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Mohamed Elmenshawy is a former resident fellow at The Middle East Institute. He writes a weekly column for Egyptian daily Al Shorouk News.
In August 2009, he was selected to join the U.N. Secretary General’s High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations initiative, as part of its Rapid Response Media Mechanism. He is a regular commentator on international politics in major international and Arabic television and radio networks. Recent appearances include Al Jazeera TV, CNN International, and C-SPAN.
His writing regularly appears in the Huffington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, Foreign Policy, and other outlets.
This paper is part of an MEI scholar series, titled “Obama’s Legacy in the Middle East: Passing the Baton in 2017.” Click here to view the full project, or navigate using the table of contents to the right.
As the war against ISIS rages in Syria and Iraq, Egypt is fighting its own war on terror. On October 24, the Sinai Peninsula witnessed the deadliest attack on Egypt’s military in years. Twenty-eight soldiers were killed and another 30 injured when a car bomb exploded at the Karm al-Qawadis security checkpoint in Sheikh Zuweid in North Sinai.
Several weeks ago an Islamist and jihadist alliance led by Ansar al-Sharia–a group with ties to Islamic State (formerly ISIS)–took control of Benghazi and declared an “Islamic Emirate.” A few days ago, an Islamist alliance took control of Tripoli’s main airport. These developments have come as a shock to the Egyptian government, which considers an Islamic state on Egypt’s 720-mile long western border an immediate threat to Egypt’s national security. This helps explain Egypt’s alleged role in recent airstrikes inside Libya coordinated with the United Arab Emirates.
The current crisis in Gaza represents the first real foreign policy test for Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Hamas’s rejection of the Egyptian initiative to end hostilities calls into question Egypt’s ability to maintain its decades-long special status as mediator, a role it assumed by virtue of its relations with all parties – Israel and the United States on one hand, and the PLO and Hamas on the other.
Just 48 hours before handing over the reigns to now President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Egypt’s interim President Adly Mansour signed into law a controversial piece of legislation that regulates elections for Egypt’s new House of Representatives.[1] Since the law was announced in early June, it has generated conflicting analysis regarding its impact on the nature of the electoral system, the character of the legislature that will be elected as a result, and the extent to which it might further empower the president.
On March 26, Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi resigned from the military and announced his presidential bid. What do we know of Sisi’s platform, and what kind of military leadership does he leave behind? MEI spoke with resident scholar Mohamed Elmenshawy about these and other issues.
Will any challengers take on the enormously popular Sisi?
In 2011, many observers predicted that relations between Libya and Egypt would become closer after both countries underwent similar revolutions followed by attempts at democratic transition. But three years later, the realization of this prediction appears unlikely. Political realities and ideological differences have led to a relationship that is contentious at best.
Testimony of MEI Resident Scholar Mohamed Elmenshawy before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, delivered February 11, 2014. Click here for video clips and additional testimony from this hearing.
This article originally appeared in The Christian Science Monitor
The American relationship with Egypt needs to change if Washington wants to have substantive influence in Cairo. America’s recent strategy in Egypt has been focused on buying Egyptian compliance through military and economic aid, but it seems to have had little effect.
Yesterday, the United States announced that it would delay the delivery of four F-16 fighter jets to Egypt.[1] While such a move might appear to signal a block in U.S. military aid to the country, most Egyptians believe that the United States will, as it always does, provide Egypt with military funding.
In the wake of yesterday’s outbreak of what has been called the largest protest ever, against Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi, observers are left with one question: What comes next? None of the major players appear to have a practical answer to this question. For instance, no one has produced a politically sound “exit strategy” beyond the loud demand to remove Morsi and to hold a new presidential election.
This article was first published by Al-Monitor on April 28, 2013
Assertions and opinions in this publication are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
Al-Ahram columnist Ahmed al-Beri wrote on 23 March that “while the United States has often been supportive of President Mohamed Morsi’s regime, Egypt’s security and economic deterioration may be forcing it to reevaluate this support.”[1] Such thoughts are not exclusively al-Beri’s; they are dominating intellectual circles inside Egypt. The emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood as the new political warhorse in Egypt has complicated a delicate strategic relationship between Cairo and Washington.
