Nazia Hussain

This essay argues that the conversation about Karachi needs to shift from viewing high levels of criminality as spawning ungoverned urban pockets to understanding how criminality, violence, and informality are shaping its political order. In this order, the state is not a passive player; it bestows and withdraws patronage to non-state actors in pursuing its larger interests. It purposely deregulates public services for some parts of the city and sections of the population. It also possesses the sovereign power to legitimize certain practices and actors, while delegitimizing others. The relationships between state and non-state actors are not driven solely by corruption. They are deeply political in nature, and have evolved over the years in the political, historical, institutional, and economic contexts of Karachi.

Along with countries such as Syria and Iraq, Pakistan has become a theater of doctrinal differences between Shia and Sunni Muslims, signifying that rifts between local groups have become linked to the wider violent sectarianism in the Middle East.

The attempted assassination of Malala Yousufzai by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan on October 9, 2012, marks a milestone in the trajectory of Pakistan’s future. It has manifested the balkanization of Pakistani society along the lines of those who have been labeled in the popular vernacular in Pakistan as “liberals,” and those who claim ideological proximity with the reactionary religious ideology and demonstrate mistrust and disapproval of American policies instituted in the “War on Terror.” How this debate pans out between the two groups will mark the path to Pakistan’s future.

The 21^st century has been called the “Century of the City,” as half of the world’s population lives in urban areas.[1] Virtually all of the projected global population growth will be in cities of the developing world, and most of it will be concentrated in informal settlements.