of this “New Delhi-Tehran Axis” for the United States, and how should Washington respond to growing ties between India and Iran?


Dietl, Gulshan. "India and the Arab Spring: Regime Changes in North Africa," MEI (Delhi) Occasional Paper, No. 28 (October 2011).
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in North Africa have been the harbingers of the ‘Arab Spring’. All three of them have witnessed regime changes and are in the process of taking stock and moving on. Whether the ‘Spring’ will spread eastwards in a typical domino effect to the rest of the Arab world remains to be seen. Whether it eventually brings about comprehensive reshaping of the region is uncertain at best. The paper proposes to analyse the Indian responses to these developments ...


Dorraj, Manochehr and Carrie Liu Currier. “In Arms We Trust: the Economic and Strategic Factors Motivating China-Iran Relations,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2012), pp. 49-69.
This article examines contemporary China-Iran relations, focusing on the economic and strategic ties that have helped solidify the relationship since 1979. We begin with an overview of the arms and technology transfers that mark the early years of the relationship, analyzing the benefits each side gained from these transactions. In addition to discussing the short-term financial benefits behind forging stronger ties, we examine how the regional ascent of both states has also presented several long term factors that helped motivate their cooperation. These developments shed light on the important role the U.S. has played, both in terms of where it has tried to intervene and what success it has had influencing the Sino-Iranian relationship.


Dorraj, Manochehr and Carrie Liu Currier. “Lubricated with Oil: Iran-China Relations in a Changing World,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 15, Issue 2 (2008), pp. 66-80.
China and Iran are emerging powers with increasingly significant political and economic relations that have regional and global dimensions. In this article, we set out to explore the historical roots, evolution and development of this relationship with a particular emphasis on the period since the Islamic revolution of 1979 …


Gentry, James Brandon. “The Dragon And The Magi: Burgeoning Sino-Iranian Relations In The 21st Century,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly (November 2005), pp. 111-125.
Over the last several years, China and Iran have significantly strengthened their bilateral ties, reaching out to one another on issues ranging from energy and nuclear proliferation to trade, tourism, and military cooperation. With a relationship bolstered by a shared suspicion of U.S. interests, China’s ever-growing thirst for energy resources, and Iran’s desire to maintain its position as a Persian Gulf powerhouse, the Sino-Iranian partnership looks to move forward at a steady pace into the foreseeable future …


Garver, John W. “Is China Playing a Dual Game in Iran?The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2011), pp. 75-88.
One aspect of China’s Iran policy suggests a sincere effort to uphold the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime in cooperation with the United States. Another suggests that Beijing believes a nuclear-armed or nuclear-armed-capable Iran would serve China’s geopolitical interests in the Persian Gulf region. Is China playing a dual game toward Iran? …


Gill, Bates. "Chinese Arms Exports to Iran,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 2, No. 2 (May 1998). 
Chinese arms exports to Iran have caused considerable concern within the international community, particularly for the United States. In conjunction with the U.S.-China summit of October 1997, China apparently took a number of steps to curtail sensitive transfers to Iran as part of a broader, more positive trend in Chinese nonproliferation policy. But numerous concerns persist that China continues to provide Iran with systems and technologies that contribute to further development of its cruise and ballistic missile capability, as well as to its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs …


Harold, Scott and Alireza Nader. “China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations,” RAND Corporation (2012).
The partnership between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People’s Republic of China presents a unique challenge to U.S. interests and objectives, including dissuading Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability. This paper examines factors driving Chinese-Iranian cooperation, potential tensions in the Chinese-Iranian partnership, and U.S. policy options for influencing this partnership in order to meet U.S. objectives.


Hughes, Lindsay. “The Energy and Strategy of China-Iran Relations,” Future Directions International (November 19, 2015).
China’s interest in Iran may be best gauged by its energy imports from that country, but it would be short-sighted to see that aspect of its relationship as the sole reason for its interest. Beijing’s desire to improve its relationship with Tehran has as much to do with its strategic ambitions as with its desire for commerce and trade.


International Crisis Group, "The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing," Asia Briefing No. 100, February 17, 2010.
Beijing is unconvinced that Iran has the ability to develop nuclear weapons in the short term and does not share the West’s sense of urgency about the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, despite the risks that this would present to China’s long-term interests. Moreover, it does not believe the sanctions proposed by the West will bring about a solution to the issue, particularly given the failure of this approach so far. And while Beijing has stated that it supports a “nuclear-free” Middle East, it does not want to sacrifice its own energy interests in Iran. However, if China finds itself facing unanimous support for sanctions from other Security Council members, it will delay but not block a resolution, while seeking to weaken its punitive terms …


Janardhan, N. “The GCC-Iran Row,” Khaleej Times, January 30, 2012.
… As the economic balance of power shifts from West to East, it is certain to impact the political and security dynamics of Asia in the mid-to-long term. In this context, developing a robust pan-Asian cooperative approach is important. Since Iran and the GCC countries are permanent neighbours, it is in their best interests to resolve their differences through a win-win formula, however daunting it is …


Jang, Ji-Hyang and Peter Lee. “Oil Price Stability Expected Despite the Iranian Crisis: Iran Striving for Depoliticized OPEC,” Issue Brief No. 20, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, March 9, 2012. 
The international standoff over Iran’s nuclear program has entered its most volatile phase to date. In light of the deteriorating security situation evidenced by an escalating series of sanctions, assassination attempts, and growing talk of a preemptive military strike against Tehran’s nuclear facilities, the region is facing one of its most dangerous periods ever. Not surprisingly, this crisis continues to affect crude oil prices ...


Maleki, Bahman. "Perspectives on India-Iran Relations,” MAP Project (November 13, 2013).
Iran-India relations are far-reaching and multidimensional. However, a variety of issues, including the upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa, U.S and Israeli influence over the region, Iran-Israel belligerence, and terrorism all constrain bilateral diplomacy.


Pant, Harsh V. "India's Relations with Iran: Much Ado about Nothing," The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2011), pp. 61-74.
In the last few years, India’s policy toward the Middle East has often been viewed through the prism of Indian—Iranian relations. The international community, and the West in particular, has been obsessed with New Delhi’s ties to Tehran, which are actually largely underdeveloped, while missing India’s much more substantive simultaneous engagement with Arab Gulf states and Israel ...


Payne, Jeffrey S. “China’s Iran Bet,” MAP Project (June 2015). Iran offers a unique platform for China’s ambitions in the Middle East, and as such Beijing is willing to bet that the benefits of closer ties with Tehran will outnumber the costs. This analysis examines the calculations China is making regarding its relationship with Iran and argues that deepening bilateral ties reveal the centrality of Iran for China’s Middle East strategy.


Pradhan, Prasanta Kumar. “GCC-Iran Rivalry and Strategic Challenges for India in the Gulf,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January–March 2011), pp. 45-57.
The relations between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which are marked by competition and rivalry, have posed challenges for Indian foreign policy in recent times. The two sides have engaged in ideological conflicts over the Shia-Sunni divide, territorial disputes, presence of the US in the region, Iranian nuclear programme and Saudi-Iranian relations …


Kumar, Vikas. “India and Iran Meet in Chabahar: Reviving Old Ties -- Part One“India and Iran Meet in Chabahar: Why India? -- Part Two,” Future Directions International, October 2015.
India needs Iran to access Central Asia and Afghanistan and diversify its energy imports. Iran needs India to develop the transport infrastructure connecting Afghanistan and Central Asia to Chabahar and access cost-effective space, pharmaceutical and information technologies. What are the prospects for consolidating this relatuionship?


Kumaraswamy, P.R. “India’s Persian Problems,” Strategic Insights (July 2008).
Either by design or sheer coincidence, Iran has emerged as the most hotly contested and controversial aspect of India’s foreign policy …


Scott, Emma. “Defying Expectations: China's Iran Trade & Investments.” MAP Project (April 2016).
This essay examines China-Iran trade relations, as well as Chinese investments in Iran. Particularly, it asks whether the Chinese-Iranian stated ambition to increase the value of bilateral trade to $600 billion within a decade is attainable. Additionally, it identifies the factors responsible for the trade deficit in Iran’s favor, and shows that the pace of China’s foreign direct investment (F.D.I) in Iran is slowing in spite of absolute increases.


Scott, Emma. “A Nuclear Deal with Chinese Characteristics: China's Role in the P5+1 Talks with Iran.”China Brief. Vol. 15(14), Washington DC, The Jamestown Foundation. July 17, 2015. Like many in the international community, Beijing welcomed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed on July 14 between the members of the P5+1 group (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia plus Germany) and Iran (Xinhua, July 14). As a new phase in Iran’s interaction with the world is about to begin, it is worthwhile considering the role China played and the possible future directions of China-Iran relations.


Shen, Dingli. “Iran’s nuclear ambitions test China’s wisdom,” The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2006), pp. 55-66. 
The Iranian nuclear case presents a challenge to China's leaders and an opportunity to demonstrate their ability to balance domestic interests with responsibilities as a growing global power. What considerations shape Beijing's decisions, and what will it do next? …


Shichor, Yitzhak. "Hobson's Choice: China's Second Worst Option on Iran," China Brief, Vol. 10, Issue 6 (2010).
... For years, the Chinese have used a variety of tactics to postpone resolution of the Iran nuclear ambitions and suffocate international attempts to force Tehran to abandon its nuclear program. Now, Beijing perhaps realizes that blocking sanctions could entail a war against Iran, an option that—from its own standpoint and that of the international community (including Iran)—is far worse ...


Shichor, Yitzhak. "Disillusionment: China and Iran's Nuclear Program," CSIS Freeman Report (July/August 2006).
... China no doubt prefers good relations with Iran, the avoidance of sanctions, and the avoidance of force against Iran. But when push comes to shove, it is more important for Beijing to avoid worsening Sino-American relations.


Van Kamenade, Willem. “China vs. the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (July 2010), pp. 99-114.
If China, a major importer of Iranian oil and gas, were to go along with sanctions against the Iranian energy sector, it would indirectly sanction itself. But China’s motivations are more complex than simply its energy interests. Post-1949, China has been a longtime target of Western sanctions. Since 1989 to the present day, it has been under a transatlantic arms embargo, not as punishment for external aggression but for domestic repression. Although opposition to sanctions is a core principle of Chinese foreign policy, China does not want to be seen as the willing enabler of Iran becoming the tenth nuclear weapons power in the world. What is China’s role in opposing sanctions? And what role do stakeholders have in influencing China’s current policy?


Zambelis, Chris. “China’s Persian Gulf Diplomacy Reflects Delicate Balancing Act,” China Brief, Vol. 12, Issue 4 (February 21, 2012).
The diplomatic acrobatics and brinkmanship on display over Iran’s nuclear program are escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf to new heights, raising the stakes for all of the protagonists involved—including China. In this context, it is worth examining China’s position on the rapidly evolving events in the Persian Gulf …


Zambelis, Chris. “The Iranian Nuclear Question in U.S.-China Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 7, Issue 23 (December 13, 2007).
On the surface, China’s recent decision to support a more stringent United Nations (UN) sanctions regime against Iran … represents a victory for U.S.-led diplomacy to compel Iran to abandon its alleged nuclear weapons program … Nevertheless, China continues to advocate for Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear power, and its strong ties to the Islamic Republic remain in place … Beijing’s relationship with Tehran is based on geopolitical and economic calculations …


Zambelis, Chris. “Shifting Sands in the Gulf: The Iran Calculus in China-Saudi Arabia Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 10, Issue 10 (May 13, 2010).
The fourth joint meeting on economy and trade convened by China and Saudi Arabia in January 2010 in the Saudi capital of Riyadh came and went without much fanfare. Yet the meeting between China, the world’s second largest and fastest growing oil consumer, and Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest producer of oil, cemented a burgeoning bilateral relationship that is attracting increasing international attention …


IRAQ

Calabrese, John.  “The Iraq Energy Factor in Sino-Japanese Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 7, No. 6 (March 2007).
Iraq could soon emerge as an important new focal point of intensifying Chinese and Japanese commercial diplomacy and energy rivalry, in spite of their extensive overlapping interests and mutually beneficial economic ties. It is difficult to determine whether friction over energy-related matters is a symptom or an additional cause of the strained relationship between China and Japan. What is indisputable, however, is that these energy concerns have become foreign policy priorities in both Beijing and Tokyo, spurred by the debate over “peak oil,” the spike in world oil prices and heightened concerns about possible supply disruptions …


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. “Iraq's Oil Sector Open for Business: The Asia Connection,” MAP Project (May 2013).
Post-occupation Iraq's oil production ― buoyed by the existence of vast unexploited reserves ― is resurgent ... The Iraq-Asia oil connection — an important feature of the changing global energy landscape — is already firmly established and developing rapidly.


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. “Investing in Iraq: Prospects and Problems,” MAP Project (February 2013).
... Companies from Asia are beating their European and American rivals in investments in Iraq. Being more prone to risk-taking, they are cashing in on the opportunity to establish businesses that would be profitable in the long-term ...


Haddad, Fanar. "Marked" for Exclusion: The Problem of Pluralism, State-building, and Communal Identities in Iraq and the Arab World. MAP Project (August 5, 2014).
In this essay, the author argues that the dynamics of contemporary Sunni-Shi‘a relations in Iraq and elsewhere in the Arab world are not fundamentally different from those animating other societal cleavages. The modern Iraqi state’s awkwardness vis-à-vis its Shi‘a population, and indeed other outgroups and minorities, was most directly a product of exclusionary nation-building based on problematic conceptions of “unity” and “pluralism.” Rather than actually fostering unity or respecting and nurturing pluralism (politically or communally), these concepts have often been used to exclude dissenters whose non-conformity was deemed a threat to the body politic.


Maisel, Sebastian. Sectarian-Based Violence: The Case of the Yezidis in Iraq and Syria. MAP Project (July 23, 2014).
Historically, the Yezidis -- an ancient Kurdish-speaking ethno-religious community -- have been subject to discrimination and violence. The current status of this community in Iraq and Syria is precarious, at best.


Özpek, Burak Bilgehan. Maliki and the Security Sector in Iraq. MAP Project (Aril 8, 2014).
It would be unfair to argue that democracy fails to provide stability in divided societies or that democracy cannot work in Iraq. Instead, the term “democracy” should be redefined to take free market principles into consideration. As the Iraq case shows, any political group, party, or figure can manipulate the democratic system if the state apparatus controls the distribution of economic resources. If, as in the case of Iraq, a political arrangement, constitution, or power-sharing formula results in a specific group gaining control of the distribution of economic resources, this imbalance will be reflected in the composition of the security forces as well as in their mission and activities, and it will likely result in the emergence of (armed) actors in opposition to them.


Yoshioka, Akiko. “Japan’s Foreign Policy toward Iraq after 2003: Perceptions in Iraq and the Arab World,” Gulf Asia Research Bulletin, Issue No. 2 (July 2007), pp. 22-25. The collapse of the Saddam regime in Iraq triggered the beginning of a new era in Japan-Iraq relations ...


ISRAEL

Abadi, Jacob. India’s National Security Imperatives and Indo-Israeli Strategic Cooperation. MAP Project (September 18, 2014).
Over the past two decades, successive Indian governments have managed to develop increasingly extensive ties with Israel without damaging their relations with Arab countries. This essay discusses the reasons that India, which had distanced itself from Israel for four decades, decided to pursue security cooperation, and assesses the prospects for its further development.


Al-Sudairi, Mohamed Turki. Israel-Sino Relations Through the Prism of Advocacy Groups,” Al-Sabah Papers, No. 8 (November 2013).
Advocacy for the state of Israel – in the sense of attempting to favourably shape public and elite perceptions and discourses about the Jewish state and the nature of its conflict with the Palestinians and the surrounding Arab states – has been, and continues to be, of pivotal concern to both the Israeli government and pro-Israeli organisations operating in the United States and elsewhere ... This paper discusses this advocacy in the Chinese context ... The subject matter is divided into two sections organised in a chronological fashion: the first section examines the early contacts between Jewish organisations in the US and Israel with Chinese scholars, focusing specifically on the indigenous development of Jewish studies in China in the 1980s and 1990s as an outcome of this initial contact. The second section examines the evolution of pro-Israeli advocacy in Chinese academia from 2000 onwards while placing it firmly at the backdrop of the larger changes sweeping organisational and conceptual approaches to Israeli advocacy amongst the global Jewish communities of the West. This section also looks at the discourses and rationale driving pro-Israeli advocacy in China.


AL-Tamimi, Naser. “The Uncertain Future of China-Israel Relations,” Al-Arabiya (April 4, 2014).
Despite this significant improvement in Sino-Israeli relations, there are issues that may limit their development.


Feiler, Gil. “India’s Economic Relations with Israel and the Arabs,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) (July 2012).
…This paper examines India’s trade relations with Israel and the Arab countries of the Middle East. We shall examine the scope and depth of India’s commerce with Middle Eastern economies, and we shall depict the balance India must find between these two sets of relations, with a special focus on how the breakdown of the Arab-Israeli peace process influences India's economic and political relations with Israel and its neighbors …


  • Grossberg, Kenneth Alan. Delivering Innovation to the 'Zero-Defects' Culture: Japanese Conservatism Meets Israeli Risk-Taking.” MAP Project (September 4, 2014). 
    Despite the fact that Japan was one of the first countries in the world to recognize Israel as an independent nation, and despite the fact that relations between the two peoples have been generally amicable, the business linkages that would have been mutually beneficial have been very slow to develop. Only quite recently has there been a change in the wind that promises much more positive economic interaction between Israel and Japan as we enter the second half of this second decade of the new millennium.


Hussain, Mushtaq. "India-Israel Relations: Towards 'Strategic Cooperation,'" MEI (Delhi) Occasional Paper,  No. 29 (January 2012).
Ever since the establishment of full diplomatic relations in January 1992, the Indo-Israeli ties have witnessed a tremendous growth. Most of this has largely been fuelled and dominated by India’s requirements for state-of-the-art military technology and hardware from Israel ...  Riding on this confluence of interests, both countries have managed to put aside the uneasy past, and develop a new level of trust and operational understanding ...


Inbar, Efraim. “The Indian-Israeli Entente,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) (March 2004).
India and Israel both represent ancient civilizations and share a British colonial past. They were the first states to become independent (in 1947 and 1948, respectively) in the post–World War II wave of decolonization. Both were born out of messy partitions and have maintained democratic regimes ever since under adverse conditions. But despite the two states’ similarities, it took more than four decades for them to establish a warm relationship including full diplomatic relations, flourishing bilateral trade, and strategic cooperation. The strategic aspect of this relationship—a post–Cold War phenomenon—is the focus of this article. The rapprochement between India and Israel is an important component of a new strategic landscape in the greater Middle East that includes Central Asia and parts of the Indian Ocean littoral …


Kumaraswamy, P.R. “The Friendship with Israel: India Squares the Circle,” MEI (NUS) Insights (June 2009).
The establishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel in January 1992 marked a new beginning in India’s Middle East policy. This was its most dramatic foreign policy move following the end of the Cold War … How did India square the past and pursue a more fruitful approach towards Israel? A modest attempt is made here to delineate some of the salient features of Indo-Israeli relations and the manner in which India handled its potential pitfalls.


Kumaraswamy, P.R. “At What Cost Israel-China Ties?Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2006), pp. 37-44.
Israel’s military ties with China—especially the upgrading of Harpy surveillance aircraft—are undermining the Jewish state’s security …


Levkowitz, Alon. Upgrading Israeli-South Korean Relations: Can Seoul Tilt in Favor of Jerusalem? MAP Project (September 15, 2014).
Israel has come to recognize South Korea as being of increasing importance to its economic, security, and diplomatic interests. Meanwhile, Israeli innovation has attracted South Korean businesses and investors. As a result, Israel-South Korean economic ties have grown in recent years, albeit with little fanfare. These positive developments could eventually lead Seoul to alter its official policy toward Israel.


Pant, Harsh V. “India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) (December 2004).
There has been a steady strengthening of India’s relationship with Israel ever since India established full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, despite Indian attempts to keep this flourishing bilateral relationship out of public view. A flourishing Indo-Israeli relationship has the potential to make a significant impact on global politics by altering the balance of power, not only in South Asia and the Middle East, but also in the larger Asian region, which has been in a state of flux in recent times. However, notwithstanding the convergence of interests on a range of issues between India and Israel, this bilateral relationship will have to be carefully managed because of a host of constraints which circumscribe this relationship. This study examines those factors which are bringing the two nations increasingly closer and the constraints that might make it difficult for this relationship to achieve its full potential.


Shahaf, Emanuel. Israel and Indonesia: Window of Opportunity? MAP Project (September 21, 2014).
Israel and Indonesia are two nations whose relations―due to political circumstances―have yet to fulfill their enormous potential. Were there to be progress in peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, a window of opportunity could open for Indonesia's new president to take practical steps that would begin to unlock this potential.


Shai, Aron. “The Evolution of Israeli-Chinese Friendship.” The S. Daniel Abraham Center  for International and Regional Studies. Research Paper No. 7 (2014).
The first part of this study reviews the historical background of Sino-Israeli relations. The second analyzes China-Israel bilateral relations since January 1992, when full diplomatic relations between the two countries were established. The third part examines some of the international perspectives that involve both China and Israel. The fourth part ventures a look into the prospects of future Sino-Israeli relations. It also attempts to substantiate how Israel should reexamine its China policy more consistently and regularly, in view of changes occurring in the international arena.


Shichor, Yitzhak. On Probation: The Open-Ended Future of Sino-Israeli Relations. MAP Project (September 5, 2014). 
China, “a quarter of mankind,” can no longer be ignored. Economic reform is not the essence of Deng Xiaoping’s revolution; opening China to the outside world is. Israel is part of this phenomenon. After thirty years of no relations (and even mutual hostility); ten years of unofficial relations; and more than twenty years of official relations, both countries have managed to overcome their earlier illusions and to come to terms with the limits of their bilateral relations.


Shichor, Yitzhak. "Reconciliation: Israel’s Prime Minister in Beijing," China Brief, Vol. 7, Issue 2 (May 9, 2007).
 ... On January 11, 2007 Ehud Olmert ended his three-day official visit to China. His visit indicated that Beijing may now be willing to forgive (though probably not to forget) and turn to a new page in Sino-Israeli relations following over six years of a relative chill ...


Shichor, Yitzhak. “Mountains Out of Molehills: Arms Transfers in Sino-Middle Eastern Relations,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 2000).
Washington’s successful pressure on Israel to cancel the sale of the Phalcon early-warning plane to the People's Republic of China (PRC) has yet again highlighted the issue of Israel’s arms transfers to China and, indirectly, of Chinese arms transfers to the Middle East … The purpose of this article is to offer a rational, realistic, balanced and sober analysis of arms transfers in Sino-Middle Eastern relations …


Shichor, Yitzhak. "Hide and Seek: Sino-Israeli Relations in Perspective," Israel Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1994), pp. 188-208.
Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of China and Israel were established as late as January 1992 ... Based on an already existing infrastructure, their quick progress is an outcome of an unofficial relationship that has been have been painstakingly promoted long before ...


JAPAN

Calabrese, John.  “Dueling Stakeholders in Iran’s Energy Projects,” Gulf-Asia Research Bulletin, 1 (April 2007), pp. 15–20.
In February 2004, Japan’s Inpex Corporation signed a preliminary accord with Iran to develop Azadegan, one of the world’s largest oilfields. The following October, the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) agreed in principle to join forces with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to develop the massive Yadavaran oilfield. Yet, more than two years later, neither of these headline-grabbing deals has been implemented. The twists and turns in bringing these proposed mega-projects to fruition lay bare a tangle of economic and geopolitical issues …


Calabrese, John.  “The Iraq Energy Factor in Sino-Japanese Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 7, No. 6 (March 2007).
Iraq could soon emerge as an important new focal point of intensifying Chinese and Japanese commercial diplomacy and energy rivalry, in spite of their extensive overlapping interests and mutually beneficial economic ties. It is difficult to determine whether friction over energy-related matters is a symptom or an additional cause of the strained relationship between China and Japan. What is indisputable, however, is that these energy concerns have become foreign policy priorities in both Beijing and Tokyo, spurred by the debate over “peak oil,” the spike in world oil prices and heightened concerns about possible supply disruptions …


Coleman, Bryan. In Japan's Return to Iran: Risky Business,”MAP Project (December 2016).
This essay discusses Japan’s long-standing energy dependence on the Middle East and the complications arising from it, with a focus on relations with Iran. More specifically, it looks at the risks and potential rewards of the revival and strengthening of Japan’s economic relations with Iran in the wake of the nuclear deal.


Dowty, Alan. “Japan and the Middle East: Signs of Change?Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 2000).
There has been a vast disparity between Japan’s heavy dependence on the Middle East and the low level of its involvement in that region. This situation has prevailed despite the fact that, apart from its own East Asian neighborhood and arguably its ties with the United States--no other region has such an obvious impact on the well-being, prosperity, and even basic security of Japan. There are signs, though, that Japan’s historic policy toward the region is now changing …


Funahashi, Kazumi. “Japan's Unfinished Democracy: Lessons for Democratic Transormation in the Middle East,” MAP Project (April 2013).
Japan’s latest Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) White Paper, released on March 26, 2013, emphasizes the importance to Japan of supporting democratic development in the Middle East and Asia. Stability in the Middle East is essential for Japanese prosperity. Japanese investment and aid has already made significant contributions to the region’s socio-economic stability. The next step is for Japan to contribute its lessons learned as a successful case of democratic transformation.


Hashimoto, Naofumi. “Interview with Senior Japanese Diplomat / Arabist,” MAP Project (December 2012).
Japan’s policy priority remains unchanged: it is to contribute to international and regional efforts to maintain and restore stability in the Middle East, particularly in light of our country’s dependency on the region’s energy resources.


Imai, Kohei. “Comparative Middle Power Diplomacies: Turkey and Japan,” MAP Project (November 7, 2013).
Middle power is an opaque term that involves multiple concepts. Through different conceptualizations of the term, Turkey and Japan are both middle powers. Indeed, widely read textbooks about Turkish foreign policy published around 2000 regard Turkey as a middle power. In the Japanese context, several scholars, including Yonosuke Nagai, Yoshikazu Sakamoto, Nobuya Banba, and Mitsuru Yamamoto, have evaluated the foreign policy of their own country as middle power diplomacy since the late 1970s. Recently, Yoshihide Soeya comprehensively summed up Japanese middle power diplomacy after the 1970s.


Yoshioka, Akiko. “Japanese Prime Minister’s Visit to the Middle East to Build a Multilayered Relationship,” Gulf Asia Research Bulletin, Issue No. 3 (November 2007), pp. 26-29.
... This visit was noteworthy for two reasons. The first was the energy and economic aspect which has always been, and will continue to be, the most important factor in Japan’s relationship with the region. This region has significantly grown in importance in recent years because of rising oil prices. However, the prime minister’s visit may also be viewed as an expression of the active foreign policy of Japan, which is attempting to position its relationship with the region in a more multilayered way ...


Yoshioka, Akiko. “Japan’s Foreign Policy toward Iraq after 2003: Perceptions in Iraq and the Arab World,” Gulf Asia Research Bulletin, Issue No. 2 (July 2007), pp. 22-25. The collapse of the Saddam regime in Iraq triggered the beginning of a new era in Japan-Iraq relations ...


JORDAN

Khempon, Piriya. Interview with HE Piriya Khempon, Thai Ambassador To Jordan, MAP Project (January 2013).
Thailand sees Jordan as a genuine friend and as a strategic ally in the Middle East. Thailand also looks at Jordan as an example of a country of moderate Islam in which Islam and modernization can go hand in hand. This friendship is exemplified in the excellent relations between the two Royal Families of Jordan and Thailand ...


LIBYA

Dorsey, James M. "Fall of Gaddafi: Policy challenge for China and Russia," RSIS Commentary, No. 126 (September 5, 2011).
The impending fall of Gaddafi’s regime and takeover of Tripoli by the Libyan rebels pose a policy challenge for China and Russia in their support for autocratic leaders in the Arab world.


Mattes, Hanspeter. Challenges to State Building after the Fall of Qaddafi. MAP Project (April 3, 2014). 
The fall of the Qaddafi regime and the loss of the state monopoly on violence gave way to a duopoly of power in Libya whereby rudimentary “national” forces—under the control of the National Transitional Council (NTC) from March 2011 to August 2012—were established in competition with the non-state “Revolutionary Brigades,” which had borne the brunt of the military struggle against Qaddafi’s forces. Since then, the Revolutionary Brigades have increasingly sought to assert themselves in the political arena.


Roumani, Jacques. Libya on the Brink: Insecurity, Localism, and the State Not Back In. MAP Project (March 12, 2014).
The Libyan uprising launched almost three years ago has yet to produce the promised transition to a new post-Qaddafi political order. The moment of unity generated by toppling the tyrant has fragmented due to the fact that, unlike Tunisia or Egypt, no state apparatus existed to take over from the victorious rebels. Transitional authorities under the National Transitional Council (NTC, March 2011-August 2012) were too weak to govern and acquire legitimacy. Their successor 200-member constituent assembly, the General National Congress (GNC) elected in July 2012, has not fared much better due to dysfunctional politics, factional disputes, pervasive distrust, a legacy of institutional destruction, and sporadic resistance by former members and supporters of the toppled regime, as well as historical, regional, and tribal cleavages.


Zambelis, Chris. “A Swan Song in Sudan and Libya for China’s ‘Non-Interference’ Principle,” China Brief, Vol. 11, Issue 15 (August 12, 2011).
… [I]t is worth looking beyond the energy and economic interests that underlie Beijing’s presence in the Arab world to examine its approach to handling some of the most contentious issues impacting the region, including the circumstances that culminated in the independence of Southern Sudan and the conflict in Libya … 


MALAYSIA

Abdul Hamid, Ahmad Fauzi. Shi‘a-Inspired Violence in Malaysia: A Possibility? MAP Project (July 24, 2014). 
Ever since the triumph of Iranian Shi’a revolutionaries against the shah in 1979, the Malaysian government has been wary of the dangers of the revolution being exported across its borders. The author argues that rather than oppressing and vilifying indigenous Shi‘a citizens, the state should engage them intellectually, socially, and perhaps even religiously, in the spirit of Prime Minister Najib Razak.


Abu-Hussin, Mohd Fauzi. “Malaysia and the GCC Countries: Fertile Ground for Further Expansion of the Takaful Industry,” MAP Project (June 16, 2013). The Takaful industry has expanded rapidly in recent years. In 2011, the industry recorded 19% higher growth than in the previous year. Takaful is generally regarded as a profitable product with ample growth potential. With strong support from industry players, government institutions and increasing awareness among customers, the Takaful industry is expected to develop further in the coming years.


Abu-Hussin, Mohd Fauzi, Ahmad Azam bin Sulaiman, and Mohd Yahya bin Mohd Hussin, “Capturing Arab gulf market: An analysis of Malaysian exports competitiveness in the market,” African Journal of Business Management, Vol. 5, No. 21 (2011), pp. 8521-8535.
…  Arab Gulf countries appear to be a new destination for Malaysia’s trade and investment. Malaysia recently has implemented a new approach to its international trade strategies by shifting from dependency on traditional exports markets (US, Japan and EU) to Asian and Middle East orientation (BNM, 2010, NEAC, 2010). Middle East markets especially Arab Gulf Countries are seen as potential emerging market for the Malaysian economy …


Abu-Hussin, Mohd Fauzi. Exploring International Trade between Malaysia and GCC Countries: Empirical Analysis on Trends, Developments and Challenges, PhD Thesis, Durham University, United Kingdom (2010).
… One of the main aims of this research is to explore in detail bilateral trade relations between Malaysia and the GCC countries and their determinants … Based on the findings, it can be said that trade relations with the GCC countries is still insignificant in comparison to that with Malaysia’s major trading partners. Nevertheless, due to Malaysia’s niche products, expansion strategy of services sectors in both Malaysia and the GCC countries and the existence of favourable countries to trade in the GCC, these may create huge potential for expansion. The findings also reveal that, cultural differences and lack of capital have been the major problems for Malaysian businessmen in doing business with the GCC region. The findings also indicate that there is a growing interest in establishing a Malaysia–GCC free trade agreement as shown by Malaysian traders …


Abu-Hussin, Mohd Fauzi and Asmak Binti Ab Rahman. “GCC Economic Integration: Challenge and Opportunity for Malaysian Economy,” The Journal of International Social Research, Vol. 2, No. 9 (2009), pp. 43-55.
…The economic tie between Malaysia and GCC has been remarkable particularly on trade, oil sources as well as investment opportunities for Malaysia. At the same time, recent development shows that, the GCC nations also investing and participating in Malaysian economy and this contributing considerably its economic growth. Given this background, the objectives of this paper are first to analyse GCC economic condition from Malaysian perspective and secondly to highlight the economic co-operation at the intra-regional level between GCC and Malaysia. In doing so, this paper will particularly look into the trends, level and few other aspects of its trade and economic relation with the GCC members, and the benefit that gained by Malaysian investors as well as expatriates investing and working in this region …


Alatas, Syed Farid. Salafism and the Persecution of Shi‘ites in Malaysia. MAP Project (July 30, 2014).
In the last few decades, religious scholars have branded many age-old Malay and Sufi religious practices as wrongful innovations. One of the great casualties of this rising intolerance has been Shi‘ism, whose followers have received some of the most intense criticism. It is widely accepted that these developments have much to do with the rise of Salafism.


Bagher, Hanieh Mohammad and Seyed Mansour Sajed. “The Artistic Activities of Iranian Immigrants in Malaysia,” MAP Project (August 6, 2013).
Popular art produced by immigrant artists reflects their special circumstances, namely the challenges and limitations associated with navigating two cultures. Such is the case for many Iranian artists in Malaysia who have nonetheless overcome these obstacles to create art.


Calabrese, John. Positioning Malaysia within the Global Energy Landscape. MAP Project (August 19, 2014). 
Malaysia ― Southeast Asia's second largest oil and gas producer and the world’s second largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) ― is located along the seaborne energy trade channel that binds together the Indian and Pacific oceans. Yet rapidly increasing energy use has led to a sharp rise in Malaysia's dependence on oil imports and a decline in the surplus of natural gas for export. Under these circumstances, the government of Prime Minister Najib Razak has embarked on an ambitious effort to transform Malaysia into a major maritime energy hub and revitalize the oil and gas (O&G) sector. This essay discusses the major steps that Malaysia has taken in pursuit of these goals and the ways in which Malaysia-Gulf Arab energy relations have changed as a consequence.


Devadason, Evelyn. Malaysia: A Base for the Growing Asia-Middle East Market? MAP Project (June 6, 2013).
"The Malaysia-GCC framework agreement signed in January 2011 ... initially failed to enhance bilateral economic cooperation ... However, with the shift in the direction of GCC trade from the West to Asia and the emphasis on the “Islamic connection” by Malaysia and many of its Middle Eastern counterparts, the intensification of economic cooperation, especially Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries appears to be gaining momentum ..."


Devadason, Evelyn S., Ahmad Zubaidi Baharumshah and Thirunaukarasu Subramaniam.Leveraging Trade Opportunities with Non-Traditional Partners: The Malaysia-GCC Perspective,” Conference Paper (November 2011).
This paper examines the impact of economic factors on bilateral trade flows between Malaysia and the GCC through estimations of panel data using a gravity model. In particular, the paper compares the determinants of bilateral trade between Malaysia and two regions, the non-traditional Gulf alliance and the traditional ASEAN counterpart, to provide insights for leveraging opportunities through trade with the former. The gravity estimates imply the importance of size effects, similarities in GDP and differences in factor endowments as drivers of trade flows between Malaysia and the GCC, underlying the fact that inter-industry trade dominates these flows. The opposite holds in the case for the Malaysia-ASEAN trade. The Gulf region therefore provides opportunities for Malaysia to export quantity-based final (end-use) products and to diversify its exporting strategy away from quality-based parts and components.


Foley, Sean. “Malaysians Vote -- The Middle East Watches,” MAP Project (May 2013).
How Malaysians will addresses the challenges and tensions revealed by the 13th general elections in 2013 will be watched carefully not only by that country's own citizens but by those in the Middle East as well.


Fozi, Navid. “The Iranian Diaspora in Malaysia: Emergent Pluralism,” MAP Project (July 10, 2013).
The Iranian diaspora in Malaysia is incredibly diverse. Supporters of the Green Movement, students, individuals who fast and pray and those who do not know the direction of the qibla, clerics who promote secularism and those who promote the authority of the vilayat-i faqih, Iranian Kurds, Turks, and Arabs, journalists, artists, and environmentalists: all these—and more—constitute the community of Iranians who have fled or quietly moved to Malaysia.


Idris, Asmady and Ömer Kurtbağ. “A Non-Regional Perspective on Bilateral Relations Between States from Different Regions: A Case Study of Malaysia-Saudi Arabia Relations,” Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research, 22:9 (2014): 1339-1352.
This study attempts to introduce a new approach of analyzing bilateral relations between states from different regions, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, by formulating a ‘non-regional perspective’ which is extracted from debates on regionalism.


Idris, Asmady and Ömer Kurtbağ. “Malaysia-Turkey Relations in History and Today,” MAP Project (November 19, 2013).
Malaysia and Turkey lie nearly 5,000 miles and seven time zones apart. They have different historical experiences and state structures. The role that religion plays in their public life also differs markedly. Yet Malaysia and Turkey have more in common than is widely acknowledged. Both are newly industrialized, middle-income, predominantly Muslim countries and mid-sized powers in their respective regions. Both are also expected to assume a greater regional and global role in the coming years.


Idris, Asmady. Malaysia-Saudi Arabia Relations: Roots, Dimensions, and Prospects,” MAP Project (June 18, 2013).
Malaysia’s relationship with Saudi Arabia has long been amicable and fruitful. Indeed, Malaysian-Saudi relations have deeper historical roots than are commonly recognized. During the contemporary period, the religio-cultural, economic, and other aspects of the bilateral relationship have expanded. In fact, Malaysian-Saudi relations are complex, multifaceted, and have significant potential for further development.


Idris, Asmady. “Malaysian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Humanitarian Issues in Gaza, Palestine,” International Journal of West Asian Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2012), pp. 49-78.
Since Israel‟s blockade and the Operation Casting Lead (OCL)in the Gaza Strip, many international NGOs have come forward to render help and lessen the plight of the Palestinians. For the Malaysian NGOs, particularly Aman Palestin and Lifeline4Gaza, easing the burden of the Palestinians is a responsibility that must be shared. Although these two groups applied different approaches, with Aman Palestin using the land route of the Rafah crossing and the Lifeline4Gaza joining the international flotillas, the same goals are being pursued: to help the people of Palestine to be safe and free ... [I]n the case of Malaysia, it can be argued that both the state and non-state actors (Malaysian NGOs) are co-operating well in promoting the issue of human rights internationally. Both are supporting each other to ensure the mission and the vision of helping the Palestinians becomes a reality.


Jahangiri, Pegah. “Iranians in Malaysia: Batik Artist Pegah Jahangiri,” MAP Project (July 19, 2013).
Artist Pegah Jahangiri hails from Tehran, but is currently a doctoral student in visual arts at the University of Malaya, Malaysia. She recently spoke to MEI about her work with batik, strikingly dyed cloth found all over the world, but particularly popular and refined in Southeast Asia.


Marcinkowski, Christoph. “Historical Dimensions of the Shi`a in Southeast Asia,” MAP Project  (July 17, 2013).
Shafi`i Sunnis dominate the Malay-Indonesian world, including Singapore, southern Thailand, and the southern Philippines. Shafi`is also constitute the majority of southern India’s Muslim population, a fact that is of historical relevance to the Islamization of Southeast Asia. Persia, too, was one of the centers of Shafi`i Sunni scholarship prior to the establishment there of Twelver Shi`ism as the “religion of state” in 1501 under the Safavid dynasty. Yet there is also a Shi`i presence in Southeast Asia, and it is not simply a result of post-1979 events in Iran. It is rooted in a historical trajectory, especially of Islamic mysticism, or Sufism.


Marcinkowski, Christoph. “The Iranian Shi`i Diaspora in Malaysia,” MAP Project  (July 17, 2013).
Malaysia―a majority Muslim but multi-religious Southeast Asian country, a leading member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and one of Asia’s “tiger economies”―is home to tens of thousands of Iranian citizens and of Malaysian (formerly Sunni) converts to Shi`ism. According to conservative estimates, in Kuala Lumpur alone there reside about 100,000 Iranian nationals, including university teachers, students, and especially businesspeople―among them adherents of various political positions.


Nejad, Alireza Salehi. Iranians in Malaysia: Businessman Alireza Salehi Nejad. MAP Project (July 25, 2013).
Alireza Salehi Nejad, an Iranian citizen who resided in Malaysia from 2007 through 2010 as a student and then a businessman, recently spoke with MEI about his experiences living in Kuala Lumpur. He graduated from Asia Pacific University (APU), a partner of Staffordshire University in Malaysia, with a degree in business information technology and then established a consulting company whose clients are foreigners who wish to invest their capital in Southeast Asia, particularly in Malaysia, and Malaysian residents who wish to invest in other countries, especially in the Middle East and Western Europe. Alireza also founded a mountaineering club, which boasts more than 700 members, the majority being from Malaysia, Iran, Pakistan, Tanzania, Indonesia, and Kazakhstan.


Shanahan, Rodger. Malaysia and its Shi‘a “Problem”. MAP Project (July 25, 2014).
The primacy of ethnic Malays (and by association their adherence to Sunni Islam) has meant that Shi‘i Islam is considered a “deviant” sect in the country. Although official spokespeople regularly claim that the state has no concerns about Shi’a practicing their faith as long as they refrain from proselytizing, adherents face both social and legal restrictions.


Yaghoubi, Asghar. “Iranians in Malaysia: Artist Asghar Yaghoubi and His 'Journey Within,'” MAP Project (July 26, 2013).
Artist Asghar Yaghoubi, who was born in Shiraz, Iran, moved to Malaysia in 2008. An accomplished painter and sculptor, he also teaches art at the Cube Gallery, of which he is the founder and director. The gallery is the first and only art gallery in Southeast Asia owned by an Iranian.


OMAN

Rakhmat, Muhammad Zulfikar. “Exploring the China and Oman Relationship,” The Diplomat  (May 10, 2014).
China’s relations with the countries of the Persian Gulf have expanded considerably over recent years. Although ties between China and some of these countries have been well reported, China’s relationship with the Sultanate of Oman, the first country to deliver oil to China, has yet to be fully documented. Yet the two countries have ties that go well beyond oil cooperation.


Zambelis, Chris.China and the Quiet Kingdom: An Assessment of China-Oman Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 15, Issue 22 (November 16, 2015).
Middle East specialists have often treated Oman as something of an afterthought: Oman’s historic stability and its characteristically quiet profile, despite its proximity to perpetual geopolitical flashpoints and its penchant for navigating some of the world’s most complex diplomatic fault lines, has relegated it to outlier status. This oversight belies Oman’s strategic importance and obscures the extent of China’s interests in Oman. In recent years, contacts between China and Oman have diversified beyond the energy sector, yielding notable developments on the diplomatic, military, and economic fronts.


PAKISTAN

Bubalo, Anthony, Sarah Phillips and Samina Yasmeen. “Talib or Taliban? Indonesian students in Pakistan and Yemen,” joint paper of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, the Centre for International Security Studies and the Centre for Muslim States and Societies, September 2011.
This paper looks at the issue of Indonesian students who study at Islamic educational institutions in Pakistan and Yemen. Its primary goal is to understand whether the presence of Indonesian students at Islamic institutions in Pakistan and Yemen poses a risk, either in terms of radicalisation, or in the formation (or re-formation) of direct contacts between Indonesian extremist groups and counterparts in these countries such as al-Qaeda …


Calabrese, John. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): Underway and Under Threat,” MAP Project (December 2016).
China is already Pakistan’s largest trade and defense partner. But the coming into operation of the CPEC lends a new meaning to, and could transform the relationship between these two “all-weather allies,” including insofar as their ties to the Middle East are concerned — provided that the territorial and maritime security challenges associated with the completion and use of this corridor can be satisfactorily addressed.


Çolakoğlu, Selçuk. “Turkey-Pakistan Security Relations since the 1950s,” MAP (November 25, 2013).
The initial impulse for Pakistan and Turkey to pursue security cooperation stemmed from their common opposition to Communism in the 1950s. Over the past decade, Pakistan and Turkey have once again sought to cooperate in the security sphere, this time in countering terrorism and ensuring stability in Afghanistan.


De Cordier, Bruno. Pakistan and the GCC countries: Complementarity, or a Center-Periphery Tale?”  Central Asia Economic Papers (November 2013). 
This paper examines the conomic, as well as other levels of interaction and ties between the states, economies, and societies of Pakistan and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.


Humayun, Fahd. “Pakistan's Hard Choices in the Middle East,” Foreign Policy (November 19, 2015).
For decades, Pakistan’s approach to the Middle East has been shaped by two competing heritages: religious and post-colonial. But the rise of new power poles in the Middle East, together with the international response to Paris after last week’s deadly attack, will likely heighten the need for a hard Middle East policy review in Islamabad in the coming days.


Hussain, Nazia. “Pakistan's Jihadi Problem and the Middle East,” MAP Project (April 2013).
... Along with countries such as Syria and Iraq, Pakistan has become a theater of doctrinal differences between Shia and Sunni Muslims, signifying that rifts between local groups have become linked to the wider violent sectarianism in the Middle East. This evolving composition of the “Jihadi problem” in Pakistan demonstrates that while jihadi groups may be based locally, their outlook is becoming increasingly transnational, and directly linked with the Middle East and the various conflicts raging within the region ...


Looney, Robert. Agrarian Mirage: Gulf Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan’s Agricultural Sector. MAP Project (October 1, 2014). 
In the late 2000s, one rarely picked up a financial newspaper without seeing an announcement of Gulf investments in large tracts of Pakistani agricultural land. Today, however, there is little, if any evidence of a single foreign-financed agricultural project in Pakistan having come to fruition. This essay explores why.


PALESTINE AND PALESTINIANS

Idris, Asmady. “Malaysian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Humanitarian Issues in Gaza, Palestine,” International Journal of West Asian Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2012), pp. 49-78.
Since Israel‟s blockade and the Operation Casting Lead (OCL)in the Gaza Strip, many international NGOs have come forward to render help and lessen the plight of the Palestinians. For the Malaysian NGOs, particularly Aman Palestin and Lifeline4Gaza, easing the burden of the Palestinians is a responsibility that must be shared. Although these two groups applied different approaches, with Aman Palestin using the land route of the Rafah crossing and the Lifeline4Gaza joining the international flotillas, the same goals are being pursued: to help the people of Palestine to be safe and free ... [I]n the case of Malaysia, it can be argued that both the state and non-state actors (Malaysian NGOs) are co-operating well in promoting the issue of human rights internationally. Both are supporting each other to ensure the mission and the vision of helping the Palestinians becomes a reality.


Zambelis, Chris. “China’s Palestine Policy,” China Brief, Vol. 9, Issue 5 (March 4, 2009).
… widespread popular opposition to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East coupled with feelings of nostalgia for a return of the revolutionary China of old, Arab and Muslim proponents of a greater role for China in Middle East politics see China’s rise as a positive trend, especially as it relates to the question of Palestine ...


PHILIPPINES

Cruz-del Rosario, Teresita and James Dorsey. “Why do we protest?Al Arabiya, June 24, 2011.
… What drove Filipinos to openly protest after more than two decades of silence and acquiescence? What urged Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans, Syrians and Yemenis to break their silence and speak back at power despite the brutal response from some of their governments? …


Franco, Joseph. Violence and Peace Spoilers in the Southern Philippines. MAP Project (July 15, 2014).
The 27 March 2014 signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) by the Philippine Government (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front was heralded as the start of enduring peace and development in Mindanao. Unfortunately, spoilers opposed to the CAB remain capable of derailing the process. Joseph Franco explains some of the nuances of spoiling efforts as well as the prevailing socioeconomic milieu in the Southern Philippines that sustains latent enablers for sectarian conflict.


Sevilla, Henelito A., Jr. “Turkish Cultural Diplomacy in the Philippines,” MAP Project (November 13, 2013).
The Philippines and Turkey have not fully capitalized on their human resources and strategic assets in order to expand commercial ties and boost cultural exchanges. However, thanks largely to the efforts of a critical mass of Turkish nationals who have formed the backbone of a “constituency” for advancing Philippine-Turkey relations, the tide may be turning. Three recent developments indicate that the groundwork is being laid to pursue a more robust bilateral relationship: 1) the opening of Turkish-owned schools operating both in Manila and in Zamboanga City (southern Philippines); 2) the creation of the Pacific Dialogue Foundation in the Philippines; and 3) the establishment of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines.


Sevilla, Henelito A., Jr. “The Philippines' Elusive Quest for Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Observer Status,” MAP Project (May 2013).
This essay presents the official rationale for and position of the Government of Philippines regarding its longstanding quest for OIC observer status and analyzes the domestic considerations and external variables that have had a bearing on its candidacy.


Sevilla, Henelito A., Jr. “The Emergency Evacuation of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) from Libya and Syria” MAP Project (February 2013).
The political crisis in Libya and, more recently, the conflict in Syria exposed the obstacles the government faced in its efforts to repatriate thousands of Filipinos residing and working in these countries. These situations also exposed the vulnerability of Filipino workers. In addition, they revealed the dilemma faced by the Philippine government in trying to serve the interests of its citizens in engaging the authorities in these conflict-affected states while being pressured by the major powers to condemn these same governments for violating human rights.


Sevilla, Henelito A., Jr. “Why Middle East Matters to the Philippines?Asia Pacific Journal of Social Sciences, India, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2010), pp. 1-29.
… The Philippines approach to its relations with the Middle East region has remained traditional – oil, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). There is a neglect of attention from the Philippine side to utilize intellectuals/professionals to help to improve the awareness of the general population about the opportunities and challenges the Middle East region can offer …


Qatar

Zambelis, Chris. “China and Qatar Forge a New Era of Relations around High Finance,” China Brief, Vol. 12, Issue 20 (October 19, 2012).
... A series of quiet yet important developments emanating from China’s relationship with Qatar—one of the region’s smallest countries in both population and area—is emblematic of the growing complexity of China’s role in the Middle East ...


SAUDI ARABIA

Al-Sudairi, Mohammed Turki. "Sino-Saudi Relations: An Economic History," Gulf Research Center (August 2012).
Given that economic ties between Saudi Arabia and China have grown considerably in the last two decades with energy at the heart of the relationship, a new GRC Paper takes an in-depth look at Sino-Saudi economic relations starting from the late 1980s onwards. In addition to examining the oil and petrochemical partnerships spearheaded by Aramco and SABIC, the paper also includes wider issues such as the role played by Saudi corporate investors and Chinese companies operating in the Kingdom in cultivating this relationship. Besides, the paper highlights some of the comparative advantages and difficulties latent in the various sectors through which this engagement unfolds.


Calabrese, John. The India-Saudi Arabia Strategic Partnership: A Work in Progress, The Diplomatist Magazine. Special Report on India and Saudi Arabia (2013).
The historic visit of King Abdullah to India in 2006 infused the bilateral relationship with a fresh momentum and, embodied in the Delhi Declaration, provided a road map for its further development. The reciprocal visit by Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh in February 2010, culminating in the Riyadh Declaration, elevated the relationship to a “strategic partnership” based on the strengthening of energy, economic, cultural, political, and defence ties. Since then, there has been notable progress on many fronts.


Calabrese, John.   “China and Saudi Arabia Extend Ties Beyond Oil,” China Brief, Vol. 5, No. 20 (December 2005).
Though initially slow to develop, Sino-Saudi relations today are multifaceted—expanding both in scale and in scope. China and Saudi Arabia lie at the center of a complicated set of cross-regional relationships. Saudi Arabia is a global oil superpower. China, having rapidly emerged as a major player in the international economy, is today the world’s second-largest oil consumer. Indeed, these countries might rightly be regarded not only as the twin engines of growing Gulf-Asian energy independence but of broader economic and geopolitical trends that are just beginning to take shape …


Gupta, Ranjit. Interview: Jeddah, Saudi Arabia -- The Second Posting (1976-1978),” MAP Project (June 3, 2013).
"... Soon after arriving, however, I was surprised to find out from long-serving local staff at the Embassy and a few Indians who had resided in Saudi Arabia for more than three decades that I was the first non-Muslim Foreign Service Officer to serve in the Indian Embassy in Saudi Arabia ..."


Idris, Asmady and Ömer Kurtbağ. “A Non-Regional Perspective on Bilateral Relations Between States from Different Regions: A Case Study of Malaysia-Saudi Arabia Relations,” Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research, 22:9 (2014): 1339-1352.
This study attempts to introduce a new approach of analyzing bilateral relations between states from different regions, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, by formulating a ‘non-regional perspective’ which is extracted from debates on regionalism.


Idris, Asmady. Malaysia-Saudi Arabia Relations: Roots, Dimensions, and Prospects,” MAP Project (June 18, 2013).
Malaysia’s relationship with Saudi Arabia has long been amicable and fruitful. Indeed, Malaysian-Saudi relations have deeper historical roots than are commonly recognized. During the contemporary period, the religio-cultural, economic, and other aspects of the bilateral relationship have expanded. In fact, Malaysian-Saudi relations are complex, multifaceted, and have significant potential for further development.


Janardhan, N. “India-Saudi ties: From cold indifference to warm embrace,” Khaleej Times, January 20, 2006.
India’s relations with Saudi Arabia have been incongruent in the past. While political ties have been far from bonhomie as a result of Cold War alignments and Saudi-Pakistani affinity, economic cooperation took a more realistic form and flourished.


Kéchichian, Joseph A. “Saudi Arabia and China: The Security Dimension,” MAP Project (February 2015).
Political and security ties between Saudi Arabia and China have developed far more slowly than have their economic relations. This essay explores the security dimension of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and China, and attempts to shed light on the question of why Sino-Saudi cooperation in the security sphere has been very limited.


Pant, Harsh V. “Saudi Arabia Woos China and India,” Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2006), pp. 45-52.
In January 2006, Saudi king Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz al-Saud visited China and India, a trip some commentators labeled "a strategic shift" in Saudi foreign policy and reflective of "a new era" for the kingdom … Abdullah's travel was significant. His reception suggested both Chinese and Indian recognition of the House of Saud's role in regulating global oil prices and the impact that Saudi oil policy has not only on Western economies but on the Chinese and Indian economies as well. Riyadh's relations with Beijing and Delhi are not shaped by energy alone, however. There is a major political component to Saudi strategic thinking …


Zambelis, Chris. “Shifting Sands in the Gulf: The Iran Calculus in China-Saudi Arabia Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 10, Issue 10 (May 13, 2010).
The fourth joint meeting on economy and trade convened by China and Saudi Arabia in January 2010 in the Saudi capital of Riyadh came and went without much fanfare. Yet the meeting between China, the world’s second largest and fastest growing oil consumer, and Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest producer of oil, cemented a burgeoning bilateral relationship that is attracting increasing international attention …


SINGAPORE

Janardhan, N. “GCC-Singapore FTA offers hope amid crisis,” Khaleej Times, January 3, 2009.
As 2008 ended on a low amid a global financial crisis, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Singapore formalised in December came as a whiff of fresh air …


Razzouk, Assaad W. “Showcasing Middle Eastern Art in Southeast Asia,” MAP Project (December 2012).
There is an explosion of artistic creativity in the Middle East; contemporary Middle Eastern art should have a positive reception in a region with strong affinities to the Middle East ...


Simpfendorfer, Ben. “Singapore’s Hadrawmi Community in Today’s Economy,” MEI (NUS) Insights (March 2010).
The Middle East is one of the world’s fastest growing markets. Singapore has a long history of trade with the region owing to its Hadrami community. Yet, the city has not fully capitalized on the Middle East’s more recent booming growth. Finding a role for the Hadrami community could well help to unlock the Middle East’s potential. However, the community cannot be expected to play the same role as it did in the past, as its population is too small and its economic influence too diminished. Nonetheless, trade theory suggests the Hadrami community’s historical legacy could play a role in developing Singapore’s services trade with the Middle East.


SOUTH KOREA

Chang, I-Wei Jennifer. The Iran Sanctions and South Korea’s Balancing Act. MAP Project (June 2, 2014).
Following the recent progress on the Iranian nuclear issue and the subsequent easing of sanctions, South Korean businesses are reengaging the Iranian market. A South Korean trade delegation visited Iran on March 9, 2014 to expand bilateral trade ties in the mining, industrial, and food sectors. On March 17, South Korea’s Finance Ministry lifted a ban, allowing South Korean auto, construction, pharmaceutical, and telecommunications industries to resume trade with Iran, though sanctions remained in the shipbuilding, shipping, and harbor sectors.


Janardhan, N. “South Korea’s relevance to Gulf,” Khaleej Times, November 11, 2010.
When 2009 ended with a South Korean-led consortium winning a landmark $20 billion contract to build four nuclear reactors in the United Arab Emirates, it eclipsed other Western bidders. While the choice of an Asian company, especially South Korean, surprised many, Middle East watchers would vouch that it is a move that epitomises the region’s growing ties with Asia during the last decade.


Kim, Insoo. South Korea’s Immature Professionalism in the Security Sector. MAP Project (March 13, 2014).
It is widely accepted that South Korea has successfully consolidated democracy. For example, U.S. President Barack Obama cited South Korea as an exemplary case of economic growth and democracy in his famous speech at Cairo University on June 4, 2009. Two years later, when Egypt underwent a civil uprising that brought to an end the country’s decades-old Mubarak regime, he lauded South Korea’s democracy once again, suggesting that “Egypt could transform itself into a democracy on the model of Indonesia, Chile, or South Korea.” By 2013, however, alleged election fraud in South Korea had damaged the international reputation of its mature democracy. The Democratic Party—the country’s main opposition party—publicly called the 2012 presidential election unfair because the National Intelligence Service (NIS) had manipulated public opinion prior to the election, leaving disparaging comments about opposition party candidate Moon Jae-in on popular websites.


Jang, Ji-Hyang. The Role of a Middle Power South Korea in Iran, Syria, and Egypt. MAP Project (May 23, 2014). 
This article examines how South Korean foreign policy deals with Iran, Syria, and Egypt, with the overarching argument that because South Korea is pushing to build its middle power presence, it should clearly articulate its position on key security issues in the Middle East. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, South Korea should support international norms such as nonproliferation, humanitarian protection, and democracy. Unless the South Korean government consistently upholds these norms, it will encounter setbacks in finding international support in its dealings with North Korea.


Kwon, Jeeyun. The Rise of Korean Islam: Migration and Da‘wa. MAP Project (May 19, 2014).
In 2001, there were only 34,000 Muslims living in Korea; today there are more than 150,000. Furthermore, there are over 45,000 ethnic Korean Muslims. In contrast to Europe, where over a thousand years of political, cultural, and religious interactions have shaped social attitudes toward Islam, Korea’s Muslim population remains relatively unnoticed, comprising only 0.3 percent of the total Korean population. However, Islam in Korea is in the midst of great change. With the continuing increase in international migration over the past decade from Muslim-majority countries, the Korean Muslim community is transforming into a significant social and religious force.


Lee, Hee-Soo. 1,500 Years of Contact between Korea and the Middle East. MAP Project (June 7, 2014).
Islamic history in Korea and Korea-Middle East relations predate the Korean War by more than a millennium. Yet, many Koreans are not aware of this long history of cultural and commercial interaction. Furthermore, there are widespread misconceptions in Korea about the Middle East and aspects of Islam.


Lee, Kwon Hyung. Korea and the GCC: Reaching a Sustainable Economic Partnership. MAP Project (June 6, 2014). 
Over the past four decades, economic relations between the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have been focused on two sectors. Given the lack of energy resources in Korea, the GCC countries have provided oil and gas for Korean manufacturing, electricity, transport, and related activities. These countries have also provided Korea with business opportunities in the construction sector, including the building of expressways, seaports, and industrial plants.


Levkowitz, Alan. "The Republic of Korea and the Middle East: Economics, Diplomacy, and Security," Academic Papers Series, Korea Economic Institute (KEI), Vol. 5, No. 6 (2010).
... The new millennium heralded a change in South Korea’s involvement in the Middle East. Its economic involvement now includes major nuclear energy projects. For the first time, Seoul also became militarily involved in the Middle East, including sending troops to Iraq and Lebanon, and it began to play a more active political role in the region, which might increase further if Seoul decides to become a more dominant player in the region. These changes will have implications on Seoul’s policies beyond this region ...


Moon, Steve Sang-Cheol. Korea and the Middle East: Religious Encounters. MAP Project (June 14, 2014).
On the surface, it is difficult to identify the common ground between Korea and the Middle East in terms of religious heritage: Shamanism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Christianity are the major religions of Korea, while Islam predominates in the Middle East. However, rapid globalization and the increased frequency of exchange between Koreans and the peoples of the Middle East are beginning to challenge common assumptions about the religious composition of each region. This essay will describe the history and current status of Islamic expansion in Korea, as well as Korean Christian missions in the Middle East.


Woo, Jongseok. Democratization and Building a Democratic Army: Lessons from South Korea. MAP Project (March 28, 2014).
Democratization in a country is not just about electing new leaders through free, fair, and competitive elections; it entails a much more comprehensive political overhaul, including deposing ruling elites from the previous autocratic regime, building workable democratic institutions with a new constitution, reaping support from pro-democracy civil society groups, and managing national security and order. Possibly the most significant factor in the success or failure of a state’s democratic transition and subsequent consolidation is establishing a firm and democratic control over the armed forces. Without depoliticizing the once-politically dominant military and making top military officials politically neutral and subordinated under democratically elected leaders, the post-democratization political process of a nation is destined to be highly unstable and most likely will derail from the route to democratic consolidation.


SYRIA

Chang, I-Wei Jennifer. “China's Evolving Stance on Syria,” MAP Project (February 2013).
This article argues that Beijing’s policies on the Syrian uprising have been consistently and firmly against foreign military intervention and regime change in Syria.


Dorsey, James M. "Which way will China jump on Syria?" Interview Transcript (February 13, 2012).
... China in many ways has a very different stake in all of this than Russia does. While Russia has interests that are direct in terms of Syria and its relationship with Syria and the position Syria gives it within the Middle East for China it really is a question of its overall foreign policy and that has been a policy that has been challenged ever since the Arab revolt started more than a year ago ...


Siddiqui, Fazzur Rahman. “Unabated Violence in Syria and the Divided Global Community,” ICWA View Point (January 2012).
...The Syrian crisis is not merely an indigenous phenomenon but it is also a hostage to external power politics among different regional and global players. This is an issue of contestation between political principles and values on one hand, and political diplomacy and strategic calculation on the other.


Maisel, Sebastian. Sectarian-Based Violence: The Case of the Yezidis in Iraq and Syria. MAP Project (July 23, 2014).
Historically, the Yezidis -- an ancient Kurdish-speaking ethno-religious community -- have been subject to discrimination and violence. The current status of this community in Iraq and Syria is precarious, at best.


Siddiqui, Fazzur Rahman. “Different Dimensions of the Syrian Crisis,” ICWA View Point (March 2012).
... A revolution that began with a democratic spirit has been transformed into a sectarian conflict and the world does not remain unaffected by its spill over.


Zambelis, Chris. “The Geopolitics of Sino-Syrian Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 8, Issue 20 (October 24, 2008).
… In accordance with Beijing’s strategy toward the Middle East, Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao’s January 2001 meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad helped initiate a new chapter in Sino-Syrian relations that would lead to the expanded trade and closer bilateral ties both countries share …


 TAIWAN

Calabrese, John.  “Taiwan and the Gulf: The Sky’s the Limit?” Middle East Institute (MEI) Analysis (July 2012).
Dubai’s Burj Khalifa and Taiwan’s Taipei 101 tower, the world’s two tallest skyscrapers, differ in height by a stunning 1,076 feet, are separated by nearly 4,000 miles of ocean, and are situated in countries and regions which, linguistically and culturally, have little in common ― except business. Business between East Asia and the Gulf has continued to flourish in spite of and partly because of the global economic recession. Economic ties between Taiwan and the Gulf countries are, in some ways, illustrative of this broader interregional phenomenon. Yet, Taiwan itself, and by extension its relations with the Gulf countries are sui generis …


Schafferer, Christian. “The Rise and Fall of Transitional Justice in Taiwan,” MAP Project (February 13, 2014).
Authoritarian rule in Taiwan ended peacefully in the late 1980s. Since then, state institutions and private organizations have repeatedly attempted to address the atrocities committed during authoritarianism (1945-1987). This essay explores the various factors that have determined transitional justice in Taiwan over the last two decades. It demonstrates that post-authoritarian Taiwan has experienced three distinct periods: first, limited apology and compensation (1988-2000); second, attempts at transitional justice that ended in failure (2000-2008); and third, a reversal of all transitional justice mechanisms and a relapse to the past (2008-present). These changes are due in significant part to indigenous conflicts in Taiwan that have not been resolved, but also to global economic and political events that have drastically reduced the focus on democratic governance and accountability.


Yamada, Makio. Taiwan’s Relations with Saudi Arabia: An Interview with Ibrahim Chao. MAP Project (December 8, 2014).
Over the past half century, Saudi Arabia has been the most important country for Taiwan’s Middle East diplomacy. The following interview with HE Dr. Ibrahim Chao (Hsi-lin Chao), Taiwan’s representative to the Kingdom from 2009 to 2012, sheds light on the contours of and recent developments in the bilateral relationship. Prior to joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, or Taiwan, Ibrahim Chao earned an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Shariah (Islamic Law) from the Umm al-Qura University in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Since retiring from the diplomatic service, he has served as an advisor to the Chinese Muslim Association in Taipei.


thailand

Chambers, Paul. Obstacles to Civilian Control of the Security Sector in Thailand. MAP Project (March 18, 2014). 
Over 30 military coups and coup attempts have taken place in Thailand since 1932, when absolute monarchy was overthrown, the latest of which was in 2006. Clearly, achieving democratic civilian control over Thai security forces remains a daunting challenge. When we talk about Thai security forces, we are referring to the country’s army, navy, air force, police, and paramilitaries. The army is much larger than the other services, although the police force is also quite sizeable. Soldiers and police have tended to obey elected civilian authorities due to partisan connections or simply because the appearance of compliance is convenient. But in actuality the security forces are generally insulated from the sanction of elected governments.


Khempon, Piriya. Interview with HE Piriya Khempon, Thai Ambassador To Jordan, MAP Project (January 2013).
Thailand sees Jordan as a genuine friend and as a strategic ally in the Middle East. Thailand also looks at Jordan as an example of a country of moderate Islam in which Islam and modernization can go hand in hand. This friendship is exemplified in the excellent relations between the two Royal Families of Jordan and Thailand ...


Rackett, Tim. Putting Out the Fire in Southern Thailand: An Appeal for Truce Seeking. MAP Project (July 14, 2014).
Observers have struggled to explain ongoing sectarian violence in southern Thailand given that both Thai Buddhists and Malay/Thai Muslims are victims of violence, have historically coexisted peacefully, and share local customs and spiritual traditions. Tim Rackett explores the role of majority and minority ethnic and religious identities in fueling sectarian violence and identifies a way out.


TUNISIA

Stewart, Robert. Incorporating Cultural and Religious Practices into Transitional Justice: Lessons Related to Islam in Tunisia and Aceh, Indonesia. MAP Project (August 16, 2014). 
The Tunisian transitional justice has not drawn upon the Islamic tradition and would almost certainly not have been able to do so in a way that contributes to the ultimate success of transitional justice there. Why? This article will answer that question by focusing upon the circumstances of Tunisian transitional justice and by comparing them to the transitional justice process in Aceh, Indonesia, where Islamic practices were to some degree drawn upon. These case studies demonstrate that local cultural or religious practices must have widespread legitimacy and popular acceptance if they are to effectively contribute to transitional justice.


TURKEY

Albay, Erdoğan.  “Turkey-Singapore Relations: A Manifestation of Turkey’s Growing Interest in SE Asia,” MAP Project (November 5, 2013).
The content and scope of Turkish foreign policy has dramatically altered since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002. The Asia-Pacific region, which was previously a low priority in Turkey’s foreign policy calculations, is gaining increased space within Turkey’s general strategy and long-term planning, and is seen as vital to the growth of its small to medium sized firms, upon which the wealth of Turkey’s growing middle class is based.


Atlı, Altay.  “Turkey and Indonesia: Historical Roots, Contemporary Business Links,” MAP Project (November 4, 2013).
Though sympathy between Turkey and Indonesia has a long tradition, in part based on their shared experience of being Muslim-majority countries that successfully executed anti-imperialist struggles, for years this sympathy has failed to translate into a closer relationship. This is now changing. New economic linkages and the relative absence of thorny political issues are bringing them closer together. As President Abdullah Gül stated during a meeting in Jakarta in 2011, “A new era is beginning with Indonesia.” Economic agents such as businessmen and entrepreneurs are the pioneers of this era.


Atlı, Altay. “Societal Legitimacy of the Military: Turkey and Indonesia in Comparative Perspective,” Turkish Journal of Politics, Vol. 1 No. 2 (Winter 2010), pp. 5-22.
... This article aims to identify and analyze the factors that influence the military’s legitimacy in society, comparing the cases of Turkey and Indonesia. Within this framework, six variables are taken into consideration: i) Historical foundations of the military; ii) Threat perceptions; iii) Civilian inefficiency; iv) Institutional structure of the military’s influence on politics; v) Internal cohesiveness of the military; and vi) Economic interests of the military.


Atli, Altay. Questioning Turkey's China Trade,Turkish Policy Quarterly (January 2011), pp. 106-116.
This essay focuses on Turkey-China economic relations between the two countries and suggests that four questions need to be addressed if Turkey is to develop its relations with China in a way that is not only beneficial but also sustainable and progressive in the long term. The essay concludes that there is evidence of progress in all of four areas, albeit some distance to go.


Çolakoğlu, Selçuk. “Turkey-Pakistan Security Relations since the 1950s,” MAP Project (November 25, 2013).
The initial impulse for Pakistan and Turkey to pursue security cooperation stemmed from their common opposition to Communism in the 1950s. Over the past decade, Pakistan and Turkey have once again sought to cooperate in the security sphere, this time in countering terrorism and ensuring stability in Afghanistan.


Çolakoğlu, Selçuk. “Turkey and China: Seeking a Sustainable Partnership,” SETA, Brief No. 41 (January 2010). 
Turkey and China have forged a good economic and political relationship in the current decade. Both countries provide great economic, political, and strategic opportunities for each other in their own regions. Despite Ankara’s effort to push for a more integrated Uyghur community in Xinjiang under the Chinese Administration, the current difficulties transformed the issue into a problem area between China and Turkey. Turkey’s reiteration of its one-China policy may motivate China to display certain signs of improvement on the conditions of the Uyghur people. There is still considerable need to strengthen the relationship between Turkey and China and transform it into a strategic partnership. Realization of this prospect requires more systematic effort from both countries.


Cook, Steven A. Closing the Channels of the Military's Economic Influence in Turkey. MAP Project (April 20, 2014).
After a decade of working to subordinate Turkey’s military establishment so that it cannot influence the trajectory of Turkish politics, closing the channels of the military’s economic influence has been part of this process. Despite early expectations, the AKP has not forged a more democratic and liberal Turkey, but there is no denying the critical importance of its successful effort to institutionalize civilian control of the armed forces.


Erşen, Emre.  “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A New Alternative for Turkish Foreign Policy?,” MAP Project (October 18, 2013).
In June 2012, Turkey was accepted as a “dialogue partner” at the Beijing Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Although this decision did not completely satisfy the Turkish government, which apparently preferred the status of an observer, it still had a profound meaning, as Turkey is the first NATO member state to enjoy such a privileged institutional relationship with the SCO. This new relationship has become even more significant in light of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s declaration in a televised interview in January 2013 that membership in the SCO could become an alternative to Turkey’s stalled EU accession process. More recently, the brutal suppression of the Taksim Gezi Park demonstrations by Turkish security forces heightened concerns about the future of democracy in Turkey, giving rise to more frequent comparisons between the Turkish regime and the authoritarian political systems of the SCO member states.


Esenbel, Selçuk. Interview with Professor Selcuk Esenbel: Director of the Asian Studies Center, Bogazici University, Istanbul Turkey, MAP Project (May 2013).
"... Students are very much interested in Asian topics — the rise of China, the brilliant modernization background of Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia. All of these countries and peoples are attracting attention. We have many more students studying these languages than in the past. We are now getting the first crop of academics. People are doing graduate work in Asian economics, politics, and literature ..."


Esenbel, Selçuk and Altay Atli. “Turkey’s Changing Foreign Policy Stance: Getting Closer to Asia?,” MAP Project (September 30, 2013).
Turkey’s foreign policy under the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) government continues to attract widespread attention by scholars and policy circles alike. Over the past decade, the way Turkey has formulated and implemented its policies toward the rest of the world has transformed from a traditionally status quo-ist and reactive stance that emphasizes maintaining close relations with the West to a more assertive, multidimensional, and proactive approach with a broader geographical scope. While the process of accession to the European Union (EU) remains the main axis of its foreign policy, Turkey is now showing greater interest in regions hitherto neglected, including Asia, and this interest is materializing in the form of greater dialogue between countries, expanding economic and commercial relations, and frequent exchanges between peoples.


Fidan, GiraySino-Turkish Relations: An Overview,” MAP Project (October 4, 2013).
Since the West’s economic crisis in 2008, Turkey has been less keen to join the EU, and many Turks have begun to discuss the advantages of being closer to Asia, including China, the pivotal Asian force. China has been Turkey’s third-largest trading partner for ten years now, and this standing even excludes energy imports such as oil and natural gas. While both sides are intent on deepening relations in all aspects, some obstacles must be overcome in the near future, such as the trade deficit between the two countries, which leaves Turkey indebted to the powerhouse that is China to the tune of more than $20 billion annually.


Guo, Changgang. “Turkey: An Increasing Interest for Chinese Academia,”  MAP Project (October 9, 2013).
In recent years, Sino-Turkish relations have grown increasingly close. Sino-Turkish trade, for instance, saw a sharp rise from $4.87 billion in 2005 to $19 billion in 2012, a rise of 292.09 percent. In 2005, 44,077 Chinese citizens traveled to Turkey, and this number rose to 114,582 in 2012—a 159.96 percent increase. 2013 has seen such an overwhelming number of visits and travels to Turkey from China that the Chinese government has adopted some restrictive measures, such as limiting the number of delegations from various levels of government and universities that can make the trip.


Imai, Kohei. “Comparative Middle Power Diplomacies: Turkey and Japan,” MAP Project (November 7, 2013).
Middle power is an opaque term that involves multiple concepts. Through different conceptualizations of the term, Turkey and Japan are both middle powers. Indeed, widely read textbooks about Turkish foreign policy published around 2000 regard Turkey as a middle power. In the Japanese context, several scholars, including Yonosuke Nagai, Yoshikazu Sakamoto, Nobuya Banba, and Mitsuru Yamamoto, have evaluated the foreign policy of their own country as middle power diplomacy since the late 1970s. Recently, Yoshihide Soeya comprehensively summed up Japanese middle power diplomacy after the 1970s.


Imai, Kohei. Turkey's Norm Diffusion Policies toward the Middle East: Turkey’s Role of Norm Entrepreneur and Norm Transmitter, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol. 42 (2011), pp. 27-60.
This paper examines how Turkey has established and transformed particular norms as norm entrepreneur and norm transmitter toward the Middle East from constructivism perspectives. At first part, this study reviews previous studies about norm and norm spread, especially contributions of Florini, Finnemore and Sikkink, and Acharya. In second part, this paper presents framework of Turkey’s norm entrepreneur and norm transmitter roles, and applies it to specific examples. As the examples of norm entrepreneur, Ankara Forum and Turkish model are taken. On the other hand, Turkey’s activities in Democratic Assistance Dialogue and in OIC were examples of norm transmitter.


Idris, Asmady and Ömer Kurtbağ. “Malaysia-Turkey Relations in History and Today,” MAP Project (November 19, 2013).
Malaysia and Turkey lie nearly 5,000 miles and seven time zones apart. They have different historical experiences and state structures. The role that religion plays in their public life also differs markedly. Yet Malaysia and Turkey have more in common than is widely acknowledged. Both are newly industrialized, middle-income, predominantly Muslim countries and mid-sized powers in their respective regions. Both are also expected to assume a greater regional and global role in the coming years.


Kaya, Karen. “Turkey and China: Unlikely Strategic Partners,” Foreign Military Studies Office  (Fort Leavenworth, KS: August 2013). 
In late September-early October 2010 Turkey and China held a bilateral military exercise in Turkey, the first such exercise that China conducted with a NATO member. This, coupled with the numerous high-level diplomatic and military visits between the two countries since 2009, has led to talk of a new “strategic partnership” between Turkey and China. While it is debatable whether the two countries are really at the level of a strategic partnership, the burgeoning Sino-Turkish relationship, which has remained unconsidered and understudied, is worth examining in order to assess the implications it may have for the U.S. and its defense community. This article analyzes the Turkey-China relationship in light of their strategic interests and discusses why it is unlikely that they will become true strategic partners, given the wide divergence between these interests. 


Satana, Nil S. Civilianization of Politics in Turkey. MAP Project (April 16, 2014). 
From the standpoint of Turkish civil-military experts, the concern has never been whether Turkey should civilianize but rather what civilianization would lead to when it was finally achieved. Following the 2013 Gezi protests and the government’s harsh response to the protestors, Turkey’s success in the civilianization of its politics is quickly snowballing into uncertainty.


Sevilla, Henelito A., Jr. “Turkish Cultural Diplomacy in the Philippines,” MAP Project (November 9, 2013).
The Philippines and Turkey have not fully capitalized on their human resources and strategic assets in order to expand commercial ties and boost cultural exchanges. However, thanks largely to the efforts of a critical mass of Turkish nationals who have formed the backbone of a “constituency” for advancing Philippine-Turkey relations, the tide may be turning. Three recent developments indicate that the groundwork is being laid to pursue a more robust bilateral relationship: 1) the opening of Turkish-owned schools operating both in Manila and in Zamboanga City (southern Philippines); 2) the creation of the Pacific Dialogue Foundation in the Philippines; and 3) the establishment of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines.


Tao, Zan. “An Alternative Partner to the West? Turkey’s Growing Relations with China,” MAP Project (October 25, 2013).
The relationship between Turkey and China has rarely been a point of focus for international observers in the early twenty-first century. However, the landscape has recently undergone a dramatic change, with increasing numbers of symposiums, forums, panels, articles, columns, think tanks, and researchers focusing on Sino-Turkish relations in China or in Turkey. The change is mostly due to the impressive rise of both Turkey and China as powers on the regional and global level, respectively. Today, Turkey is the sixteenth largest economy and China the second largest. At the same time, they are more ardently looking at and listening to each other.


Ungor, Cagdas. “Turkey and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Few Shared Values and No Common Destiny,” MAP Project (October 15, 2013).
Almost every written piece on Turkey’s relations with Asia begins with a reference to the ancient Silk Road. When Turkish statesmen address Chinese audiences, they often use this metaphor to point out the “millennia-old cultural exchanges and neighborly relations” between the two countries. Inside Turkey, however, few can make sense of this anachronistic notion of shared identity. Asked about ancient Sino-Turkish ties, many will only recall how the Chinese built the “Great Wall” against the nomadic tribes of Central Asia—considered to be the forefathers of modern Turks.


Ungor, Cagdas. “China Reaches Turkey? Radio Peking’s Turkish Language Broadcasts During the Cold War,” All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012), pp. 19-33.
A young socialist regime with few diplomatic ties in the 1950s and 1960s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) made significant attempts to reach foreign audiences through the use of mass media. Shortwave broadcasting was a particularly significant means of disseminating the PRC’s worldview abroad. Radio Peking’s Turkish language section, which was established in 1957 along with Arabic and Persian broadcasts, signaled China’s desire to reach countries in the Middle East. Predating official Sino-Turkish ties and providing a direct cultural link between China and Turkey at a time when few such channels existed, Radio Peking’s Turkish language broadcasts should be regarded as a significant aspect of Sino-Turkish relations during the Cold War years. Based on recently available Chinese language sources, as well as interviews with retired staff, this article examines Radio Peking’s Turkish language section with regard to its organization, program content and audience from 1957 to 1976. It is significant that the PRC regime continued its Turkish language broadcasts amidst various challenges, such as administrative instability, lack of trained personnel, poor technical equipment and unsatisfactory audience numbers …


Ungor, Cagdas. “Perceptions of China in the Turkish Korean War Narratives,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2006), pp. 405-420.
Turkey’s decision to enter the Korean War in the early 1950s was a major event in the republic’s history. As the country became a NATO member after the war, most scholars see this event as the beginning of a new era in Turkish foreign policy. This article argues that the Korean War has also been important in shaping the long‐term image of East Asian cultures and peoples in Turkish collective memory. The article’s main focus is on the Sino‐Turkish military encounter and the representation of China and the Chinese in the Turkish war memoirs, journals, and other narratives. This study also aims to discuss the critical role of these narratives in constructing a negative image for China while they created a favorable cultural stereotype for Koreans and Japanese.


Zambelis, Chris. “Sino-Turkish Strategic Partnership: Implications of Anatolian Eagle 2010,” China Brief, Vol. 11, Issue 1 (January 14, 2011).
While China cooperates with NATO countries and other members of the international community in anti-piracy operations in the waters off the Horn of Africa, its participation in “Anatolian Eagle” marked the first time it engaged in joint air exercises with a NATO member … There are already signs that “Anatolian Eagle 2010” set a precedent for future joint military exercises, training, and other forms of cooperation between China and Turkey …


UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE)

Janardhan, N. “UAE-Sino ties: Full of energy for synergy,” Khaleej Times, November 7, 2007.
… The fact that Chinese President Hu Jintao visited the UAE in January this year and UAE Minister of Economy Sheikha Lubna Al Qassimi visited China three months later bears testimony to the current level of bilateral engagement between the two countries … The growing ties are anchored in complementarity of economic interests and driven by a rediscovery of ‘East-East’ relations …


Janardhan, N. “UAE and India: Partnership for Progress,” Khaleej Times, November 23, 2010.
In Celebration of a Legendary Friendship is the title of a recent book commemorating age-old UAE-India relations. While there are no second thoughts about the validity of this spirit, the visit of Indian President Pratibha Patil to the UAE serves as a reminder that this time-tested bond, while rooted in the past, needs to recalibrate its approach, focus on the present, and evolve a vision for the future.


Kumar, Rajesh B. “The UAE’s Strategic Trade Partnership with Asia: A Focus on Dubai,” MAP Project (August 19, 2013).
Over the past several decades, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been transformed into one of the world’s most robust economies. The key to the UAE’s success has been economic diversification; indeed, oil now accounts for only one-third of the country’s GDP. According to UAE Ministry of Foreign Trade Reports, the value of non-oil exports increased thirtyfold during the period 1981-2009. Dubai accounted for approximately 82 percent of non-oil exports in the UAE in 2010, while Abu Dhabi accounted for 14 percent. In particular, by setting up over two dozen free zones as platforms for nearly all industry sectors, the UAE has become far less dependent on oil.


Liu, Zongyuan (Zoe). “Rising Chinese Waves in the UAE,” MAP Project (August 2015). The flow of oil and gas from the Persian Gulf to East Asia has rejuvenated the ancient Silk Road, refashioning new networks of collaboration. The energy trade―the backbone of Sino-Middle Eastern ties―has provided the foundation for an increasingly diversified and robust set of relationships between China and the Gulf monarchies. The multidimensional strategic partnership between China and the UAE, in particular, is illustrative of this broader pattern.


Pradhan, Samir. “Dubai: Trade, Transit, and Cultural Amalgamation,” MAP Project (September 6, 2013).
"Open Doors; Open Minds”—the tagline of the Sheikh Mohammed Center for Cultural Understanding (SMCCU), a non-profit organization advocating awareness and understanding among the various cultures that live in Dubai—epitomizes Dubai’s emergence as an international trade and transit hub as well as a place of cultural symbiosis that hosts diverse nationalities from almost all corners of the globe.


Razzouk, Assaad W.  “Art Dubai, Abu Dhabi Art, and the Sharjah Biennale: The Emergence of a Global Art Hub,” MAP Project (August 31, 2013).
While visiting Dubai, Sharjah, and Abu Dhabi frequently over the past 20 years, I couldn’t fail to notice that the three cities have increasingly, inexorably become a metropolitan area, ever merging as they build and develop in each other’s direction.


Scott, Emma. “China’s One Belt One Road Strategy Meets the UAE’s Look East Policy.” China Brief. Vol. 15 (11), Washington DC, The Jamestown Foundation. May 29, 2015. The UAE has become an important commercial focal point for Chinese companies, and the recent high-level diplomacy has showcased China’s intensions to strengthen further ties (MFA, February 14). Yet with the Emirates having own corporations integrated into the global economy, the feasibility of China’s plans to incorporate the UAE into its “One Belt, One Road” initiative has some limits despite the UAE’s “Look East” policy. 


Thafer, Dania. “After the Financial Crisis: Dubai-China Economic Relations,” MAP Project (September 15, 2013).
Dubai is strategically located at a junction between Europe, Africa, and the Far East. For China, an emerging global leader in trade and international business, Dubai is a promising place in which to conduct business. Exploring Dubai-Sino economic relations beckons a more comprehensive understanding of both the level of Dubai’s economic diversification and the impact of the global financial crisis. Dubai’s private sector is extensively engaged in foreign trade, with an emphasis on the service industry. The service industry has three subsectors—tourism, finance, and real estate. Assessing the trajectory of China’s involvement in these three sectors of Dubai’s economy sheds light on how Dubai-Sino economic relations have been affected by the global financial crisis.


Vietnam

al-Tamimi, Naser. “GCC-Vietnam Relations: Hidden Potential,” MAP Project (December 2, 2013).
During the 1970s the Communist Party dominated almost all walks of life in Vietnam. This strict control, especially in regard to the economy, failed to achieve sustainable development. Vietnamese authorities then began to pursue a policy of openness to the outside world, and the Doi Moi, or “renovation,” was launched in 1986. As a result of this and other gradual reforms, Vietnam has become one of the fastest-growing economies in Asia, with annual GDP growth averaging 7.1 percent between 2000 and 2012—a rate that the country is expected to sustain over the next decade. In this context, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-Vietnam relations are promising and may develop steadily over the coming years.


YEMEN

Bubalo, Anthony, Sarah Phillips and Samina Yasmeen. “Talib or Taliban? Indonesian students in Pakistan and Yemen,” joint paper of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, the Centre for International Security Studies and the Centre for Muslim States and Societies, September 2011.
This paper looks at the issue of Indonesian students who study at Islamic educational institutions in Pakistan and Yemen. Its primary goal is to understand whether the presence of Indonesian students at Islamic institutions in Pakistan and Yemen poses a risk, either in terms of radicalisation, or in the formation (or re-formation) of direct contacts between Indonesian extremist groups and counterparts in these countries such as al-Qaeda …


CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS [SECURITY SECTOR REFORM]

Al-Dawsari, Nadwa. “The Popular Committees of Abyan, Yemen: A Necessary Evil or an Opportunity for Security Reform?” MAP Project (March 5, 2014). In early 2011, Yemeni youths took to the street to demand the downfall of the regime and much-needed democratic reforms. This eventually led to the removal of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh from power later the same year. The political turmoil associated with the uprising has resulted in an alarming deterioration of the security situation throughout the country, most notably the seizure of two major cities in the southern governorate of Abyan by Ansar al-Shariah (AAS), an offshoot of al-Qa`ida. Backed by the Yemeni government, the Popular Committees (PCs), local armed resistance groups, pushed AAS out of major cities in Abyan.


Chambers, Paul. Obstacles to Civilian Control of the Security Sector in Thailand. MAP Project (March 18, 2014).
Over 30 military coups and coup attempts have taken place in Thailand since 1932, when absolute monarchy was overthrown, the latest of which was in 2006. Clearly, achieving democratic civilian control over Thai security forces remains a daunting challenge. When we talk about Thai security forces, we are referring to the country’s army, navy, air force, police, and paramilitaries. The army is much larger than the other services, although the police force is also quite sizeable. Soldiers and police have tended to obey elected civilian authorities due to partisan connections or simply because the appearance of compliance is convenient. But in actuality the security forces are generally insulated from the sanction of elected governments.


Cook, Steven A. Closing the Channels of the Military's Economic Influence in Turkey. MAP Project (April 20, 2014).
After a decade of working to subordinate Turkey’s military establishment so that it cannot influence the trajectory of Turkish politics, closing the channels of the military’s economic influence has been part of this process. Despite early expectations, the AKP has not forged a more democratic and liberal Turkey, but there is no denying the critical importance of its successful effort to institutionalize civilian control of the armed forces.


Delos Reyes, Allan and Maria Anna Rowena Luz G. Layador. Security Sector Reform in the Philippines. MAP Project (May 9, 2014). 
The Philippines is often described as having one of the most vibrant civil societies in Asia. In the last three decades, the country has been home to two mass mobilizations that led to regime change. These mobilizations and other robust civil society initiatives have been attributed to “both political and social [movements] that were nurtured by politicized sectors of society for almost half a century.”


Droz-Vincent, Philippe. Civilianizing the State: Reflections on the Egyptian Conundrum. MAP Project (May 14, 2014).
The military, though it has been the most powerful and influential actor during Egypt’s transition since 2011, is not the great deus ex machina of the Egyptian system. Rather, it is an actor that, since the fall of Mubarak, has managed to maintain some organizational coherence and legitimacy and has served as the convener for various and changing forces that are the crux of a new ruling coalition. Consequently, civilianizing the Egyptian state will require that security sector reforms be embedded in a broader set of political reforms.


Jaraba, Mahmoud. The Egyptian Military’s Economic Channels of Influence. MAP Project (May 14, 2014).
Egypt’s new constitution grants the country’s generals greater autonomy and an increased formal political role. The draft authorizes military trials for civilians (Article 204) and ensures that the military’s budget be beyond civilian scrutiny. The most significant change is that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) will have the final say in choosing or dismissing the defense minister for two presidential terms (Article 234).


Kim, Insoo. South Korea’s Immature Professionalism in the Security Sector. MAP Project (March 13, 2014).
It is widely accepted that South Korea has successfully consolidated democracy. For example, U.S. President Barack Obama cited South Korea as an exemplary case of economic growth and democracy in his famous speech at Cairo University on June 4, 2009. Two years later, when Egypt underwent a civil uprising that brought to an end the country’s decades-old Mubarak regime, he lauded South Korea’s democracy once again, suggesting that “Egypt could transform itself into a democracy on the model of Indonesia, Chile, or South Korea.” By 2013, however, alleged election fraud in South Korea had damaged the international reputation of its mature democracy. The Democratic Party—the country’s main opposition party—publicly called the 2012 presidential election unfair because the National Intelligence Service (NIS) had manipulated public opinion prior to the election, leaving disparaging comments about opposition party candidate Moon Jae-in on popular websites.


Özpek, Burak Bilgehan. Maliki and the Security Sector in Iraq. MAP Project (Aril 8, 2014).
It would be unfair to argue that democracy fails to provide stability in divided societies or that democracy cannot work in Iraq. Instead, the term “democracy” should be redefined to take free market principles into consideration. As the Iraq case shows, any political group, party, or figure can manipulate the democratic system if the state apparatus controls the distribution of economic resources. If, as in the case of Iraq, a political arrangement, constitution, or power-sharing formula results in a specific group gaining control of the distribution of economic resources, this imbalance will be reflected in the composition of the security forces as well as in their mission and activities, and it will likely result in the emergence of (armed) actors in opposition to them.


Mattes, Hanspeter. Challenges to State Building after the Fall of Qaddafi. MAP Project (April 3, 2014).
The fall of the Qaddafi regime and the loss of the state monopoly on violence gave way to a duopoly of power in Libya whereby rudimentary “national” forces—under the control of the National Transitional Council (NTC) from March 2011 to August 2012—were established in competition with the non-state “Revolutionary Brigades,” which had borne the brunt of the military struggle against Qaddafi’s forces. Since then, the Revolutionary Brigades have increasingly sought to assert themselves in the political arena.


Roumani, Jacques. Libya on the Brink: Insecurity, Localism, and the State Not Back In. MAP Project (March 12, 2014).
The Libyan uprising launched almost three years ago has yet to produce the promised transition to a new post-Qaddafi political order. The moment of unity generated by toppling the tyrant has fragmented due to the fact that, unlike Tunisia or Egypt, no state apparatus existed to take over from the victorious rebels. Transitional authorities under the National Transitional Council (NTC, March 2011-August 2012) were too weak to govern and acquire legitimacy. Their successor 200-member constituent assembly, the General National Congress (GNC) elected in July 2012, has not fared much better due to dysfunctional politics, factional disputes, pervasive distrust, a legacy of institutional destruction, and sporadic resistance by former members and supporters of the toppled regime, as well as historical, regional, and tribal cleavages.


Satana, Nil S. Civilianization of Politics in Turkey. MAP Project (April 16, 2014). 
From the standpoint of Turkish civil-military experts, the concern has never been whether Turkey should civilianize but rather what civilianization would lead to when it was finally achieved. Following the 2013 Gezi protests and the government’s harsh response to the protestors, Turkey’s success in the civilianization of its politics is quickly snowballing into uncertainty.


Woo, Jongseok. Democratization and Building a Democratic Army: Lessons from South Korea. MAP Project (March 28, 2014).
Democratization in a country is not just about electing new leaders through free, fair, and competitive elections; it entails a much more comprehensive political overhaul, including deposing ruling elites from the previous autocratic regime, building workable democratic institutions with a new constitution, reaping support from pro-democracy civil society groups, and managing national security and order. Possibly the most significant factor in the success or failure of a state’s democratic transition and subsequent consolidation is establishing a firm and democratic control over the armed forces. Without depoliticizing the once-politically dominant military and making top military officials politically neutral and subordinated under democratically elected leaders, the post-democratization political process of a nation is destined to be highly unstable and most likely will derail from the route to democratic consolidation.


CROSS-REGIONAL DYNAMICS

Bubalo, Anthony and Malcolm Cook. “Horizontal Asia,” The American Interest (April-May 2010), pp. 12-19.
Conventional wisdom now intones that the 21st century will be the Asian century, with power shifting inexorably away from the West toward that vast and, for many Westerners, rather vague entity called Asia. If this is the case, and there are grounds for believing it is, we need to clarify what exactly (or even approximately) we mean by ‘Asia’”…


Calabrese, John.  “The Consolidation of Gulf-Asia Relations: Washington Tuned In or Out of Touch?” MEI Policy Brief (June 2009).
To many American policymakers and opinion leaders, the term “Gulf-Asia Relations” is merely an abstraction. To some, it is synonymous with China’s rising oil import dependence on the Gulf. The United States, long accustomed to being the predominant external actor in East and West Asia and preoccupied with issues specific to each region, has yet to examine systematically the salience, full scope and implications of burgeoning Gulf-Asia ties, much less to adjust its policies to them …


Cruz-del Rosario, Teresita and James M. Dorsey. The Arab Revolts and South East Asia: What Impact and What Influence?Actuelle de l'Ifri, June 19, 2012.
... The consequences of the wave of Arab protests on Southeast Asian countries carry their load of opportunities and risks for governments, in political, social and economic terms. But the impact is not one way, and Southeast Asian experiences could represent a source of inspiration ...


Davidson, Christopher. “Persian Gulf — Pacific Asia linkages in the 21st century: a marriage of convenience?” Research Paper, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, The London School of Economics (January 2010).
An important new relationship is developing between the six monarchies of the Persian Gulf — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — and the three most industrialized states of Pacific Asia – China, Japan and South Korea …


Dorsey, James M. "The Arab Revolts and South East Asia: What Impact?" Actuelle de L'lfri (June 22, 2012).
Southeast Asia experienced its own political upheavals well before the Arab revolts. Nevertheless, the wave of popular uprisings that shook the Middle-East and North Africa region goes far beyond the region’s boundaries, and Southeast Asia is no exception to the global crisis of confidence towards governments ...


Dorsey, James M. "The Arab Revolts: Impact on Central Asia," RSIS Commentary, No. 161 (August 27, 2012).
The rise of Islamist forces in the complicated post-revolt transition in the Middle East and North Africa may have an impact on post-Soviet states in Central Asia, that are still struggling with transition to democracy or have yet to experience popular revolts.


Hashimoto, Naofumi, “The US 'Pivot' to the Asia-Pacific and US Policy: Towards and Integrated Approach,” MAP Project (March 2013).
The purposes of this essay are twofold: 1) to bring to light the nuances and dual character of the US “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific, and 2) to suggest ways by which the strategic guidance could be further elaborated or modified so that the prospects for stability and security both in this region and in the Middle East are enhanced.


Ianchovichina, Elena, Maros Ivanic and Will Martin, “Implications of the Growth of China and India for the Middle East and North Africa,” Journal of Developing Societies, Vol. 2, No. 4 (October 2007), pp. 397-434.
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is expected to benefit more than most other regions from continued rapid growth in China and India. This paper analyzes the trade-related implications of this growth for the MENA countries using a global general equilibrium model, modified to take into account the focus of China and, increasingly, India on exports of manufactures from global production chains. We find that most of the gains to the MENA region come from improvements in the terms of trade, particularly linked to increasing demand for energy. Increased competition from China and India in third markets, coupled with increased domestic demand due to the terms of trade improvement, would reduce aggregate exports by MENA countries, although exports from the non-oil economies will likely expand. In the oil-exporting countries of the Middle East, Dutch-disease effects increase the importance of policies to promote adjustment to the changing world environment and to take advantage of the opportunities created by the growth of China and India.


Ismail, Norafidah. "The Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD): Progress and Potential," MAP Project (May 2013).
The Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) is an Asia-wide cooperation framework founded in 2002. What, if any progress has the ACD made in achieving its stated objectives and in developing a “Pan-Asian Community” since then? This essay discusses the ACD’s progress in four project areas (i.e., e-education, energy, agriculture, and finance), the convening of the First ACD Summit (in October 2012), as well as the participation of the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) and Iran in the ACD’s functioning and development.


Janardhan, N. “An Asian Asia,” Khaleej Times, December 29, 2011.
… After centuries of colonialism and global domination by the West, Asia is on the cusp of re-emerging not only as a dominant economic power, but also as a potential political force. However, just as Asia became a source of attraction for the West at the peak of its economic prowess, history is repeating itself.


Niblock, Tim. “Southeast Asia and the Gulf: Convergence and Competition in the Wider Asian Context,” Asia and the Gulf, MEI (NUS) Middle East Papers, Vol. 1 (Spring 2012), pp. 3-21.
The shift in the balance of the global economic order has become increasingly apparent … The role of the Gulf region is of particular significance in the current shifts in the global economy. In some respects the Gulf, itself part of Asia, constitutes one dimension of the shift in power … The economies of the Gulf have traditionally been closely linked to those of the Western world, yet non-Middle Eastern Asia has become increasingly active and involved there … How the Gulf countries balance and manage their relationships with East/South Asia and the West is, therefore, an important issue for the future for all of the parties involved (the Gulf countries, the West, and non-Middle Eastern Asia …


Sevilla, Henelito A., Jr. “The Philippines' Elusive Quest for Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Observer Status,” MAP Project (May 2013).
This essay presents the official rationale for and position of the Government of Philippines regarding its longstanding quest for OIC observer status and analyzes the domestic considerations and external variables that have had a bearing on its candidacy.


culture AND society

Armijo, Jacqueline M. and Lina M. Kassen. “Turning East: The Social and Cultural Implications of the Gulf’s Increasingly Strong Economic and Strategic Relations,” Asia and the Gulf, MEI (NUS) Middle East Papers, Vol. 1 (Spring 2012), pp. 22-45.
Although scholars had long believed that trade between the port cities of the Gulf and the southeast coast of China had flourished from the early days of Islam, it was not until 1998 that evidence appeared not only documenting this early trade, but also revealing the extent of the trade …


Alatas, Ismail Fajrie. “Between Abu Dhabi and Java: A Transnational Hadrawmi Family in an Era of Nation States,” Asia and the Gulf, MEI (NUS) Middle East Papers, Vol. 1 (Spring 2012), pp. 46-65.
Globalization, an idea that enjoyed its heyday in the 1990s, seems today to be seen as an increasingly problematic concept. The assumption that a single system of connection, notably through capital and commodities markets as well as information flows, has penetrated the globe is no longer considered in a very positive light” …


Bagher, Hanieh Mohammad and Seyed Mansour Sajed. “The Artistic Activities of Iranian Immigrants in Malaysia,” MAP Project (August 6, 2013).
Popular art produced by immigrant artists reflects their special circumstances, namely the challenges and limitations associated with navigating two cultures. Such is the case for many Iranian artists in Malaysia who have nonetheless overcome these obstacles to create art.


Cruz-del Rosario, Teresita and James M. Dorsey. Street, Shrine, Square and Soccer Pitch: Comparative Protest Spaces in Asia and the Middle East, RSIS Working Paper, No. 230, November 8, 2011.
Shrines, squares and soccer stadiums have provided the settings for anti-government protests and people power in Southeast Asia and the Middle East in recent decades. At times used for mass detentions and torture of regime opponents by the security forces in the Middle East and North Africa, soccer stadiums became battlefields of resistance by soccer fans against autocratic rulers as the fans became politicized, clashing with security forces and increasingly using matches to shout anti-government slogans. The authors project those spaces as venues of political entitlement. They enabled protestors to overcome fear in confronting the regime in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, Benghazi and elsewhere. They also generated a sense of entitlement and demands for far-reaching reforms in post-revolution Egypt and other North African and Middle Eastern countries. 


Fozi, Navid. “The Iranian Diaspora in Malaysia: Emergent Pluralism,” MAP Project (July 10, 2013).
The Iranian diaspora in Malaysia is incredibly diverse. Supporters of the Green Movement, students, individuals who fast and pray and those who do not know the direction of the qibla, clerics who promote secularism and those who promote the authority of the vilayat-i faqih, Iranian Kurds, Turks, and Arabs, journalists, artists, and environmentalists: all these—and more—constitute the community of Iranians who have fled or quietly moved to Malaysia.


Galal, Mohamed Noman. "Dialogue Among Civilizations and Its Relevance for the 21st Century," seminar paper, Shanghai, China (January 1, 2011).
... Dialogue is ... an essential prerequisite to enabling millions of people in conflict torn societies around the globe to narrow their differences, heal their wounds and promote their involvement in a peace process in society and among nations ...


Galal, Mohamed Noman. "Harmony in Chinese and Muslim Cultures: A search for common denominators," paper presented at the Cultural Forum, Beijing, China (2011).
There are various philosophical concepts that explain inter-human relations throughout the march of human history.  Prominent among them are two concepts: the concept of Conflict and the concept of Harmony. One could trace these two concept in Western, Chinese and Muslim Civilizations alike. However, [this paper is limited to] Chinese and Muslim Civilizations with a quick reference to the Western one ...


Jahangiri, Pegah. “Iranians in Malaysia: Batik Artist Pegah Jahangiri,” MAP Project (July 19, 2013).
Artist Pegah Jahangiri hails from Tehran, but is currently a doctoral student in visual arts at the University of Malaya, Malaysia. She recently spoke to MEI about her work with batik, strikingly dyed cloth found all over the world, but particularly popular and refined in Southeast Asia.


Marcinkowski, Christoph. “Historical Dimensions of the Shi`a in Southeast Asia,” MAP Project  (July 17, 2013).
Shafi`i Sunnis dominate the Malay-Indonesian world, including Singapore, southern Thailand, and the southern Philippines. Shafi`is also constitute the majority of southern India’s Muslim population, a fact that is of historical relevance to the Islamization of Southeast Asia. Persia, too, was one of the centers of Shafi`i Sunni scholarship prior to the establishment there of Twelver Shi`ism as the “religion of state” in 1501 under the Safavid dynasty. Yet there is also a Shi`i presence in Southeast Asia, and it is not simply a result of post-1979 events in Iran. It is rooted in a historical trajectory, especially of Islamic mysticism, or Sufism.


Marcinkowski, Christoph. “The Iranian Shi`i Diaspora in Malaysia,” MAP Project  (July 17, 2013).
Malaysia―a majority Muslim but multi-religious Southeast Asian country, a leading member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and one of Asia’s “tiger economies”―is home to tens of thousands of Iranian citizens and of Malaysian (formerly Sunni) converts to Shi`ism. According to conservative estimates, in Kuala Lumpur alone there reside about 100,000 Iranian nationals, including university teachers, students, and especially businesspeople―among them adherents of various political positions.


Nejad, Alireza Salehi. Iranians in Malaysia: Businessman Alireza Salehi Nejad. MAP Project (July 25, 2013).
Alireza Salehi Nejad, an Iranian citizen who resided in Malaysia from 2007 through 2010 as a student and then a businessman, recently spoke with MEI about his experiences living in Kuala Lumpur. He graduated from Asia Pacific University (APU), a partner of Staffordshire University in Malaysia, with a degree in business information technology and then established a consulting company whose clients are foreigners who wish to invest their capital in Southeast Asia, particularly in Malaysia, and Malaysian residents who wish to invest in other countries, especially in the Middle East and Western Europe. Alireza also founded a mountaineering club, which boasts more than 700 members, the majority being from Malaysia, Iran, Pakistan, Tanzania, Indonesia, and Kazakhstan.


Razzouk, Assaad W. An Artistic Dialogue Shows the Absence of Cultural Exports from the Arab World. MAP Project (December 12, 2014).
The exceptionalism of Thaer Maarouf and Jason Tecson is that they reached over a cultural desert to talk to each other and to serve as catalysts of multi-contextual significance—emphasizing that beyond conflicts, it is traditions, culture, and history that define people today. The Arab world would do well to learn from their exchange. Exporting the distinguished culture of the Middle East is critical in any effort to counter the barbaric images of the region currently shaping Asia’s view of Arabs.


Razzouk, Assaad W. “The Songkok and Raouf Rifai's Darwiche: A Cultural Dialogue between the Middle East and Southeast Asia,” MAP Project (March 2013).
... Rifai’s art seamlessly travels to Southeast Asia and integrates in its cultural scene ... More broadly, Darwiche is conversing with Southeast Asia, leveraging common cultural roots to highlight how art can transcend the particular and speak to the universal, portraying and negotiating the neuroses of society with wit, depth and passion.


Razzouk, Assaad W.  “Art Dubai, Abu Dhabi Art, and the Sharjah Biennale: The Emergence of a Global Art Hub,” MAP Project (August 31, 2013).
While visiting Dubai, Sharjah, and Abu Dhabi frequently over the past 20 years, I couldn’t fail to notice that the three cities have increasingly, inexorably become a metropolitan area, ever merging as they build and develop in each other’s direction.


Razzouk, Assaad W. “Showcasing Middle Eastern Art in Southeast Asia,” MAP Project (December 2012).
There is an explosion of artistic creativity in the Middle East; contemporary Middle Eastern art should have a positive reception in a region with strong affinities to the Middle East ...


Saade, Bashir. “East Meets East – A Shakuhachi and Nay Duo” MAP Project (September 16, 2013).
Instruments such as the shakuhachi and the nay—though both many centuries old—have seldom met because they come from very distant places. The nay is a piece of reed from the Middle East, while the shakuhachi is bamboo from Japan. Although very simple in substance and shape, their sound has a strong character because they have grown to represent in the most complex ways what they have inherited from the past. When Kamal Helou, my musical partner, and I made these two instruments converse, we knew that we were forcing the laws of time. We found the first musical contact timid—both the shakuhachi and the nay imposing their characters, clinging to their traditional aesthetics. The shakuhachi is sharp and focused, the nay moving and warm. Yet the similarities were evident, both instruments having come to reflect similar ethical questions—the universality of being and the intuition of the soul.


Simpfendorfer, Ben. “Singapore’s Hadrawmi Community in Today’s Economy,” MEI (NUS) Insights (March 2010).
The Middle East is one of the world’s fastest growing markets. Singapore has a long history of trade with the region owing to its Hadrami community. Yet, the city has not fully capitalized on the Middle East’s more recent booming growth. Finding a role for the Hadrami community could well help to unlock the Middle East’s potential. However, the community cannot be expected to play the same role as it did in the past, as its population is too small and its economic influence too diminished. Nonetheless, trade theory suggests the Hadrami community’s historical legacy could play a role in developing Singapore’s services trade with the Middle East.


Yaghoubi, Asghar. “Iranians in Malaysia: Artist Asghar Yaghoubi and His 'Journey Within,'” MAP Project (July 26, 2013).
Artist Asghar Yaghoubi, who was born in Shiraz, Iran, moved to Malaysia in 2008. An accomplished painter and sculptor, he also teaches art at the Cube Gallery, of which he is the founder and director. The gallery is the first and only art gallery in Southeast Asia owned by an Iranian.


ECONOMY, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

Abu-Hussin, Mohd Fauzi. “Gulf Arab Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): ASEAN Targets of Opportunity,” MAP Project (March 2013).
Although China and India have been new favorable destinations for Arab investors, Southeast Asian countries offer distinctive and profitable investment markets, featuring high demand and relatively low labor costs. In recent years, investments from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have surged.


Abu-Hussin, Mohd Fauzi, Ahmad Azam bin Sulaiman, and Mohd Yahya bin Mohd Hussin, “Capturing Arab gulf market: An analysis of Malaysian exports competitiveness in the market,” African Journal of Business Management, Vol. 5, No. 21 (2011), pp. 8521-8535.
…  Arab Gulf countries appear to be a new destination for Malaysia’s trade and investment. Malaysia recently has implemented a new approach to its international trade strategies by shifting from dependency on traditional exports markets (US, Japan and EU) to Asian and Middle East orientation (BNM, 2010, NEAC, 2010). Middle East markets especially Arab Gulf Countries are seen as potential emerging market for the Malaysian economy …


Abu-Hussin, Mohd Fauzi. Exploring International Trade between Malaysia and GCC Countries: Empirical Analysis on Trends, Developments and Challenges, PhD Thesis, Durham University, United Kingdom (2010).
… One of the main aims of this research is to explore in detail bilateral trade relations between Malaysia and the GCC countries and their determinants … Based on the findings, it can be said that trade relations with the GCC countries is still insignificant in comparison to that with Malaysia’s major trading partners. Nevertheless, due to Malaysia’s niche products, expansion strategy of services sectors in both Malaysia and the GCC countries and the existence of favourable countries to trade in the GCC, these may create huge potential for expansion. The findings also reveal that, cultural differences and lack of capital have been the major problems for Malaysian businessmen in doing business with the GCC region. The findings also indicate that there is a growing interest in establishing a Malaysia–GCC free trade agreement as shown by Malaysian traders …


Abu-Hussin, Mohd Fauzi and Asmak Binti Ab Rahman. “GCC Economic Integration: Challenge and Opportunity for Malaysian Economy,” The Journal of International Social Research, Vol. 2, No. 9 (2009), pp. 43-55.
…The economic tie between Malaysia and GCC has been remarkable particularly on trade, oil sources as well as investment opportunities for Malaysia. At the same time, recent development shows that, the GCC nations also investing and participating in Malaysian economy and this contributing considerably its economic growth. Given this background, the objectives of this paper are first to analyse GCC economic condition from Malaysian perspective and secondly to highlight the economic co-operation at the intra-regional level between GCC and Malaysia. In doing so, this paper will particularly look into the trends, level and few other aspects of its trade and economic relation with the GCC members, and the benefit that gained by Malaysian investors as well as expatriates investing and working in this region …


Abudu, Shalamu, Zhuping Sheng, Chunliang Cui, and Donghai Guan. “The Karez System in China’s Xinjiang Region,” MAP Project (January 17, 2014).
The water harvesting and underground transmission system called a karez in the Uygur language, or kan er jing in Mandarin, has provided sustainable water supplies in some communities of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang), China for over 2,000 years. These water systems have also been used in countries in North Africa and West Asia, as well as other Asian countries, including Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan.


Beng, Phar Kim and Vic Y.W. Li. “China’s Energy Dependence on the Middle East: Boon or Bane for Asian Security?" The China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2005), pp. 19-26.
… [O]ne of China’s present acute pre-occupations is the stability and security of its energy supply, especially from the Middle Eastern region which currently supplies up to 57 percent of China’s overall oil usage/imports …


Bubalo, Anthony and Mark Thirwell. “New Rules for a new great game: Northeast Asian energy insecurity and the G20,” Lowy Institute Policy Brief (November 2006).
… The purpose of this Policy Brief is to examine the risks that the competition for oil resources might pose for international security, focusing particularly on the relationships between the United States, Middle East oil producers and major Northeast energy consumers, and to propose a mechanism for defusing some of the risks that this competition could entail …


Bubalo, Anthony and Mark Thirwell. “Energy insecurity: China, India and Middle East oil,” Lowy Institute Issues Brief (December 14, 2004).
… The rapid expansion of their economies has seen China and India become voracious consumers of energy. Oil, much of it imported from the Middle East, has become an increasingly important part of their energy needs. … As a result, energy security has become a key foreign policy objective and, particularly in the case of China, is shaping their approach to the Middle East. This issue brief provides an overview of current energy demand trends and raises for discussion some of the potential longer term strategic implications of this growing dependence on Mid-East oil.


Calabrese, John.  “Taiwan and the Gulf: The Sky’s the Limit?” Middle East Institute (MEI) Analysis (July 2012).
Dubai’s Burj Khalifa and Taiwan’s Taipei 101 tower, the world’s two tallest skyscrapers, differ in height by a stunning 1,076 feet, are separated by nearly 4,000 miles of ocean, and are situated in countries and regions which, linguistically and culturally, have little in common ― except business. Business between East Asia and the Gulf has continued to flourish in spite of and partly because of the global economic recession. Economic ties between Taiwan and the Gulf countries are, in some ways, illustrative of this broader interregional phenomenon. Yet, Taiwan itself, and by extension its relations with the Gulf countries are sui generis …


Calabrese, John.  “Japan’s New Energy Future and the Middle East,” Middle East Institute (MEI) Analysis (June 2012).
Over the past three decades, Japan has taken significant steps to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels and diversify its foreign sources of supply. Nevertheless, coal, oil, and natural gas have continued to dominate Japan’s fuel mix … Japan is also the world’s largest LNG importer. Furthermore, energy supplies from the Middle East, and from the Gulf in particular, remain critically important to the well-being of the Japanese economy ― all the more since the Fukushima disaster …


Calabrese, John. China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1998), pp. 351-366.
Energy cooperation is the dominant aspect of expanding relations between China and the Persian Gulf countries ... In pursuing its objectives in the Gulf, China has encountered as many challenges as opportunities -- in the form of regional crises and conflicts, as well as US pressure ...


Calabrese, John.  “Dueling Stakeholders in Iran’s Energy Projects,” Gulf-Asia Research Bulletin, 1 (April 2007), pp. 15–20.
In February 2004, Japan’s Inpex Corporation signed a preliminary accord with Iran to develop Azadegan, one of the world’s largest oilfields. The following October, the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) agreed in principle to join forces with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to develop the massive Yadavaran oilfield. Yet, more than two years later, neither of these headline-grabbing deals has been implemented. The twists and turns in bringing these proposed mega-projects to fruition lay bare a tangle of economic and geopolitical issues …


Calabrese, John.  “The Iraq Energy Factor in Sino-Japanese Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 7, No. 6 (March 2007).
Iraq could soon emerge as an important new focal point of intensifying Chinese and Japanese commercial diplomacy and energy rivalry, in spite of their extensive overlapping interests and mutually beneficial economic ties. It is difficult to determine whether friction over energy-related matters is a symptom or an additional cause of the strained relationship between China and Japan. What is indisputable, however, is that these energy concerns have become foreign policy priorities in both Beijing and Tokyo, spurred by the debate over “peak oil,” the spike in world oil prices and heightened concerns about possible supply disruptions …


Calabrese, John.  “Dragon by the Tail: China’s Energy Quandary,” MEI Perspective (March 2004).
This paper examines the implications for the United States of China’s emergence as a major oil importer, and of China’s reliance on Middle Eastern oil in particular. To the extent that Chinese authorities consider this dependence to be a strategic liability, what adjustments have they made to minimize the risks associated with it? In what ways does China’s increasing dependence on foreign oil imports intersect with American interests? Given the overall climate of Sino-American relations, what can the United States do, or refrain from doing, to help ensure that China manages its growing energy dependence in a manner that contributes to stability and prosperity in the Middle East and East Asia? …


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. “Iraq's Oil Sector Open for Business: The Asia Connection,” MAP Project (May 2013).
Post-occupation Iraq's oil production ― buoyed by the existence of vast unexploited reserves ― is resurgent ... The Iraq-Asia oil connection — an important feature of the changing global energy landscape — is already firmly established and developing rapidly.


Devadason, Evelyn S., Ahmad Zubaidi Baharumshah and Thirunaukarasu Subramaniam.Leveraging Trade Opportunities with Non-Traditional Partners: The Malaysia-GCC Perspective,” Conference Paper (November 2011).
This paper examines the impact of economic factors on bilateral trade flows between Malaysia and the GCC through estimations of panel data using a gravity model. In particular, the paper compares the determinants of bilateral trade between Malaysia and two regions, the non-traditional Gulf alliance and the traditional ASEAN counterpart, to provide insights for leveraging opportunities through trade with the former. The gravity estimates imply the importance of size effects, similarities in GDP and differences in factor endowments as drivers of trade flows between Malaysia and the GCC, underlying the fact that inter-industry trade dominates these flows. The opposite holds in the case for the Malaysia-ASEAN trade. The Gulf region therefore provides opportunities for Malaysia to export quantity-based final (end-use) products and to diversify its exporting strategy away from quality-based parts and components.


Dorraj, Manochehr and James E. English. “China’s Strategy for Energy Acquisition in the Middle East: Potential for Conflict and Cooperation with the United States,” Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 4, Issue 2 (2012), pp. 173-191.
In this article, the authors examine China's evolving energy strategy in the Middle East, particularly in the three countries that have the largest energy reserves and form the epicenter of the U.S.-China rivalry: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. With $3 trillion in foreign currency reserves, Beijing is increasingly using its cash to secure future long-term access to energy in the region. Through energy-backed loans, as well as upstream and downstream joint ventures, China’s policy banks and its national oil companies are pumping up the volume of oil and gas that will flow from the Middle East to the mainland in the 21st century. At the same time, Beijing is embedding itself deeply in the economies of these major oil-producing states through expanded bilateral trade involving multiple sectors of the Chinese economy. Beijing's monetary strength, coupled with its lack of military involvement and political baggage in the region, has China poised to benefit from its expansive access to the region’s energy resources. This article critically examines the political implications of China's energy acquisition strategy, the potential for conflict as well as cooperation with the United States, and the possibility of the realignment of great powers in the Middle East.


Dorraj, Manochehr and Carrie Liu Currier. “Lubricated with Oil: Iran-China Relations in a Changing World,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 15, Issue 2 (2008), pp. 66-80.
China and Iran are emerging powers with increasingly significant political and economic relations that have regional and global dimensions. In this article, we set out to explore the historical roots, evolution and development of this relationship with a particular emphasis on the period since the Islamic revolution of 1979 …


Doshi, Tilak K. The Asia-Pacific in the 'Golden Age Age of Gas': Implications for Middle East LNG Exporters MAP Project (April 2013).
The recent unconventional natural gas boom and the consequent gas glut in North America has the potential to fundamentally transform the dynamics of the global natural gas industry ... The Asian LNG market is imperfectly competitive ― Asia–Pacific countries such as Japan and South Korea source their LNG imports from a limited number of countries which hold significant market power and can charge high prices ... Qatar, as the world’s largest single LNG exporter, will be at the forefront of competition with key players in both the European and Asian markets ...


Doshi, Tilak K. and Adi Imsirovic. “The ‘Asian premium’ in crude oil markets: Fact or Fiction? In Zhao, Diaojing (Ed.) Managing Regional Energy Vulnerabilities in East Asia (Routledge/Warwick Studies, 2012).
There is a widely held perception that Asian customers have been paying a premium for Middle East crude oil, relative to their counterparts in the USA and Europe. This has led to calls for intervention among some observers of the Asian crude oil market in order to mitigate the so-called ‘Asian premium’ ... In this chapter, we seek to investigate the basis of arguments that assert the existence of the Asian premium ...


Eid-Oakden, Florence and Charlene Rahall. Arab FDI “Pivots” to China. MAP Project (October 16, 2014).
Thanks to unprecedented current account surpluses, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are investing billions abroad and looking more toward the East. The GCC’s growing trade ties with China have been accompanied by encouraging development in investment relations. For these countries, investment projects in China promise access not only to large and rapidly growing energy markets, but also to other booming sectors.


Jaffe, Amy Myers. “Energy Security: Implications for US-China-Middle East Relations,” The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy (2004).
In the 1970s, as the West struggled with the nearly insurmountable challenges presented by two successive Middle East oil crises, the problem failed to grab the attention of Asian elites, with a few exceptions such as Japan. Many Asian powers, notably India, China, South Korea and Indonesia were energy self-sufficient and thereby naturally shielded from the economic and political dislocation with the West’s first big lessons in energy security. Thirty years later, the situation is quite different. Asian leaders are suddenly facing the same dilemmas seen in the West three decades earlier …


Janardhan, N. “Economy first, what next?Khaleej Times, February 20, 2006.
King Abdullah’s four-nation tour in January set the stage for a dynamic relationship with Asia not only for Saudi Arabia, but also for the other five Gulf Cooperation Council countries. The visit was a recognition of the increasing importance of Asia as an economic ally at a time when the GCC economies are robust following high oil prices and need new avenues to invest.


Janardhan, N.  “Gulf-India ties get a new lease of life,” Khaleej Times, September 3, 2005.
The foundation of relations between the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and India are strong enough given the historic links, presence of about four million Indians in the region, about $5 billion in annual remittance and a potential $15-billion-plus trade bill in 2005. Though both are beginning to see eye-to-eye politically as well, trade will remain the bedrock of their bilateral ties.


Jang, Ji-Hyang and Peter Lee. “Oil Price Stability Expected Despite the Iranian Crisis: Iran Striving for Depoliticized OPEC,” Issue Brief No. 20, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, March 9, 2012. 
The international standoff over Iran’s nuclear program has entered its most volatile phase to date. In light of the deteriorating security situation evidenced by an escalating series of sanctions, assassination attempts, and growing talk of a preemptive military strike against Tehran’s nuclear facilities, the region is facing one of its most dangerous periods ever. Not surprisingly, this crisis continues to affect crude oil prices ...


Jin, Liangxiang. “Energy First: China and the Middle East,” Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2005), pp. 3-10.
China’s Middle East policy is undergoing a major shift. Traditionally, Beijing considered the region too distant for significant investment and instead limited its efforts to convincing Arab capitals to sever their ties to Taiwan and establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic … But Chinese passivity in the region may end in coming years, as the Chinese government's need to achieve energy security forces a more active policy.


Lee, Henry and Dan A. Shalmon. “Searching for Oil: China’s Initiatives in the Middle East,” Environment (June 2007).
 In a world in which the supply of oil is limited by geology and politics, China’s determination to fuel its rapidly growing economy is seen by many as a looming source of conflict. It is not simply the geographic breadth of China’s initiatives that cause anxiety in Western capitals but also its willingness to enter into economic arrangements with “rogue” states …


Leverett, Flynt and Jeffrey Bader. “Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East,” The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2005-06), pp. 187-201.
Since 2002, the Middle East has become the leading arena for Beijing's efforts to secure effective ownership of critical hydrocarbon resources, rather than relying solely on international markets to meet China’s energy import needs. There is every reason to anticipate that China will continue and even intensify its emphasis on the Middle East as part of its energy security strategy. China will likely keep working to expand its ties to the region's energy exporters over the next several years to ensure that it is not disadvantaged relative to other foreign customers and to maximize its access to hydrocarbon resources under any foreseeable circumstances, including possible military conflict with the United States … If not managed prudently, this competition will generate multiple points of bilateral friction and damage U.S. strategic interests in the region.


Looney, Robert. Agrarian Mirage: Gulf Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan’s Agricultural Sector. MAP Project (October 1, 2014). 
In the late 2000s, one rarely picked up a financial newspaper without seeing an announcement of Gulf investments in large tracts of Pakistani agricultural land. Today, however, there is little, if any evidence of a single foreign-financed agricultural project in Pakistan having come to fruition. This essay explores why.


Matthews, Stephen P. “China’s new energy focus: strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia,” Energy Security: Implications for US–China-Middle East Relations, The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, July 18, 2005.
… While the new Chinese approach to energy security is taking place with a number of Middle East oil and gas producers … it is perhaps most significant in respect of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia …


Mustafa, Daanish. “The Necessity of Karez Water Systems in Balochistan,” MAP Project (January 17, 2014).
Land is infinite in Balochistan. It is the one place in South Asia where if you ask someone how much land they have, they will generally have no idea. Instead, it is water that matters. In Balochistan, social station is not determined by landholdings but by the size of one’s share of water in a karez. These manmade underground channels passively tap groundwater and provide the lifeblood of villages at the valley floor.


Nag, Biswajit and Mohit Gupta. The Rise of Gulf Investment in India: Searching for Complementarity and Synergy. MAP Project (October 9, 2014).
This essay sheds light on the pattern of GCC investment in India by identifying India’s major Gulf partners, the size of their investment presence, and key investment sectors, as well as the areas of potential growth in and barriers to greater investment.


Parween, Arshiah. “'Invisible' White-Collar Indians in the Gulf,” MAP Project (August 14, 2013).
Since the 1970s oil boom, the Gulf region has been one of the principal destinations for workers from South Asia, with the result that today Indians constitute a large percentage of the non-nationals living in the region. Indeed, at five million out of an estimated 15 million people, the Indian community forms the largest expatriate group in each of the Gulf countries. Most Indian immigrants are from the south Indian state of Kerala, while many of the rest originate from Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar.


Qian, Xuewen. “China’s Energy Cooperation with Middle East Oil-producing Countries,” Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol. 4, No. 3 (2010), pp. 65-80.
China is rich in coal, but insufficient in petroleum and gas. The energy shortage is not a general shortage but a structural imbalance. In recent years, China's dependence on foreign oil supplies keeps increasing to meet the needs of China’s rapid economic growth. China’s top leadership, for this goal, has committed itself to energy diplomacy and vigorously promoted China’s energy cooperation with Middle East oil-producing countries. In the current conditions, carrying out energy cooperation with the Middle East oil-producing countries is inevitable and beneficial to China’s security. China and the Middle East oil-producing countries have maintained friendly and cooperative relations: mutual political, economic complementarities and cultural fusion, which create a favorable environment for cooperation for extracting and removing the Middle East oil.


Richardson, Michael. “Asia’s Middle East Oil Dependence: Chokepoints On A Vital Maritime Supply Line,” Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore (2007).
Much of Asia relies heavily on oil, and increasingly on gas, imported by sea from the politically volatile Persian Gulf region. Asia’s export-oriented but oil-short economies are tied to the fortunes of the Gulf by an energy lifeline. Both regions are integral parts of a vast conveyor belt of seaborne commerce that runs between the Indian and Pacific oceans …


Silva, Henelito. “Re-constructing the Political Mind Set of the Persian Gulf Security,” Center for West Asian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1. (2011), pp. 49-67.
…This article examines security perceptions and priorities of the littoral states of the Persian Gulf region. Longstanding mistrust, foreign intervention as well as varying national priorities which prevent them from reaching consensus to establish a stable collective security. Finally, the article recommends that there is a need to re-construct the political mindset of Persian Gulf security so everyone can enjoy the benefits the region offers to humanity.


Sevilla, Henelito A., Jr. “The Security of Energy Supply: Its Implications on the Political and Economic Growth of Asian-Pacific Region,” Special Issue 1, Journal for Social Sciences, India (December 2010), pp. 22-30.
…This work examines the impact of the Middle East oil supply and price insecurity on the economic growth potential and development of Asia and pacific region. Given their high level of dependence (especially China, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand), on the Persian Gulf oil to fuel economic growth, the conditions for future competition and cooperation between them are high and increasing. Because a relatively easy supply of oil from Persian Gulf region is and will remain a key for future uninterrupted economic growth in Asia and Pacific countries, it is important that an energy security regime, that includes appropriate mechanisms and architecture, be built in order to minimize the possibility that armed competition for scarce fossil fuel resources …


Sevilla, Henelito A., Jr. “Why Middle East Matters to the Philippines?Asia Pacific Journal of Social Sciences, India, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2010), pp. 1-29. … The Philippines approach to its relations with the Middle East region has remained traditional – oil, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). There is a neglect of attention from the Philippine side to utilize intellectuals/professionals to help to improve the awareness of the general population about the opportunities and challenges the Middle East region can offer …


Wu, Lei and Youyong Wang, “Comparative Analysis of China’s Energy Activities in the Middle East and Africa,” Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol. 3, No. 1 (2009), pp. 36-51.
The Middle East and African oil have now accounted for 70% of China’s total oil imports and will have to be China’s major sources of crude oil imports in the future, which means that Beijing will continue to emphasize its energy requirement activities and to forge closer energy cooperation with both regions. China’s energy activities in the Middle East and Africa have similar trade and investment patterns and also similar risks, the “Oil of Politics” such as the Iranian nuclear crisis and the Sudan/Darfur crisis will be the biggest challenges that Beijing faces in the Middle East and Africa …


Xu, Xiaoije. “China’s Oil Strategy Toward the Middle East,” The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy (September 2002).
China’s growing quest for energy security and its closer links with strategic energy regions, especially oil producers in the Middle East, are becoming increasingly important subjects for all the countries involved … Concerns have emerged from analysts in the OECD countries that Chinese growing dependency on the Middle East will stimulate competition with Japan and other major oil consumers in this aspect. This paper will explore further China’s new focus on and strategic intentions toward the Middle East. The strategic balance will also be addressed.


Wessels, Joshka. Qanats and Water Cooperation for a Sustainable Future” MAP Project (January 19, 2014).
Qanats are underground tunnel systems that bring infiltrated groundwater, surface water, or spring water to the earth’s surface using only gravitational force. Qanats have been used for irrigation and drinking water for centuries worldwide, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa and Central and West Asia. Although qanat technology is ancient, it is not anachronistic. The use of qanat systems could prove crucial in mitigating the effects of the world water crisis in the dry areas where they are found. However, this potential is being squandered as qanats are falling into disuse and are being abandoned at a rapid pace.


Yetiv, Steve and Chunlong Lu. “China, Global Energy, and the Middle East," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Spring 2007), pp. 199-218.
China has significantly enhanced its position and interest in the Persian Gulf region over the past 25 years, making it an important newcomer in regional dynamics. Evidence clearly shows that it has expanded, in some cases dramatically, its diplomatic contacts …


Zambelis, Chris. “China’s Palestine Policy,” China Brief, Vol. 9, Issue 5 (March 4, 2009). … widespread popular opposition to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East coupled with feelings of nostalgia for a return of the revolutionary China of old, Arab and Muslim proponents of a greater role for China in Middle East politics see China’s rise as a positive trend, especially as it relates to the question of Palestine ...


Zhang, Mei. Gulf Investment in China: Beyond the Petroleum Sector. MAP Project (October 3, 2014).
This essay explores recent GCC investment in sectors of the Chinese economy other than the petrochemicals industry and examines the challenges confronted by Gulf investors.


Zhang, Mei. “China’s Interests in the Gulf – Beyond Economic Interests?” MEI (NUS) Perspectives, No. 4 (2009).
… This essay attempts to examine whether China’s primary interest in the Gulf is oil or beyond; and the factors that determine China’s Gulf policies. There are four sections in this essay. The first section briefly traces the historical relationship of China and the GCC. The second section analyses whether China’s primary interest in the region is economic. The third section identifies the main factors that may affect China-GCC relationship beyond energy. The final section concludes with some recommendations for a deeper bilateral relationship in the future …


EDUCATION AND MEDIA

Bubalo, Anthony, Sarah Phillips and Samina Yasmeen. “Talib or Taliban? Indonesian students in Pakistan and Yemen,” joint paper of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, the Centre for International Security Studies and the Centre for Muslim States and Societies, September 2011.
This paper looks at the issue of Indonesian students who study at Islamic educational institutions in Pakistan and Yemen. Its primary goal is to understand whether the presence of Indonesian students at Islamic institutions in Pakistan and Yemen poses a risk, either in terms of radicalisation, or in the formation (or re-formation) of direct contacts between Indonesian extremist groups and counterparts in these countries such as al-Qaeda …


ISLAM AND ISLAMISM

Bubalo, Anthony and Greg Fealy. “Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia,” Lowy Institute Paper (March 14, 2005).
Against the background of the ‘war on terror’, many people have come to view Islamism as a monolithic ideological movement spreading from the centre of the Muslim world, the Middle East, to Muslim countries around the globe. To borrow a phrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadist who fought to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamists as fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan. This paper explores the truth of that perception. It does it in part by looking at the way Islamism has evolved in the Middle East. It then assesses the impact that Islamist ideas from the Middle East have had in Indonesia, a country often cited as an example of a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalised by external influences …


Bubalo, Anthony and Greg Fealy. “Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East and Indonesia,” Brookings Institution Analysis Paper (October 9, 2005).
Against the background of the ‘war on terror’, many people have come to view Islamism as a monolithic ideological movement spreading from the center of the Muslim world, the Middle East, to Muslim countries around the globe. To borrow a phrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadist who fought to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamists as fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan. This paper evaluates the truth of that perception …


Haddad, Fanar. Secular Sectarians. MAP Project (June 17, 2014). 
A common dichotomy that emerges in discussions of Sunni-Shi‘i “sectarianism” in the contemporary Middle East is that of secular versus sectarian. The logic underlining this false duality is obvious enough: a sect is, after all, a subgroup of a religious denomination that exists as a result of theological or jurisprudential peculiarity as shaped by history, politics, and geography. Therefore, logic would suggest that “secularism” is a plausible antonym for “sectarianism:” a temporal, civic approach to public space rooted in modern understandings of the nation-state and its master institutions and the need to separate church from state. As intuitive as this undoubtedly seems, it remains a false dichotomy that misrepresents sectarian identities and sectarian dynamics in the Arab world and overlooks the role played by class, politics, and power in what is ostensibly a religious issue.


Marashi, Ibrahim. Reconceptualizing Sectarianism in the Middle East and Asia. MAP Project (June 18, 2014).
Sectarianism as a concept has gained renewed prominence following an offensive by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in early June 2014, which resulted in the fall of Mosul and a string of Iraqi towns. These land grabs have resulted in a flurry of commentaries blaming the conflict on sectarian differences between Iraq’s Shi‘a and Sunnis and predicting the fragmentation of Iraq along sectarian lines. This piece seeks to provide an analysis as to whether sectarianism, in and of itself, is the driving factor behind the renewed conflict in Iraq or the three-year civil war raging in Syria.


ENERGY AND SECURITY

Abisellan, Eduardo Lt. Col. “CENTCOM’s China Challenge: Anti-Access and Aerial Denial in the Middle East,” Brookings Institution 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper (June 28, 2012).
… [D]espite the rebalancing of U.S. efforts away from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East today is fast becoming an arena for another “Great Game,” one that may inevitably pit the U.S. against China in a regional competition for influence and power. China, through its economic ties to the region, has already achieved influence parity with the U.S. Now it could very well leverage this growing influence to gain further concessions and achieve a future positional advantage to counter U.S. regional hegemony and naval supremacy in both the Middle East and within the Asia-Pacific region— all the way from the source of its energy supplies through its long and vulnerable sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and to home ports in China …


Beng, Phar Kim and Vic Y.W. Li. “China’s Energy Dependence on the Middle East: Boon or Bane for Asian Security?" The China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2005), pp. 19-26.
… [O]ne of China’s present acute pre-occupations is the stability and security of its energy supply, especially from the Middle Eastern region which currently supplies up to 57 percent of China’s overall oil usage/imports …


Bubalo, Anthony, Greg Fealy, and Whit Mason. “Zealous Democrats: Islamism and Democracy in Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey,” Lowy Institute Paper (July 28, 2009).
The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world … The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist … The paper begins with a discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt …  It then considers the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (the Prosperous Justice Party or the PKS) … Finally, it examines the case of the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (the Justice and Development Party or the AKP) in Turkey …


Blumenthal, Dan. “Providing Arms China and the Middle East,” Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2005), pp. 11-19.
Chinese policy in the Middle East has grown more active over the past decade. With its overriding goal of securing oil and gas to fuel China's economic growth, the Chinese government has actively cultivated its relations with the oil-rich Middle East, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia. In their dogged pursuit of this goal, Chinese policymakers have been more than willing not only to undercut U.S. nonproliferation efforts but also to work closely with governments that export Islamism—despite Beijing's concerns about China’s own increasingly assertive Uighur Muslim population …


Calabrese, John. “Asia’s Role in the Mideast Solar Surge,” MAP Project (June 2015). Renewable energy accounts for an ever-growing share of worldwide electricity generation capacity. Solar power, in particular, is on the rise globally. Indeed, within a decade solar power could become the most inexpensive source of electricity in many regions, including in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This essay examines the growth trajectory of solar energy in the MENA region and its relationship to developments in Asian, notably Chinese and Japanese, solar markets.


Calabrese, John. China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1998), pp. 351-366.
Energy cooperation is the dominant aspect of expanding relations between China and the Persian Gulf countries ... In pursuing its objectives in the Gulf, China has encountered as many challenges as opportunities -- in the form of regional crises and conflicts, as well as US pressure ...


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. “India’s Approach to Sanctions on Iran,” e-International Relations, April 29, 2012.
In the past few years, the US-led international economic sanctions against Iran have inhibited Indo-Iranian energy ties considerably … Even as it publicly condemns U.S. sanctions, the Indian government is reportedly quietly urging the country’s refiners to gradually reduce their reliance on Iranian crude. The apparent contradiction between Delhi’s public defiance of the Western sanctions, and its quiet adaption to them, embodies the complex set of factors India’s leaders face in trying to balance New Delhi’s competing interests with the United States and Iran.


Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. “India-Iran Relations: Progress, Challenges and Prospects,” India Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 4 (2010), pp. 383–396.
The current thrust in Indo-Iranian relations is just as old as the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s Indo-Iranian interests converged around a number of areas, namely, energy, Central Asia, terrorism emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan, security and domestic compulsions. It reached a peak during the period 2001–03 with the Tehran and Delhi declarations, which established a substantial set of framework for enhanced cooperation. Although India’s ties with Iran suffered with the Indo-US civil nuclear deal and New Delhi’s opposition to Iranian nuclear ambition, there’s little to indicate that the two countries are willing to abandon their mutually beneficial relationship. This article examines the nature and scope of Indo-Iranian relationship. It also reflects on the various challenges that this relationship faces in addition to the ‘US factor’ and analyses the future of Indo-Iranian ties in the context of ever-changing situation in their proximate neighbourhoods.


Dorraj, Manochehr and Carrie Liu Currier. “In Arms We Trust: the Economic and Strategic Factors Motivating China-Iran Relations,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2012), pp. 49-69.
This article examines contemporary China-Iran relations, focusing on the economic and strategic ties that have helped solidify the relationship since 1979. We begin with an overview of the arms and technology transfers that mark the early years of the relationship, analyzing the benefits each side gained from these transactions. In addition to discussing the short-term financial benefits behind forging stronger ties, we examine how the regional ascent of both states has also presented several long term factors that helped motivate their cooperation. These developments shed light on the important role the U.S. has played, both in terms of where it has tried to intervene and what success it has had influencing the Sino-Iranian relationship.


Garver, John W. “Is China Playing a Dual Game in Iran?The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2011), pp. 75-88.
One aspect of China’s Iran policy suggests a sincere effort to uphold the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime in cooperation with the United States. Another suggests that Beijing believes a nuclear-armed or nuclear-armed-capable Iran would serve China’s geopolitical interests in the Persian Gulf region. Is China playing a dual game toward Iran? …


Gill, Bates. "Chinese Arms Exports to Iran,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 2, No. 2 (May 1998). 
Chinese arms exports to Iran have caused considerable concern within the international community, particularly for the United States. In conjunction with the U.S.-China summit of October 1997, China apparently took a number of steps to curtail sensitive transfers to Iran as part of a broader, more positive trend in Chinese nonproliferation policy. But numerous concerns persist that China continues to provide Iran with systems and technologies that contribute to further development of its cruise and ballistic missile capability, as well as to its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs …


Foley, Sean. “Maher Zain, Technology, and Southeast Asia's Place in Modern Islam,” Oxford Islamic Studies Online (March 2012).
... There is little in Maher Zain's initial career that would suggest he would become a commercial success [in music] in Southeast Asia or be a leading synthesizer of his faith with modernity ... But Zain's greatest commercial success was in Malaysia, and in the Muslim world's most populous nation, Indonesia ...


Harold, Scott and Alireza Nader. “China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations,” RAND Corporation (2012).
The partnership between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People’s Republic of China presents a unique challenge to U.S. interests and objectives, including dissuading Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability. This paper examines factors driving Chinese-Iranian cooperation, potential tensions in the Chinese-Iranian partnership, and U.S. policy options for influencing this partnership in order to meet U.S. objectives.


Janardhan, N. “Gulf security and India,” Khaleej Times, January 12, 2007.
While the relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and India are currently rooted in economic dynamics, it is not completely unrealistic to assume that the region would consider India as a more favoured partner if it is willing to address the Gulf’s security concerns as well…


Jang, Ji-Hyang and Peter Lee. "The Curious Case of Post-Authoritarian Politics: Explaining 'Muslim Rage' and the Innocence of Muslims Protests," Issue Brief No. 28, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, September 28, 2012.
... History suggests that, at least over the short term, newly-democratizing countries have been overwhelmingly less stable than their authoritarian predecessors and that this instability frequently allows room for fringe elements to dominate the public discourse. In the absence of established political authority that is capable of effectively informing public opinion, many people are often inclined to rely on their past prejudices and revert to proven modes of political contestation ...


Pember-Finn, Tom. “China and the Middle East: The Emerging Security Nexus,” Greater China (Summer 2011), pp. 37-46.
The paper analyzes the emerging security concerns that China is facing in the Middle East. Three pertinent case-studies are focused upon: the PRC’s interest in piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the situation in Xinjiang province and its resonance in the Middle East, and finally the PRC’s role in the Iranian nuclear crisis. This analysis of specific case studies, as opposed to a reiteration of general comments on China’s thirst for Middle Eastern oil, is seen as an important step in pursuing the study of China’s relations, especially with the Middle East, to stimulating new lines of enquiry. The paper considers the implications of these case studies with special reference to China’s economic and political security and finds developing concerns for China within these two sectors.


Russell, Richard. “China’s WMD Foot in the Middle East Door,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005).
China has an expanding body of strategic interests in the greater Middle East region. This is manifested in its security relationships with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan, which entail WMD and ballistic missile cooperation. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan are pivotal states in the region. They are increasingly likely to view China in coming years as an alternate source of security and as a counterbalance to American power. Over the past decade, Chinese diplomacy has produced an impressive array of bilateral and multilateral arrangements for curbing WMD and ballistic missile proliferation. But China’s strategic imperatives for access and influence in the greater Middle East will likely push Beijing to cut corners in the spirit, if not the word, of these international arrangements ...


Shen, Dingli. “Iran’s nuclear ambitions test China’s wisdom,” The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2006), pp. 55-66. 
The Iranian nuclear case presents a challenge to China's leaders and an opportunity to demonstrate their ability to balance domestic interests with responsibilities as a growing global power. What considerations shape Beijing's decisions, and what will it do next? …


Shichor, Yitzhak. “Mountains Out of Molehills: Arms Transfers in Sino-Middle Eastern Relations,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 2000).
Washington’s successful pressure on Israel to cancel the sale of the Phalcon early-warning plane to the People's Republic of China (PRC) has yet again highlighted the issue of Israel’s arms transfers to China and, indirectly, of Chinese arms transfers to the Middle East … The purpose of this article is to offer a rational, realistic, balanced and sober analysis of arms transfers in Sino-Middle Eastern relations …


Siddiqui, Fazzur Rahman. Arab Spring and the Changing Contours of Arab Politics, ICWA Issue Brief (October 2012).
... In recent months, the Arab world has experienced profound changes, some of them unprecedented in nature, with far reaching impact. In countries like Egypt and Tunisia, a successful political transition has taken place while Syria is still fuming under the impact of sectarian conflict. The situation in Libya and Yemen seems to be stable after the election but not devoid of frequent tribal and ethnic conflict. To date it is unclear where this turbulence in the region is heading and what trajectory it will follow. But one thing is obvious, recent developments have changed the face of the Arab world ...


Siddiqui, Fazzur Rahman. Arab Spring and the Changing Contours of Arab Politics, ICWA Issue Brief (October 2011).
... The Arab crescent, an arc of states bordering the Mediterranean and the Red Sea is in state of flux and it is too early to assess the full strategic impact on the region but one thing can be said with certainty is that regional politics will never be the same after this Arab political tsunami ...


Silva, Henelito. “Re-constructing the Political Mind Set of the Persian Gulf Security,” Center for West Asian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1. (2011), pp. 49-67.
…This article examines security perceptions and priorities of the littoral states of the Persian Gulf region. Longstanding mistrust, foreign intervention as well as varying national priorities which prevent them from reaching consensus to establish a stable collective security. Finally, the article recommends that there is a need to re-construct the political mindset of Persian Gulf security so everyone can enjoy the benefits the region offers to humanity.


Sevilla, Henelito A., Jr. “The Security of Energy Supply: Its Implications on the Political and Economic Growth of Asian-Pacific Region,” Special Issue 1, Journal for Social Sciences, India (December 2010), pp. 22-30.
…This work examines the impact of the Middle East oil supply and price insecurity on the economic growth potential and development of Asia and pacific region. Given their high level of dependence (especially China, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand), on the Persian Gulf oil to fuel economic growth, the conditions for future competition and cooperation between them are high and increasing. Because a relatively easy supply of oil from Persian Gulf region is and will remain a key for future uninterrupted economic growth in Asia and Pacific countries, it is important that an energy security regime, that includes appropriate mechanisms and architecture, be built in order to minimize the possibility that armed competition for scarce fossil fuel resources …


Van Kamenade, Willem. “China vs. the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (July 2010), pp. 99-114.
If China, a major importer of Iranian oil and gas, were to go along with sanctions against the Iranian energy sector, it would indirectly sanction itself. But China’s motivations are more complex than simply its energy interests. Post-1949, China has been a longtime target of Western sanctions. Since 1989 to the present day, it has been under a transatlantic arms embargo, not as punishment for external aggression but for domestic repression. Although opposition to sanctions is a core principle of Chinese foreign policy, China does not want to be seen as the willing enabler of Iran becoming the tenth nuclear weapons power in the world. What is China’s role in opposing sanctions? And what role do stakeholders have in influencing China’s current policy?


Zambelis, Chris. “Sino-Turkish Strategic Partnership: Implications of Anatolian Eagle 2010,” China Brief, Vol. 11, Issue 1 (January 14, 2011).
While China cooperates with NATO countries and other members of the international community in anti-piracy operations in the waters off the Horn of Africa, its participation in “Anatolian Eagle” marked the first time it engaged in joint air exercises with a NATO member … There are already signs that “Anatolian Eagle 2010” set a precedent for future joint military exercises, training, and other forms of cooperation between China and Turkey …


Zambelis, Chris. “China’s Persian Gulf Diplomacy Reflects Delicate Balancing Act,” China Brief, Vol. 12, Issue 4 (February 21, 2012).
The diplomatic acrobatics and brinkmanship on display over Iran’s nuclear program are escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf to new heights, raising the stakes for all of the protagonists involved—including China. In this context, it is worth examining China’s position on the rapidly evolving events in the Persian Gulf …


Zambelis, Chris. “The Iranian Nuclear Question in U.S.-China Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 7, Issue 23 (December 13, 2007).
On the surface, China’s recent decision to support a more stringent United Nations (UN) sanctions regime against Iran … represents a victory for U.S.-led diplomacy to compel Iran to abandon its alleged nuclear weapons program … Nevertheless, China continues to advocate for Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear power, and its strong ties to the Islamic Republic remain in place … Beijing’s relationship with Tehran is based on geopolitical and economic calculations …


TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

Barsalou, Judy and Barry Knight. “Unrequited Desire: Egyptians' Passion for Justice and Accountability,” MAP Project (December 17, 2013). Egyptians who believed that the removal of President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 would lead to the establishment of a democratic government have faced many setbacks. Youthful revolutionary activists unsuccessfully challenged the power of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) transitional government and the autonomy of the military. The electoral triumph of Islamist parties and candidates in parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011 and 2012 eclipsed weak and inexperienced secular parties and brought to power leaders who failed to ensure adequate representation of political opponents, women, and Copts in key aspects of governing, or to protect Copts from rising attacks. Continuing divisions among opposition forces, along with the roundup of Islamists and other opponents by the military, which engineered the July 2013 removal of President Mohamed Morsi, suggest that the struggle to achieve justice and create an accountable government will be prolonged.

Bucher, Matthew. “Copts in Egyptian Civil Society: Challenge and Hope in Transition,” MAP Project (February 3, 2014).
“Through wisdom a house is built, and by understanding it is established.” Pope Tawadros II, the Pope of the Coptic Orthodox Church, tweeted this verse of scripture in December 2012. He wrote it as one of a series of daily reflections on the book of Proverbs. This phrase, however, also provides an entry point into the Coptic Orthodox Church and its place in Egyptian civil society. Egypt is in the midst of rebuilding its government and society following an 18-day revolution in 2011, 18 months of military rule that ended with the election of Mohamed Morsi, and the removal of President Morsi one year later by the Egyptian military in July 2013. Egyptian Christians now have the opportunity and challenge to renegotiate their place in Egyptian civil society during this time of unrest and transition. What wisdom, understanding, and vision will Christian clergy and lay leaders put forth in order to co-labor with their neighbors, the state, and other stakeholders to build a new house for Egyptian society? This new vision must be rooted in Copts’ historical experience and include the possibility for new models of engagement and representation.


Dougherty, Beth K. “De-Ba`thification in Iraq: How Not to Pursue Transitional Justice,” MAP Project (January 30, 2014).
The de-Ba`thification process in Iraq has fallen profoundly short as a transitional justice mechanism over the past decade. Poorly conceived, badly implemented, and controlled by hard-liners, the process has been so highly politicized that it has eroded the rule of law and intensified the sectarian tensions that are at the heart of the violence haunting Iraq.


El-Shewy, Mohamed. “'Going Grassroots:' Transitional Justice in Egypt,” MAP Project (January 27, 2014).
Since the inception of its transitional justice and accountability program in November 2012, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) has faced a number of challenges related to its work. Of these, one of the most arduous has been operating in a context of ongoing political and social upheaval. The period since November 2012 can generally be divided into three distinct phases, each marking a change in EIPR’s organizational and conceptual approaches to transitional justice. Though EIPR sees its work in Egypt less in phases and more as a long and complicated struggle against injustice and impunity that will likely continue for the foreseeable future, the three phases are helpful for documenting its approach to transitional justice since 2012.


Etcheson, Craig. “The Challenges of Transitional Justice in Cambodia,” MAP Project (January 3, 2014).
An internationalized transitional justice process has been underway in Cambodia for some years and appears to be nearing a conclusion. This retributive justice process—formally known as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and informally called the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT)—was designed to achieve accountability for gross human rights violations between 1975 and 1979, when Cambodia was ruled by a political movement known as the Khmer Rouge. The ECCC has generated useful lessons for other countries that may be considering a similar exercise. This essay will review a few of those lessons, including (1) political obstacles to ensuring accountability for human rights violations; (2) challenges and limitations of the tribunal model; (3) costs and benefits of amnesties; (4) potential alternative justice mechanisms such as truth commissions, reparations, and apologies; and (5) the consequences of justice too soon and justice delayed.


Fisher, Kirsten, J. “Libya, the ICC, and Securing Post-Conflict Justice,” MAP Project (December 16, 2013).
Since questions of post-atrocity accountability began to surface in regard to the “Arab Spring,” there has been interest in the pursuit of international-led justice in countries that have experienced uprisings, such as Bahrain, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. There were calls for the involvement of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in both Libya and Syria. The ICC has become involved only in Libya. However, this involvement has become mired in struggles that expose the challenges of a system that some regard as simply another expression of a profoundly undemocratic international order.


Jeffery, Renée. Sequencing Transitional Justice Mechanisms: Lessons from the Solomon Islands. MAP Project (March 4, 2014).
Between 1998 and 2003 the Melanesian archipelago state of the Solomon Islands was marked by a violent civil conflict precipitated by a combination of ethnic tensions, economic insecurities, and perceived injustices. Known colloquially as “The Tensions,” the low-intensity conflict left around 200 people dead and more than 11,000 displaced from their homes. In addition, more than 5,700 human rights violations were committed during the conflict, of which at least 1,413 involved torture. Although its transition has not been from authoritarian rule to democracy, the Solomon Islands’ attempts to address the human rights violations that took place during this conflict hold a number of important lessons for the transitional states of the Middle East.


Kersten, Mark. “Libya's Political Isolation Law: Politics and Justice or the Politics of Justice?” MAP Project (February 5, 2014).
In May 2013, Libya’s General National Congress (GNC) overwhelmingly passed the Political Isolation Law (PIL). The PIL’s enactment represented a far-reaching attempt to prevent members of the regime of Muammar Qaddafi from holding public office during the country’s transition. But the decision also appeared to fit a precarious pattern of post-conflict accountability in Libya, which has been characterized by acts of vengeance and one-sided justice aimed at anyone associated with the defeated regime. The passage of the law also reflects the current state of political instability in Libya wherein decisions are politically motivated and often forced at the barrel of the gun rather than agreed upon through public consultation and democratic decision-making.


Khoun, Theara. “Cambodia: Politics and a Legacy of Trauma,” MAP Project (January 7, 2014).
Cambodia’s traumatic history has often been used as a tool for power among rival politicians in the country, particularly when elections are approaching. This article, however, argues that due to the passage of time, such tactics in relation to the Khmer Rouge have started to lose ground, in particular owing to demographic redistribution, social media outreach, and changes in perception.


Kim, Hun Joon. “Truth Commissions in South Korea: Lessons Learned,” MAP Project (December 20, 2013). 
South Korea has launched various transitional justice measures since democratic transition in 1987, with truth commissions being employed most frequently. With at least ten truth commissions established to date, South Korea has been a leader in such initiatives in the Asia Pacific region. This paper analyzes two of South Korea’s most prominent truth commissions―the Jeju Commission and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)―in an effort to answer why some truth commissions succeed while others do not.

Kimura, Ehito. “The Problem of Transitional Justice in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” MAP Project (January 17, 2014). 
Transitional justice in Indonesia has largely failed. While exact definitions vary, transitional justice here refers loosely to the righting of past wrongs by holding perpetrators accountable for their actions. In Indonesia, neither Suharto nor any of the high-ranking officials of the New Order era have ever been put on trial or held accountable for human rights abuses during 32 years of authoritarian rule. In fact, no Indonesian has been successfully convicted for past abuses despite numerous attempts to do so.


Lamont, Christopher K. “Transitional Justice and the Politics of Lustration in Tunisia,” MAP Project (December 26, 2013). 
No transitional justice dilemma is more contested in Tunisia than that of lustration and vetting. While trials of former ruling elites, either in absentia or in the courtroom, grab international headlines, the question of how to deal with the tens of thousands of former Ben Ali regime functionaries who were complicit in past abuses yet are not likely to be brought to trial has proven even more politically charged. To be sure, the question over the fate of these potential targets of lustration and vetting continues to contribute to Tunisia’s prolonged post-revolutionary political crisis, as draft laws on lustration and ad hoc leaks from state archives solidify cleavages among Tunisia’s diverse array of transitional political actors.


Manea, Elham. “Yemen’s Contentious Transitional Justice and Fragile Peace,” MAP Project (February 24, 2014). 
Yemen was not immune to the wave of popular uprisings that swept some countries of the Middle East and North Africa region. However, because of the Yemeni state’s fragility, concurrent zones of conflict, and a power struggle that divided the core military and tribal elites, the international community was afraid that the youth uprising that started in January 2011 might lead to a collapse of the state. Given the consequences of such a collapse on the security of the Gulf states, oil production, and the international war on terror, the Gulf Cooperation Council brokered a deal in November 2011—the Gulf initiative—which laid the foundation for a transitional government. The main aim of the initiative was to secure a peace deal that halted Yemen’s slide into chaos. Peace was sought through the brokering of an inclusive National Dialogue Conference (NDC), but peace did not entail changing the regime or its pattern of politics. While transitional justice has been a part of this process of peaceful reconciliation, it raises questions about the sustainability of this peace and provides a showcase of the precarious state of Yemeni affairs.


Omar, Rowida. “The Delay of Transitional Justice in Egypt,” MAP Project (February 12, 2014). 
The situation in Egypt has been very complicated, with the democratic process and path toward transitional justice shifting under four different ruling systems—Mubarak, SCAF, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the interim ruling authorities—over a short period of time. All four systems committed abuses against the people, leaving victims and cases to be investigated. The combination of sharp divisions within society, disagreements about transitional justice itself, and delayed government responses to people’s demands has made the situation particularly charged.


Robins, Simon. “Toward Victim-centered Transitional Justice: Nepal and Timor-Leste,” MAP Project (December 4, 2013). 
The first decade of the twenty-first century has been characterized by the emergence of a new politics of human rights that has become the defining agenda of much national and international politics. This universalist discourse of rights has gained unprecedented leverage in global debate, propelled by narratives that rarely pause to question the evidence or ideology that underlies it. This is nowhere more true than in the practice of human rights after conflict or political violence, in which transitional justice has become a dominant approach to addressing legacies of violations, backed by an industry of practitioners and donors.


Schafferer, Christian. “The Rise and Fall of Transitional Justice in Taiwan,” MAP Project (February 13, 2014). 
Authoritarian rule in Taiwan ended peacefully in the late 1980s. Since then, state institutions and private organizations have repeatedly attempted to address the atrocities committed during authoritarianism (1945-1987). This essay explores the various factors that have determined transitional justice in Taiwan over the last two decades. It demonstrates that post-authoritarian Taiwan has experienced three distinct periods: first, limited apology and compensation (1988-2000); second, attempts at transitional justice that ended in failure (2000-2008); and third, a reversal of all transitional justice mechanisms and a relapse to the past (2008-present). These changes are due in significant part to indigenous conflicts in Taiwan that have not been resolved, but also to global economic and political events that have drastically reduced the focus on democratic governance and accountability.


Stewart, Robert. Incorporating Cultural and Religious Practices into Transitional Justice: Lessons Related to Islam in Tunisia and Aceh, Indonesia. MAP Project (August 16, 2014).  
The Tunisian transitional justice has not drawn upon the Islamic tradition and would almost certainly not have been able to do so in a way that contributes to the ultimate success of transitional justice there. Why? This article will answer that question by focusing upon the circumstances of Tunisian transitional justice and by comparing them to the transitional justice process in Aceh, Indonesia, where Islamic practices were to some degree drawn upon. These case studies demonstrate that local cultural or religious practices must have widespread legitimacy and popular acceptance if they are to effectively contribute to transitional justice.


Voorhoeve, Maaike. “Transitional Justice in Tunisia,” MAP Project (February 27, 2014). 
Since the “Arab Spring,” international actors have considered Tunisia an exemplar of democratic transition in the Arab world. But this optimism is increasingly being replaced by fear and frustration, especially within Tunisia itself. Transitional justice—dealing with the crimes committed by previous regimes—is one of the subjects of debate.


Wielbehaus-Brahm. “All Retributive Justice, No Restorative Justice in the Post-Arab Spring Middle East,” MAP Project (March 4, 2014).
In the wake of the revolutionary fervor that has swept the Middle East and North Africa since the beginning of 2011, retributive justice has taken precedence over restorative justice approaches as countries seek to address human rights violations.


Wolman, Andrew. “South Korea: Reflecting on 25 Years of Transitional Justice,” MAP Project (December 6, 2013).
Prior to its first democratically elected government taking office in 1988, the Republic of Korea endured a peculiarly harsh twentieth century. The first decade saw Korea’s last dynasty struggle futilely to modernize amidst the specter of growing Japanese interference. From 1910 until 1945, the nation suffered through the traumatic and humiliating period of Japanese colonization, emerging upon Japan’s defeat in World War II only to face the division of the country into North and South Korea and the incredibly destructive Korean War of 1950-1953. The post-Korean War period was characterized by political divisions, human rights abuses, and economic growth, presided over by a series of authoritarian rulers.


WOMEN

Parween, Arshiah. “Challenging Stereotypes: Educational Aspirations of Emirati and Indian Muslim Women,” MAP Project (March 2013).
Stereotypes of Muslim women abound. Muslim women are frequently portrayed as uneducated and suppressed. They also are often regarded as being opposed to education. In this essay, I argue that many Muslim women do not choose to forego education, but rather are unable to access this basic right mainly due to a lack of opportunity and socio-political constraints. The sharply contrasting cases of India and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are illuminating in this respect.

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