Perspectives on the Middle East 1983

Proceedings of a conference

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and Diplomacy
Middle East Institute

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Proceedings of A Conference

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Editors

William G. Miller

Philip H. Stoddard

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

This volume contains the papers, questions and answers, and summaries of dinner discussions from the three sessions in The Fletcher Series on the Middle East. The Series, sponsored jointly by The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and The Middle East Institute, was held at the Cabot Intercultural Center of The Fletcher School on December 3, 1982, January 14, and February 4, 1983. They were intended to assess the new relationships which have emerged in the aftermath of the war in Lebanon; to consider the impact of revolutionary movements in the Middle East; to discuss the most widely acceptable solutions to the Palestinian question; to explore ways to move toward practical arrangements for a peaceful settlement.

Associate Dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy William G. Miller and Philip H. Stoddard of The Middle East Institute are the editors of this volume. The rapporteur for the dinner sessions was Jonathan Auerbach. The editors would like to thank Eugenia Dyess, Barbara Fennessy and Jonathan Auerbach of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy for their help in the editing of this volume. We especially want to thank Kathleen Manalo for her guidance and editorial skills. We are also grateful to Freda Kilgallen, Melissa Mueller, Polly Diven, Ellen White, Monique Gaudette, Ellen Spirer and Mark Whaley for their transcription of the tapes of the conference and for their craftsmanship under trying conditions.

The editors would like to extend their thanks to all the speakers and discussants, and to the fine conference audience who contributed so much to The Fletcher Series on the Middle East. They extend special thanks to the corporations who assisted in the publication of this volume: Bank of Boston, Conoco, Exxon, Mobil Oil and Raytheon.

Washington, D.C.
May 16, 1983

INTRODUCTION

William G. Miller and Philip H. Stoddard

On September 1, 1982, in the context of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, President Reagan proposed an initiative for peace in the area which centered on a West Bank-Gaza Strip homeland for the Palestinians under Jordanian sovereignty. The Fez Conference of Arab leaders was held soon after the enunciation of the Reagan proposal. The Fez Conference was seen as a declaration by the Arab nations of a desire for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Conference believed a two-state solution, as well as recognition of Israel, offered the best course of action.

Conditions seemed favorable enough to hope that the contending parties might be brought together for negotiations leading to a settlement. Although continued settlements on the West Bank by the Begin government and the difficulties associated with the withdrawal of forces from Lebanon pose considerable obstacles, the peace process ultimately may succeed if the United States is determined to use its influence in the area and is serious about bringing the parties together.

It was against this backdrop that The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, in conjunction with The Middle East Institute, held a series of three meetings between December 1982 and February 1983. The meetings brought together over 70 expert and distinguished diplomats and other officials from the Middle East and the United States, as well as scholars, journalists, legislators and corporate executives, to discuss how the negotiating process might be pushed forward.

At the first session, December 3, 1982, papers were presented by Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., of Maryland; Professor Haim Shaked of Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University and the University of Miami; and Professor Walid Khalidi of Harvard and American University of Beirut. After reviewing the Palestinian and Israeli perspectives on key issues and various proposals, including the Fez declaration and the Reagan initiative, participants in the series concluded that the crucial elements required for an agreement encompassed: facilitating an official dialogue between the PLO and the Israelis; obtaining the support of the majority of Arab states for a Jordanian-PLO approach to the Israelis; and fostering a sustained effort by the United States to bring the Israelis into negotiations. It was the view of most of the participants that it was in the United States' interest to press the parties to enter into negotiations. If this were done, some form of a two-state solution was seen as likely to emerge, with a transitional period for the Palestinian entity under Jordanian rule. Although the Reagan plan as a whole was not acceptable to either the PLO or the Israelis, it was viewed as a reasonable set of proposals for the initiation of negotiations. Nearly all participants were of the view that the prestige and influence of the United States in the Middle East were on the line. Consequently, if the United States did not use its power to push negotiations along, its position in the Middle East would be seriously weakened.

The revolution in Iran continues to raise fears that it may spread to other parts of the Middle East. Because the pattern of revolution in the Middle East in the post-World War II period has proven to be so pervasive, the session on January 14, 1983, was devoted to consideration of various revolutions, including the Iranian, Iraqi, Egyptian, Algerian and Palestinian struggles, to see what insights they could provide into the political situation in the Middle East today. Papers were given by Professor Shaul Bakhash of Princeton; Professor Hanna Batatu of Georgetown and Professor Khodadad Farmanfarmaian of The Fletcher School. Participants then explored the usefulness of various approaches that had been suggested: class analysis; the study of political elites; the emotional and intellectual impact of revolutionary ideologies; the revulsion of the populace at repressive excesses, and various combinations of these factors. It was clear from the discussion of the Iranian revolution, in particular, that serious scholarly work, especially studies that provide integrative analysis of revolutionary movements in the Middle East, is urgently needed.

The final session of the series, held on February 4, 1983, focused on foreign policy, but it also returned to many of the themes raised in the first two sessions. Following papers given by Dr. Harold Saunders, former Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia; Counselor Oded Eran of the Israeli Embassy; and Harvard Professor Herbert C. Kelman, most participants expressed the view that the stability of the Middle East in the future would be heavily dependent on how, and to what extent, the United States would pursue the Reagan proposal. Great concern was expressed about the divergent purposes and policies of Israel and the United States. The need for harmonizing the policies of these two states was seen as an urgent requirement of an effective U.S. role in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time, a failure by the U.S. to push the peace process along would further fuel revolutionary movements. The greatest challenge for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East was seen as one of developing means by which King Hussein could take the lead for the PLO and the Arabs in negotiations with Israel. It was strongly believed that for Hussein to succeed, the United States would have to persuade the Israeli government to join the dialogue. United States involvement would have to be sustained and substantial. Its diplomacy of the past six months was viewed in the Middle East as tentative and inadequate. One sign of this inadequacy, in the view of many observers of the Middle East, has been the continuing delay over withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. Without success in this endeavor, the United States will lack the credibility it needs for success in the larger Palestinian dimension of the conflict, and it will be even more difficult to achieve the Palestinian-Israeli settlement that could form the basis of a durable peace.

June 1983

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON SPEAKERS

DR. SHAUL BAKHASH, born in Teheran, with degrees from Harvard and Oxford, has been both a journalist and a university professor and is presently on the faculty of Princeton University, prior to which time (1981-82) he was a member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University. He is the author of Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform Under the Qajars, 1858-1896, and he has written extensively on Iran for American and British journals.

DR. HANNA BATATU is Professor of Arab Studies at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University. He has been Research Fellow at Harvard, Princeton and M.I.T. and has taught at the American University of Beirut since 1962, where he is currently both Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration.

THE HON. L. DEAN BROWN is President and Ex-officio Member of the Board of The Middle East Institute and a former United States Ambassador to Jordan.

MR. ODED ERAN, Counselor at the Embassy of Israel, has served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1966, and abroad in London and at the United Nations, and in Tel Aviv as Deputy Director for the Bureau of Middle Eastern and Egyptian Affairs.

THE HON. THEODORE L. ELIOT, JR., Dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Professor of Diplomacy, attained the rank of Career Minister in the United States Foreign Service. He has served in a variety of posts both abroad and in Washington, where he served as Executive Secretary of the Department of State. From 1973 to 1978, he was U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan.

DR. KHODADAD FARMANFARMAIAN is Adjunct Professor of International Economic Relations at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He taught at Brown, Harvard, and Princeton before returning to Iran to serve as Chief Planner, Deputy Governor and then Governor of the Central Bank of Iran and as Head of the Plan and Budget Organization of Iran until 1973.

DR. HERBERT C. KELMAN, Professor of Social Ethics at Harvard University, is regarded as the leading exponent of the use of social-psychological methodology to solve political problems in the Middle East. He has lectured at the University of Michigan, Syracuse University and the American University in Cairo.

DR. WALID A. KHALIDI is a professor at the American University of Beirut and Director of Research at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University.

THE HON. CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., United States Senator from Maryland since 1968, is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

DEAN WILLIAM G. MILLER, Associate Dean of Mid-Career Programs and Adjunct Professor of International Politics at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, is a former U.S. Foreign Service officer. He has served on Capitol Hill as Staff Director of the Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers and the Select Committee on Intelligence. In 1979 he was a presidential emissary to Iran.

DR. HAROLD H. SAUNDERS is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. A former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (1978-1981), he has also served as Director of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State, and as a member of the National Security Council staff and of the U.S. Middle East Negotiating Team.

DR. HAIM SHAKED is a professor at the Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University and Director of the Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami.

DR. PHILIP H. STODDARD is Executive Director of The Middle East Institute. Formerly, he was Director of Intelligence and Research for Near Eastern Affairs in the U.S. Department of State.

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. David Anable -- Editor of Overseas News, Christian Science Monitor

Mr. Jonathan D. Auerbach -- Conference assistant and rapporteur

Dr. Graeme Bannerman -- Staff member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Dr. Ali Banuazizi -- Associate Professor of Psychology, Boston College

Joseph W. Bartlett, Esq. -- Partner in the law firm Gaston, Snow & Ely Bartlett and a member of the Fletcher Board of Visitors

Professor William A. Brown -- University of New Hampshire and former Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Israel

The Hon. William Brubeck -- The Joha Corporation; a long-serving former member of the Foreign Service of the United States

Mr. Peter R. Chase -- International Affairs Adviser, Mobil Oil Corporation

Professor Benjamin J. Cohen -- William L. Clayton Professor of International Economic Affairs, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Mr. Christopher Y. Crockett -- Vice President in charge of the Middle East & African Division, The First National Bank of Boston

Ms. Eugenia C. Dyess -- Assistant Director, Mid-Career Programs, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; conference proceedings copy editor

Mr. Subhi J.M. El-Uteibi -- Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; Director of Studies, the Evaluation Branch Office of Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan

Minister Mohamed El Zoeby -- Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt

Ms. Catherine Essoyan -- Staff member, American Friends Service Committee, Inc.

Professor Mansour Farhang -- Visiting Scholar, Center for International Studies, Princeton University

Professor Leila Fawaz -- Assistant Professor of History (Middle East), Tufts University

Ms. Barbara Fennessy -- Staff Assistant, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Mr. Simha Flapan -- Harvard University; editor of New Outlook

Mr. Murray Gart -- Writer and consultant, Time, Inc.; former Chief of Correspondents, Time Magazine

Mr. H.D.S. Greenway -- National/Foreign Editor, The Boston Globe

Mr. Peter Grose -- Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

Dr. George S. Harris -- Director for the Middle East Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State

Professor Mark Heller -- Visiting Scholar, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; Senior Research Associate, Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University

Professor Alan K. Henrikson -- Associate Professor of American Diplomatic History, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Mr. John A. Hunt -- General Manager, International Supply & Trading, Gulf Oil Trading Company

Mr. Ellis O. Jones -- Loan Officer, International Banking Division, The First National Bank of Boston

Ms. Rose Kelman -- Cambridge, Massachusetts

Mr. Ahmad Khalidi -- Cambridge, Massachusetts

Ms. Rasha Khalidi -- Cambridge, Massachusetts

Mr. Jehangir A. Khan -- The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, (class of 1983)

Professor Philip Khouri -- Professor of History, Department of Humanities, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Professor David L. Larson -- Professor of Political Science, University of New Hampshire; former official in the U.S. Department of State; former Assistant Dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Ms. Orna Ben-Naftali Leshem -- The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, (class of 1984)

Mr. Franklin A. Lindsay -- Chairman of the Executive Committee, Itek Corporation

Professor Robert F. Meagher -- Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Mr. William L. Miller -- Washington, D.C.

Mr. Guive Mirfendereski -- The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, (class of 1979)

Mr. Joseph Montville -- Chief, Global Issues Staff, U.S. Department of State

Mr. John E. Mroz -- President, Institute for East-West Security Studies

Ms. Soussan Nasr -- Newton, Massachusetts

Mr. Vali Nasr -- The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, (class of 1984)

Mr. Kamel Oussayef -- The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, (class of 1983)

Ms. Juliana Peck -- The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, (class of 1983)

Mr. Philip A. Phalon -- Vice President for Corporate Marketing, Raytheon Company

Ms. Elizabeth Prodromou -- The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, (class of 1984)

Dr. William B. Quandt -- Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program, The Brookings Institution; former staff member, National Security Council

Mr. Stephen Rosenfeld -- Deputy Editorial Page Editor, The Washington Post

Professor Alfred P. Rubin -- Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Professor Nadav Safran -- Professor of Government; Member, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University

Dean Jeffrey A. Sheehan -- Assistant Dean, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Mr. Donald L. Snook -- Senior Public Affairs Advisor (Middle East), Exxon Corporation

The Hon. Michael E. Sterner -- Partner, International Relations Consultants, Inc.; former U.S. Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates

Professor Susanne P. Tongue -- Assistant Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Dr. Michael H. Van Dusen -- Staff Director, Sub-Committee on Europe and the Middle East, House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Professor Arpad von Lazar -- Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

The Hon. Marshall W. Wiley -- Partner, Sidley and Austin; former U.S. Ambassador to Iran

PERSPECTIVES FOR AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE

DECEMBER 3, 1982

INTRODUCTION

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you to this first of three sessions in The Fletcher School Series on the Middle East. I want, first of all, to welcome our distinguished participants who are sitting in the front rows, including especially our own senator from Massachusetts, Senator Paul Tsongas, whom we are delighted to have in our midst today, and the representatives of the nations of the Middle East who also honor us with their presence here this afternoon. I also want to express appreciation to the President of The Middle East Institute, Ambassador Dean Brown, and to his staff for the cooperation and assistance they have given us in making this series possible. I also want to thank our sister institution, Harvard University, its Center for Middle Eastern Studies, and its Center for International Affairs for their help, and also the Semitic Museum and the American Friends Service Committee for the beautiful exhibitions of photographs. Also, I want to thank those private foundation and corporate donors who have made this series possible. Here at The Fletcher School, we all owe a special debt of thanks to the Chairman of this conference, Associate Dean William Miller,and his assistants Eugenia Dyess, Barbara Fennessy, and Jonathan Auerbach for all the work they have done to prepare for this series. Dean Miller will be the moderator of these sessions.

It is a special pleasure for me, as the Dean of the School, an institution dedicated to the furthering of the rule of international law and to the belief that negotiated settlements are the best ways to resolve international disputes, that we are meeting on such a difficult and crucial issue as the crisis in the Middle East. Perhaps we will, in the course of our discussion, find some new ways to push the peace process along. Perhaps, even this most intractable of problems has reached a stage where all the parties believe it is finally time to turn their backs on bloodshed and move in peaceful ways toward a stable and lasting peace. What we seek here today is a deeper understanding of a most complex situation. We are not here to hear an adversarial debate, but rather an exposition of different points of view. It is our belief that a sound, negotiated settlement benefits from an understanding of what the contending points of view are and why these points of view are held. An acceptance that compromises are necessary is also required. There now seems to be a recognition in many quarters that compromises in the Middle East are necessary, and an even wider recognition that without negotiated settlements there are really no lasting benefits from victory in war except a legacy of bitterness.

It is the duty of an academic institution such as this to bring together articulate, scholarly spokesmen of different views to discover what is sound and reasonable and to do so in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I am deeply grateful to our three speakers and our many distinguished participants for their willingness to come here today to see if, through understanding and reasoned discussions, new ways can be found to further the process of peace.

When Americans look at the Middle East, we are moved by many different thoughts and emotions. Firstly, we are moved by the extraordinary impact of history. Coming from a young and optimistic nation, we find the reality of the Middle East often overwhelming. Our feelings are a confusion of the joy of discovery and of the pain of discovering how insignificant we are in the long course of human events. Secondly, we Americans see the Middle East as the source of the three great monotheistic religions. Yet, we are constantly troubled by the seemingly endless conflict among these three faiths and within these faiths between their various sects. Thirdly, we have seen this part of the world as the area in which East and West have clashed for millennia. The Persians have fought the Greeks, and then the Romans, and in modern times, of course, we have had our own troubles with that great nation. Crusaders from western Europe fought Turks and Arabs; adventurers and imperialists from Britain and France and Portugal also fought Turks and Arabs and Persians; the Russian Empire encountered Turks and Iranians and, in more recent years, Afghans. This clash of cultures seems to most of us Americans a troubling and difficult problem. To the extent it opens the way to competition in the area between us and the Soviets, it poses a grave threat to mankind. Fourthly, in the wake of Hitler's holocaust, we Americans have had a strong moral attachment to Israel. This attachment is held by the great majority of Americans, not just our Jewish citizens. Fifthly, there has been a gradual and long overdue awakening in this country concerning the Arab and other Islamic peoples and their cultures. Our interest is based not just on oil and money, but on a recognition that Islamic culture has made, and continues to make, a major contribution to the culture of mankind as a whole, and that we Americans have much to learn from this great civilization. And finally, when Americans look at the Middle East, we are moved in our finer moments by our sense of fairness and compassion, by our belief in the dignity of man, and by our adherence to the principle of self-determination. All of these thoughts will be in our minds as we pursue our discussion today.

We are exceptionally fortunate in having with us three speakers of unusual competence. There is no question but that they will contribute to our understanding of these difficult matters. Dean Miller will have the pleasure of introducing our panelists. I have the great pleasure to introduce the first speaker. He has been Senator from Maryland since 1968. He served as Congressman, in fact as my Congressman I am proud to say, from the sixth district of Maryland from 1958 until 1968. He has, characteristically throughout his career, worked for negotiated, bipartisan approaches to fundamental national issues. He has striven throughout his legislative career to find broadly based solutions to difficult problems such as race relations, the war in Vietnam, the constitutional balance between the executive and legislative branches in the areas of foreign relations, treaty-making, and war powers. With Senator Mike Mansfield, the then majority leader, he was instrumental in creating the committees which investigated the scope and activities of the intelligence agencies of the United States with the purpose of bringing the secret activities of the United States government under constitutional control. As Chairman of the Senate Rules Committee, he has just completed an investigation into the conduct of the FBI in the Abscam matter. The Foreign Service of the United States has no greater friend. He has worked diligently to improve the quality of our diplomats and of our foreign policy. He has travelled extensively throughout the Middle East, and is thoroughly familiar with the issues and the key officials in that part of the world. It is a signal honor to invite Senator Charles McC. Mathias to this podium.

THE PARADOX OF PEACE

The Honorable Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.

I want to congratulate Dean Eliot and Dean Miller in undertaking this Series on the Middle East under the joint sponsorship of The Fletcher School and The Middle East Institute, because I think there is very little that could be done that is more important and more useful at this moment. Finding answers to the problems of the Middle East is long overdue; it is certainly timely and necessary to continue to try to find answers and that is why the effort that is being made here is important. If there is one thing that all parties to the Middle East conflict agree on, it is that the war in Lebanon was a turning point in Middle East history -- a turning point not in the sense of a new departure,but in the sense of a critical juncture. I think that distinction is important, because it expresses both the fear, the very real fear, and the hope , and, I hope, equally real hope, that many of us on Capitol Hill are feeling as the negotiations for peace in the Middle East continue.

Let me make it clear that it is not my intention today to offer yet another peace plan, because the cupboards of history are very well stocked with peace plans, most of them totally unused and the rest of them only slightly soiled. Instead, what I would like to share with you are my impressions of recent events in the Middle East and my sense of what the future holds. A congressional recess has many virtues, not the least of which is the opportunity for a little reflection. I used to say "a little opportunity to think," but my staff objected to that. Yet it does give an opportunity to the weary for reflection. A good deal of the free time I had in this recess was spent pondering what I would say here today.

Fear and hope are really what I feel here today. I fear that a legion of pundits may be right when they say that the changes in the Middle East equation, brought about by the war, are unlikely to improve the prospects for peace. I hope that we can prove that they are wrong.

Of course the litany of changes is by now familiar: the military reduction of the PLO, the deflating of the Soviet military image, the securing of Israel's northern border, and the potential for enhanced American influence. Within Lebanon itself, and particularly in Beirut, there is the shift in the balance of power among the Lebanese, Christian, Muslim, and Palestinian populations.

Pessimism arises, of course, when these changes are viewed from a long-term perspective. The dominant personalities in the Arab-Israeli conflict have not been altered by the war, a factor of particular importance in a region where monarchies flourish and where religion and politics are very closely intertwined.

Furthermore, there remains the impasse over explicit Arab recognition of Israel. After Anwar Sadat's momentous trip to Jerusalem, I had hoped that the barriers to recognition would fall. The PLO contention that recognition was its last trump card, a contention that was explained to me in great detail by Mr. Arafat and under conditions that Ambassador Dean Brown will well remember, that contention really does not seem as valid, in view of the dramatic territorial and political concessions which flowed from the Egyptian-Israeli peace. For a moment, recognition appeared to be the cornerstone for a lasting peace; it was, at least at that moment, the first trump card.

But I have to say that I am not so sure today. Israeli annexation of the West Bank seems to have developed an uncontrollable momentum, a kind of a spirit of religious destiny which precludes negotiation, with or without the prerequisite recognition. These trepidations were confirmed by the Israeli Cabinet's approval of five new settlements in the immediate aftermath of the war, actually forty-eight hours after President Reagan had announced his peace initiative.

While peace within Lebanon may have been facilitated by the war, the fundamental Arab-Israeli differences have survived intact. This I think is sufficient explanation for the prevailing spirit of pessimism.

Still, we have to be hopeful and President Reagan, to his credit, has proposed a comprehensive peace plan which provides a framework for capping the two horns of the Middle East dilemma -- Israeli security and Palestinian nationalism. The arrangement that he suggests for resolving the Palestinian problem is not new nor claimed to be new. The concept of federation was embodied in the peace plan proposed by General Allon immediately following the 1967 war. The Reagan plan may not be new, but our understanding of how difficult it is to make peace, gained in the intervening years, does add a new element to it.

If we learned just one lesson from Camp David, and from the unsuccessful Rogers Plan, Dayan Plan, Eban Plan, and Fahd initiative, it should be that implementing a settlement, whether a comprehensive settlement or just a partial solution, is bound to be a painstaking, difficult, slow process. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979 would probably not have been signed had it not been for President Carter's patience and his personal commitment, and most important, his presence. His effort has been described, and I think with good reason, as "an exercise in personal diplomacy unequalled since the time of President Wilson." The Sinai accords, signed in 1974 and 1975, were also testimonies to the art of patient diplomacy as practiced by Henry Kissinger. Other proponents of peace have not been as persistent and therefore not as effective; they offered programs without offering the resolution necessary to see them through.

In urging the President to persevere as I do, it would be remiss to ignore the matter of congressional responsibility. The times are propitious for bipartisan and effective action. The mid-term elections are behind us and oil is in sufficient supply for the moment.

We will be very shortly voting on foreign aid, on arms sales,and the outcome of those votes could determine foreign policy in the Middle East region for a number of years to come. In this matter, I for one do not feel very comfortable about the moment of reckoning. So far, neither our aid to Israel -- and I think it has been unstinting aid to Israel -- nor our arms sales to Saudi Arabia and to Jordan have produced the kind of positive results that we had hoped for. But, I think it does not serve the interest of any of these countries if we do not try to use every means at our disposal to bring peace to the region. Nahum Goldmann, who died just a few months ago, formerly the president of the World Jewish Congress and the World Zionist Organization, expressed a somewhat similar view in 1978, when he said that "with greater American interference," (interesting that he used the word interference) "peace could have been brought about long ago."

Well, perhaps now is the appropriate time to do just what Dean Eliot and Dean Miller are suggesting that we do: to look up from this trail of economic and military incentives and to look around us to see if it is leading us in the right direction. By refusing to do this, we encourage uncertainty and dangerous speculation. For example, the debate between those who interpret Arab moderation as a reflection of U.S. economic persuasiveness and those who interpret it as a reflection of Israeli military imperatives is a kind of unproductive and distracting debate. Rather than debating who should take credit for the shift, we should be applauding the shift itself. The pressure which moderate leaders face from radical elements throughout the region is as real today as it was in 1951, when Abdullah of Jordan was murdered for daring to consider a separate peace with Israel.

The war in Lebanon for all of its tragedies, for all of the emotions that it has evoked not only in the Middle East but throughout the world has, in fact, also evoked some reactions that bode well for the future. The six-nation delegation that came to Washington five weeks ago to discuss the Fez Declaration and to discuss the President's initiative represented what has been an uncharacteristic Arab consensus on the priority of peace. Previous declarations which were issued in the wake of Arab-Israeli confrontations -- like those for instance that emanated from Khartoum and from Rabat -- were far more rejectionist in tone than the Fez Declaration.

And in Israel, an impressive demonstration of the health and vitality of the democratic process has just taken place. A judicial commission of inquiry into the Sabra and Shatila massacres was appointed after 400,000 Israelis protested the government's initial rejection of the idea. Think of 400,000 people, citizens, protesting in a nation where that represents approximately ten percent of the population.

Another favorable sign has been the expressed willingness of the Israeli government to withdraw from Lebanon without the precondition of a peace treaty.

These may seem like relatively small concessions in light of the more obvious and the more dramatic peace-making, such as that practiced by Anwar Sadat. But even in that case, we must not forget that the seeds of his venture were sown in 1974, when the first peace agreement in twenty-five years between an Arab State and Israel was concluded, and it too was achieved through an exhausting process of step-by-step diplomacy.

Future peace agreements are also likely to be reached in a cautious and deliberate fashion. The Arab-Israeli dispute, as we know it, has gone on now for nearly three-quarters of a century and it is unlikely to be resolved through one or two dramatic theatrical gestures. One of my great resources in literature is Boswell's Life of Johnson. It is a never failing friend in a time of need and in this matter Boswell quotes Johnson as saying that we will not know "the precise moment when the friendship was formed -- as in filling a vessel drop by drop, there is at last a drop which makes it run over; so in a series of kindnesses there is one which makes the heart run over."

It is the essence of leadership to see that the drops continue to flow. The United States has demonstrated a willingness to assume this role by its quiet but firm efforts to induce Arab nations to recognize Israel and thus to dispel a cloud that has obscured the Middle East landscape and its paths towards peace. At the same time, the administration has swept aside any doubts about the sincerity of U.S. opposition to Israel's settlement policy.

The war in Lebanon has given the United States a new incentive to review its Middle East policy in order to determine if it is based upon old myths or on current realities. More importantly, the war has created new alignments and new policies and new possibilities for peace in the Middle East. I suppose it is a paradox of peace that the opportunities for making peace are spawned in conflict.

But opportunities that are bought at that cost must be grasped, and you are here to find a way to do just that. I congratulate you for that effort, and I am proud to be among you.

Miller: Thank you Senator Mathias. Our next speaker is Dr. Walid Khalidi who is a distinguished scholar of the Middle East. He is a man of great compassion, understanding and learning and is so regarded by his many friends and colleagues. He is singularly fitted to talk about the Palestinian perspectives since he comes from a family that has lived for over a thousand years in Jerusalem. I know of no man who through direct experience, learning, and compassion can better speak to this very difficult subject. Dr. Khalidi -

PERSPECTIVES FOR AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE

Walid A. Khalidi

I must thank The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy for inviting me to this conference. I welcome the holding of this conference and the concern that The Fletcher School is showing in the Arab-Israeli conflict. I am happy to take part in this panel, particularly with Senator Mathias whose thoughtful writings on foreign policy I have been reading and admiring. I am particularly happy to serve again on a panel with Professor Shaked whom I know to be dedicated to a peaceful outcome of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

I want to make two preliminary points, one of which is very general and connected with conflict resolution as a whole.

Some experts on conflict resolution advocate the dictum, "ignore the historical record", when dealing with a conflict situation. Now the grounds for this advice are the following: you need to look forward and therefore you need to concentrate on the solution. An examination of the historical record would inevitably lead to controversy and therefore it would exacerbate conflict. It would divert attention from realities, the realities of the situation, the realities of power -- in other words it would divert attention from the realm of the possible.

I am no expert on conflict resolution. The only conflict I am really familiar with is the Palestinian problem which, I am afraid, is a full-time job. But I know from this conflict that ignoring the historical record, at least in this case, will not do -- and it will not do because to ignore the historical record is to ignore the crux of the Palestinian problem and the crux of the Palestinian problem is its moral dimensions -- in other words the realm of blame and responsibility.

Some experts on conflict resolution will solve the moral issue through the concept of symmetry. They will distribute rights equally to both sides. They will distribute blame equally to both sides. This is neat -- it looks fair. Nevertheless, it is fundamentally an alibi.

I hasten to assure you that I am not about to plunge into an historical exposition of the Palestinian problem, nor am I soliciting from you a verdict on it. My point really is this: the examination of the historical record and the attendant moral dimension is, at least in the Palestinian problem, a necessary prelude to the understanding of its intractability. It could, for example, and inter alia, throw some light on the seemingly chronic disease from which the Palestinians, we are told, have suffered through the decades -- the disease of negativity.

Such an exercise in examining the historical record is in my opinion particularly incumbent on third parties. But I hasten to say, and this is my second point -- my second preliminary point -- I hasten to say that I do not think that the United States government is a third party in the Palestinian problem. But, if it is not a third party, then what is it? In my view the United States government is, and has been for some time, for some three and a half decades, very much a party to the conflict. Since I have been talking about moral dimensions, I think it is in order to elaborate somewhat on this point: it is because the United States government has been such a crucial party in the Palestine problem, the Arab-Israeli conflict, that its moral responsibility is all the greater. Historically, the United States government was a principal architect of the establishment of Israel, and therefore, it could be argued, responsible to that extent, at least, for the consequences of that policy as far as the Palestinians are concerned.

It could also be argued that the unique United States support for Israel in the economic, military, technological, diplomatic, political, and psychological fields has significantly contributed to Israel's enjoyment of the leeway to follow the policies that it has followed and is following. More specifically, it could be argued that the military neutralization of Egypt through Camp David has compounded, as it no doubt did, Israel's already crushing military superiority even before this neutralization. Moreover, the United States' coyness, until very recently, about interpreting the Camp David terms (although the United States was the principal architect of the Camp David agreement) as far as the occupied territories are concerned; the treatment of the PLO as a leper, a pariah, and the request that it say and do things that the United States does not demand of Israel, the other protagonist; the permissiveness, to say the least, towards Begin on the issue of settlements and subsequently on the Iraqi reactor and the Golan, etc.; these and many other aspects of United States policy could hardly be characterized (at least some of you would agree that they could hardly be characterized) as disincentives to Begin to persevere in pursuing his dreams of conquest.

There is another side of the coin. As world champion of the principles of freedom and self-determination, it is difficult to see why the United States' responsibility towards the Afghan rebels or the members of Polish Solidarity or indeed towards Israel itself should be greater than that towards the Palestinians. At the same time I could easily edit a whole volume of statements made over the years by successive United States administrations and addressed to the Arab governments committing the United States to safeguarding fundamental Palestinian rights, statements that have remained just that -- statements. I might give one example in this regard: repeated

United States commitment to the principle of the return of the Palestinian refugees made for two decades successively between 1948 and 1967. Of all the undeclared wars in history, the American war -- because this is what it seems to us Palestinians to be -- the American war on the Palestinians is one of the most gratuitous.

If I have referred to the importance of the historical record in the Palestinian problem and to the attendant moral responsibilities, it is because I firmly believe that no solution (if there still is a chance for a solution) will be viable unless it is anchored in this record and in these moral responsibilities. I also believe that a solution reflecting the current configuration of power without reference to this record and these responsibilities is a solution built on quicksand. The Middle East is strewn with the ruins of powers much greater than some Middle Eastern powers of today. But, equally, a solution based on an absolute concept of justice is unattainable, and I have suggested before, and I suggest today, the concept of Pragmatic Justice as an organizing principle for a negotiated settlement. Pragmatic Justice takes cognizance of the imperatives of equity and reality. It embraces both the changes brought about by the evolution of time and the historical context, i.e., the historical record, in which these changes have taken place. I have identified ten ingredients of a viable settlement. I believe these ingredients to be the gist of the consensus forged at Fez. I believe this consensus to be an unprecedented landmark in the evolution of the Palestinain problem. I believe the devaluation of Fez by Washington to be an extraordinarily short-sighted misconstruing of the situation.

But, before I go into details of these ingredients, I would like to offer a "model" of the framework within which these ingredients fit. "Model" is really much too grand a word. It is a very simple figure that I really have in mind, the figure of three circles, three circles overlapping: a Palestinian circle, an Arab circle, and an Islamic circle. At the point of their overlapping, that is where the Palestinian problem occupies its place in the Middle East. It occupies a place at the point of intersection of the Palestinian, Arab and Islamic dimensions.

Now, about these ten ingredients of an honorable settlement. The first one is that the historic protagonists of this conflict must talk to each other. The historic protagonists of the conflict are the Palestinians and the Israelis. The main point here is that in my opinion, only such a bilateral, direct Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation will de-fuse the Palestinian dimension of the conflict. Only the Palestinians can give the requisite signal to the Arabs and the Muslims. That is why the Palestinian representative at these talks must be the legitimately recognized representative of the Palestinian people, and that is why I will now utter an obscenity and say it has to be the PLO. Begin's argument that the PLO are terrorists is ludicrous coming from Begin. One would have thought that Begin would be quite at home talking to terrorists, particularly if they are faithful students of his, as the PLO are. The underlying principle for the Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation is mutual and reciprocal recognition. Perfect simultaneity, perfect orchestration is not essential to bring about mutual and reciprocal recognition.

My second ingredient is what I redundantly call the territorial locus. There are two points here. The solution must involve Palestinian acquisition of territory, i.e., territory as such must be possessed by the Palestinians. This territorial imperative is the same phenomenon that we see everywhere on the globe; it pertains to human beings just as much as it pertains to the animal kingdom. The second point is that this territory that the Palestinians have to acquire has to be in the territorial locus of the conflict. Now, the habitat of the conflict is the area between the Jordan River and the sea. It is this area -- not any other area -- this specific area between the Jordan and the Mediterranean that has been the arena of the struggle between the Palestinians and Israelis since 1882. It is only in this area, and nowhere else, that the territorial reconciliation could be effected. The underlying principle here will be, of course, partition, and the most viable partition line is that of 1967. The end result will be a two-state solution, west of the Jordan River, divided along the 1967 boundaries, with both states living in coexistence, side by side, as the "point finale" of the settlement, as the permanent settlement in mutual recognition.

My third ingredient is the concept of sovereignty. This is already foreshadowed in the points outlined with regard to the territorial locus. Only the concept of sovereignty will compensate the Palestinians for their tribulations and give them the psychological fillip necessary to channel their energies into constructive endeavor. Sovereignty need not preclude reasonable, and preferably reciprocal, measures to allay the security concerns of others. Sovereignty need not preclude various forms of association with others.

My fourth point deals with Jerusalem. There are two aspects to Jerusalem: one pertains to the viability of a Palestinian State on the West Bank and the second relates to the relationship between Jerusalem and the wider Arab-Islamic context. I will deal with the second aspect later. I will now concentrate on the more narrow aspect of Jerusalem in relation to the viability of a West Bank state. As far as this, the strictly Palestinian aspect of Jerusalem, is concerned, the exclusion of Eastern Jerusalem from the Palestinian State means that there physically, in fact, cannot be a Palestinian state. One forgets that if pre-1967 Israel has a narrow waist in the plains, so has the West Bank at Jerusalem. The waist of the West Bank at Jerusalem resembles the waist of the figure eight, or the waist of a "B". Remove East Jerusalem from the Palestinian

State and the districts of Nablus to the North and Hebron to the South (the two main districts of the West Bank) would be completely cut off from one another.

The concept of return is my fifth ingredient. If the Jews have a right of return after 2,000 years, whatever their ethnic origin and wherever they were born, it seems to some, at least, to stand to reason that Palestinians, who themselves were born there or their parents or grandparents, that they, too, have a right of return after 34 years of exile (if you compute from the 1948 exodus) or after 15 years of exile (if you compute from the 1967 exodus). If the right of return is not endorsed, the Palestinian State would lose one of its most powerful attractions to Palestinians, as would the state of Israel, were the right of return to Israel to be annulled in relation to the Jews living outside Israel. The positive psychological effects of the establishment of a Palestinian state on the Palestinian diaspora -- and there would always be a Palestinian diaspora even after the establishment of a Palestinian state -- would be eliminated if the right of return were not endorsed. Thus, the endorsement of the right of Palestinian return would strongly underpin a Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation. There is, of course, the question of where the return is to take place: to the Palestinian State on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or to pre-1967 Israel? The right of return to the Palestinian State on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and how it is applied should be left to the Palestinian State itself. At the Fez Conference the possibility was indicated of a negotiated settlement of the issue of return to Israel proper, i.e., the pre-1967 Israel. This indication came when the assembled heads of state referred to the right of compensation of Palestinians who do <u>not</u> wish to return to the pre-1967 Israel.

My sixth point involves the settlements. The West Bank including Jerusalem is about 5,500,000 dunums in size. A dunum is 1,000 square meters. In other words, the West Bank is 550,000 hectares. I have myself calculated that perhaps not more than 1,000 hectares of the 550,000 hectares were Jewish owned in the West Bank before 1967. But between 1967 and today, Israel has grabbed -- there is no other word -- at least 43% of the total area of the West Bank. Some people go up as high as 60% of the West Bank. In other words, at least about a quarter of a million hectares of Palestinian land on the West Bank have been grabbed by Israel in the period between 1967 and 1982. Benvenisti, the Israeli ex-deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, in his recent study, has drawn attention to the Israeli policy of intensive urban settlement on the West Bank -- these urban settlements to become appendages to the main metropolitan areas in Israel -- and he has emphasized the extreme danger of this policy in terms of the possibility of blocking a negotiated settlement, because these urban settlements are based on the principle of cheap housing. They will attract tens of thousands of Israelis looking for pleasant, cheap housing, and those so attracted will constitute a constituency which will be very, very difficult for any Israeli decision-maker to defy, when it comes to, if it ever comes to, a question of withdrawing from the West Bank.

There are two questions as far as this question of settlement is concerned. What is the political time on the West Bank? That is question #1. Is it midnight? Is it past midnight? Is it just before midnight? There are two subsidiary questions to this one of political time. Is there any physical basis left today, the 3rd of December 1982? Is there any physical basis left today for the kind of negotiated solution I have been talking about? And if there still is such a basis today, will there be tomorrow? Benvenisti gives us three more years. The second question is what happens to the existing settlements in a negotiated agreement? I will deal with this question first. In a post-solution environment, the settlements, in my opinion, will be a major irritant and source of instability in a Palestinian state. The first question, that of political time on the West Bank, as I think Senator Mathias indicated, perhaps not exactly in these same words, is the single most important question under which the answer to practically everything else has to be subsumed. We will deal with this question and its implications, I am sure, during the discussions immediately after these remarks and later on in the evening.

The seventh point is that of the transitional period. Clearly, you need a transitional period to get from where you are to where you want to get to. The problem is how you control what happens during the transitional period. That is the crux of the matter.

The eighth point is what I call the need for minimal symmetry in reciprocal obligations between the Israeli and the Palestinian states. The operative word here is minimal. Without some attention to this issue, the Palestinian state could be so overloaded, so overwhelmed with obligations, that those in charge of it would be smothered in the eyes of their own constituencies.

The ninth point embraces rather ambitiously both Golan and Jerusalem. I have already dealt with one aspect of Jerusalem, I will deal now with the others. You will recall I said at the beginning that we have three circles overlapping, the Islamic, the Palestinian and the Arab. At the point of overlap, that is precisely where the Palestinian problem is located. I have dealt with the Palestinian dimension, or tried to. The two other circles are the Arab and the Islamic. Israeli retention of the Golan will perpetuate specifically Syrian irredentism. The return of the Sinai makes the retention of the Golan more galling to Syria and could fuel Pan-Arab irredentism. This, plus unsatisfied Palestinianism (and there will always be unsatisfied Palestinianism whatever the Palestinian-Israeli settlement) i.e., Syrian irredentism, plus Pan-Arab irredentism, plus Palestinian unsatisfied feelings could explosively interact. The further retention of East Jerusalem is the surest recipe to fuel Islamic irredentism. The resultant mixture would sooner, perhaps rather than later, play into Soviet hands. A solution allowing for East Jerusalem as the capital for a Palestinian state, with West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel,is the political formula most fitting for Jerusalem ecumenically. The "unification" of Jerusalem by force is the antithesis of ecumenism. Israel has no monopoly on the Hebrew prophets. They are the marrow of Islamic religious consciousness as much as they are the marrow of Christianity. Political Jewish biblicalism in Jerusalem will sooner rather than later breed a chronic countercrusade, given the religious atmosphere prevalent in the Middle East. Access to the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem had never been an issue per se, and the Israeli leaders know this.

My tenth point is the need for regional and international endorsement of a settlement. The regional endorsement of a solution along these lines is, as I said, in the offing. This is what Fez is all about. Clearly, the two superpowers must underwrite such a settlement, and I am personally deeply perturbed by the apparent deliberate attempt at the exclusion of the USSR from the circumference of deliberation.

In the best of faith, to the best of my knowledge and in concord with my conscience and my sense of duty to my people, as well as in the light of my understanding of the regional realities of today and, probingly, of tomorrow, I have outlined what I sincerely believe to be the honorable and reasonable path to a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem.

I feel that the gap between this and President Reagan's proposals is substantial. Of course better Shultz than Haig, anyday, anytime. But I must confess that as I understand it, the U.S. message to the Arabs on September 1 was the following: Do not expect anything more than the September 1 statement by Reagan. Fez is not good enough. The PLO must act unilaterally and without expecting reciprocity from Israel -- it must recognize not just the existence of Israel but the right of Israel to exist. (Do you recognize the right of the communist state of the Soviet Union to exist?) Only such a statement from the PLO, and preferably all the Arab states, can produce further progress. Camp David is the only game in town. Hussein is the only acceptable interlocutor. There can be no Palestinian state. Time is running out for the Palestinians, and for the Arabs, but not (apparently) for the Israelis, nor for the United States. If the Palestinians and the Arabs do not act soon they will have only themselves to blame. Underlying all this is an unstated assumption that any settlement is better for the Palestinians and the Arabs than no settlement.

My feeling on this point is as follows: if thinking distinguishes man and robot from animal, dignity and self-respect distinguish man from both robot and animal. I really doubt whether just any crumb from the political table of a sated Begin or Sharon will bring about the historic reconciliation we are after.

I also fear that these signals from Washington serve to divert attention from the patent reluctance of Washington to face up to the fact and its consequences that the single, greatest obstacle to an historic Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation is the blind fanaticism and willfulness of one Menachim Begin, who is confident in the knowledge that he has nothing to fear from this great and puzzling country, the United States of America.

Miller: Thank you Dr. Khalidi. Our last speaker this evening is a very distinguished historian of the modern Middle East. He is a professor at Tel Aviv University, and he is also the Director of International Studies at the University of Miami. Dr. Shaked, born in Tel Aviv, has historic roots in the area just as Dr. Khalidi has, and he has no less sense of history, compassion, and understanding. I am very happy to introduce him tonight to present the perspectives from the Israeli point of view. Dr. Shaked -

PERSPECTIVES FOR AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE

Dr. Haim Shaked

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I would like to join my predecessors in thanking The Fletcher School and the Middle East Institute for taking the initiative and holding a conference on this extremely complicated issue. I am deeply honored to be a member of this very fine and distinguished panel.

The task that was assigned to me is to try and summarize briefly neither my own personal assessment of what has been happening or what is about to happen in the Middle East; nor my personal understanding of what might trigger a process of reconciliation and resolution. Rather I was requested to attempt to present the array of views, the spectrum of opinion that exists in Israel concerning this particular question and, furthermore, to try and explain why this is so. Before I do that, I would like, however, to state in one or two sentences where I personally stand on these matters. I think this is important in light of my attempt thereafter to remove my personal conviction from my analysis and to look at the scene as I understand it to be in as dispassionate a way as possible.

Personally, I regard the conflict between Israel and Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world as a conflict between national movements. I have no doubt whatsoever that this multifaceted conflict cannot be resolved unless a solution includes, as a very major component, the satisfaction of the national aspirations of all parties involved. I think it is imperative for us to allow each party to define its own national aspirations and what part of these aspirations it can live with or without in a world of real politic and political realities. The question, of course, is how to get there; what might produce a chain reaction which would set us at least closer to such a situation which -- under current circumstances -- appears to be almost utopian. Personally, I could live with a number of the points which Professor Khalidi made here. I have great respect for his thinking and for his analysis, but I am afraid my own personal opinion is really irrelevant in this situation. Before one explains what is happening today in Israel with regard to this particular issue, one has first of all to identify a number of misunderstandings about the substance of Israel, the national objectives of Israeli society, and its modus operandi. Distance, dealing with this subject only under a shadow of crises, the plurality of voices with which Israeli society -- as a purely democratic society -- speaks, and the nature of the reporting about the Middle East (particularly during and in the aftermath of a major and unfortunately very bloody crisis in Lebanon) -- all of these tend to produce a number of optical distortions which blur the picture. It is imperative to clarify them in order to assess what kind of a solution is possible; what are the major ingredients which might turn such a solution from a rather theoretical and academic analysis to a political reality.

It is quite well known that Zionism, in its own self-perception and self-image, regards itself as a revolutionary movement, by now about 100 years old, which has set out to achieve two major objectives. The first was the establishment of a sovereign Jewish state. Originally many Zionists, of all shades of opinion, believed rather naively that when such a state would be established it would concentrate the Jewish people from its diaspora and would create a "normalization," as they put it, of the Jewish situation. This, in turn, might even diminish anti-Semitism. The second goal was to try and turn that state into a model society, the implementation in modern times of the age-old "Light unto the Gentiles" notion. It is quite clear, at least to the educated Israeli populace, that Israel is still far from the achievement of both goals. The debate which is raging inside the Zionist movement within and without Israel is whether indeed the Zionist movement could regard itself as having achieved the establishment of not only a sovereign, but also a secure Jewish state. In the subjective perception the Zionist movement has of itself, this precedes the attainment of the second goal, that of becoming a model for others. And it is this subjective perception which is often overlooked and, consequently, causes a misunderstanding of the nature of the society we are talking about and its amenity to this or that type of government.

A second fundamental point about which there has been a major optical distortion -- and I hope I shall be excused if I borrow from biblical similes in this regard -- concerns an aspect of history. I fully agree with my predecessor that history cannot and should not be ignored, particularly with regard to an area such as the Middle East, where ancient history is very much alive. Israel has come to appear to outsiders more and more as a military Goliath. I submit to you that if you look not at the perception of Israel abroad in terms of military achievements, quantities of military hardware and prowess, etc., but rather at the debate which has been going on within the core of the Israeli defense establishment, you will find very much of the self-image of a David, confronted by a threatening Goliath. Granted, this does not conform with the outcome of all major military encounters between Israel and its neighbors. Every analyst or historian will be able to document in what way Israel has achieved military and technological supremacy over its environment. It so happens however that many important, high-ranking generals and other members of the Israeli defense establishment do sincerely regard the conflict primarily as one of an Israeli David vs. an Arab Goliath.

The key term which recurs in all military analyses and statements emerging from Israel since the late 1940's and down to our own day is that of the need for an Israeli military deterrent which might prevent rather than precipitate war. This is not an argument devised for propaganda purposes. It happens to be a deep conviction of most senior military and defense planners in that country, shared by both Labor and Likud orientations. Thirdly, if you combine the first and second points and put them into the historical context in which the State of Israel evolved from the pre-state period throughout the 1948-49 war and down to 1982, it becomes clear that Israeli society and its leadership have been obsessed -- perhaps paranoid -- with security matters. Unfortunately, there is a long, sad Jewish history which nourishes such paranoia. Even if it is selective and subjective thinking -- it is there, and it is germane to the understanding of what we are talking about. One of my colleagues at the University, who happens to be a professor of psychology, has a big poster in his room which says: "The fact that you are paranoid does not mean that they are not after you."

The fourth fundamental point relating to Israeli society's outlook on the Middle East and on the prospect for peace in the region concerns the gradual and quite painful process of its "extremization." It is important to understand that a very large segment of the Israeli public laments that, but regards this process as an outcome of a long confrontation between the Arab world and Israel, and too long a rejection of the latter by the first. This is the general backdrop against which an understanding of the gamut of Israeli opinion on the Palestinian question should be analyzed. To the "Zionist-Israeli consensus," the Palestinian problem is a part of a larger, more complex Middle East. It is part of the ongoing conflict which Israel has with the Middle East environment. Dr. Khalidi was right in pointing out that this kernel of the conflict, the Jewish-Arab conflict over Palestine, happens to be in the middle of a number of circles. This is precisely the perception of most Israelis, but the conclusions they draw are quite different. There are a number of very interesting symmetries in the historical evolution of the Zionist movement and the Palestinian movement. For the sake of brevity, I shall concentrate on a number of asymmetries, as they are perceived by Israelis.

The first is that while the Palestinian ingredient of the Arab world does have a problem with the Arab states -- some of which are not very helpful, or even hostile and at times treacherous -- the basic conflict of the Palestinians is with one country: Israel. The Israeli perception of Israel's problem is very different. Most Israelis, if asked how they would define Israel's problem, would refer to the whole Arab world, one ingredient of which is the Palestinian problem. (And there is a difference of opinion in Israel as to the importance of this ingredient.) Very few people in today's Israel ignore the Palestinian problem altogether or think that it is of minor importance. Since the war of 1967, which, among other things, reopened within Israel the seemingly closed 1948-49 file, few Israelis can and do ignore this issue. But many Israelis regard it as one out of a cluster of complicated, conflicting relations with many Arab states. If one juxtaposes these two perceptions one can begin to see why a program such as Dr. Khalidi's might be of great interest and perhaps a temptation for many Israelis -- but only as an end result. The important question, in my opinion, is whether such an end result can be achieved. In the eyes of most Israelis, the question is whether such a plan, which might make the Palestinians happy, can deliver the rest of the Arab world in terms of a peace arrangement, or whether this is where stage two begins, namely, after 1967 the 1948 issue will be reopened, and no one knows where this is going to end.

Secondly, in the Israeli perception, the question of right and wrong, aggressor and victim, just and unjust, is viewed in a way which is diametrically opposed to the way in which it is perceived by the Palestinian movement and by a large part of the Arab world. Israeli ideologues and politicians could make up a list as to why their perception is historically right, whereas the other sides' perception is false.

The third in this list of asymmetries concerns the question: what kind of a solution? What is the essence, the substance of a possible solution? In Israeli eyes, points of view such as those which Dr. Khalidi has been expressing publicly and courageously are not identified with the mainstream of thinking in the Arab world or among Palestinians. All the statements and texts which have emanated from summit conferences, the PLO and individual Palestinian leaders have not been clear-cut enough to convince the Israeli public that the Palestinian movement, in particular, and the Arab world, in general (except Egypt) is willing to move from the "everything or nothing" formula to that of a compromise, namely whether the Arab world as a body politic, and not just an exceptional few educated people and educators, is really willing to make peace with Israel, and the obstacle is just the conditions for that peace. I may have my own personal opinion as to where the Arab world stands on this issue today as compared with 10 or 20 years ago, but most decision-makers in Israel today are convinced that there has been very little, if any, change for the better.

Having said that, I would like to sketch broadly the range of opinion which exists in Israel with regard to a possible settlement of this dispute. First of all, it is extremely important to note that quite a few important people in Israel are not at all convinced that the Arab-Israeli conflict can be resolved in our lifetime. They make a very strong case as to why, in their opinion, the very nature of this conflict, its history and its present complications cannot really be resolved. As they see it, there may occur a temporary lull, which is very deceptive, because the whole thing may explode again in a situation in which -- as they see it -- Israel would find itself at a disadvantage. Those who do believe that a solution can be found in our generation are of a very wide array of opinion. The spectrum ranges from a minority, but not that small a minority, which regards the setting up of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank as the only significant move which can trigger such a process of peace. There is another, much smaller fringe, which would be much happier to design ways and means to obliterate the problem altogether, not physically but politically. The first group seems to be, in my opinion, much larger than the second. The latter, as far as I can gauge it, seems to be more influential politically. Between these two poles lies the majority of the constituency and of the decision-makers. Their opinion is split almost 50-50 between two concepts. First, territorial compromise with Jordan, which was the main platform of the Labor alliance government for a decade (from '67 to '77). Second, the current government (since 1977) essentially looks at the arrangement differently, while it, too, is concerned with the safeguarding of Israeli political and strategic interests as well as historic aspirations. It would tolerate at most an Israeli sovereignty in Gaza and the West Bank, with some kind of an arrangement underneath this umbrella, autonomy, canton or whatever. The settlements were not begun by the current government under Mr. Begin. It was the previous government which started this process. There are two very different interpretations as to what these settlements are all about as far as the Israeli public is concerned. The first, that of the Labor alliance, was very much in line along with the famous Allon Plan, namely, settlements equaling primarily military security. The second interpretation, which prevails in Mr. Begin's government, regards settlements not only as a strategic-military asset, but primarily as an historical-ideological necessity. It is important not to overlook a common denominator of these two interpretations, namely, that settlements are a counter-weight to an ever-complicated problem of a growing Arab minority and the implications of a future solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict for the Israeli Arabs as citizens of a Jewish state.

There is another significant dimension in this picture; it is not static. Rather, it changes constantly. We know what it is like now, but it seems to me that it has not reached a point of no return, and there is still much room for political maneuverablility. I do not know whether it is five minutes to twelve or ten years to twelve. I believe that the Lebanese war has introduced momentum. Such momentum cannot be utilized constructively unless an attempt is made to understand properly what Israel is all about, and what actually motivates Israel for better and for worse. In this analysis of the Middle Eastern situation and in any important attempt to look for a solution to the conflict, Israel must be regarded as much a given as are all other political components of the Middle East, and it is as much a variable as all others are -- but neither more nor less a given and a variable. If it is true to say that Mr. Arafat is in a sense a prisoner of an extremely complicated and difficult coalition to deal with, so is also Mr. Begin. These are two givens which we cannot afford to ignore if we wish to discuss real politics rather than utopian designs and ideas. There is room for maneuverability if one accepts the premise, further accentuated by the Lebanese war and its aftermath, that Israel is a society which is well organized to cope with the challenge of war, but is also unwilling to ignore a serious chance for peace. An Israeli government would find it relatively easy to mobilize Israel in order to fight a war. It would, however, be unable to withstand the pressures generated by an Israeli society if it sensed that the government was averting -- let alone aborting -- a chance for peace. In a sense, one of the most striking consequences of the Sadat trip to Jerusalem was the emergence of a massive grassroots movement such as "Peace Now."

Finally, if indeed it is true that with time there has been a process of a re-Palestinianization of the Arab-Israeli conflict, indeed the Palestinian protagonists are re-emerging as a key party (which was not the case for many years, unfortunately), then it is essential for Palestinians to understand better the Israeli mood, as it is essential for Israelis to understand what is troubling the Palestinians. I would suggest to all who believe that a solution has to be found that the most rewarding type of warfare against Israel is not the military one, but a real peace offensive. There is a daily newspaper which carries every day on its front page a small column called "Your Morning Smile." Recently they printed the following story: a lady was asked how her marriage to her husband had survived so many crises over the years, her husband having been known as a person not very easy to live with. Her answer was as follows: the secret is in a restaurant which we have in the neighborhood. The place is marvelous, the food is great, the music is soothing, the ambience is right and then, after the meal, there is this quiet relaxing walk home. He goes there Sundays, I go there Wednesdays. . .This is not the right formula for a possible solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

DISCUSSION

Q. von Lazar: I would like to ask the Senator how aid or arms sales could be used to affect the Israeli and Palestinian attitudes toward negotiations?

A. Mathias: One of the elements of a settlement both in the President's plan and in the minds of many people is the question of Israeli security. Dr. Shaked has just described it in terms of paranoia, a tremendous concern with security. If the Congress, for example, were to engage in a heated and protracted, wasted debate on the level of assistance to Israel, and reduce it below the present level with a lot of recrimination, and raise questions about the reliability of the United States as a source of -- really of the means of survival if you are thinking both of economic aid and other aid -- I think the Congress would then create such problems that the security of Israel would be jeopardized, and the search for peace in the Middle East prolonged. That is just one example.

Q. The question to our other two panelists is what do they think the United States could do in order to move the process along?

A. Khalidi: I am not of the opinion that Israel's margin of security is so slender that signals of dissatisfaction with policies that contradict the stated preferences of the President of the United States would place Israel in such dire jeopardy. I think we have a reasonably wide margin there in which to allow Washington to indicate to Israel that when Washington says settlements are "an obstacle to peace," or statements even more withering than that, such as settlements are "unwelcome," that when such statements are made the United States really means it. I think as long as Tel Aviv thinks the United States does not really mean these things, then I do not see why, if you were in the shoes of Begin or Rabin or Peres, you would really worry very much. It seems to me that this is really very much the crux of the problem. Take for example the decision on Tuesday of the Appropriations Committee to indeed increase the aid to Israel even before the Israeli Commission of Inquiry had made its report, even before the Israelis have actually left Lebanon, even while they say they do not approve, they reject not only the Fez plan, they reject President Reagan's plan. I recognize this is not a final decision by the Appropriations Committee, but I do not see that this kind of signal from Washington is going to help the decision-makers in Israel along the path of accommodation.

A. Shaked: I too share that part of the comment which relates to the credibility problem which American foreign policy has in the

Middle East and in larger parts of the world (unfortunately). my opinion however there is a certain lesson, if historical lessons are of any value whatsoever, there is a certain lesson with regard to the only major breakthrough in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict in many decades. Namely, that it was not a U.S. initiative which created a qualitative change, it was a Middle Eastern initiative which the United States then developed and became committed to that created the only qualitative change in many, many years. Please do not misunderstand me; I am not recommending that an Arab leader announce that he is going tomorrow to Jerusalem. I am not one of the persons who believes that history should of necessity repeat itself, but I think there is a certain lesson there which has to be more seriously studied. There have been a number of previous plans produced either by American Presidents or by very senior people in Washington, Secretaries of State, etc. The only time when these policies meant a change in Middle-Eastern terms was either by very painstaking diplomatic activity such as the famous shuttles by Mr. Kissinger and by Mr. Habib to which I alluded before. Washington is capable of, and perhaps willing to, create a plan, and then to go ahead and take all the responsibilities which are required, in order to impose such a plan on the involved parties. One small comment: after the Camp David announcement at the press conference in Washington, one of the involved diplomats was asked what the secret of Camp David's success was, and his answer was the strike at the New York Times.

A. Mathias: I just wanted to comment that Dr. Khalidi's point illustrated the very difficult dilemma in which we find ourselves. I think it is difficult for the United States to make a point and underscore it, if it is always assumed that the cornucopia of aid is going to continue to flow without cessation. We have to remember the nature of Israeli society and government. If any final settlement is to be reached, there is going to have to be a vote in the Knesset. I think we need to give some attention to the Knesset, perhaps almost as much as the Knesset gives to the Congress, to determine what kind of result can be gotten there in support of an agreement, if an agreement is ever laid before it. If not a vote of the Knesset, there will have to be a referendum of the Israeli people. Dr. Shaked's point, I think, is well taken, that there is a sense of paranoia and extreme sense of concern about security, and if we take actions at this time which feed that paranoia, then that vote in the Knesset, the favorable vote in the Knesset, or the favorable referendum of the Israelis, simply will not be forthcoming. You have to take a long look. I think this is where you get to Dr. Khalidi's point in taking a long look. There may be other decisions that will be influenced by current events, and that is where the restraining hand can come in. I think it is not wise to take punitive actions which feed the paranoia that now exists.

A. Khalidi: I have two points I want to make. One is about the Sinai analogy. Very often one is told that we have a case of Israel pulling out of Sinai in response to a gesture from Arab countries. Clearly, Professor Shaked does not expect a queue of Arab leaders outside Begin's office as he himself indicated. But, I think the analogy of Sinai does not apply to the West Bank. I think you can make a case, and I would be interested to hear Professor Shaked's response to this; I think you can make a case as follows: wrenching and traumatic and bruising as the withdrawal from Sinai was, the locus of Zionist ambitions has historically been on both banks of the river Jordan. Even Ben Gurion, if one looks at his personal memoirs -- it is a voluminous volume -- one notices that in 1934, Ben Gurion was advocating a Jewish state on both banks of the Jordan. Labor Zionism subsequently did not pursue this idea, but Revisionist Zionism is based fundamentally on this concept of a Jewish state on both banks of the Jordan. Revisionist Zionism, the Zionism to which Begin subscribes, is based on this concept. This is the backbone of the Revisionist ideology. It is not "on both sides of the Sinai frontier," it is "on both banks of the river Jordan." And if it is on both banks of the river Jordan, it is at the same time on the West Bank of the river Jordan. Therefore, I think a case can be made that the Sinai deal was indeed a prelude to the movement to take the West Bank. As far as the need to consider the moods of the Knesset which Senator Mathias brought up and which I think is very important, you have a problem here and the problem is this: if Israeli public opinion including the Knesset were under the impression that Begin can actually get away with the policy of what even Professor Shaked -- perhaps I should not say "even" -- but what Professor Shaked has described as a policy of creeping annexation; if the Knesset and Israeli public opinion really think that he can get away with it, why should they not vote in favor of it? So how do we influence the Knesset if we are worried about exciting its paranoia?

Q: A little more on Israeli paranoia: we hear from serious Israelis, frustrated and serious, that the Labor Party would like the United States to squeeze aid in order to force Begin from power. I would like Dr. Shaked first to tell us if that is the way it would work and if not, why not?

A. Shaked: The question was whether American help, involvement or interference, is an attempt to remove Mr. Begin from power or to make him, I assume, lose an election. Is this a fair paraphrase, sir?

Q: Yes, in light of the Israeli Labor Party's private suggestion to that effect, would we not be wise to consider those Labor Party suggestions?

A. Shaked: Let me divide my answer into two parts. The first is that I do not know what the private suggestions of the Israeli Labor Party members are. There has been a major scandal in Israel lately with regard to an alleged conversation which took place between an American journalist and Israeli Labor leaders, and the scandal is still reverberating. The Israelis whose names have been cited all deny not that such a meeting took place, but that this is what they said or implied. The journalists insist that this is what had been said. I was not there; it is very difficult for me to judge. Irrespective of that, I think that any American pressure, particularly public pressure, would be counterproductive insofar as Israeli society goes and if I know anything about Israeli society no matter what this or that person, either politician or analyst, may think or wish, if there were to be American pressure exerted on the Israeli Prime Minister, and if this pressure were steered by that Israeli Prime Minister into a vote situation, it would result in a much more overwhelming vote in his favor than the size of his constituency. Mr. Goldmann, who was quoted here before, was very well known in this country, was highly respected internationally, but was almost an anathema within the Israeli political system. This is a fact which has to be borne in mind. I do not believe that any constructive positive consequences might arise from such an American venture.

I would like to take this opportunity to address myself to a comment which Professor Khalidi made before to a question which he addressed to me. I shall answer it briefly, because it was brought up. The West Bank indeed occupies in the Zionist movement and in Jewish history a place which is very different from that of the Sinai. There is no doubt about that, and if Mr. Begin is believed to be pressured by the United States in Israeli perceptions, of course he would get even more support than he has now. There is, however, in my analysis, something which stands in Israeli priorities even higher than the attainment of peace. This is where I detect a hardening of Israeli position now at the crossroads. This is where I think concerned persons should address themselves in order to maintain as much fluidity there as possible, not to mention any means or ways to spirit away from extreme positions to more moderate ones. If any policy favored by an outside power, whether it is the PLO, Syria, Jordan or the United States, has a chance, it must be a policy which will excite the grass root levels of Israeli society.

Q. Cohen: Dr. Shaked spoke of symmetries and asymmetries and I was struck by one symmetry between your two presentations. Dr. Khalidi speaks of possibilities for peace and attributes most of the problems to the intransigence of the Reagan administration. Dr. Shaked speaks of the chances for peace and attributes a great deal of the responsibilities to the intransigence of the Arab world and the Israelis. What I would like to ask, then, is that each of you address, specifically, the concerns addressed by the other. Dr. Khalidi, you speak of what, in practical terms, the Arab world could do to reduce Arab intransigence; Dr. Shaked, you speak of what, in practical terms, Israeli society could do to reduce Israeli intransigence.

A. Khalidi: The Arab summit held in Fez, as I indicated in my remarks, in my opinion is an unprecedented development in the evolution of the Palestinian problem. Here we have all of the heads of states agreeing on a concept for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The only absentees were Libya and Egypt. Libya because I think it disapproved of the program that was being discussed and Egypt, of course, not because it disapproved, but because of the disagreement on the part of the Arab states on the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty. In other words, except for Libya, this program represents as close to a consensus as we have had on the Arab side of this issue. And this is, as I said, an unprecedented development. Now, if you look at this communique of Fez, you see that it is divided into two sections. The first section is a preamble, historically the most fascinating because the preamble explicitly refers not only to the Fahd plan which was shot down last year by the radicals, but it specifically refers to the Bourguiba plan of 1965. Now the Bourguiba plan of 1965 was a plan that clearly enunciated a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the principles of partition and a two-state solution in coexistence with each other between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. When Bourguiba put his plan forward in 1965, there was a tremendous outcry against partition by the Arab countries. Clearly the Arab countries at the time were not prepared to see a negotiated settlement along these lines. Now this was 1965, and Bourguiba himself was boycotted. For many years a great number of Arab countries actually broke their diplomatic relations with Tunisia. The Bourguiba plan is specifically referred to in the preamble of the Fez communique. I find this, as a student of the Palestinian problem, quite without precedent, and I am clearly disturbed by the fact that it has passed completely unnoticed in the United States. I think this is an index of the movement that has taken place within the Arab countries. It is not just one country saying this, it is not two countries saying this, it is the entire leadership of the Arab world including the radicals with the exception of Qadhdhafi, including Arafat saying this. I think this is remarkable, absolutely remarkable and I think it was simply shot down, immediately, peremptorily by Begin.

A. Shaked: I would like to state that I fully share Dr. Khalidi's assessment of the Fez statement and the great change which such a statement signifies within a continuum of a conflict situation. If you judge the statement comparatively not only because it alludes to the Reagan plan, but more comprehensively because of everything that is in it and that is omitted from it, it is an extremely important document. I do not know if this has gone unnoticed in the United States or not; it has not been unnoticed in Israel; that I know for sure. The problem with regard to Israeli intransigence, if you wish, is one for which I do not have a simple or a short statement. It would take me, I am afraid, very long to build up the analytical structure which is required in order to try and support what I have indicated before, namely, that the room for maneuverability is at the grassroots in Israel and not the Prime Minister, or not the Cabinet level. May I just suggest that one problem across the barricades of the Arab-Israeli conflict is that the two main parties, or even the many parties which are involved, fail very often to see what the other party or parties is doing. This pattern has evolved to the dimensions almost of a Greek tragedy. It is certainly not one move, or what I referred to before, a microscopic move, which can change such a situation, but if I take all the microscopic moves which have happened in this situation, I do think that there is a change. The sum total of this change as far as my analysis goes is for the better, and not for the worse. The better meaning more of an opportunity to reach a solution, as compared with the situation in the 1950's and '60's.

A. Mathias: Let me just add an illustration. Peter Shore, who is a member of Parliament in Britain, a member of the Labor Party, was recently talking to Prime Minister Begin and was urging him to enter into some dialogue with the PLO, with Arafat, and Begin reacted violently. He said absolutely not; he would never, never, ever sit down with terrorists, assassins and murderers. Peter Shore said to the Prime Minister that he must not be intransigent; after all, history does record men who were once terrorists and who have become statesmen, leaders of nations. Begin looked him right in the eye without blinking and said, "I assume you refer to Mugabe."

Q. Rubin: I would like to understand more fully the suggestions made by Professor Khalidi. I have four questions. The first, you referred to the 1967 boundary; I wonder did you mean by that actually the boundary at the start of 1967, that is, the boundary after the 1956 war, or do you mean the boundary after the 1967 war? That is, are you proposing to undo the consequences of the Six Day War when you speak of the 1967 boundary? Or are you speaking of the boundary as it began in 1967 and you are willing to negotiate from the basis of the conclusion, from the conclusion of the Six Day War? Second, the Fez conference, you said, spoke of compensation for Palestinians dispossessed by Israel and I wondered if there was anything in the Fez conference or elsewhere regarding what appears to me to be the obverse of that, that is, the compensation for the Jews who left their countries not wholly willingly in order to immigrate to Israel, and now, of course, form the backbone of Begin's popular support in Israel. It seems to me that there is a contradiction. Third, you spoke of Jewish-owned land. I am a lawyer and I have some difficulties with this perception of Jewish-owned land or any other ethnic-owned land. Barry Goldwater used to tell a story when he was running for President. He asked if he had time to play golf with some of his supporters in Arizona and they told him that they were terribly sorry; traditionally the golf club had not been open to Jews. He said he was only half Jewish; could he play nine holes? What is this figure, this 42% or whatever it is? Are corporations Jewish? Why is the dominance of ethnic consideration so overwhelming in this part of the world, that the question simply does not arise; that corporations are identified or people are identified as Jewish or Arab or Muslim or whatever ethnic identity they have, by governments or by their neighbors, without regard to what we, in the United States, would regard as property of individuals? And fourth, you equated the Golan Heights and Sinai. I was wondering whether in your approach to that, you mean to imply that the same or certain conditions would apply; that is, the Israelis withdraw from the Golan in return for something like a peace treaty with Syria, a demilitarized area in the Golan Heights, an American buffer, a UN buffer, or some kind of buffer. Do you mean to imply that if the Golan Heights does go back, that it would satisfy the Arab irredentists?

A. Khalidi: Here are the answers. By referring to the 1967 boundary strictly speaking, I mean the boundary as it existed before the June war, perhaps more technically it should be referred to as the 1949 boundary.

As far as the compensation of refugees of Moroccan Jews is concerned, this of course, has been brought up by Israel very often when discussing the return of Palestinian refugees. This is a matter for the Israeli government to take up with the Arab governments. The Arab governments assembled in Fez discussed their concept of Palestinian return, within the context of a Palestinian-Israeli settlement. I do not personally happen to believe that migration of Jews to Israel is a punishment of the Jews. It seems to me in Zionist literature this is represented as fulfillment of Jewish aspirations, and I think there is a difference between that and the expulsion of Palestinians from their own country. I think that the Jewish minorities in the Arab countries were, in my opinion, the casualties of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the sense that their status in the Arab countries became obviously much more precarious because of the conflict in Palestine. In other words, Zionism, the introduction of Zionism into Palestine, introduced an element of greater precariousness into the lives of the Jewish community in the various Arab countries. I am not sure that these were not encouraged by Israel to leave the Arab countries. It is known that the Israeli government has departments, or the Jewish Agency had departments, specifically for the organization of mass immigration of Jews from various parts of the world including the Arab countries, so I think there is an element of fulfillment in the movement and the convergence of Jewish communities upon Israel.

The third question about my designation of Jewish-owned land, yes, I think you are right. One should more specifically say land owned by members of the Jewish community or that kind of thing. Now why do we say members of the Jewish community? Because in this particular case it is an Arab-Jewish problem, a conflict between an entity which belongs to one denomination, and entities which belong to another denomination. The Jewish Agency is called the Jewish Agency, there is something called the Jewish National Fund. These are their official names. There is a right of return of Jews to Israel. These are realities in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As far as the Golan is concerned, my main point is simply this: if we want a global settlement, we need to defuse the three dimensions mentioned -- Palestinian, Arab and Islamic -- and if the Golan is retained by Israel, then the post-settlement environment is going to be an unstable one because it could become the focus for Arab irredentism. Therefore any settlement must take into account the future of the Golan. It is a fact that the evacuation of Sinai has made it even more difficult for the Syrian government not to ask for an evacuation of Golan in a general settlement. What are the specific terms of Golan evacuation; obviously this has to be discussed. Obviously there would have to be guarantees that satisfy both sides. Golan is important because in most discussions of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Golan is forgotten, simply forgotten, and I would not be surprised if this were one of the factors that makes the Syrians particularly unforthcoming.

Q: Could you elaborate a bit along the line of Professor Khalidi on possible settlement proposals, concrete solutions to open up, to brighten up the picture if possible?

A: Shaked: Whatever my blueprint happens to be for the Middle East, it is meaningless as far as the power for political implementation is concerned. All I can do is teach students about the Middle East and hope that one day they will become prime ministers and have a better understanding of the Middle East. Having said that, I can very briefly point towards a number of ingredients or elements which in my opinion have to be a part of a Middle Eastern solution. One -- I am trying to articulate it from an Israeli point of view -- it will have to be comprehensive in the sense that if it addresses itself primarily to the Palestinian problem, or initially to the Palestinian problem, and then to the problem which Israel confronts with a variety of Arab opinions, I do not think it would be a starter. In other words, I am talking about a second ingredient which is a derivation of the first. The solution has to be systematic and comprehensive, and even this will not work unless it is bilateral between Israel and an existing Arab state, which, from an Israeli point of view preferably, should be a confrontation state. If Israelis were to make up a list of their priorities, I would assume under the current government, they would want to see Syria first, perhaps Saudi Arabia second, hoping that this would enable Lebanon to be joining in as third, and then Jordan. Under another Israeli government, I can see a different order. But it does not matter whether it is a Labor government or a Likud government, they both, for all kinds of reasons, will be very reluctant to engage first in a move which may create reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinians and then hope that this would bring in the other Arab countries.

Third, I fully agree with Dr. Khalidi's point that after Sinai, it is impossible to achieve peace with Syria without emulation of the arrangement which was made with Egypt with regard to Sinai. By the same token, it is intolerable for Syria under any government, Assad or no Assad, to go for anything less than what the late President of Egypt achieved. It would be intolerable for any Israeli prime minister to settle for anything less than, first, a clear-cut move which attests to the recognition of Israel, and then, negotiations like Camp David, or any other type of model which one may conceive of. Again, you get a problem here where the two parties are interlocked by certain precedents, and they both have to start from precedents. Unfortunately, they are not talking about an identical precedent. In Syria, we talk about Golan being identical to Sinai, and Israel, under any prime minister, will talk about a move of recognition under certain assumptions. You know that before Sadat came to Jerusalem, there was Tangier. But a move, public and clear-cut, not hidden in language such as the Fez language, or vague language, would enable an Israeli government to engage in a quid pro quo arrangement.

Number five, and with your permission this is where I shall conclude, although I am fully aware I leave much to be desired as far as details are concerned, I think that there can be no solution (and now I am not talking as a person who is trying to present the Israeli public's point of view; I am talking now as a Middle Eastern analyst who resides in Israel) to the Arab-Israeli conflict unless the Palestinian ingredient is solved to the satisfaction of all the Palestinians -- not to the satisfaction of Israel, or Syria, or all Jordan or Iraq -- but to all the Palestinians. However, I believe, in light of what I said before, that in order for such a plan to become viable, and to become a starter, the time element is extremely important. Gradual developments are extremely important; what is now fashionably known as confidence-building measures are extremely important. Perhaps the first step would be for people on both sides to try and transcend their own traditional interpretation of what makes the other party tick and try to look at it from the eyes of the other party in order to accept it as a given and not just as a variable.

Q: Sterner: I was very interested in Dr. Khalidi's ten points. I want to ask whether he would try to relate the ten points to the problem of getting dialogues started. You are not saying that we would expect that Israel would have to meet all of these ten points before negotiations begin. Is this then a program that you would use as the Arab or the Palestinian negotiating program after you have come to the negotiating table?

A: Khalidi: No, I am not propounding any Arab or Palestinian negotiating solution. I am giving my own views of what I think are the ingredients of a solution, acceptable in my opinion to the Palestinian leadership, the PLO leadership, the Fatah leadership. This is a question of judgment, my own judgment; this is my own perception. I am not writing a negotiating brief for anybody.

Q: Sterner: I understand it is your view, but the point I am trying to get at is whether you think of it in terms of a negotiating program with some kind of precondition for negotiating.

A: Khalidi: I think it is a good question. I am not thinking of it as a precondition. The modalities of how you tackle these issues, it seems to me, and in what kind of sequence and in what combination, would surely be the task of detailed negotiation which is not what I am engaged in. I am engaged in exposition.

Q: Tsongas: Senator Mathias has more knowledge on this than I do, but during the Panama Canal Treaty debates, the only people in this country who cared about those treaties were opposed. In fact, from a purely political perspective, the Panama Canal Treaty that both Senator Mathias and I supported was a negative. Indeed some Senators lost their seats because of the vote. Sadat lost his life. The question I have, is what Sadat did consistent with the wishes of his constituency? Now, assuming that breakthroughs are a function of personae, given the present personae on the scene -- Arafat, Begin, Sharon -- at least my experience with them would not suggest any breakthroughs are going to be forthcoming. They are on both sides of a course consistent with the most reactionary elements of their constituencies, so the question would then arise, if they are on this course, what can break this momentum? It seems to me that there are only two possibilities: one, that somebody in the line-up does the unexpected and breaks away from the constituency; secondly, you have an intervening event. If I had to judge what that intervening event would be, it would be the calculation of holding on to the West Bank. The cost of creeping annexation is simply not worth it. The price to be paid to the body politic within Israel, in calculating it from a quiet West Bank, is quite different from calculating it from a West Bank marked by violence and unrest. I wonder whether this analysis of the current situation would square with your analysis? I must say to Senator Mathias that so much of our political life is spent with irrational advocates that I am just not used to people who propose something rational.

A: Khalidi: I must disagree with that. It sounds so discourteous of me to say this just at the moment when you indicated you thought this panel was being rational. I want to disagree, not with that remark of yours; frankly, I want to disagree with putting Arafat together with Sharon and Begin in one and the same brackets. I disagree with that because I think that Arafat from my own assessment is the leader, certainly within the Palestinian community, of the pragmatic core and the person who would probably be very much in support of the general outlines of the points I made this evening. In other words, he is, and has been, looking for a solution that is honorable and takes into account the realities and at the same time insures the minimum necessary for his own people. It is also no secret that he has been extremely anxious to open negotiations, to open dialogue with the United States, and that he has sent not one, not two, but countless, almost an infinite number of signals to that effect. So, I really think it is somewhat unfair, if I may say so, to group him together with Sharon and Begin. The other point is this: as far as the West Bank is concerned, I assume that from Begin's point of view and Sharon's point of view, the cost of controlling it is tolerable. I would assume that Sharon and Begin have a concept of their ability to control the hostile environment, which is the same kind of concept which has fueled some decision-makers in the past; this concept involves control of space much wider than the West Bank.

A: Shaked: I find myself again in agreement with Dr. Khalidi. I would fully agree with you that you could not put Mr. Begin, Mr. Sharon, and Mr. Arafat in the same boat, but for very different reasons. Less cynically, I do think the perception of Mr. Begin and particularly of Mr. Sharon in regard to the restiveness in the West Bank, at least thus far, is certainly one in which the situation is politically tolerable for a very long time, all other things being equal for at least two reasons. One, when one watches the West Bank from a distance, all the troubles are amplified many times. Every strike, every stone thrown, every shot fired, makes headlines. What one watches from Jerusalem is a much wider and more concrete context of so many thousands of people going across lines which existed until 1967, so one can easily fall into the trap of thinking that Israel could continue to occupy, or, as the official Israeli language goes, to administer the West Bank for a very long time without reaching a situation which is intolerable, politically, as far as the Knesset or the Israeli constituency as a whole goes. I agree with Dr. Khalidi in that. It does not mean that Israeli policy-makers do not regard it as a main or a major problem. Of course they do, but I think in a wider context, they think they can take care of it. In fact, as you know, one of the deepest points of division and bones of contention within Israeli society across political lines is whether it is in the final analysis more detrimental for the future of Israel to control a West Bank in terms of the impact of this control, the Jewishness of the state of Israel, or whether because of the overriding long-term security consideration, this is the only way in which to secure the survival of the state of Israel, at least militarily, for a long time to come -- notwithstanding the price which Israeli society has to pay by controlling the West Bank. This goes right to the heart of the debate in Israel, and this debate crossed party lines a long time ago. As for the role of personalities versus policy factors, of course, I think personalities do play a very important, a very major role. It is precisely why in my analysis of Israel I tried to move away from this obvious aspect of the situation and to demonstrate that irrespective of personality changes -- and there is a great difference between a Rabin and a Begin, although their names rhyme, as far as personality goes -- but irrespective of the difference, there is a great deal of continuity in their policies which, to me as an historian and an analyst, is a very, very significant fact that we have to cope with and come to grips with.

Q: Mathias: I wonder if Dr. Shaked could expand on his answer in one respect. In 1967, I was in Israel, went to the Likud headquarters and had a long conversation with Ezer Weizmann and asked how could he be advocating incorporating the West Bank into Israel, because as you do that, you jeopardize the Jewish character of the nation. And his answer to me was, even within Israel proper within fifty years, given the demographic profile, there will be an Arab majority. And he said fifty years is nothing in the life of a nation. And then he went on to say that their answer to that would be that Likud would have such a magnificent and prosperous administration that they would attract immigration from all over the world and that was how the balance would be corrected. Of course history has spoken to that. You said it would be tolerable for a long time -- what is a long time in this context?

A: Shaked: Mr. Weizmann's answer to your question is indeed very typical of one type of analysis and thinking which prevailed in Israel at the time and which still prevails in Israel. Those who are convinced one way or another find the argument which the other part or party brings up impossible or inconsistent or illogical. Thus far at least, the opposition has not demonstrated disagreement with the arguments of the other party by really creating a new political mandate. I do not know whether this is in the offing; I have my doubts about that.

With regard to how long (what is how long in the context of what we are discussing today?), I think again that all other things being equal -- which is a principle that could never be applied to the Middle East, of course -- but assuming that we talk from a present which we know, and we are trying by extrapolation to make an assessment about the future, which we do not know, I think that a good government could control a West Bank with the present level of restiveness for five to ten years without any major difficulty as far as their voters go. They might face great difficulties as far as their dealings with other countries and governments go. They might have all kinds of problems which they may have to confront with a greater or lesser ability to resolve, but as far as the voters go, I think that they are in pretty good shape in this particular respect, as long as the Middle Eastern system remains what it is. Put one major change in the system of the Middle East, and the whole equation has to be reassessed and redefined.

Q: Gart: Can I go back to the question that was asked earlier of Senator Mathias? You suggested that the United States should use all means at its disposal to go about bringing peace in this area, but you excluded certain measures having to do with military and economic assistance and I am a bit perplexed; what did you have in mind? What means are at our disposal?

A: Mathias: Murray, it seems to me that we have an array of talent, people like Phil Habib, who can be unleashed on the problem, and I think that is one element, one array of assets that we can bring to bear on this case. Another is the concept that a settlement in the Middle East should be more than just a cessation of war and an end of violence. It ought to be the beginning of an era of peace and prosperity -- some people have used the word the Benelux of the Middle East. If you could bring to bear the enormous talents of the Palestinian people, who are among the most educated in the world, and the talents of the Israeli people, who are also among the most educated in the world, combine that with the unique geographic location of the area, these are some of the economic aspects that could be brought to bear. This is an area in which the United States could be helpful in creating a climate which promises that peace will bring with it substantial benefits that are not going to happen until peace does get there. I said I did not think we should create a diminution of aid to Israel because such a threat would have the opposite effect. Someone raised the question of the significance of Max Frankel's recent articles, and Steve Rosenthal raised the questions mentioned in Max Frankel's articles and how they have been viewed. Dr. Shaked's response confirmed the dubious nature of a policy that threatened to turn aid off and on as a lever in this respect. It seems to me there are other things we could be doing that we might or might not do depending on the degree of cooperation that occurred. Senator Tsongas knows we have pending in the Foreign Relations Committee a proposal to pick up the debt service on the Israeli debt. I am not sure that one is going to fly under any circumstances, but I just point out that the current level of aid is not the ultimate that some people have in mind as what might be desirable. When you look to the future, certainly a little more selectivity can be used.

Q: Can I just follow up on Mr. Gart's question? If you were to look at this from an Arab or a Palestinian point of view, and you speak of Mr. Habib, how can the United States set itself up as being able to advance a solution when these agreements can be broken and denied?

A: Mathias: You were addressing that question to me? Obviously, those are setbacks, problems. I do not think you can gloss them over as mere difficulties. But on the other hand, we have the unique ability to put somebody like Phil Habib on the scene and give him the maximum amount of support, to do the best he can do. This is an immediate asset that we could bring to bear on the scene.

DINNER SESSION: SUMMARY OF PARTICIPANTS' REMARKS

The evening discussion began with a broad consensus that present moderate Palestinian activity was viewed as evidence that substantial movement supporting peaceful settlement with Israel is replacing the pre-Lebanon-war militant policies of the PLO. This change in Palestinian policies is largely a consequence of the total defeat of the PLO by Israel in the war in Lebanon. The present moderate approach by Arafat and the Fatah bloc acceptance of Gaza and the West Bank as a basis of a peace settlement parallels the new moderate position toward recognition of Israel taken by most of the Arab world at the Fez II conferences in September 1982. A number of participants believed it was a mistake for the United States to ignore the significance of the Fez conference. This Arab peaceful initiative needs to be coupled to the Reagan initiative if Hussein is to have any chance to achieve movement towards a peace settlement. Fez is momentous because it declares that peace is desired; it acknowledges the primacy of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Further, since Israel was the victor in Lebanon, as victor it must take the first steps to open negotiations. Failing that, the United States, as the greatest power, must bring the parties together.

Several possible approaches were discussed for breaking the present deadlocks and triggering a move for peace in the Middle East: the least likely to succeed, it was argued, would be a bold maneuver designed to create a new momentum in the aftermath of the war in Lebanon. Despite the success of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, it was viewed as an exception, driven in part by a fear that unless bold action was taken the Soviets would move in as a partner with the United States in the Middle East. A second approach would require firm pressures by outside powers to help resolve the differences of the parties directly involved. A third possibility is to formulate an unambiguous new policy initiative acceptable to Israel. One participant pointed out that by invading Lebanon, Israel had for the first time abandoned its defensive posture, had triumphed militarily, but had not achieved its political objectives; but if the PLO political formula were to change fundamentally -- if the official rhetoric of the PLO that armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine were dropped -- then Israel could move in the direction of territorial compromise.

Participants who have been in close contact with the PLO observed that the PLO is concerned that not even unilateral Palestinian recognition of Israel and a willingness to make peace is likely to reverse the determination of the present Israel government to continue settlement of the West Bank. Further, the Israeli presence is now so extensive that it is close to the point of irreversibility.

It was observed also that the majority of the PLO strongly believes that to recognize unilaterally Israel under such circumstances would result in political suicide for Arafat, and the loss of the one remaining Palestinian trump card. Numerous signals have been sent by Arafat to Washington that he is ready to negotiate, but the "straight jacket of Sinai" makes it presently impossible for the United States to have open discussions with the PLO, and thus makes impossible any unilateral PLO concession of recognition. Arafat has confidence in the United States, but the failure of the United States to enforce its pledge of a cease-fire in July 1981 has shaken PLO confidence in the United States' word or capacity to deliver.

Key Arab leaders, whether conservative or radical, are reluctant to make any further concessions which might weaken their already precarious position, if Israel continues to press forward with its settlement policies. Recent travellers to the region explained that is why King Hussein, Arafat and other Arab leaders insist that the United States must take strong action to induce Israel to negotiate in order to convince the Arabs and Palestinians that Israel would negotiate a settlement at this time. Growing numbers of Israelis also point out that United States pressure on Israel to negotiate is essential if there is to be any motivation on the part of Israeli leaders to reopen the peace process.

Intense American diplomatic activity in the Middle East would tend to catalyze opinion in Israel, and, with increasing effect, within the Arab world and the PLO. While the United States continues to uphold its support for Israel's security, concern was expressed that the two foreign policies -- American and Israeli -- are now operating from different and rapidly diverging premises. The United States wants a negotiated settlement; Begin wants an imposed settlement. In doing so, Begin is, in effect, rejecting UN Resolution 242. There is an urgent need for a candid, searching political dialogue between Israel and the United States in order to put the two friends and allies back on the same policy track. If this dialogue does not take place, there will be increasing strain in their relations.

Moreover, there is the possibility of a further loss of American credibility in the area and a consequent loss of power unless the United States moves forward with clear purpose, and without much more delay, to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem. The United States first must also establish for itself clear goals for a practical long-term policy in the Middle East in order to convince all parties on both sides of the conflict that American peacemaking efforts will keep a steady course useful to all interests.

The turnover of American secretaries of state from Haig to Shultz that occurred during the war in Lebanon has produced a change in substance and style of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. However, the smaller powers in the region have been thrown off-balance in an effort to adapt to the new face of American diplomacy. What tends to compound this difficulty is that new personalities use different modes of communication and have yet to learn how to interpret signals given by the leaders of the complex of political systems in the Middle East.

The war in Lebanon has also added substance to a prevailing Arab perception that the United States intends to insure total military advantage for Israel. Consequently, Arab leaders such as Hussein of Jordan, when asked by the United States to negotiate with Israel, cannot overlook the possibility of further disaffecting their own political constituencies. Undoubtedly, the disastrous Lebanese war has crippled and undermined the strength of many Arab leaders in the eyes of their own people. Restoring the confidence of the Arabs in American peacemaking will require the exercise of American pressures and incentives in the Middle East; first, to strengthen the bargaining leverage of Arab leaders, and second, to demonstrate clearly to all parties the advantages of negotiation.

The discussion proceeded to a consideration of how the Reagan plan might present the Palestinians and Arab leaders such as King Hussein with an opportunity to have a voice in the terms and shape of a settlement, and how it would provide a way for the Arabs to determine if Israel is, in fact, prepared to compromise. In the past, when American peace initiatives were undertaken, they led to negotiations in the Middle East, hostilities were halted, and some issues between Israel and the Arabs were resolved. When there are no negotiations, the gap inevitably widens.

It was the general view that the time available for a settlement is running short, but some movement in the right direction could help create more time for negotiations. In this context, the Reagan plan is viewed by some as having definite values: it is a real proposal; it can be modified; it has elements that satisfy all parties; and, properly utilized, it could convince Israel that the Arabs are ready to settle peacefully.

Doubts were expressed that any Israeli government, either Likud or Labor, could accept a proposal to return to the pre-1967 boundaries. There was consideration of what the PLO might be willing to accept as a compromise. Faced with an aggressive Israeli settlement policy on the West Bank, PLO moderates are clearly ready to accept the West Bank and Gaza as the basis of a settlement. The centrist Fatah bloc of the PLO has sent clear signals that it could accept a West Bank-Gaza partition plan, but in the absence of United States support and Israeli willingness to negotiate it will not obtain the full endorsement from others within the Palestinian political community.

One view was expressed that no territorial base remains on the West Bank for a compromise settlement, and that a point of no return has been crossed. If the situation is so advanced, the possibility of an Arab-Israeli conflict will increase, along with a strengthening of Palestinian, Arab, and Islamic irredentist forces in the Middle East.

Another analysis was given that concluded that the several versions of the Allon Plan which form the core of the Labor party position are not sufficient grounds to encourage PLO moderates to the negotiating table. The analysis was based on the view that the Allon Plan would permit only a portion, a strip of the West Bank, to become the Palestinian homeland. As the strip faces the ocean parallel to the Jordan River and the Lower Valley on the West side of the Arab population centers, and extends into the Jerusalem corridor from the Northwest, the borders would thus cut off 25-35% of the Hebron District and allow a return of only 20% of the original Palestinian-populated land. Whether this eventually would be acceptable to the PLO leadership, or would be rejected as an unthinkable capitulation of Palestinian national rights, as is now the case, is far from clear. This analysis continued with the observation that if the already extensive Israeli presence on the West Bank grows, there may be no room left for discussions; if the present settlements are not removed or if the tide of new Israeli construction is not halted, compromise may become a moot point.

It was pointed out that some analysts on both the Arab and Israeli sides believe that dramatic concessions made in the present time frame can bring about substantial change in the physical nature of an Israeli-Palestinian territorial settlement. Yet this school of thought points out that any arrangement not fully underwritten by the United States is likely to be unsuccessful.

In the view of the Palestinians, the Reagan plan requires the Palestinians to join the negotiations with Jordan and Israel without any sense of the political modalities of the outcome, without any concrete idea of what they will get in exchange for their willingness to conclude a peace with Israel. Some Arab observers take the position that since Israel is the dominant party, it must take the first political step and give a signal, such as a moratorium on new settlements. If prospects for movement forward will depend ultimately on decisions by the United States, then the issue is what American policy options are available and practical.

The group had considerable discussions about the use of U.S. military aid and economic assistance as a means of policy pressure in the Middle East, particularly the political and tactical wisdom of possible Congressional action in this area. Without a clearly defined Reagan strategy for working with the Congress on aid issues, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Appropriations Committee are unlikely to consider measures to link American policy to possible changes in levels of U.S. aid. Another complicating factor is the possibility of shortfalls in the aid already committed to several Middle East states, as well as in multi-billion dollar American loan obligations to international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. It was noted that rekindled debate in Congress over the aid issue in the aftermath of the war in Lebanon has aroused the attention and increased the political activity of American Arab and Jewish groups. Further discussion by American officials and public groups on how to manage the flow of American aid to Middle East states is likely to intensify and widen as the issue gains greater public visibility.

In summary, the main points of view on prospects ahead for a Middle East peace settlement are deeply pessimistic. One outlook is that Israel under Begin is de facto annexing the West Bank in accordance with its Zionist historical claims to the ancient Jewish homelands of Judea and Samaria and if Arab peace offerings were now made they would not change official Israeli policies. Consequently, the Middle East is on the threshold of the second century of the Arab-Israeli conflict as Israeli settlements continue apace. A second, less pessimistic outlook is that sufficient time and physical space now exist to establish a Palestinian homeland on the West Bank, but only if the United States acts now to simultaneously pressure Israel and the Arab world.

DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL CHANGE AND REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

JANUARY 14, 1983

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Eliot: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the second in our series, jointly sponsored by The Middle East Institute and The Fletcher School, on the Middle East. This session, as you all know, is entitled "Development, Social Change and Revolution in the Middle East." The final and concluding session takes place on February 4 and will deal with foreign policy issues. We have some very distinguished speakers with us today, and I will ask the Conference Chairman, Dean Miller, to take over and introduce them to you.

Almost all of us here are children or grandchildren or great-grandchildren of revolutions, or have experienced them, and yet, how little we know about them. Are there any reliable barometers to tell us when political malaise will turn into revolution? There has been a great deal of writing on the Western revolutions, particularly the American, French and Russian. Students of these revolutions, such as Crane Brinton, have described phases that seem to be common to all: a rise in the standard of living in the midst of intellectual discontent, violent overthrow, the revolution eating its own, a period of consolidation, and a gradual subsidence into normality. Are there reliable, political, seismic indicators that can tell us when an upheaval is coming? Certainly the study of past revolutionary movements can give some sense of what is to come. At the same time, analysis applied to the American, French, Russian or Chinese revolutions may not be entirely applicable to revolutions in the Middle East. Whether the best indicators come from class analysis, the study of elite politics, or the power of new ideas, has long been debated. But "the acceptance of violence in order to bring about change," as Chalmers Johnson has termed revolution, requires an analysis of the status quo and the new order being sought. The spreading flame of ideas or martyrdom by individuals or groups, or the massive revulsion caused by excessive repression , or some combination of these factors, demand a degree of integrative analysis if we are to make any sense out of revolutions. This is what we seek to discuss today.

Sigmund Newman defined revolution as "a sweeping fundamental change in political organization, social structure, economic property control, and the predominate myth of the social order, thus indicating a major break in the continuity of development." We have seen that kind of change in most, if not all, of the revolutions that have taken place in the Middle East since the end of World War II. In the light of history, are there any clues, any touchstones, any common themes in the Algerian, Syrian, Egyptian, Iraqi, and Iranian revolutions? It would be helpful perhaps to quote an observation by Sir Hamilton Gibb, made twenty-five years ago in 1957, that may help us understand the nature of these revolutions:
"In the Islamic lands of the Middle East in the present century, society is sharply split by a great divide between the professional classes in general, administrators, lawyers in the state courts, military officers, physicians, journalists, businessmen, and the mass of population, including the religious

teachers, artisans, peasants and tribesmen. The former are almost wholly westernized, in that their education, organizations, and social conduct have been influenced over two or three generations by the corresponding institutions in Western societies. The latter remain, in general, attached to the traditional institutions of their Islamic society, which may or may not be Islamic in the strictest sense. The former groups have been affected, not only by the Western institutions themselves, but also by the concepts and values that underlie them, at least in theory, although in practice, both institutions and values are far from having thrown off entirely the effects of earlier habits and attitudes. The masses not only hold to the traditional values, but in consequence of the frequent disruption of the older social institutions by the intrusion of Western law and techniques, distrust the dimly-grasped structure of ideas behind the new institutions, for the most part passively, but sometimes to the point of enrolling in activist Islamic movements. Yet, by the mere effects of habituation over a period of two or three generations, their patterns of thought and habits of conduct have, in several sectors, been appreciably modified by the new institutions, not so far as to discredit the traditional concepts and values, but rather by an obscure process of conflation."

With the clear understanding that deep knowledge of the Middle East gave him, Gibb prescribed the role for Western universities and for the educated from both the West and the Middle East. I would suggest that this formula is what we are trying to do here today, and what we should try to do as a long-term institutional approach, and I quote Gibb again: "Thus at the academic level, there is urgent need of more developed study and analysis, especially among advanced students from the Middle East and Western universities, both of the existing social relationships and attitudes, including the native concepts and institutions of law, and of the implications of structural changes. Effective progress can be achieved only from within, but Western guidance can greatly assist the educated minority to reexamine and reevaluate constructively the bases of their own social traditions, instead of merely assuming the universal validity of solutions derived from Western traditions or from Western or communist theory."

Our three speakers today have all lived through revolutions and thus have the insight that such an experience can give. I would like to ask Dean Miller to introduce them. Thank you.

Miller: Our three speakers today have been asked to deal with a very difficult assignment; namely, to try and make sense out of the revolutionary movements that have taken place in the post-war period. Each of our speakers has had direct experience with revolutions in his own country and the experience of revolution has moved them to try and understand what has taken place. Almost all of us here are in fact sons of revolutions, and we are well aware that revolutionary governments soon become status quo powers, and that revolutionary attitudes and sympathies change rather quickly into patterns of conservatism. A troubling question that has been on my mind as I have thought about revolutions, then experienced them, is whether the disastrous consequences of revolutions can be averted. Can steps be taken to eliminate what seems to be a determinism of bloodshed, hatred and bitterness? Could it have been otherwise if moderate reform movements had been more actively supported when significant evidence of popular discontent surfaced? This appears to be the case in Algeria. In my view, it was certainly the case in the course of Iran's continuing revolution which is now almost a century old. At several points along the way, violent upheaval could have been averted if the moderate voices for reform had been heeded and supported. Each of our three speakers today is certainly sensitive to -- if not in agreement with -- the troubling thought that there is no necessity for revolutionary inevitability.

There are many other factors. Revolutions in the Middle East have occurred close on the heels of extraordinary rapid economic development. The Iranian example at least seems to indicate that unless there is a rough congruence of political growth with economic development, a national pressure cooker is created. These are but a few of the factors that attend revolution. Our three speakers should provide us with the beginnings of understanding how to make sense out of what is a dominant pattern in the Middle East.

The first speaker is Dr. Shaul Bakhash, who is widely regarded as one of Iran's finest journalists and historians. Born in Iran and educated there, and later at Harvard and Oxford, Dr. Bakhash is the author of a major work on the Qajar dynasty, a study of Reza Shah, and has just completed a book on the Iranian revolution, of which he was an eyewitness. He is presently Visiting Associate Professor in the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton.

REVOLUTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Shaul Bakhash

In the last three decades, revolutions have convulsed most of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Monarchies have been swept away in Egypt, Iraq, Iran and Libya. In Syria, a series of coups led to extensive social, economic and political transformations that add up to a revolution. In Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya, deep changes in the structure of government and society have followed anti-colonial struggles and the achievement of independence from colonial powers.

Only the intrepid would attempt to generalize about revolution in so vast an area, or even the four countries -- Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Iran -- which are the subject of this paper. Revolution in each of these countries has, after all, been shaped by a particular history, distinctive social conditions. In Iraq and Egypt, there occurred initially only a coup, a military seizure of power; social revolution came later, in Egypt almost by inadvertence. In Iran, by contrast, the monarchy collapsed in the face of a vast popular movement. In Algeria, revolution followed a drawn-out, bitter colonial war, without parallel in the other three countries under consideration.

Unlike Algeria, Egypt or Iraq, Iran was never a colony or an administered territory. The shi'ism which a majority of the population profess has shaped Iran's revolutionary movement in distinctive ways. Egypt is not plagued by the ethnic, religious and geographic divisions that pit Iraq's groups and classes against one another and shape its post-revolution politics. In Iran, Iraq and Algeria, oil revenues have provided a freedom for revolutionary experimentation that Egypt lacks.

Yet the revolutionaries in these countries, as elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa, have each viewed their revolutions as characterized by a shared colonial past and a shared identity as Arabs, Muslims or members of the Third World. There have been numerous cross influences. The revolutionary officers in Iraq looked to Nasser for inspiration. Guerilla movements in Iran modeled themselves after the PLO or the FLN in Algeria. The revolutionary movements in Iraq and Syria, despite sharp differences, trace their roots to a common Ba'athist heritage. Khomeini's writings are read throughout the Islamic world; groups of Muslims from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Suez hope to emulate in their own countries Iran's Islamic Revolution.

Moreover, in Egypt, Algeria, Iran and Iraq, in three important areas -- the composition of the ruling and privileged classes, the structure of the economy, and forms of political organization -- revolution has given rise to broadly similar patterns. In each, revolution has strengthened a variant of the corporate state.

In Egypt, Algeria, Iran and Iraq, revolution has resulted in important transformation of the ruling elites. Monarchies or colonial regimes were swept away, as were the individuals or families who owed their wealth, power and influence to their connections with the ruling family or group. Revolution also eroded the position of the old nationalist politicians, such as the Wafd in Egypt or the National Front in Iran. The nationalist politicians were, at least on paper, committed to the parliamentary system and liberal values. They were replaced by leaders who drew on other sources for their models and for political inspiration.

In the state apparatus, there also occurred a substantial transformation of secondary elites, both as a result of changes in personnel and also through the expansion of the bureaucracy and the creation of new bureaucratic structures. Revolution thus served as a vehicle to propel newcomers from socially disadvantaged groups to jobs, promotion, income and privilege. In Algeria, the departing colonial administrators and their Algerian counterparts left vacant some 200,000 jobs and positions that were filled largely by new aspirants to office.

In Iran, revolution was followed by extensive purges of the army and bureaucracy, and even such institutions as universities, hospitals and industrial enterprises, making way for new upwardly mobile claimants. Moreover, tens of thousands of new jobs were created in the parallel bureaucracy of revolutionary organizations, such as the revolutionary courts, the revolutionary guards and the revolutionary committees, and the Crusade for Reconstruction. In Algeria and Egypt, a large bureaucracy mushroomed around bodies for political mobilization, such as the FLN in Algeria and the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt, and a clutch of organizations concerned with the mobilization of workers, students, peasants and women.

The expansion of the bureaucracy in post-revolution periods in all of these countries is by any standards astonishing. In Iraq, the number of civil servants increased from 85,000 to 450,000 between 1958 and 1972, a five-fold increase in just 14 years. In Egypt, the bureaucracy expanded from 350,000 in 1952 to 1.2 million in 1970. In Iran, within four years of the revolution, the civil service has grown from 1.2 to 1.7 million. Moreover, in Egypt, Iraq and Algeria, revolution has been followed by very rapid expansion of the educational system, which itself has become a vehicle for social mobility. Both Egypt and Iraq, for example, have laws that guarentee every university graduate a government job.

These developments perhaps do not in every instance represent a revolution of classes, the displacement of one socio-economic class by another.

Some studies conducted in Egypt, for example, suggest that the bureaucracy has continued to be largely recruited from among the upper and middle classes, as was the case in the past. In Iran under the monarchy, the educational system was already expanding with great rapidity, and the bureaucracy was already being recruited from among the middle sectors of society. In Iraq, at a much earlier period and in a much smaller way, some such movement was also taking place. However, even if we regard these developments as an intensification of processes already under way, there is little doubt that the acceleration in opening up education, the bureaucracy and jobs to new groups has been considerable.

Moreover, supposedly ideological conflicts have often been primarily struggles to define the conditions for entry into jobs and access to privileges in terms so as to benefit one of many competing groups. In Iran, for example, an intense debate took place between the so-called liberals and the adherents of the Islamic Republic Party as to whether "skills" or "piety" constitute the more important qualification for office. Here, "skills" and "piety" were code words by which the Western-educated and technically skilled groups, and those educated in more traditional terms, pressed their claims to office and power. In Algeria, the campaign to "Arabise" the universities reflected in part a desire to assert an Algerian identity and to end reliance on an "alien" educational system. But the campaign for Arabisation was also linked to the struggle for recognition by those who lacked the French language and the technical skills that had served as qualifications for office.

A transformation of elites has taken place, but largely within and as a result of the expansion of the state sector. In transformation of the economic structure, the emergence of the state as the dominant force is also the most striking feature.

Major shifts have also occurred in property ownership. Post-revolution governments have invariably focused on land reform, and with good reason. In pre-revolution Egypt, over 72 percent of landholders owned less than the minimum amount considered sufficient for subsistence, while 280 families owned ten percent of all the agricultural land in the country. In Iraq, 15-16 percent of the landholders owned some 88 percent of the arable land. In Algeria, 40 percent of the best land in the country was held by French colons, and in the sector held by native Algerians, 3 percent of the owners held 26 percent of the land.

Egypt adopted a series of measures by which the upper limit on holdings was set at 200 hectares, then gradually reduced to 100 hectares, and later to 50 hectares. In Iraq, the government, acting more precipitously, expropriated some 75 percent of the arable private land in the country in one fell swoop, inviting untold dislocations in the agricultural sector. In Algeria, the government nationalized all foreign-held land soon after the revolution and in 1971, introduced a series of measures sharply limiting land that could be held by native Algerians. In Iran, a land reform had already been carried out under the monarchy. A strong land reform measure was nevertheless approved after the revolution, but the plan, for various reasons, proved abortive.

Moreover, private property came under attack on a much wider front. In Egypt, primarily between 1960 and 1962, the government took over the foreign share in Egyptian economy, nationalized banking and insurance, took over some 300 major industrial and commercial enterprises and sequestered the property of some 600 leading families. Similar nationalization laws were announced in Iraq in 1964, and in Iran within months of the revolution. In Algeria too, the large private sector was, for the most part, dismantled.

The effects of these measures were, of course, considerable. The older, large landowning class was largely eliminated in all four countries. The power of a new, pre-revolution industrial class, and of large businessmen, contractors and the like, was broken and the social fabric of the old ruling groups was unravelled. This process to a degree worked to the advantage of smaller traders and businessmen and the more traditional bazaar elements. For example, the departure, or forced expulsion, of some of the Coptic and Jewish communities in Egypt, and the elimination of vigorous competition from large-scale industry in Iran, created a space and opportunities which smaller entrepreneurs and traders seized.

But even this strata of businessmen and traders soon found its scope limited, as the state moved to establish a virtual monopoly over foreign trade and a large measure of control over the internal distribution of goods. It is the state that has emerged as the major economic beneficiary of revolution in Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Algeria, controlling insurance, banking, major industry and in many instances, large tracts of agricultural land; serving as importer of the first instance; buying up farm products; dictating agricultural policy and monopolizing the major areas of economic activity. Great Britain's Labor Party has said it aims at controlling the commanding heights of the economy. In Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Iran, revolutionary governments have sought to control not only the commanding heights, the penthouses of the economic structure, but the middle stories and the entrance lobbies as well.

State control of the economy was not always from the beginning planned by the revolutionaries. Sweeping measures of nationalization were not implemented in Egypt until eight years after the revolution, in Iraq until six years after the seizure of power. In Algeria, it took the government nearly a decade to move against native Algerian agricultural holdings. But given revolutionary ideology, the momentum of revolution, the dynamics of political conflict in each of the four countries, and the economic dislocation resulting from revolution, the state seems to have been bound, sooner or later, to seek to bring the economy under its control.

In Algeria, the departing French <u>colons</u> left their large estates untended, encouraging the peasants to seize them and the government to establish supervisory bodies over the peasants. In Iran, the government initially stepped in to manage major industries whose owners had left the country. Moves in all four countries against one type of property, for example agricultural holdings, eroded general confidence among the propertied classes, undermined the incentive to invest and tempted the government to seize the initiative itself.

Moreover, revolutionary governments were of necessity committed to social justice. When post-revolution economies flagged and when businessmen, left on their own, appeared to prefer quick profit, excessive gain or speculation to long-term investment, the impression was confirmed that the private sector was incorrigible. Nasser justified the nationalization of private industry in Egypt on the grounds that the business community was not doing its share to help develop the country; this was in part mere rationalization, in part a reasonable explanation for government policy.

Pressure also built up very quickly from politically radical groups and from the population for implementation of egalitarian economic policies. Nationalization and expropriation were seen as instruments for weakening the hold of foreign interests and powerful landed and entrepreneurial groups on the economy. Moreover, with the possible exception of the Egyptian revolutionaries, revolutionary leaders came to power with strong feelings of animosity towards the propertied classes, who were seen as representatives of the ancien regime, agents of foreign interests, exploiters of the working classes and barriers to revolution. In its 1963 Sixth National Conference, the Ba'ath Party remarked of the bourgeoisie that "this social and economic class is no longer capable of playing a positive role in economic life. It is an opportunistic class and constitutes a natural ally of neo-imperialism." The formulation was not untypical.

Three features of the "revolutionary" economies seem to stand out. First, the economic performance of revolutionary economies has not been scintillating. In Algeria, agricultural production has largely stagnated since the revolution. In some instances, per hectare yield has actually fallen. The country was producing 70 percent of its own food in 1969. It produced only 37 percent of its own food in 1977 and 30 percent in 1980. Iraqi agriculture has fared little better. In Iraq, too, food imports have soared. Grain imports were worth two to three million Iraqi dinars in the early 1960's; by 1976, the figure stood at 56 million Iraqi dinars. Neither in Iraq nor in Iran is there any indication that nationalization has done much for industrial efficiency. As in Egypt, the state has proved a poor manager.

Secondly, in the three oil-producing countries, Algeria, Iran and Iraq, where foreign exchange has been plentiful, revolution has made little difference to developmental strategy. True, Algeria initially elected to concentrate on heavy industry and to minimize investment in consumer goods, while Iran and Iraq sought to provide their populations with both steel and butter. Nevertheless, the industrial strategy of Algeria and Iraq, with its focus on oil-related industry, petrochemicals, steel, machine tools, glass, metals and car assembly differs very little from the industrial strategy of Iran under the Shah, or that of Saudi Arabia for that matter. Socialist revolutionaries have appeared no more able to resist the temptation to opt for heavy industry, high technology and rapid GNP growth figures, irrespective of skewed income distribution, than capitalist bourgeois planners.

Thirdly, revolutionary economies have proved as unable to avoid the pitfalls of helter-skelter economic development as more conservative oil-based regimes. The Iranian revolutionaries blamed on the capitalist, pro-Western orientation of the Shah's regime such features as the neglect of agriculture, migration to the urban centers, housing shortages, poor social services and the like. Yet, Algeria, Iraq, Egypt and post-revolution Iran are plagued by similar problems; despite fulminations against creating economies dependent on Western technology, specialists and equipment, in each of these countries dependence can be said to have grown rather than declined in the post-revolution era.

These problems confronting post-revolution economies explain the gestures toward the private sector that followed the first phase of hurried nationalization and state control. This process has gone furthest in Egypt. Under President Sadat's "open door" policy, foreign contractors, bankers and investors have returned; the Egyptian middle class has been given its head again; private sector commercial activity is booming.

But similar, if much more limited, steps have been taken elsewhere. Iraq, in the early 1970's began to pass legislation to encourage Iraqi nationals to repatriate capital, invest in small industrial projects and engage more vigorously in trade. In Algeria, light industries have remained in private hands. In Iran, beginning in 1983, steps were taken to temper the impulse to nationalize foreign trade and to seize private urban and agricultural property. In each country, there has emerged as a result a new class of wealthy importers, contractors and smaller traders who have waxed rich on links with a vast bureaucratic apparatus.

Yet the state has remained the dominant power in the economy. It is still in control of the key sectors. It is the dispenser of precious licenses, favors, and influence. Besides, the concentration of economic power has been closely linked to the concentration of political power.

Not unexpectedly, revolutionary regimes in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq and Iran have claimed to represent the mass of the people. All four countries have gravitated towards a single party system--the FLN in Algeria, the Ba'ath in Iraq, the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt, the Islamic Republic Party in Iran. All four seek legitimation through organizations for mass mobilization, in theory representing such undifferentiated groups of people as workers, peasants, women, youth.

While revolutionary regimes are not unresponsive to demands articulated through these organizations, the single party is almost invariably the instrument of the state. The organizations for mass mobilization are controlled by the government. Parliaments are non-existent, rubber stamps or representative in only a very limited sense. Power is exercised by a small ruling group and ultimately based on the military.

Post-revolution governments have failed to develop representative institutions, effective mechanisms for conflict resolution or the means by which various interest groups can articulate their views. The reasons are complex. I offer only three, very tentative suggestions.

First, a breakdown has occurred over the last half century in the imperfect mechanisms through which various social, ethnic and interest groups sought to defend and advance their interests in relation to the central government. The Oxford historian, Albert Hourani, in the paper entitled "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," argued some years ago that in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire, politics centered around two types of roles: the role of governing and administering was carried out by members of the Ottoman ruling group; the role of mobilizing and directing public energy was carried out by the local notable families.

These notables sought to influence the government by gaining influence over the active forces of society -- the urban mobs, the craftsmen, the popular religious leaders, the tribal chiefs. They, and the leaders of these various elements, acted in some fashion as intermediaries between the government and the mass of the people. The notables continued to play this intermediary role, following the collapse of the Ottoman empire, in relation to the British and the French. The situation was different in Iran, but broadly similar figures acted as intermediaries between the central authorities and various groups in the population.

But the hold of the notables, local leaders and intermediaries was gradually eroded as a result of demographic developments and the impact of new political ideas because the notables and intermediaries came to be identified with unpopular colonial regimes, as in Egypt and Iraq; because powerful rulers deliberately set out to undermine the influence of alternate centers of authority, as was the case in Iran. The two Pahlavi monarchs in Iran gradually broke the power of the tribal chiefs, local notables, the trade and merchant guilds, and eventually of the nationalist politicians who had acted as a bridge between the old politics and the new. This facilitated appeals to an undifferentiated mass, without traditional intermediaries.

Secondly, post-revolution societies have not been characterized by consensus regarding the purpose and organization of society. William Quandt, in his <u>Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954-1968</u> (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1969), has shown that participation in the anti-colonial struggle does not necessarily create a common ideology or a common vision. On the contrary, he argues, revolutionary struggle tends to intensify the claims of various groups to leadership, even if these claims may be subsumed during the course of the struggle. Iran recently provided a dramatic example of the rapidity with which a powerful coalition of political forces, welded together in common cause against the unpopular government, will break down once victory is achieved and rival claims begin to be pressed.

Thirdly, revolutionary governments have sought to impose a common ideology on highly heterogeneous societies. Hanna Batatu's The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, 1978) and Ervand Abrahamian's Iran Between Two Revolutions are both attempts to apply class analysis to political and social movements, respectively, in Iraq and Iran. Both succeed in showing that groups in the Middle East have acted out of economic interest. But both have also shown that groups and individuals identify closely with family, tribe, ethnic, confessional and craft group, and by geographical origin, in an extremely complex pattern. Both confirm the picture of Middle Eastern society as a rich mosaic of overlapping groups and interests.

But the ideologies with which revolutionary governments have come to power in Iran, Iraq, Algeria and, to a lesser extent, Egypt appear to militate against a recognition of the complexity of the societies over which they have achieved control. On the one hand, revolutionary governments in these societies invariably employ the language of class conflict, directing their attacks against the bourgeoisie, landowners, industrialists and counter-revolutionaries. On the other hand, revolutionary rhetoric also assumes the existence of a community -- revolutionary, Arab, Islamic -- sharing a common vision, interests and goals, free of conflict, for which the ruling party or the regime speaks.

Moreover, revolutionary governments, particularly in Iraq, Algeria and Iran, have shared the assumption that it is possible to restructure society, to reorganize radically economic relations, to alter human nature itself, to create an altogether new society through central direction. This has remained an elusive goal. But this has not prevented the Ba'ath in Iraq, the FLN in Algeria, the regimes in Egypt and Iran from seeking to define and redefine the organization of entire societies in a succession of national charters and proclamations, and continuing to concentrate power at the center in order to carry out these vast plans for economic, political and social reorganization. Once again, it is the state that has emerged from revolution as the predominant repository of political power.

Revolution in Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Iran has thus brought about a transformation of elites and opened access to office, power and privilege to new classes in society. Access to education and government employment has in Egypt, Algeria and Iraq grown dramatically in the post-revolution period; in Iran, revolution accelerated trends already under way in the pre-revolutionary period. Revolution has often also broken the power of the old landed classes, industrialists and entrepreneurial groups. But it is the state that has emerged as the primary economic beneficiary of this process and as the dominant force in the economy. In close alliance with the state, a new privileged class of entrepreneurs, contractors and traders is emerging. Due to political ideology, the impulse to use power to reshape entire societies and the unwillingness to brook competition or opposition, power has also been concentrated in these post-revolution societies in the hands of the state; mechanisms for resolving conflicts and through which various groups can articulate their views have failed to develop.

Miller: Professor Hanna Batatu, Professor of Arab Studies, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, was born in Jerusalem. He was a staff officer in the Palestine Mandatory Government, Jerusalem, from 1940-47. Dr. Batatu studied international law and diplomatic history at the University of Vienna, and at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and received an M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard. In the course of his career, Dr. Batatu has won numerous academic awards, honors, and fellowships. His academic appointments include lecture posts and research fellowships at Harvard, MIT, and Princeton, and Professor at the American University at Beirut. His teaching and research focuses on politics, political thought, and society in the Arab East, and the Soviet Union. He is the author of numerous, important books and articles on social classes and politics in Iraq, Syria and the Arab world as a whole. His present research includes work on the relationships between the social structure and political power in distinctive periods in the modern history of Syria.

THEY EGYPTIAN, IRAQI, SYRIAN REVOLUTIONS: COMPARISONS

Hanna Batatu

My paper is oriented toward the past. The Egyptian, Iraqi and Syrian revolutions are now a matter of history. They all have gone through their Thermidor. I thought I would concentrate on a few themes and narrow the focus of my paper somewhat and discuss the three revolutions merely from the standpoint of their underlying causes and social character. I should state at the outset that there are great gaps in our knowledge of the social origins and social outcomes of Arab revolutions. It may come as a surprise that there is not a single systematic in-depth study of the social roots or economic background of the two hundred or so Free Officers who mounted the 1952 coup and gave a powerful impetus to the modern Egyptian revolution. Similarly, relatively little is known about the families of Syria's and Iraq's rulers and the significance of these families as units of political and economic interactions. Intelligible data that could shed light on qualitative changes in the basic relatinships of society are not easy to obtain, and such relevant statistics as are published are not infrequently of doubtful accuracy or not detailed enough to permit meaningful inferences or lend themselves to conflicting interpretations. Inevitably, the analysis offered here proceeds at least at some points from impressions rather than from hard facts and leads to conclusions which can only be tentative.

The causative factors underlying Arab revolutionary outbreaks are to be sure multiple and complicated, and some of them arise out of the unique internal features or external conditions of one or the other of the Arab countries. At the same time, the Arab revolutions have a common causal context. They are all directly, or through manifold and intricate mediate causes, related to a crucial historical process: the gradual tying-up of the Arab peoples in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to a world market resting on large-scale industry and their involvement in the web of forces or the consequences of forces unleashed by the industrial and technological revolutions.

To this process, which is still at work, is related in one way or another a series of large facts. Among others, the advance in the Arab world of the West's power and capital; the incipient imitation of modern techniques; the diffusion of elements of Western culture; the improvement of health standards and the swift rise in the rates of population growth; the English, French, and Italian conquests; the dismemberment of the

Ottoman Empire and the severance of several Arab provinces from their natural trading regions; the settlement of French, Spanish, and Italian colons in Algeria, Morocco and Libya, and of European and Oriental Jews in Palestine; the setting up of dependent monarchies, republics and sheikdoms with new standing armies and new administrative machines; the exploitation of the region's oil resources and the sudden explosion in the Arabian peninsula of the "epidemic of oil money."

The ensuing structural consequences have been far-reaching. Old local economies based on the handicraft or pearl-diving or boat-building industries and traditional means of transport (camels and sailing ships) declined or broke asunder. A tillage, essentially localized or based on bare subsistence or subordinate to pastoralism, gave way to a settled, market-related agriculture or an agriculture heavily dependent on one cash crop, wine in Algeria, cotton in Egypt. Private property, which had been largely confined to towns, became wider in extent, stabilized, and extremely concentrated. Extensive tracts of state domain and communal tribal land passed into the hands of new men of capital or European colons or ex-warring sheiks or chieftains or retainees of ruling pashas, often through forced purchases or without ground of right or any payment whatever. A handful of mercantile families rose to inordinate wealth by virtue of the preferential patronage of princely elites with exclusive hold over fabulous oil resources. Existing balances between sects, religious groups and social forces were severely disturbed. Tribes, guilds, and mystic orders lost cohesion or disintegrated and the vital economic defenses which they provided for the peasants and artisans weakened or vanished. Vast masses of people moved from the oil-poor to the oil-rich lands in search of income, or from the countryside to the big cities to enroll in the new armies, bureaucracies, or police forces, or to find employment in the businesses that supplied the needs of these institutions, or to swell the ranks of unskilled laborers and tangibly depress their earnings. Hundreds of thousands of peasants in Algeria and Palestine were uprooted from their homes and severed from their means of livelihood. Old ties, loyalties and norms were, to a lesser or greater degree, undermined, eroded or swept away.

In these structural changes, all the important radical parties and movements, including the Moslem Brethren, the Communists, the Ba'ath, the Free Officers, the Arab Nationalists, the Algerian Mujahidun, and the Palestinian Fedayeen, had their roots. From the same sources flowed the insurrectionary trend which had its most powerful expressions in this century in the Egyptian revolutions of 1919 and 1952, the Iraq revolutions of 1920 and 1958, the Syrian revolutions of 1925-27 and 1963, the Palestinian popular upheaval of 1936-39, the Algerian revolution of 1954-1962, and the civil wars of 1970 in Jordan and of 1975-76 in Lebanon.

To the same structural changes are related the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948-49, 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982, and their widespread disruptive effects, particularly on the economies of Egypt and Syria involving, as they did, enormous diversions of human and physical resources into defense.

To be more explicit, the recurring upheavals and conflicts in the Arab world reflect underlying structural discordances. There are also conflicts between ethnic forces, religious groups, or economic classes that suffered, and ethnic forces, religious groups, or economic classes in and outside the Arab countries that benefited from the processes just described.

In Iraq, the officer corps and the Ba'ath party drew many of their restless elements from the northern Arab families who had moved to the capital and whose traditional economic life had been disorganized by the hindrances of the new frontiers with Syria, and by the decline of such industries as the production of 'aba'as, woolen cloaks, in the town of 'Anah and of kalaks, rafts of inflated skins, in the town of Takrit. Much of the mass backing of the Communists at Baghdad in the revolutionary years 1958-1963 came from the populace of the quarter of Bab-al-Sheikh, the center of a once thriving manual textile industry, or from the Shurugis, that is, the tribal peasant migrants from the 'Amarah province whose mode of subsistence had been upset by the shift to a market-oriented economy; the intensification of their sheiks' hold on the land; the unrestricted use by Baghdad's and Kut's big landowners of irrigation pumps on the Tigris and the consequent drying up of some of the river channels. Far more interesting is the fact that no fewer than thirty-two percent of the entire membership of the Communist Central Committee in the same revolutionary years were descendants of sadah, that is, claimants of descent from the Prophet. These sadah were of moderate means and often simultaneously provincial 'ulama. Of causal significance here is a decline in the material situation of the men of religion, especially in the inferior ranks. A consequence of this was that their sons fulfilled a role not unanalogous to that played in the nineteenth century by the sons of the lower clergy in the history of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia.

In some of its aspects, at least in terms of its social origins, Iraq's revolution is a rural revolution or a revolution of the small country towns or of partially urbanized, rurally-originating forces against Iraq's chief city and its governing class. All the effective leaders of the various phases of Iraq's revolution were by birth or by origin from small country towns: 'Abd-ul-Karim Qasim from Suwairah, 'Abd-us-Salam 'Aref from Sumaichah, Ahmad Hasam al-Bakr and Saddam Husayn from Takrit. Thirty-four out of the forty-seven members of the Ba'ath party command in the period 1952-1970, nine out of the fifteen members of the Supreme Committee of the Free Officers in 1958, and twelve out of the fifteen members of the Revolutionary Command Council in the years 1968-1977 had similar rural roots. In their overwhelming majority, they stemmed from the rural middle or lower middle classes -- from small or intermediate landed peasants, petty agricultural entrepreneurs, petty tradesmen, and the like.

This rural aspect is a characteristic which Iraq's revolutions share with the revolutions of Egypt and Syria and incidentally of Algeria and Libya. The leaders of Algeria's FLN came mainly from the middle or lower middle social elements of Algeria's villages and small towns. Few of them were relatively advantaged. More often, they stemmed from families which had reportedly declined in wealth and status over the years. Similarly, the principal leaders of the Libyan revolution originated from the Bedouin rural sectors of Libyan society and had their roots in the interior and oases rather than in the coastal cities.

Out of the twelve members of Egypt's Revolutionary Command Council in 1952, at least eight had rural origins and active rural connections including Gamal Abdul Nasser, Muhammad Najib and Anwar Sadat. On the other four we have no information. In a book published in 1977, Ahmad Hamrush, an army officer who took part in the military coup, maintains, on the basis of discussions he had with "all the officers who moved against the monarchy on the night of July 23rd," that none of them descended from big landowners or from the poor peasant mass and that none of their fathers owned, on the night of the coup, more than fifty feddans (the feddan is roughly equal to an acre). This may perhaps explain why the ceiling on agricultural ownership did not fall below this limit in any of the stages of agrarian reform. Except for the long-time Commanders of the Armed Forces, 'Abd-ul-Hakim 'Amer and 'Abd-ul-Latif al-Baghdadi, who were sons of affluent 'umdas or village headmen, the members of the top revolutionary command stemmed from families of moderate means -- government officials or small or middle peasants. For example, Sadat's father owned only two and a half feddans in the village of Mit Abul Kum and Nasser's grandfather owned only about five feddans in the village of Beni Murr. In the three or four decades before the revolution, peasant families with five, or less than five, feddans were losing ground economically for a variety of reasons: among others, the vicissitudes of the cotton prices; the pressure on increasingly scarce land; the fragmentary processes of the Islamic law of inheritance; the recurrent insect attacks and soil deterioration arising out of the extension of perennial cultivation; the neglect of drainage and the shift around the turn of the century by the small and middle peasants from the three to the two-year crop rotation.

Rural forces were also significant in the Syrian revolution. The Ba'ath regime of the revolutionary years, 1963-68, rested on an alliance within the army between varying groups which shared similar rural roots and similar rural orientations and embraced 'Alawis from the Latakia province, Druzes from the Jabal al-'Arab, and Sunnis from the region of Hawran and the district of Dayr az-Zur and from different small country towns. The lot of the 'Alawis, who constituted the most numerous and poorest peasants in the plains to the west, south and east of the 'Alawi Mountains, was never enviable. Under the Ottomans, they were abused, reviled, and ground down by exactions, and, on occasion, their women and children were led into captivity and disposed of by sale. Their conditions worsened with the deepening commercialization of agriculture and after the First World War became so deplorable that they developed the practice of selling or hiring out their daughters to affluent townspeople. It is such conditions that drove them to enroll in great numbers in the state armed forces, a fact which eventually was instrumental in their rise to the political dominance which they now enjoy. The Druzes were also from an economically disadvantaged rural region but, protected by difficult terrain, they long enjoyed a de facto autonomy which they lost in recent decades in the wake of the improvement in the means of communication and the decisive increase in the fire power of the central government. The Hawranis were for the most part small farmers and sold their produce in markets controlled by the merchants in Damascus who often succeeded in bending the state machine to their wishes and were therefore able to set the conditions of trade in manners answering to their interests. Their relationship with the Hawranis became, in essence, relationships of creditors and debtors.

As the merchants of Damascus dominated the Hawran, so did the entrepreneurs of Aleppo dominate Dayr az-Zur, but here there was also a tribal division at work. For example, at Dayr az-Zur the traditional leaders stemmed from the Albu Saraya, a section of the affluent Baggara tribe, whereas many of the Ba'athists descended from such inferior and underprivileged clans as the Khorshan and Shuyukh. This, incidentally, is not unlike the situation in Libya where the tribal factor was important. Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi and his revolutionary colleagues, who abolished the tribes as political institutions, came with few exceptions from Libya's minor and depressed tribes. The major aristocratic tribes had sided with the monarchy. Similarly, in Iraq, even though the Ba'ath regime has consciously worked to weaken the country's tribal structure and to undermine the clan as a unit of social control, the revolution signifies in certain of its aspects the decline of such superior tribes as Shammar and Rabi'ah and the rise in the weight of such inferior clans as aj-Jumailah and Albu Nasir. The Jumailah tribesmen formed the backbone of the key military units shielding the regime of their kinsmen, 'Abd-us-Salam and 'Abd-ur-Rahman 'Aref, in the period 1963-1968. The Albu Nasir serves a similar function in the present regime of Saddam Husayn. Saddam himself, his minister of defense, his chiefs of intelligence and of public security, and the commanders of the presidential bodyguard and of the crucial Republican Guard, all belong to the tribe of Albu Nasir.

Did the revolutions change the face of society? How profound or qualitative were these changes? One of the most significant effects of the revolutions in all the three countries under study -- Egypt, Iraq and Syria -- is that the government has grown enormously in the life of the people. Its impact upon the social structure, or at least its capacity to determine the direction of social change, has been enhanced by its planning powers and its greater influence over the distribution of the national income. Related to this is the increase of its functions on most economic fronts -- in banking, large-scale industry, cooperative agriculture, health, welfare, housing and education.

These increased tasks of the government have involved a big build-up in its staff and bureaus. In Egypt, state employees grew from only 11,000 in 1898 to roughly 350,000 on the eve of the 1952 coup and to about 2.9 million today. In Syria, they increased from 34,000 in 1960 to 331,000 in 1979. In Iraq, they rose from a few thousand in 1921 to 85,000 in 1958 and to 662,000 in 1978. The post-revolutionary figures include, of course, employees in the public economic sector. When members of the armed and security forces, pensioners and dependents of the soldiers, and other state servants are considered, it becomes clear that in all three countries more than one-fourth of the inhabitants depend directly upon the government for their livelihood and life chances.

The growth of government is in some measure politically induced and irrational economically in the sense that a very considerable number of people have been engaged by the state to reduce unemployment, as in Egypt, or to recompense followers or ward off opposition, as in Syria and Iraq, and thus are superfluous and purely parasitic and, in effect, hamper the functioning of the administrative machine. To some degree, big government is explicable by past nationalization measures and the uprooting of the social power of private large-scale property. At the same time, present international economic relations are so structured; the financial, organizational, and technical powers of multinational corporations are so overwhelming; Arab conditions are so underdeveloped that, with some exceptions, Arab private entrepreneurs cannot grow autonomously and can only exist as appendages of either the multinational corporate system or of their own governments. This largely accounts for the fact that the tendency toward state dominance of the economy and the related trend toward big government are as characteristic of the traditionally oriented as of the radical or quasi-radical Arab countries. For example, in Kuwait, one out of every four citizens is a government employee.

The huge increase in the size and role of government, conjoined with other influences such as the rapid rate of population growth and the relatively depressed level of agriculture, have led to an accentuated and unhealthy demographic urban growth. Damascus grew from about 200,000 in 1938 to 345,000 in 1961 and to 1.2 million in 1983; Baghdad from about 150,000 in 1900 to 793,000 in 1957 and to 3 million in 1983; Cairo from 374,000 in 1882 to 2.3 million in 1952 and to almost 9 million today, that is, it almost quadrupled in thirty years. The problems and tensions generated by such unusually rapid changes are obviously not calculated to add to the stability of the existing regimes.

Another consequence of the growth of government has been an appreciable rise in the numerical importance of the urban middle class at least in Iraq and possibly in Syria. This has been reinforced by the widening of educational opportunities. Although the available figures are incomplete or not sufficiently precise, it appears that in Iraq in the first revolutionary decade alone, there was a twofold increase of townsmen in the middle and lower middle income brackets, and that their proportion of the urban inhabitants as a whole went up to something like thirty-four percent from the twenty-eight percent or so at the time of the revolution. Impressionistic evidence strongly suggests that the bulk of this rising component of the middle class, particularly in the bureaucracy and the public sector, is of relatively recent rural origin. Indeed, in Syria, at the bottom of the discontent of the urban traders and the sympathy which segments of them developed for the Muslim Brethren is the fact that they frequently found themselves compelled to deal with state employees who were of rural origin and, if not hostile to the urban trading community, had little understanding of the intricacies of trade and thus wittingly or unwittingly raised all sorts of impediments in its path.

At any rate, until the retreat from radicalism, which in Egypt and Syria was carried out under the banner of infitah or the policy of the "open door," but which in Iraq proceeded more subtly, the upper and intermediate layers of the salaried middle class and, more particularly, their military and technocratic segments were the main urban beneficiaries of the revolution. Indeed, their interests permeated the state to a greater degree than the interests of any other element of society. At the same time, the ranks of the industrial workers considerably increased and the greater number of those were now better fed, better clothed, and better cushioned monetarily against sickness and unemployment--in striking contrast to the increasing misery in Egypt of the bulk of the floating, economically unintegrated semi-proletariat.

In the countryside, all three revolutions expanded the small-holding peasantry and improved its social and economic conditions. However, by the 1970's in Egypt, thirty-three percent of all rural families had remained landless, but twenty percent in Syria and only twelve percent in Iraq. On the other hand, in Iraq, the exodus from the countryside has been most intense (Sixty-five percent of Iraq's population now live in cities.) and the deterioration of agriculture deepest. Iraq's food import bill increased from $98 million in 1970, to 707 million in 1975, and to 1.2 billion in 1977. Everywhere, the casual agricultural laborers have benefited least from the revolutions, particularly in Egypt and especially in the case of the migrant laboring class known as the tarahil, which number now at least two million and perhaps three million. These are usually recruited for four to eight weeks for the maintenance of canals and other rural work and are abused by both their employers and by special labor contractors, the muwakkil anfar, who extract commissions from them which often add up to something like twelve percent of their earnings and to whom they are perpetually indebted. Their indebtedness has been generated by existential constraints which compel them to borrow from the labor contractors during the slack season and for such occasions as birth, deaths, sickness, and marriage.

A consequence of all three revolutions, partly unintended, has been the rise in the importance of the rich and middle peasants, particularly in Egypt where they control about sixty-two percent of the farming area and as high as eighty to ninety percent of the agricultural machinery. Their position has been further enhanced by the infitah, or "open door" policies.

One final point: all three revolutions had initially sought to reduce their subordination to the Western economy and the international division of labor and to achieve a certain measure of economic independence. But, in effect, the integration of the three countries in the world system has progressed and deepened. As a matter of fact, as measured by the proportion of its gross domestic product accounted for by exports and imports, the Arab world as a whole has now the highest levels of integration into the contemporary world system of all the regions of the Third World.

Miller: Dr. Khodadad Farmanfarmaian is Adjunct Professor of International Relations at Fletcher. He has had an extraordinary and distinguished career over the past thirty years as an academic and as a high ranking Iranian official, particularly in the field of economic development. He has a B.A. and M.A. in economics from Stanford, and a Ph.D. from the University of Colorado. He has been on the faculties at Colorado, Brown, Harvard, Princeton and Tehran universities. He has served in high government posts in Iran as head of the Economic Bureau of the Iranian Planning and Budget Organization; Deputy under Abol Hasan Ebtehaj; and later as Director of the Planning and Budget Organization. Dr. Farmanfarmaian in the late 1950's and 1960's directed the most dramatic periods of growth in Iranian history and one of the most spectacular periods of economic growth in any nation's history. He later served as Governor of the Central Bank of Iran, and Member of the Board of Trustees, National Iranian Oil Company. In private business, his work in the fields of domestic and international banking and finance includes service as chairman of several private banks in Iran, advisor and consultant to multinational companies in the United States, Europe and Japan on major projects and energy problems. He has had extensive experience with such international agencies as the World Bank, IMF, EXIM Bank, and has negotiated for Iran with governments of both East and West, as well as many multinational commercial and investment banks. There are few men who have had such experience in the field of international economic development and international finance. We have asked him to deal with the problem of how such a successful economic development program as Iran's could have helped contribute to another stage of the Iranian Revolution. Could the revolution have been averted had economic development gone in other directions? Dr. Farmanfarmaian will assess what in the hindsight of history was missing and give some considered thought why.

PLANNING, DEVELOPMENT AND REVOLUTION: REFLECTIONS ON IRAN, 1958-1978

Khodadad Farmanfarmaian

Ladies and gentlemen, the kind words that have been said about me do not in any way mitigate my diffidence as I stand before you after two very distinguished scholars have spoken to you about revolutions in the Middle East. Indeed, as I look at the audience I see so many familiar faces of experts in the field. I'm indeed reminded of the plight of that great Persian humorist, Mullah Nasrudin, who was once urged, as I was by Dean Miller, to come and give a speech. Not being really able to handle the subject, he came before the audience, turned to them and asked: "People! Do you know what I'm going to talk about?" The crowd answered, "No, we do not." He then said, "If you do not know it by now, it's too late, and I cannot help you." So, he walked out of the room. They brought him back again, he asked the same question, this time the crowd had grown wiser, and they answered, "Yes." He said, "If you know it by now, then I don't have much to add." He again left the room. The third time they brought him back, some of the people said "yes" and some of the people said "no." And he said, "Well, will the few who know tell those who do not know?" And he left the room.

Ladies and gentlemen, I find myself in the same plight. Disenchanted by the promise of economics, certainly after experiencing the Iranian revolution, the shock and the rude awakening of the revolution, I have tried to see if I can find refuge in history. In the aftermath of revolution I have turned from economics to the history of my own country and see whether or not really I might be able to find an answer as to why economic development failed and ended in revolution. I have found recourse to history to be much more helpful in trying to understand what happened in 1978 than going into my economist's bag of tools. I find three major factors deeply imbedded in the psyche of the Persians that have molded the political development as well as the economic development of my country.

First: Nationalism. Persian nationalism, Iranian nationalism, is not a consequence of the social revolutions of Europe, nor is it a result of revolutions against colonial powers, of which we have had many elsewhere in the post-war period, certainly. Iranian nationalism springs out of the three-thousand-year history of Iran; Iranians do have a unifying dominant language; Iranians do have a national religion; Iranians have evolved over three thousand years a distinct culture, a great national art and an even greater prose literature and still greater lyric and epic poetry. Iranian nationalism has created certain patterns and habits within each Persian which distinguish him from all others: his extraordinary suspicion of foreigners; indeed, his constant fear of interference from abroad. This explains, in part, the obsession with military development above all else.

A second factor we notice is a desire for justice and equity and equality before law. After millennia of oppression, after having experienced invasion of the country by alien forces so many times, it is only natural that the Persian, oppressed over the years by his own government, by his own state, as well by invaders from abroad, should have formed a deep desire to have equity and justice -- at a minimum to be able to preserve his life and property. He has also as a result developed a deep mistrust in his own government. Very often, we find that this mistrust finds the form of taking things into his own hands, however weak their positions may have been against the state and the military power of a corrupt monarch.

A third factor which serves as a motivating, energizing force in the country and throughout the recent history of the country, from 1800 to the present, is the quest of the Persian for modernization and for development. The quest of the Persian for progress; this, in spite of his fear of the West, you will find in him, almost in a paranoiac fashion, a desire to try to get the "secret" of progress from the West. In this factor, you find the manifestation of what I have chosen to call the conflict between the intelligentsia and the conservatives and the clergy -- a conflict which has come up from time to time again during the history of Iran.

Let me illustrate the significance of these three factors in questions not necessarily from great minds, but which give insight. The first is from the man who assassinated King Nasir-e-Din Shah at the end of the nineteenth century, Mirza Reza Kermani, who as the great English scholar E.G. Browne quotes his interrogations while in prison, not, under duress, not, mind you, under torture, but as is attested by Browne, in free circumstances. Kermani recites poetry, (it's impossible really to get a Persian to speak for any length of time without getting him to recite poetry) a kind of expression that illustrates the importance of nationalist spirit as a basic characteristic of the Iranian:

> Never may that evil omened day befall
> When Iran shall become the stranger's thrall,
> Never may I see that virgin fair and pure
> Fall victim to some Russian gallant's lure
> And never may fate this angel bride award
> A serving maiden to some English lord.

This poem was written just before he was hanged. During his interrogation, he told of his motivation for killing the great

Shah. He spoke primarily about the lack of justice, the lack of equality before law. Mind you, this man was an ordinary Iranian, extraordinary in a certain sense, but he was far from being a great leader of the time. He said,

> ...this great deed has been accomplished...Men are relieved and all are waiting to see what the new Shah will do, and whether he will heal men's broken hearts by justice, clemency and uprightness or not. If he vouchsafes to his people some degree of peace and ease and becomes the means of his people, gives them tranquility of mind, and bases his rule on justice and equity, assuredly all the people will be ready to die for him, his sovereignty will be firmly established and his good name will remain inscribed eternally on the page of history.

We have to begin with Prince Abbas Mirza, a great reformer, who sent students to England and France to learn the secrets of the West as early as 1811. Following him, we have Amir Kabir, the great Prime Minister of Nasir-i-din Shah, who establishes the Dar el Funun, the first polytechnic university in Iran, sends a large group of students--forty a year--abroad in order to be educated and to bring the fruits of education to the country. He also carried out administrative reforms and a system of financial controls. One of the greatest of the nineteenth century reformers, Prime Minister Mirza Sepah Salar, continues the work of Amir Kabir, but alas both of them are murdered by the king because of jealousy, because of fear that these reformers are conspiring to take power away from him. There are others such as Malkom Khan, who was of Armenian origin, writing in the 1880's a detailed plan of how to develop the Iranian economy at a time when we hardly had any roads, no railroads, few ports or factories. He wisely wrote, "Let me tell you in one word what you should do first, and that is, to create in this country a factory which will produce good human beings."

We enlightened, modern economists talk as if we have invented the idea of the primary importance of human development, capital investment in human development; indeed, as early as 1880, there were influential Persians writing to the Prime Minister and to the King directly, urging the Shah first to try to establish a "factory" that could produce first class, well-trained minds who could then build roads, railways, establish banks and factories. For him it is the most important thing that could be done to increase production in the country because he understood that knowledge is the key to power. He knew then, as we now know only too well, that you cannot begin to defend the country until you have a base of well-trained minds; and that the real security of the country can only be based on a healthy economy.

The numbers of influential leaders who think this way increase as we approach the period of the constitutional revolution in Iran. Particularly noteworthy are the secret societies which sprang up throughout Iran. These secret societies called anjuman in Persian were circles of the educated and influential who gathered together secretly to discuss these ideas for reform; how to prevent oppression; how to bring about modernity and progress to the country; how to have a just government of law and how to assure the rights of individuals. This growing pressure for reform culminated in revolution in 1905 when the Shah was forced to give the people a constitutional government. What followed was an attempt by the Shah to destroy the new government, which precipitated an uprising from northern Iran and from the tribes, particularly the Bakhtiari in defense of the constitution; the king was overthrown; and, once again the constitution was reestablished. World War I, unfortunately, led to chaos in the country. The constitution was, yet, only a written instrument, an ideal, a hope. It was not yet powerful enough; it did not yet have the broad base of support within the population. After World War I, we see that in spite of the presence of a king who supported constitutional rule his regime collapses before long because of chaos in the country, and the failure of the government to provide order, reform and progress to the people, and in his place a strong military leader rose to power, Reza Shah.

Under Reza Shah, there is a shift from a government striving to strengthen freedom, equality before law, a broadly based representative form of government, to a government that stresses the other side of the coin -- centralized control, law and order and security. Under Reza Shah, there was, without question, progress, and economic development and reform; however, the parliament becomes a rubber stamp. The political development side, if you will, is set aside. Reza Shah becomes a great autocrat at the cost of the development of political freedom.

After the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, and as the allies take over Iran during the Second World War, his son, Mohammed Reza, at the ripe age of twenty, is put on the throne and for some years ruled under the aegis of the allied command. After the allies left he faced the problem of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan which, with the support of the United States and the United Nations, Iran was able finally to secure, and the integrity of the country was once again preserved.

The impact of the Second World War on Iranians is complex. First, they had lost parliamentary democracy and a strong urge to return to parliamentary democracy was released. Second, there was little economic progress; third, and more important than anything else, the shock of invasion by foreigners once again aroused the recognition that it was essential to create a strong army, as well as a strong constitutional government which would be supported by the people. Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq came riding on this wave of nationalistic emotions by Persians who had seen their country under the boots of the invaders, who had not yet forgotten that, in spite of their neutrality, their country was invaded by the allied forces. Mossadeq sensed the popular mood and was able to touch a very deep chord within the soul of Persians. He appealed to the Iranian sense of nationalism by calling for nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company--a foreign-owned company widely believed by Iranians to be unreasonably exploitative by any standard. Yet Mossadeq, who was the champion of constitutional means and had reached power because the people believed he represented the essence of constitutionalism, soon found that the existing pattern of election laws and electioneering was such that he could not carry out the popular mandate within a rigged parliament. Mossadeq dissolved the parliament and ruled by edict, but went to the people for support for doing so, using a means new to Persians, namely, a public referendum.

You are all aware of the circumstances under which the Mossadeq period comes to an end after three years. Various forces are organized to oppose him--and now we know these forces--we've learned about them--the support that the United States gave for the Shah, who had fled the country and then returned to Iran to take all power into his own hands, and to sign an oil agreement satisfactory to the West and allow the flow of oil and for revenues once again to come to Iran.

The period of great economic development really begins in 1955 and lasts until 1978. This period is marked by two basic factors: first, that Iran should undertake a systematic economic development and military expansion program by using the oil revenues. Through an emphasis on planned industrialization of the country, Iran should be modernized, the standards of living of the public improved; as a consequence, broad support among the Persians for the central government would be created. A considerable military development program should be undertaken because of the Azerbaijan and Kurdistan experiences.

The second principle which governed this period was an effort to achieve reform from the top--reform from the supreme benefactor down to the people. These two principles guided the activities of the government of Iran during this period.

Unfortunately, the only means that the Shah could use to carry out these objectives was Iranian bureaucracy. At the time, the bureaucracy was a backward, obtuse, corrupt instrument. The economic development of the country and progress toward political and social reforms within the country could not be accomplished using the existing bureaucracy. As a consequence, the Shah's regime narrowed the base of popular support even further by creating what was called "planning mechanism" as a bridge approach to do what was needed. The planning groups were given full authority for designing, for planning, for budgeting, for disbursing, for execution of plans. This new organization, which was insulated from the rest of the Iranian government and did not represent the popular will,became the main arm of reform and development.

There was a great deal of opposition to this nascent organization. The old bureaucracy challenged the new planning organization power, and gradually the Plan Organization was folded into the traditional government. The nature of the economic development itself, during this period, quite aside from the mechanism, was principally growth-oriented. We were interested in equity, to be sure, and were interested in full employment, to be sure, provided that equity and employment did not interfere with growth. In other words, if we had to select between two projects of equal merit, we would try to select the one that created more employment and provided for better income distribution; however, we often did not have the information necessary to be able to make this kind of judgement. It was always easy to select well documented, clear-cut projects that would achieve growth; it was much more difficult to select projects that would produce equity in income distribution because we did not have the information to measure income distribution.

There was lip service, of course, given to equity. In the documents recording the history of the Plan Organization you would see beautiful statements regarding equity, saying how important it was to bring development down to the masses of people; but, at the end of the day, when the projects were selected, you would find that people-oriented projects, that is,the "soft belly" we called it, of the plan, every time we were short of money, were cut out. Projects aimed at agriculture, feeder roads, health projects, such as local clinics, village development and so on -- all these were the first to go. The projects that were supported had the power elite behind them. These projects supported by the power elites in the city, in the center of power, always were kept. Now, while I say this, I also want to say that in spite of all the shortcomings of the Plan, despite all the criticism, the Plan achieved exemplary growth during this period. In 1950, the per capita income was about $100. In 1978, per capita income was around $600. The literacy rate had gone up; health standards had improved; there are figures in the World Development Reports produced by the United Nations that clearly indicated that we had grown dramatically in so many different fields. Iranians were living better; Iranians were eating better at all levels. But, as Iran grew, income distribution between rich and poor became more skewed, too. In 1973, we had the situation where, in terms of indices that are used by economists, income distribution showed clearly the gap between richer and poorer became worse and worse as time went on. A recent study has just come out indicating that from 1973 to 1978 income distribution improved drastically. This study is by the same author who showed that income distribution from 1960 until 1973 had become more skewed. There were real questions raised about the political consequence of more equitable income distribution.

The "White Revolution" was an effort by the Shah to bring reforms to his country: land reform, nationalization of forests, sale of state-owned enterprises to the public, the creation of literacy, voting rights for women, health code, reconstruction of development code, law courts, nationalization of water resources, urban and rural reconstruction, administrative revolution, worker and employee ownership, price stabilization, campaigns against profiteering, free education and free meals up to eighth grade, free nutrition for expectant mothers, nation-wide social security to cover all areas, even the rural areas. These were the reform measures that were announced by the crown which were to bring great benefits to the public. We never sat down to discuss the possibilities of implementing any one of these reform measures, sadly enough, before the Shah announced his "White Revolution." Indeed, in most cases, although the intent was good, the way the Shah and his government proceeded to carry out his "White Revolution" assured the failure of almost every one of these measures, and there lies the sadness. The Shah wanted--and I have no doubt of that--to see these things done; but at the same time, he would not listen to his own people who were supposed to be his advisors and were to carry these reforms to completion.

As the oil prices go up, and he becomes a great world figure and the leader of OPEC, the Shah increasingly behaves in an overconfident fashion: lecturing the West; defending his position on increasing the prices of oil, as a consequence of the West's misuse of this resource, and insisting on the need to conserve this noble product, petroleum. On worldwide television and in press interviews, he would call the British worker "lazy," and the children of the 1960's of the great Western society "spoiled," with too much to eat, with too many cars, and acting like semi-terrorists going around throwing bombs here and there. He advised the West that it was time for the children of America and Europe to rethink their position and their previous advantages.

He made great promises of the basis of these vast oil revenues. He promised the Iranian people that the dawn of a great civilization was coming to Iran; that we, the Iranians, were at the gateway to a great era of civilization. As far as I have been able to reconstruct the meaning of the Shah's "great civilization," it can be put, perhaps, in these terms: for the Shah, the great civilization was first a great military force, ranking fourth or fifth in the world--if you would have asked him he would have said second only to the two superpowers--these were his own words that I heard myself. He had reached, in fact, by '78, a position of considerable military power: his army was about four hundred and forty thousand equipped with two thousand Chieftans, with 120 mm. guns with laser target finders--more than the British army itself had--and 600 helicopters; his air force of sixty thousand men, some five hundred modern combat aircraft, principally F-4's and F-14's equipped with sidewinder missiles; his navy with 150 thousand personnel, thirty principal combat vessels, the largest hovercraft force in the world, three submarines (even though the Persian Gulf is too shallow to take this type of submarine; in fact, discussions had taken place as early as '77 for Iran to have twenty ocean-going submarines). An estimated fifty million dollars a year would have been necessary to maintain those submarines, if we ever had received them. There were other plans for the military: two aircraft carriers were on order, seventy or eighty F-18's to be delivered in 1978. If I am not mistaken, we paid the Israelis to get out of the queue in order to be able to purchase these particular planes.

The second point in the Shah's great civilization, as I have been able to reconstruct it, was to create an industrialized and modern society based on Western technology and work habits. The Shah had determined that Iran was to become fifth industrial country in the world. When I say "Iran was to become," all these ideas of the Shah emanate from a twenty-year perspective paper which was written for the Shah by the people in the planning organization at the time. I saw this very paper. But the Shah was not quite happy with the horizon of twenty years for Iran to become the fifth industrial power. Whenever I heard him talk about it, he spoke in rather vague terms about the time horizon to accomplish the goals of his great civilization. Sometimes he would say, "it will be much sooner than you think"; sometimes he would say, "within our lifetime"; but also, sometimes he was referring to periods of ten years.

A third point in the Shah's "great civilization" was the regeneration of Iran's great ancient heritage. A fourth point in his plan was a kind of socialist vision of equity and material well-being for all of the people. This last point--the goal of a just and participatory society with a noble vision of the future -- was aimed at assuring the continuation of benevolent monarchy as the form of government.

This sense of urgency that the Shah manifested in pushing the bureaucracy, which was already overloaded and moribund, has its explanation in the fact that he was fifty-four years old at the time that the price of oil went up in 1974. At that time, he already had learned that he had pernicious lymphatic leukemia. Now, this great sense of urgency, this desire to see all these things done during his own lifetime, these plans, better yet, these grand illusions, these lyrical illusions, we Iranians knew could not be carried out. Reports after reports were written telling the Shah that his plans were too grandiose. Those of us who were there, those of us who were intimate sources of advice, told the Shah that the econonmy could not accomplish what the Shah wanted. This sudden increase in the oil revenues of Iran, from 1973-74 to 1975-76, by 287 percent could not be absorbed under control, that was clear. The economy was already showing signs of inflation as early as 1973, and that is one of the main reasons I broke with Prime Minister Hoveida. I thought it was madness to double the plan overnight and suddenly spend all of this money. It was obvious that those who knew anything about the Iranian economy, even if they were just beginning students of fiscal policy, would have come out and said, "Now look here, there will be a great inflationary pressure generated within the country were you to spend such a tremendous amount of money overnight."

Inflation was indeed created. The Shah, however, was not to be cowed by his own bureaucracy, by his own advisors, into changing his mind. He was determined to push plans of maximum expenditures.

As a consequence, what happened was, when you told the Shah that there will be great inflation, he said: "Don't worry; import everything you need; and if you do import, surely you have enough supply; and, indeed, if you are telling me about the difference between the excess of aggregate demand over aggregate supply, when we are able to supply ourselves with all the foreign exchange we have, what are you worried about?" When you turned around and told him that the infrastructure had so many bottlenecks that it was impossible to import and bring to the country all the goods and services you needed in good time and distribute them fast enough in order to get stability in prices, he would say: "Well, build new ports; build new roads as quickly as possible; remove all the red tape and push on with this program; and besides, our people are willing to accept a little inflation at this time, because they know the great future that is coming is worthwhile." This was his answer to the problem of bottlenecks in the infrastructure.

When we told him, "Look, we don't have the skills. This bureaucracy is already overwrought; there aren't enough people to provide the country with the skills necessary," he said: "Bring them from America; bring them from Europe; bring them from Korea; bring them from Pakistan and India; and whatever else is necessary.

Let me just give you a short anecdote here. When he talked about bringing into Iran all these people from other countries, obviously he meant to pay them whatever was necessary to get them to come. This created a great problem, because many people in Iran noticed the disparity in wages, and it caused a great deal of resentment. The presence of foreigners who were receiving such vast salaries no matter who -- Americans, Europeans, or indeed Koreans, it made no difference -- the resentment was there.

The anecdote is as follows: an Iranian official was sent to India to hire Indian doctors. In the process of negotiations, he offers the doctors a salary figure. They discuss the matter. The doctors are discussing the offer among themselves and they didn't seem very excited about the offer which he himself had thought was extremely high. The Indian doctors then said, "All right, we accept your offer." He turned and said to them, "Why don't you seem pleased? Don't you think the salary is enough?" The Indians said, "Well, we had hoped the salary would be higher." He said, "But the salary is high enough." They said, "Well, sir, we nearly get the same amount of money every year in India." And the Iranian official replied, "Dear sirs, this is a monthly salary that I am offering you, not an annual salary."

The boom and rapidly rising inflation took place just as was predicted. The huge imbalances forced the government to change their plans. By 1976, they began to realize that they could not raise the prices of oil without getting recessive effects elsewhere in the rest of the world. Certainly the recessionary tendencies, as well as inflationary tendencies, that is, stagflation in the rest of the world, considerably raised the cost of the activities within Iran.

Recession abroad decreased the expected oil revenues that they had already spent, that they had already counted on. As a result, the government suddenly reversed its gears. In 1976, after they preached from 1973 on vast expenditures and rapid development forward, the government and the Shah suddenly reverse and speak of the necessity of parsimony, of cutting back, of being prudent, of saving. The Shah's government instituted price control measures, and launched an anti-profiteering campaign which had the consequence of alienating a great portion of the bazaar.

The Shah soon found that it was necessary to fire the government, to dismiss the government of Mr. Hoveida. All of us who were there at the time were aware that there was something wrong. The atmosphere was full of friction. We were waiting for flashes. But after Hoveida was removed, we expected that the Shah would turn to some of the older politicians who had not served with this now discredited group, who would not be associated with the pattern of recent years. We thought the Shah might turn to a relatively independent man like Dr. Ali Amini; or perhaps someone from the National Front like Sadeqi or Shahpur Bakhtiar. Contrary to all expectations, the Shah appointed a cabinet of young, very clean, extremely well-educated able technocrats. But they lacked any political clout and had no political support among the masses. They were not the kind of people who could go the bazaar and quiet the people. This cabinet, as able as it was, was unable to manage the mounting political problems. The momentum toward revolution was accelerating within Iranian society. Nothing was able to stop it.

As demonstrations became widespread, protests arose from every segment of the society. The oil industry was halted by a strike. The Shah's bureaucracy goes on strike and the whole nation revolts. Why? The Shah didn't learn the lessons of the Constitutional

Revolution, or of the Mossadeq period, that what was essential for stability was a broad-based government which would encompass not only modernity and development, but also the peculiarly Iranian sense of nationalism and the Iranian desire for justice and equality before the law. The Ministry of Justice--nobody even knew where it was located at the end--the Ministry of Justice has been dead for years in Iran. The people did not have a place to go for real justice. If I had, for example, committed a crime against the state--and mind you that could have been easily defined by those in power--I would have been taken into a military court, and not into a civilian court to answer for it. At the end the Ministry of Justice was rendered helpless and meaningless. Justice was not to be heard of again.

The Shah failed to decentralize the central government, to broaden the political base, to bring, as one of my students has put it beautifully, "to bring the man-made institutions, the formal institutions, together with the informal institutions within the society itself." As a result, the Shah, the government and the country paid for it dearly.

DISCUSSION

Q: Stoddard: I want to ask Shaul Bakhash about political ideology and the extend to which Islam will be considered in the future in view of the attention now given to the revival of political Islam. That is an area, until recently, that had not been given very much attention in connection with revolutions. It is now used to legitimate a regime, or the symbols are used later to legitimate a regime, which earlier had been regarded as an obstacle. We see various patterns of usage of political or Islamic ideology. I wonder what observations you might have on that.

A: Bakhash: I would say that first of all it would be wrong to think of Islam as merely an instrument used for political purposes, or something used quite cynically to mobilize public opinion. Certainly in the Iranian case, it answers to and speaks to very importantly felt needs among the masses. It provides symbols around which political opinion can be mobilized. But I think that if you look at other revolutionary examples, and perhaps Professor Batatu will also have something to say about this, Islam was included in Ba'athist ideology both in Iraq and Syria. It was certainly part of the program of the FLN in Algeria. But it is really only with the Iranian revolution that you have a movement based very largely on Islam, seriously committed to recreating what is conceived to be an Islamic society.

I think the manifestations of an Islamic resurgence one now sees elsewhere in the region -- in Egypt, in Algeria, and to some degree in Iraq -- are responses to perhaps two developments: the first is that one may be seeing the beginnings of the disappointment with the most recent of those revolutionary waves. After all, there was, following the failure of Western liberal concepts for organizing government, a reversion, a turning towards a more radical, perhaps more leftist, political concept drawn to a much greater extent from the Eastern bloc countries. I think we are now in a period where that experiment, too, has been seen as not satisfying the aspirations of revolutionary groups; that is one argument. And the other is what you may be getting in some of the Arab countries, as we saw in Iran before the revolution, the introduction to active political life of new social strata and groups drawn from less advantaged groups, from more rural and provincial backgrounds, for whom the use of religion and the turn to religion comes much more naturally than the falling back on ideologies that seem alien and external.

A: Batatu: My feeling on this question is that Islam, like Christianity, has rich and varied elements which can be interpreted in many different directions. For example, Christianity was invoked by radical elements in English and German history -- the Diggers in the English Civil War and the Anabaptists during the peasants' rising of 1525 in Germany -- to pursue revolutionary ends and by the Catholic Church or by the Church of England to pursue conservative aims. We find analogous uses of religion in the Arab countries. Different Muslims interpret Islam differently according to their circumstances. The royal family of Saudi Arabia, for example, used its strategic alliance with Wahhabism to rise to power at various points. At present it construes Islamic values in its own way to buttress its own social situation. At the same time, we find Islamic movements which draw their support from underprivileged elements like the Da'wah movement in Iraq, which is a fundamentalist Shi'ite movement. On the whole, in the Arab countries but, not in Iran, Shi'ism has tended historically to be the ideology of the underprivileged. This is especially true in Iraq, Lebanon, and in the Hasa region of Saudi Arabia.

Q: Can you account for the similar interpretations of Islam by Ba'athists and conservatives in the Arab countries?

A: Batatu: I do not think that the Ba'athist interpretation of Islam has been similar to that of the conservatives. For example, in his Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, Michel 'Aflaq, one of the founders of the Ba'ath party, maintained at one point that "Islam, in its pure essence, arose out of the heart of Arabism." This particular formulation, whose obvious object is the harnessing of the emotions called forth by Islam in the service of the Arab national movement, is essentially incompatible with the standpoint of conservative orthodox Muslims, who do not connect Islam with any particular nation but view it in universalist terms.

Q: Jones: You fellows are all talking as if (and maybe I am misinterpreting you) these revolutions were over, and yet I was talking to some Turks the other day who spent a lot of time in Iran recently. They say that the bureaucracy is on the take, and that everybody is out for his own best interest and that there is hardly any kind of feeling there that they have a government that is going to be able to hold together -- at least they are interpreting it that way. It fits the description that you gave us of the previous government. We had caged prisoners in Cairo shouting against not only Sadat but the entire regime, and we can go down the line and tick off any number of other kinds of things that are happening. Where are we going? We describe nicely where we have been, but are not there other revolutions brewing and what are they about?

A: Batatu: At least in my case, I was interpreting past revolutions. I was not interpreting the existing situation and its possible explosive potentials. Recently there have been risings in Hama and Aleppo and agitations by radical Moslems in Egypt, but these agitations, though pointing to deep, underlying trouble, have not had a sustained effect. They certainly may portend events of a revolutionary character, but they do not amount to a revolution as yet, at least in the sense that I am interpreting the phenomenon "revolution."

A: Bakhash: Well, I think that if you look at the Iranian revolution, certainly there remain a large number of unresolved conflicts. Perhaps the two main ones relate to the distribution of property and to the organization of government in the post-Khomeini period. As to whether the revolution is over, the answer is no. It could go in one of two directions. Either there will be further nationalizations, further take-over of property, further moves towards egalitarian and radical policies on the one hand or, on the other hand, of course, governments tend to muddle through, and it is perfectly possible that in the post-Khomeini period Iran would continue to muddle along.

A: Farmanfarmaian: I do not think revolution as such purges the souls of human beings. Whether or not we will see a better society in Iran is yet to be witnessed. Whether or not this Islamic revolution in Iran is capable of doing that is yet to be witnessed. I do not have any specific information indicating to me that the way the present government in Iran is moving will ultimately bring the Iranian bureaucracy to a position where there will be a very honest type of regime. Human beings will continue to have their frailties; it does not matter under what system. It is the same as happened under the Russian Revolution in all these other countries. There is a great deal of evidence that many in the present regime have been on the take and will probably continue to be on the take. The key point is whether the regime wishes to weed out corruption, whether an honest system of due process will be created -- some system of real justice.

Q: Chase: You have been talking to some extent retrospectively and I wondered if Hanna Batatu would like to do a little futuristic speculation. Most people who observe the Middle East have spent a lot of time waiting for revolutions to happen and most of the time it eventually has. In a number of countries, it has not. If you assume that the people bring about revolutions, indeed like a detective story, all they need is an opportunity. Do you have any observations which you would like to make in terms of what affects the timing of a successful revolution?

A: Batatu: I think that Machiavelli made a very pertinent observation with regard to this particular question that you are raising. Machiavelli had a concept called the concept of *virtu*. The substance of this concept is that man can change his environment qualitatively, but this depends upon two essential things and their meeting together. First, favorable circumstances, and then a leadership which is able to understand these circumstances, react instinctively with them, seize the favorable moments, and then act with determination to fulfill them. When these two characteristics meet, a qualitative change in the situation becomes possible. The thing that strikes us most about Arab revolutions, say the Ba'athist revolution in Iraq and Syria, is that the coups which the revolutionaries succeeded in pulling off through their control of the means of violence were often, at least in their initial phases, leaps in the dark because the revolutionaries did not understand their own situation; they had not made a single study of the problems facing their society and often found themselves unable to move in any direction. This accounts, for example, for the failure of the first Ba'athist regime in 1963. This is substantially my answer to your question: a broadly-based organization, favorable circumstance, and a leadership which understands these circumstances and is able to react to them at the appropriate moment with enough decisiveness, are indispensable prerequisites for a successful revolution.

Q: I would like to inquire whether it is indeed acknowledged by the leaders at hand that the fate of their countries is indeed in their hands, and that Western subversion which we heard so much about in the nineteenth century has come to an end. If indeed this is the case, what kind of effect is this going to have in each country? I do not think we can now blame the West for the failure of revolutions in Syria and Iraq.

A: Batatu: Well, I do not think that the role of the West has ended. This would be a fiction. At present, for example, the United States is the most important power in the region. Historically, the first coup d'etat in Syria, that of 1949, which triggered coups and counter-coups and led in part to the unbalancing of the society, was pretty much engineered by a CIA action group led by a certain Major Mead who got in touch with Husni az-Za'im, the then Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army, suggested the idea to him, nursed the idea, and showed him how to go about it. Of course, the officers who took part in the coup with Za'im did not know about this. There were also objective reasons which contributed to the success of the putsch. Nonetheless, the role of the United States was significant. Why did the government of the United States interfere at that point to unbalance the Syrian regime? The Syrian Parliament had been dragging its feet and unwilling to ratify the Tapline (the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company) Agreement which granted transit facilities to the Mediterranean for an American pipeline from Saudi Arabia. Shortly after the coup, the obstacle was removed and the agreement was approved.

This is a page from the past, but the role of the big powers has not come to an end. In fact, I think that it is very likely to increase in intensity. I read the other day a report in the American press. I do not know how accurate it is. It might be unfounded. In this report, the columnist Anderson, who often publishes a lot of rubbish, but is sometimes well-informed, maintains that his agents were apprised of a Pentagon plan to establish a Rapid Deployment Force in Jordan, to buttress the Jordanian monarchy, and at the same time, to interfere in the Gulf countries in the event of a threat against them. This report might be completely without foundation. Interestingly enough, back in 1949, when a rumor spread that foreign hands were behind the military coup in Syria, the rumor was dismissed as a product of Arab imagination. The Arabs are an imaginative people, granted. But I feel that the role of the big power is far from ended. In fact, it is still there.

Q: Shaked: I would like to raise a question about Iran. There is an element which is surprisingly missing in the Iranian story, and this is the military. Now I would like to ask this question from two different points of view. Number one, why would Iran be different from so many other countries in that it was not the military which tried to overturn the regime, and the same issue could be put in a slightly different fashion: once the revolution started, and it became clear that the generals and the military would be identified with the establishment and therefore exterminated, why at that last moment they did not try to move the clock backwards by use of force and any other means which was at their disposal?

A: Bakhash: I do not think anyone imagined in 1978 that the army would make a coup against the monarchy before the revolutionary movement began. Why the army did not then step in to prevent the revolution, with or without the Shah, I think is fairly clear. The Shah had developed an army in which the generals and commanders had very little independence of decision. He had not at all encouraged them to work together in a decision-making body. The Joint Chiefs were, in a sense, a fiction as a functioning group. Therefore, in the course of 1978, as the situation on the streets became more and more difficult, and as the Shah began increasingly to avoid making decisions, the military chiefs began to meet together. There were some among them who thought of taking action, but in the end, the army took no decision. One of the legends -- it may also be true -- why the army never decided to prevent the revolution from happening was, again, the evil hand of U.S. interference. General Huyser arrived in Iran, warned the generals not to involve themselves, to stay neutral, and they did so. General Huyser's influence may have been exerted in that direction. My own feeling is that the Army would probably not have acted independently, with or without an American general at their elbow telling them what to do. In fact, it is interesting that after the Shah left Iran and went to Morocco, some of the generals tried to contact him there to get permission to stage a coup, and he never came to the phone. I simply think by habit, training, they had not learned to act independently.

A: Farmanfarmaian: The only thing I would like to add -- and I fully agree with Dr. Bakhash's answer -- is that the army, by the time the Shah left, had already reached the position, because the soldiers had been out of the barracks already, and as we say in Persian, they were already touched or moved by the people in the street; they were affected by them. They had lost their sense of mission, of coming out and hitting a target and going back into the barracks. They had become like ordinary police in the streets. We know, there is some evidence, that in many cases they refused to take orders. That is, the soldiers refused to take orders from their commands. This the top command knew, of course. This may have affected their thinking as to whether or not they should make a move and bring about a coup d'etat. The second point was this: this is directly from the horse's mouth -- what the Shah told me -- that he not only did not want bloodshed himself, but that he had urged his generals not to cause bloodshed. This is for certain. To what extent that had an effect on the generals who would be left naked to fend for themselves, I cannot be sure. Nevertheless, these factors are present.

Q: I would like to address my question to Professor Batatu. In a larger comparative and historical sense, would you say that the Iranian regime, the Khomeini regime, knows its society, and were it is going, or can we not say much about it because it is too early?

A: Batatu: I must admit that I am not competent to answer the question because my knowledge of Iran is really superficial. Shaul could handle it far better than I.

A: Bakhash: The collapse of the monarchy came much more rapidly than the revolutionary coalition imagined. And one might say about certain elements in the revolutionary coalition that they did not know exactly where to go once the revolution occurred. But I think this is not true for Khomeini himself, who had a very clear idea of the post-revolutionary society he wished to build. He has moved inexorably forward in that direction. Obviously, in an revolutionary situation, there are unknowns. Who could have predicted the sudden emergence of an armed population that would be so difficult to control? But leaving aside these inadvertent developments from the revolutionary situation, I certainly think that Khomeini was quite clear about the direction in which he wanted to go.

DINNER SESSION: SUMMARY OF PARTICIPANTS' REMARKS

The evening discussion began with the observation that since 1945 a series of revolutions and the turbulent aftermath have created a pattern of instability in the Middle East. However, not all Middle East states have experienced revolutions. Tocqueville in writing about the 1848 French Revolution noted that conditions can become ripe for revolution when the ruling classes lose power, because they become unworthy of retaining it. Moreover, revolutionary change can take place when there are beneficial changes in the social structure of the state.

The process of revolution is neither inevitable nor necessary in the Middle East, nor once a revolution has begun, does it follow a destructive path in every case. Clearly, greater understanding is needed of how existing Middle East ruling regimes can deal with the forces of change and structural weaknesses within their political systems, which in the past have often led to revolution.

It was observed that revolutionary trends and movements in the Middle East and the Palestinian question are linked. Many Palestinians have been directly involved in many of the major Middle Eastern revolutionary movements and have had an influence on most Arab nationalist groups. The Palestinian question has been and still is an important element in the foreign policy of the Arab world. Nasser's earliest written works discuss the leading role of the Palestinian movement in the context of Arab nationalism and the rise of the Ba'ath party can be largely attributed to the Arab defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.

In the past political opposition groups in the Arab world have used the Palestinian question as an element in challenges to the power of conservative Arab regimes. Conservative Arab leaders are constantly under challenge by these opposition groups, and are accused of being agents of foreign imperialist countries and conspirators against the cause of Arab nationalism. The causes, idealism and zealotry of several major revolutionary movements in the Middle East are fed by the Palestinian question. It continues to be a central emotional and ideological factor in revolutionary movements in the area. Many Arabs from Syria, Iraq and other Arab states have joined the Palestinian movement with heartfelt commitment and have died for it.

It was noted that Iran has a history of ties with the Palestinians. The Shah of Iran has been described as being privately sympathetic, but as a matter of policy opposed to the Palestinian movement. Under the Shah the representative from Israel to Iran was not accorded official recognition but in fact had full powers and privileges. There were also extensive commercial, military and intelligence ties with Israel. After the early 1960's, the democratic-progressive elements in the Iranian political spectrum, such as the National Front movement, and particularly the younger generations that made up the militant urban guerrilla Mojahadin and Fedayeen elements, developed close relations with the Palestinians. Khomeini, in his rise to power, used the Shah's connections with Israel as ammunition in his attacks on the Pahlavi regime. Khomeini's group, in its formative stages, received extensive assistance, material aid, and training from the PLO. It is a sign of how volatile present political conditions are in Iran that Khomeini now shows hostility to the Palestinian movement because of threats to his rule from elements in Iranian opposition groups, such as the Mojahadin who were close to the PLO and were assisted by them and received training from them.

One participant stressed that the role of leadership needs to be considered in understanding the dynamics of revolutions in the Middle East. The Shah is a dramatic example of a powerful head of state who lost control and is cited as a case where successful tactical leadership without sound, long-term goals ended in total failure and revolution. By the measure of his long tenure as king, 37 years, the Shah can be viewed as an exceptionally tenacious political figure. However, many hold the Shah completely accountable for awakening too late to the need to bring about political reforms, a broader political base, and an orderly transfer of power. Despite numerous attempts, the Shah was not able to successfully mobilize the population and was not able to create stable institutions. The fact that former Iranian cabinet officials were marching against the Shah in the final days before the government collapsed, was cited as an indication of how completely the regime had lost political support and its political will to continue in power.

The personal failings of the Shah, such as arrogance, a kind of malaise, perhaps caused by his fatal illness, were noted as other causes beyond systemic political weaknesses. One participant who was in the revolution noted that both external and internal pressures were working against the regime and accelerated the deteriorating situation in Iran. The Iranian elites, the ruling group, lacked the cohesion of an effective political force and were too split and disunited to help stave off the final delegitimation of the Shah. It was the absence of essential group loyalty that ultimately destroyed the hold of the Shah and his elite circles and created the way, without serious opposition, for Khomeini's triumphant return to Tehran. The concept of a central governing authority is rooted in the history of Iranian political culture. The replacement of the Shah by Khomeini has kept intact the thread of central authority in Iran, but Khomeini's leadership, now seen as in the pattern of previous Shahs, began as a somewhat detached moral-religious authority, rather than as the leadership of a political program to restructure the government.

American-Iranian relations since World War II were described as close and, until Khomeini, a decisive factor. Between 1945 and 1979, the United States' policy did not support political activities which did not emanate from the Pahlavi ruling group. The American policy preference for the Shah was paralleled by a failure to understand the full nature and dynamics of Iranian politics, its local variants, its personalities in circles other than official groups, and the effect of long-term policy developments.

American ties with Iran reached an important turning point in the early 1960's, when many United States officials concluded that the Shah was gradually losing his grip on the reins of power. This concern, very late in the game, prompted American officials to exhort the Shah to appoint a strong, popular prime minister. However, the Shah resisted suggestions from the outside that the internal situation in Iran was being badly handled. The period when the United States failed to voice its concern to the Shah over the poor health of Iran's economy, during the development of the 1969-1970 Nixon-Kissinger-Shah strategic consensus for the area, was viewed as a critical juncture. While both the Shah and Kissinger discussed in detail mutual strategic interests in the Middle East, particularly its "twin pillars" policy for the policing of the Gulf, there was no discussion of the far more critical potential political dangers inherent in the Iranian economic development and modernization process.

Another participant discussed how the mission of General Huyser to Tehran in 1978 raised the question about what the United States could have done differently, if anything, to have averted the revolution in Iran. Whether the United States had in mind the creation of a moderate pro-Western government to replace the Shah, or a blueprint for a military coup, if no such reform government could be installed, is less important than the fact that Khomeini foresaw such a potential threat and systematically destroyed the military in the early days of his takeover. Today, there is a feeling of anti-Americanism, a perception on the part of the leadership and the masses in many quarters of the Middle East, not just in Iran, that American meddling is responsible for domestic political turbulence in many states in the area. Thus, the perception, as well as the reality of outside interference in domestic affairs, such as the overthrow of Mossadeq in 1953 by the CIA, are equally important factors in understanding the forces which help shape the internal structural conditions and turbulent political tendencies of these Middle East countries.

The discussion turned to what American policy should now be towards other potentially unstable regimes in the Middle East. In light of the region's history of chronic instability, the United States must develop relations which go beyond policies designed only to reinforce military ties with Middle East states. The United States must take closer account of economic, social and political conditions, and formulate long-term policies to deal with changes that are fostered by economic development, political awareness and social change. A number of participants from the area commented that in the case of

Iran, American policy, perhaps unwittingly, contributed to the erosion of the ruling regime's popular base of political support. Close study of the reasons for the failure of the United States in Iran will help provide an understanding of how to modify the present conduct of United States foreign policy to deal with conditions which contribute to possible revolutionary change in the Middle East.

Considerable discussion centered on the idea that classifying revolutionary trends in the Middle East, as in the case of the Palestinian movement, for instance, is not easily done. The Palestinian revolution is dynamic, not static. For example, it is clear that a major shift has taken place in the outlook of most Palestinian revolutionaries in the past ten years. Revolutionary goals have changed in response to extensive and profound transformations that have taken place in the Middle East in the period from 1973 to 1983. Prior to 1973, the PLO categorically rejected any form of territorial compromise with Israel; constant calls were heard from leading PLO members for the total liberation of Palestine through armed struggle. Now that it is apparent beyond doubt after the destruction of PLO military forces in Lebanon that the PLO cannot achieve its maximalist aims, more limited gains and moderate goals are being fitted into the Palestinian political program. The emerging Fatah-centrist position within the PLO can be regarded as an example of adaptation. The Fatah is now using moderate tactics to further its political objectives.

The Palestinian revolutionary movement has been embraced by the Palestinian population of the West Bank and continues to be at the present time. The PLO has recognized that its continued mandate to lead the Palestinian cause derives, in part, from the consent of Palestinians now living under Israeli administration on the West Bank. Thus, the PLO leadership is in tune with the political sentiments of the masses; this sensitivity to popular sentiments has enabled figures such as Arafat to remain popular leaders in the face of changing political conditions within the PLO and in major Palestinian population centers.

After considerable discussion, it was the view of the participants that there are no useful analytical tools, methods or measurements now available to assess the outlook for the future in the Middle East; no single definition or typology of revolution can be used to order the vast array of political-revolutionary phenomena which has taken place in the area. An important question is whether the Iranian revolution is a unique development or the wave of the future. The fact is that no satisfactory archetypal models exist for determining the shape of future revolutions in the Middle East, but that further theoretical work and historical analyses of revolution are a priority concern. It was also agreed that close study of countries in the Middle East where revolutions have <u>not</u> occurred, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, could also add to the understanding of why some, yet not all, regimes are stable.

Revolutionary upheaval marks the post-World War II history of the Middle East with a few notable exceptions. It is still an open question whether revolutionary patterns will continue to dominate the politics of the Middle East in the years ahead. The failure of the United States and the various regimes of the Middle East to adapt to economic, political and social change in the past does not bode well for the hope of future stability in the area.

FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

FEBRUARY 4, 1983

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Brown: We at The Middle East Institute were delighted with the prospect of joining together with old friends and institutions, with whom we have worked before, to develop this series. I am sure that you will carry out the same high standards today, both in the presentations and in the interchange afterwards, which have been in the previous two sessions very illuminating to all of us. I think that this is the sort of discussion that allows some weeks in between meetings to reflect on our preconceptions and perhaps bring ourselves some new light and new thinking about the Middle East. I want to express, Ted, my thanks to you and to Bill Miller for making all of this possible and for letting us have the chance to work with you on a wonderful project.

Eliot: Thank you very much, Dean. I hope this is the first of many cooperative efforts between The Middle East Institute and The Fletcher School.

In the course of discussion in our two previous sessions our participants have underlined the belief that bringing peace to the Middle East will require a radical change of attitudes and policies. It has been pointed out that there have been breakthroughs. The Egyptian-Israeli peace was a triumph of statesmanship on both sides. Yet, it should be remembered that Egypt and Israel continued hostilities for ten years after the first tentative moves toward a settlement were made, and fought a war before making peace. Even under the most favorable conditions, strengthening and expanding the peace process in the Middle East will take time and patience.

It was the general view of our first two sessions that it is now necessary to be clear and straightforward in our goal of peace. It is not in the interests of the United States to pursue ambiguous policies in the Middle East, or to evade any opportunities to unsnarl the stalemated Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem. Only one power -- the United States -- with compassion and understanding, can bring the disputing parties to a point where mutually acceptable concessions are possible.

From discussions we have had here during the first two meetings, there is a widely shared view that the thrust of American efforts should continue toward the legitimization of the idea of a political settlement where all parties accept mutual recognition, compromise, and normalized relations. Historically, the United States has always expressed its support for a just, comprehensive and durable settlement of a Middle East conflict. The Reagan proposals build upon a number of key international resolutions and agreements which the United States endorses -- UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the Sinai Disengagement Agreements, and the Camp David Accords.

Statements by President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz and others have reaffirmed the binding relationship between the United States and Israel. It is a long-standing friendship founded on moral conviction, shared democratic values, and a strong strategic consensus.

The United States has close ties with the Arab world and wants those relations to be strengthened. The Arab states with which America has good relations are continuing to move with determination and courage in the direction of peace.

Reasonable efforts to create diplomatic options and open the way for reasoned discourse are consistent with the Reagan approach to a negotiated Arab-Israeli settlement and a peaceful restitution of Palestinian rights.

Yet, it is important to take account of the impediments which lie on the path to peace in the Middle East. Everyone who has studied or has been involved in these problems knows that it is not easy to find solutions. If Israel continues its settlement policies and unless the Arabs and Palestinians clearly agree to coexist peacefully with Israel, there will be continued strife, and it is the view of our sessions thus far that if movement toward peace does not take place, it is likely that more violence will erupt.

There are nevertheless trends which give cause for hope. The Arab world is moving away from rejection to acceptance of Israel. Within the Israeli political system, there is a healthy democratic debate under way concerning the government's settlement policies. Constructive action by outside powers can help strengthen and accelerate these evolutionary trends toward political convergence in the Middle East. The past decade has proven that in the case of Egypt and Israel the will to make peace can bear fruit.

Today, creative and sustained diplomacy can help to make the prospects for a broad Arab-Israeli peace likely. There can be no doubt that the agenda and the elements of compromise necessary for peace in the Middle East are now understood by all parties. Courage, compromise and intense negotiations by all parties will help make peace a reality.

With that introduction I would like to call on Dean Miller.

Miller: I am happy to introduce as our first speaker Harold Saunders, one of this country's most distinguished and devoted public officials. He has served both Democratic and Republican administrations for over twenty years with dedication, keen awareness of great difficulties, and with distinction. There are few government officials who command so much respect for their knowledge and for the integrity with which they have performed their duties. Mr. Saunders served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs from 1978 until 1981.

He was the director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department and previously he was a member of the National Security Council staff. He was a member of the negotiating team which, from the Kissinger shuttles through the signing of the Camp David Accord, produced five Arab-Israeli agreements between 1974 and 1979. After leaving the government, he has continued his work on the Middle East as a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and, in a private capacity, continues to play an important role in helping to shape United States policy thinking during this critical period in the history of the Middle East.

THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN THE 1980's

Harold H. Saunders

Time is casting the Palestine problem in a new shape. Few Americans understand the full meaning of the changes that are taking place. Few policy-makers understand the painful choices they will face in dealing with the Palestine problem in the 1980's.

This will not be another discussion of next steps in trying to resolve the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict. My purpose is to raise basic questions about where we are going. Experience tells me that the most important questions are not about what we should do next. The most important questions are: What is the problem? What are the possible solutions? How much do we care whether there is a solution? What are we willing to invest in achieving one? As the classic saying has it, when you do not know where you want to go, it is difficult to figure out how to get there.

Now we are approaching a fork in the road. Few Americans appreciate that decisions now being made -- or avoided -- could foreclose an historic opportunity for resolving the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict peacefully and could profoundly affect the U.S.-Israeli and the U.S.-Arab relationships. One path leads steadily downhill from that fork to another generation of impasse and conflict and a serious rift between the United States and key states in the Middle East, including Israel. The other path is a tough climb continuing from the opportunity in early 1983 for movement toward a just and lasting peace.

As we face that choice, our President and Secretary of State, our Congress, our press, and our electorate need to reflect seriously on where each fork in the road leads and why. Our leaders will have no alternative but to go where events drag them unless we have a clear sense of where we want to go. They need to be able to explain our choices straightforwardly to the American people to build political support for active U.S. leadership, if they are going to try to achieve a peaceful settlement.

I propose to move quickly through five fundamental questions that need to be dealt with in laying the foundation for understanding the new situation we face. My purpose is to sharpen our perspective on the problem we are trying to resolve. Then I want to suggest a direction for policy.

Five Questions

First: What is the Israeli-Palestinian problem? What is the problem we are trying to resolve?

This is not an academic question. We ask this question because the answers can focus our efforts to resolve the problem. For more than two decades, all sides worked from what now appears to be an incomplete or inaccurate definition of the problem to be resolved. There is still a serious difference among the parties to the conflict about the nature of the problem. Until there is a common understanding of the exact mix of elements in the problem, solutions will be difficult to negotiate.

In the 1940's, the Palestine problem was clearly defined: How could the rising number of Jewish immigrants coming to Palestine and the Palestinian Arabs already there live at peace together with claims to the same land west of the Jordan River? It was a problem of two peoples -- two nationalist movements -- pursing a right of self-determination in what each claimed to be its own land. As one Israeli described the problem in 1981, "The land of our fathers is the land of their fathers." The problem had roots deep in history. It had overtones as fresh as the experience of decolonization and growing nationalism that intensified in the post-war world.

After 1948, when the Jewish population of Palestine declared Israel an independent state, the Palestine problem became the Arab-Israeli conflict -- a contest of national power between the state of Israel and existing Arab states.

Arab states refused to accept the partition of Palestine between Jews and Arabs. They attacked Israel and refused to accept it. That war ended with armistice agreements in 1949, between the state of Israel and neighboring Arab states. Through the 1950's and much of the 1960's, the focus remained on the state-to-state Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab states saw Israel as a product of latter-day western imperialism, a system from which they were struggling to free themselves. The conflict was complicated by Arab shame over defeat after their 1948 attack on Israel, an urge to win back dignity and self-respect, and fear that the Israelis would win superior positions in any society bringing them together.

Nor did the Arab states recognize separate national rights for the Palestinian Arab people. They determined that they would play the Arab role in Palestine. The Palestinian Arabs ended up living in the Jewish state, in refugee camps, or in Arab and other states -- in most cases as second class citizens or as refugees. Jordan governed on the Arab side of the 1949 armistice lines in the West Bank, and Egypt governed in Gaza.

The 1967 war changed the situation -- more dramatically than we recognized at the time. It put Israel in military control of all of the area west of the Jordan River, as well as in occupation of Egyptian and Syrian territory. Yet the language of state-to-state conflict continued to be used in describing a framework for peace laid out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 in November, 1967 -- Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict in return for recognition of the right of all states to live in peace within secure and recognized borders. The assumption underlying Resolution 242 was that Israel would turn back territories occupied in the 1967 war to the Arab states which had controlled them before the war.

The Palestinians were mentioned only as "refugees." The central issue was not seen as resolution of the "Palestine problem" -- the problem of two peoples claiming national rights in the land west of the Jordan River. An acknowledged point in resolution of the conflict remained the recognition of a Jewish state, but in 1967, there was little talk by Arabs or anyone else of the reciprocal recognition of a politically separate Palestinian Arab identity.

At the end of the 1960's and in the early 1970's, however, the Palestinian Arabs asserted their own national identity, and the definition of the problem began to shift again. In 1974, at the Arab summit meeting in Rabat, the Arab governments recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestine people." In 1975, a statement on behalf of the Ford Administration before the Middle East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee included these words: "We have also repeatedly stated that the legitimate interests of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiation of an Arab-Israeli peace. In many ways, the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict. Final resolution of the problems arising from the partition of Palestine, the establishment of the state of Israel, and Arab opposition to those events will not be possible until agreement is reached defining a just and permanent status for the Arab peoples who consider themselves Palestinians...."

Still there is disagreement on the exact nature of the problem. The debate is unresolved. The question is as fresh as the initiative of President Reagan on September 1, 1982, in which he called for resolution of the problem through the association of the West Bank with Jordan. It is as fresh as the talks between King Hussein of Jordan and PLO Chairman Arafat over the nature of the relationship between the Palestinians and Jordan in a peace settlement.

One of the most contentious issues since the early 1970's has been whether the Palestinian problem is absorbed in the state-to-state conflict or whether it remains the "Palestine problem" of the 1940's -- a conflict between two peoples with claims to the same land. The debate lies between two schools of thought.

One school includes those who recognize that the Palestinians are a people with a claim to political expression of their identity parallel to that enjoyed by the Jewish immigrants in Palestine. They recall the recognition of the 1940's that two peoples with separate identities and claims were involved. They point to the fact that -- even if the Palestinians were later than the Zionists in developing a national consciousness -- the Palestinians are widely recognized today as a people. In addition to their origins in the same land, they are now bound together in a common trauma -- what they call the "national catastrophe of 1948," when they lost their homes. Many in this school of thought believe that such a people is entitled to the right of self-determination. To those who argue that point, they recall that justice was defined in 1947 by the world community -- including the United States -- as warranting the creation of separate Palestinian Arab and Jewish states in Palestine.

A second school holds that the Palestinians are not a separate people -- that they are simply "Arabs" whose Palestinian national consciousness is recently developed. As Arabs, according to this view, they can live as well in one Arab land as another. Those who hold this view see Jordan as the state where Arabs who once lived in Palestine are becoming the dominant political element. They do not see the Palestinians as entitled to the same rights as the Jewish people. Or at least, they fear that recognizing equal rights for Palestinians and Jews in Palestine may threaten the security of the Jewish state and exclusive Jewish claims to the land.

On first glance, there would appear to be more readiness to recognize that the Palestinians are a people with political claims than in the early 1970's. The words of "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David" are clear: "The resolution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements." At Camp David, the parties acknowledged an Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the heart of the conflict between Israel and neighboring Arab states. That clarity fades when practical solutions to the problem are negotiated. What can be negotiated given the real objectives of the parties prevails. The compelling question that negotiators cannot wish away is: How workable, how just, and how lasting will be a peace agreement which does not reflect a realistic perception of the problem?

That leads to our <u>second</u> question: <u>What are the possible solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian problem? What solutions reflect what perceptions of the problem?</u>

Before leaders will negotiate, they have to judge whether a negotiated solution could be better than continuing the present situation. Could negotiation solve the problem? To make that judgement they have to determine both that a solution to the problem could be achieved in negotiation which they could justify to their political constituencies and that the balance of forces is such as to make such a solution imaginable.

In the 1940's, two approaches to solution of the Palestine problem were considered. One envisioned a single state including both Jews and Arabs with full individual civil and human rights, while the other was based on the partition of the land west of the Jordan River into separate Jewish and Arab states. In November 1947, a majority of the members of the United Nations General Assembly concluded that existing tensions between Jews and Arabs made a single-state solution unworkable. They approved a proposal for partition of that land into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and a separate body centered on the holy city of Jerusalem. The United States and Israel accepted partition and the creation of separate independent Jewish and Arab states. The Arab governments rejected partition. They did not accept the surrender of any Arab sovereignty in Palestine.

In 1967, the premise of most of the non-Arab world remained that a solution would involve separate Jewish and Arab entities in the land west of the Jordan River. The formula for peace recorded in Resolution 242 was that Israel would withdraw from territories occupied in 1967, in return for peace, security and recognition. The irony of the years since 1967 is that through the early years most Arabs continued to reject the existence of a Jewish homeland there, while most Israelis accepted a solution based on partition. In the 1970's, particularly after the 1973 war, as more Arabs came to accept the existence of Israel as a fact, an increasing number of Israelis have come to believe either that the land of Israel should encompass all of Palestine west of the Jordan River or at least that the establishment of a Palestinian state there would jeopardize the security and boundaries of their own state.

In 1977, Menachem Begin's election as Prime Minister of Israel brought to power there a coalition, substantial parts of which are committed to Israeli control of all the area of the former Palestine mandate west of the Jordan River. Prime Minister Begin in negotiations has repeatedly rejected any formulation implying that Resolution 242 with its provision for withdrawal applies to the West Bank. Although the Israeli government continued to give lip service to Resolution 242, it explicitly stated its intention to assert an Israeli claim of sovereignty in the West Bank in the negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. It has taken steps by expropriating land and building Israeli settlements there to establish a permanent Israeli presence there.

There is, however, no agreement in Israel over the future shape of the state -- whether it will include all of the land west of the Jordan River along with 1.7 million Palestinian Arab citizens, or whether it will reflect a territorial partition based on some modification of the 1949-1967 boundaries. Significant voices in Israel still argue strongly that incorporating 1.7 million Arabs within the Jewish state will dilute the Jewish character of the state if they are incorporated with full political rights and will corrode Jewish tradition if they are simply repressed. Some of those who continue to advocate a solution reflecting separate identities also believe that, whatever the political base, a genuine peace could bring Jordanians, Palestinians, and Israelis together in Benelux-type associations that few have yet been bold enough to define.

At this point, it is important to reflect for a moment on the definition of "genuine peace." One question that has pervaded the discussions since the 1967 war has been what a relationship of real peace would be. In the years right after the war, we spoke of peace as an end of the state of belligerency and the codification of a formal state of peace in peace treaties. Then as time went on, the Israelis began speaking of "real peace" embodied in a normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab states. President Carter endorsed that objective in 1977, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed in March 1979, contained an annex on practical steps that each side would take to build a normal relationship. Now as we return to the Palestine problem where geography brings the parties to the conflict to live without natural buffers between Palestinians and Israelis, the nature of the relationship is central. The question is whether any effort to achieve real peace and normal relations can succeed if it does not accord comparable dignity to both parties.

The willingness of leaders to negotiate peace and normal relations will depend on whether they judge that a just and lasting peace can be negotiated. It is difficult to envision a negotiation before a greater measure of consensus exists on the shape of a possible compromise solution and before a balance of forces exists which can produce such a negotiated solution. Those who focus on the practical aspects of organizing a negotiation may be misdirecting their energies unless they are concentrating on how to persuade the parties that negotiation has a reasonable chance of producing the kind of solution they could live with and that the United States will actively support a negotiated compromise. Any strategy for moving toward a negotiated settlement must include steps for enabling Arab parties to conclude that Israel is prepared to negotiate a fair settlement. It must also include deliberate steps for enabling Israel to debate its future in the face of a realistic opportunity to negotiate peace with Arab parties ready to accept Israel. This leads to the third question.

Third: How can the parties be persuaded to commit themselves to a negotiated settlement if they believe that continuing the present situation is preferable to any negotiated settlement they can foresee? How can the parties be persuaded to see more advantage in a settlement than in living in the present situation?

By the early 1980's, no questions seemed more acute that these: Can these conflicts be resolved peacefully through political and diplomatic initiatives with the assistance of the United States? Can the incentive for a negotiated settlement be increased peacefully? Or can a settlement be achieved only over time when a new balance of power within the Middle East forces a settlement? If a new balance of forces is required, must it result from a shift in the military balance, or could U.S. diplomatic involvement or other political acts like President Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem achieve a shift peacefully?

One option is to allow time to pass until the balance of advantage shifts. The present government of Israel seems to believe that allowing time to pass, while it tightens its physical grip on the West Bank and Gaza, will make it more difficult in any negotiation to dislodge Israel from those positions. On the other side, President Assad of Syria states explicitly his view that Israel will not negotiate a just settlement until the Arab nations over time have strengthened their military position so that Israel cannot ignore a clearcut threat to its security. Other Arabs would add to President Assad's point the thought that nuclear weapons in Arab hands within a decade will help to change the balance.

There is no question that military power has played a major role in changing the environment for negotiation. Already we have seen how the conflict in 1967 gave Israel an enormous bargaining advantage in putting it in control of all the land west of the Jordan River as well as the Sinai and the Golan Heights. We also saw how President Sadat went to war in 1973 in order to spur greater superpower involvement in the efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement. The question is whether we want to rely mainly on a further shift in the balance of forces in the Middle East to produce conditions for a settlement.

A second option begins with the judgement that military conflict in the Middle East is too dangerous to American and to other nations' interests. It is also based on the judgement that Israel over the long term cannot survive Arab numerical superiority in a sheer contest of strength. Periodic efforts have been made to try to reshape the situation by diplomatic effort. Such efforts have been almost continuous in one form or another since the 1967 war -- the Jarring Mission from 1967 to 1970, the Kissinger shuttles of 1974-75, the efforts leading to Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty with American mediation in 1977-79, and President Reagan's "fresh start" of September 1, 1982, in the wake of the 1982 Israeli-Palestinian war in Lebanon.

Serious disagreement remains over which course to follow. Much of that disagreement hinges on the argument over whose side time favors. How many times in our discussions over the years have we made the argument that "time is running out"? Yet time does not really "run out." It keeps changing the situation -- sometimes for the better, and sometimes for the worse -- and the argument goes on about how best to use time in the strategy of making peace. How is time operating in the early 1980's?

In Israel, there is disagreement between those who would use time to consolidate Israel's grip on the West Bank and Gaza and those who believe that once the grip is consolidated Israel will have deprived itself of further choice about the future shape of the Israeli state and will have committed itself to another generation of conflict. The choice being hardened -- literally in concrete on the West Bank -- is that the former mandate of Palestine will not be shared by Israelis and Palestinian Arabs but that Israel will take it all. Israeli opponents of this policy argue that closing the door on the option of withdrawal in the West Bank and Gaza is closing the door on a compromise which for more than three decades was seen as the only basis for a negotiated peace. Many Israelis fear that when Israel forecloses withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and denies the Palestinians a homeland of their own, there Israel will be resting its future alone on a prolonged contest of strength with 100 million neighbors who will have no choice but hostility. Since a lasting peace will not grow from a winner-take-all solution, they see this decision on the shape and make-up of the Israeli state as possibly more fateful than the original decision to establish Israel as an independent state.

Time is narrowing choices for the United States too -- and raising a question we have not faced before and have not yet fully recognized. The United States has previously enjoyed a full range of choice in fulfilling its oft-repeated commitment to the security of an Israel established in justice through compromise with its Palestinian Arab neighbors. If Israel tightens control over all of Palestine, a new question is posed: What Israel will the U.S. pay a price to support? Is it an Israel committed to peace with its neighbors, or an Israel committed to territorial objectives that make another generation of conflict inevitable? What is the position of the United States toward an Israel whose territorial objectives the United States does not support?

U.S. strategy in the Middle East for two decades has been based on the premise that an active effort to achieve an Arab-Israeli peace is important in maintaining some possibility of orderly change in that area and in preserving a U.S. position in the area which enables the U.S. to support Israel's security while pursuing other important interests. In this new situation the U.S. faces a choice between giving Israel a blank check, regardless of consequences for U.S. interests, and establishing limits for U.S. support consistent with U.S. interests. Israeli leaders are entitled to know the U.S. choice before they close the door on their choices.

Within Jordan, debate divides those who believe that the stability of the Hashemite monarchy would be better served by leaving the West Bank under Israeli control and those who believe that Jordan will eventually be the victim if the conflict continues, if Israel completes control over the West Bank, and if the Palestinians are expelled to establish their state in the Hashemite Kingdom. The future of Jordan as we now know it may depend on creating a Palestinian entity in Palestine -- not in Jordan. As the doors are closing on the decisions about the shape of the Israeli state, they are closing on Jordanian choices as well.

The Palestinian community is divided between those who believe that they must seize the present opportunity to establish a state in some part of the land of Palestine and those who either still do not accept Israel or who believe that Israel has no intention of making such a concession and there is no point in taking the political risks involved in trying to negotiate. The choice made will determine whether the Palestinians have the opportunity to consolidate their nationhood in the near future or whether they will remain a fragmented nationalist movement living as ethnic minorities in other nations with no hope but to try again to change the balance of force in their favor over time. If they cannot negotiate peace now, some Palestinians advocate a strategy of aiming to replace moderate governments with governments that would effectively support the Palestinian cause.

If time is moving toward prolonged conflict and not toward peace, what other instruments can be used to persuade the parties to negotiate? Israelis who would prefer to negotiate a compromise peace now say they would take a strong stand in Israel if they could argue that an Arab leader on Israel's eastern front is ready to negotiate peace and that the United States will not support an Israel which rejects peaceful compromise. Jordanians and Palestinians say they will negotiate if Israel will submit all issues to negotiation and not go on trying to settle some issues outside negotiation. For them also, the critical question in shifting the balance toward a negotiated settlement is whether the United States will involve itself decisively.

Fourth: If we are going to try to achieve a solution, by what road do we get there? Two basic approaches have been tried with a mix of nuances between.

One approach has been to focus on achieving on overall settlement by agreeing on the end result of a negotiation at the outset. In other words, there would be agreement on peace and recognition of Israel on the basis of specific boundaries of Israel. Or there would be agreement in advance that the Palestinians should enjoy the right of self-determination.

The alternative is some kind of step-by-step process built around a series of partial agreements addressing limited aspects of the conflict. This approach was most clearly articulated during the Kissinger shuttles of 1974-75, but on a larger scale it also underlay the "Framework for Peace Agreed at Camp David." At Camp David, it was agreed to go ahead with an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as a major step toward a larger peace, and it was agreed to tackle the Palestinian problem through two stages of negotiation.

A substantial cultural gap exists in this area between the U.S. and the Arab governments over this point. Arab leaders say that they are prepared to engage with us in some sort of transitional process provided they can see the "light at the end of the tunnel" or provided they "know the destination of the train before they get on." The U.S., on the other hand, has turned to the step-by-step approach because of the extreme difficulty of gaining acceptance by either side to some of the large principles of a comprehensive settlement. The U.S. views this approach as the only workable approach, especially in enabling the democratic political system in Israel to deal with major decisions of this kind.

The United States must now seriously consider that one reason why it has not been able to persuade Arabs to accept its approach to the "peace process" is that the United States has not insisted with Israel on maintaining the integrity of that process. The Arabs since Camp David have seen Israel as using the process to cover continuing expropriation of land and settlement in the West Bank and Gaza. They have not seen an effective U.S. effort to insist that all issues of consequence --

particularly the control of land in the West Bank -- be submitted to negotiation and not be resolved unilaterally outside negotiation. One of the main issues on the agenda today, therefore, is establishing the integrity of the peace process and U.S. credibility in assuring that integrity. This in effect was the principal issue on the agenda between President Reagan, King Hussein and the Palestinians.

<u>Fifth</u>: <u>What is the U.S. interest in a negotiated solution? What is the U.S. interest in establishing the credibility of the peace process?</u>

It has been commonplace for us to say that U.S. interests require a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We have been concerned for years that such conflicts could lead to a U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the area or produce region-wide instability that would open the door to the spread of Soviet influence. We have been interested in the steady flow of oil. However, despite that abstract assertion of a theoretical American interest, the practical assessment of U.S. presidents as demonstrated in their actions suggests that unless there is a crisis, some of them regard the costs of really trying to negotiate an Arab-Israeli-Palestinian settlement as greater than the advantages to be gained. What, then, is the larger U.S. interest in an Arab-Israeli-Palestinian peace?

For many of us, that conventional description of the national interest in peace would be enough. In addition, three political points can be made.

First, the President has choices to make about <u>whether</u> the United States will conduct itself as a global power. Will he invest in steps to show that the United States has the capacity to sustain a continuing influence over the course of events in an area where the United States has vital interests? Or will he show that the United States no longer has the ability or will to use its power effectively? The people of the Middle East do not question U.S. power. They do question whether the United States political system can any longer provide the base for an effective foreign policy or whether U.S. leadership can use American power wisely. Because more American and global interests come together in the Middle East today than in almost any other part of the developing world, how we deal with the problems of the Middle East will significantly affect judgments around the world in the 1980's about American effectiveness and endurance as a world power.

Second, the President has choices to make about <u>how</u> the United States will play its role as a world power. He has little choice that America must maintain military strength in the foreseeable future, although there are complex decisions to be made in the choices on weapons systems and in the nature of the nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. He does, however have a choice about how much of his own energies and political resources he will invest in America's effectiveness as a peacemaker.

This choice raises the broad question: What do we want our nation to be? Are we to be a nation actively and effectively working for peace and justice? Or are we to be seen as a nation content to enjoy our own well-being with little regard for injustice, poverty, and conflict elsewhere in the world? More concretely the question is one of hard, cold national interest. The experience of the 1970's in the Middle East when five Arab-Israeli agreements were concluded with U.S. mediation demonstrated that U.S. influence is enhanced when the United States acts effectively as a peacemaker. During those years, people looked to Washington -- not to London, Paris, or Moscow -- to learn what would happen next. If power lies in the capacity to influence the course of events, then U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East in the 1970's was clearly an instrument in enhancing American power.

Third and very sensitive to talk about is the fact that the President's choices will provide a part of the answer to questions about whether the presidency itself is an institution capable of conducting the foreign policy of a global power. The issue is whether the President will make his own decisions on what the national interest requires, attempt to win wide political support for them, and pursue his strategy with the perseverence of a marathon runner. Or will he allow his course to be determined by every change in the domestic political breezes? Will the President shape policy and lead public opinion in the interest of the whole nation or will the interest groups with the loudest voices and most active organizations pilot our course? Presidents might well ponder whether strength at the polls depends more on appeasement to interest groups or on wise and firm leadership. An important part of the answer may well be that a significant percentage of the American electorate will not have an interest in what happens in the Middle East -- until the lines form again at the gas pumps. If that is the case, that is when the President's capacity to communicate understanding of the nation's larger interests is tested.

What is Required?

This analysis of the problem and of possible approaches to a solution suggests five areas for national decision and diplomatic effort. I am not going to offer the classic blueprint for "next steps in the Middle East." I do want to suggest that little progress will be made until those guiding our strategy pay attention to how the basic counters in the power balance are stacked and to removing the psychological obstacles to a negotiated settlement. We have to recognize where we are in the peace process.

We have become accustomed to thinking of the "peace process" in terms of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. At the end of the 1970's, these became conventional cross-the-table negotiations. We forget the decade before 1977, when we were in earlier stages of the peace process trying to achieve a common definition of the problem to be solved and persuading the parties to commit themselves to a negotiated peace. The 1973 war, two disengagement agreements (1974-75), an effort to resume the Geneva

Middle East Peace Conference (1977), and President Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem (1977) were all necessary in setting the stage for negotiating a peace treaty.

Today as we turn to the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian-Syrian-Lebanese Front, we have to recognize that we are again back in those early stages of the peace process. The task is not first to find the right verbal formula for bringing Jordanians and Palestinians into the negotiating process. The problem is to create a situation in which Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian leaders alike can judge that a fairly negotiated solution is possible and that they can live with the outcome that might emerge.

What is required?

First: A U.S.-Israeli dialogue at the highest level is essential to determine common views of the problem and approaches to it before we can expect to devise an effective strategy. If the United States and Israel are operating from different premises about objectives, it is difficult to see how there can be serious collaboration in bringing peace to the area. There can be no common premises until there is a common view of the problem and of the shape of a possible solution as well as of strategies for achieving such a solution. There has been no serious U.S.-Israeli dialogue on these issues for almost three years.

The United States has committed itself to the security and future of Israel, but now the people of Israel are themselves unclear about what Israel they are asking the United States to support. The President has an obligation to the leaders and people of Israel to explain what Israel the United States will support and what the limits of United States support are for an Israel pursuing objectives the U.S. cannot support. America's interests as a global power -- on which Israeli security ultimately depends -- are affected by Israel's policies. Israel is one of the world's leading military powers, thanks in substantial part to the heavy flow of America's most advanced military equipment for more than a decade. Israel receives annually an amount of economic assistance from the United States government greater than the funds received by all but eight states of the United States under revenue sharing programs. The President has a duty to his constituency and to our friends in Israel to assure that such support serves both Israeli and U.S. interests before some event occurs that raises questions about this support in the American body politic. The nature and extent of U.S. support for Israel is a crucial factor in creating an environment where a fair negotiated settlement is judged possible.

Second: With present Arab leaders, it is most important to achieve understanding on how best to maximize the incentives in Israel as well as in the Arab countries to try for a negotiated settlement rather than one produced some years from now when Arab military power equals Israel's, with or without nuclear weapons.

This task is complex. The overriding incentive in Arab capitals for achieving an Israeli-Palestinian settlment is to achieve a goal to which Arab leaders have committed themselves to their constituencies and to reduce the potential of Palestinian nationalism to become the driving force in a movement to destroy the present generation of Arab leadership. However, Arab leaders do not by themselves have the power now to force a solution they can live with, so they need the weight of U.S. influence in the scales to create an environment for a fair negotiation. Yet they will not risk closer association with the United States until they are sure the President will take a comparable political risk to achieve a just peace. The President, on the other hand, is not inclined to take such risks until he is convinced that the Arab leaders involved are unequivocal in their commitment to a negotiated and lasting peace with Israel.

To bring these first two points together, it is difficult to see how the peace process can move further until both sides have demonstrably committed themselves to a negotiated peace with each other. It is difficult to see either side committing itself until the United States has made clear by its actions as well as its words where it places its influence in the scales. This will not be accomplished by professional negotiators, however effective. It will be accomplished only by the President.

Third: With regard to the Palestinian community, there are two basic issues to be dealt with. The first, to be answered by the Palestinian community itself, is whether they are prepared to negotiate a solution based on Palestinian coexistence in peace with Israel. The second question is for the United States: If the Palestinian community is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on a reciprocal basis, to what extent will the United States support a solution which will meet the Palestinian need for separate political expression of their own identity? The United States in the 1940's voted for separate Israeli and Palestinian states. President Reagan now speaks of a solution for the West Bank and Gaza "in association with Jordan." In order to provide an incentive for Palestinians to support the negotiating process, the Administration will have to find ways to meet the Palestinians' need for recognition.

The primary answer lies in the response to the question: What Palestinian rights will the Administration support? A more immediate tactical question is how the Palestinian community will be represented in the peace process. There are certain fictions that need to be recognized. One of these is that neither the United States nor Israel can engage in a dialogue with the PLO. In the first instance, the U.S. commitment made in August 1975 is simply a commitment not to "recognize or negotiate with" the PLO until it accepts Resolutions 242 and 338 and Israel's right to exist. There was no prohibition against exchanging views with the PLO. In addition, there is the fact that Israeli officials deal almost daily with Palestinian Arab leaders in the occupied territories who regard themselves as sympathetic members of the PLO. Moreover, Israel has waged war against the PLO and has acknowledged its contacts with the PLO to achieve prisoner exchange. Therefore, we need to recognize that the issue is not so much whether the PLO plays a role in the negotiating process, as how the larger Palestinian problem will be resolved both to provide effective representative government in the Palestinian homeland and to deal justly with the two and a half million Palestinians who would initially still be living outside the Palestinian homeland.

Fourth: It is essential to establish agreement for the withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian and Palestinian forces from Lebanon. The primary objective, of course, is enabling Lebanon to restore its own political and territorial integrity. The issue for an Arab-Israeli-Palestinian peace is to demonstrate convincingly that Israel is not determined to hold territory as part of some larger expansionist design.

Fifth and finally: A central question as efforts to shape a negotiation proceed is whether the Camp David framework can remain the predominant framework for negotiations relating to the Palestinian issue.

I continue to believe that the approach agreed at Camp David was rooted both in practical solutions to political problems and in the political constraints confining the negotiators. I would even go so far as to say that one of the problems with the Camp David framework for dealing with the Palestinian issue may be that it has not yet been tried. A freeze on settlements requested at Camp David has never been instituted with regard to negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza. Neither President Carter nor President Reagan has personally involved himself in the negotiations following on Camp David relating to West Bank and Gaza. Arab leaders have rejected the approach out of hand until King Hussein's recent interest in negotiation. One might even speculate on where we would be today if Jordan and the Palestinians had joined the negotiation in 1979, and the American President had been able to remain fully engaged.

For all of those arguments, I will be the first to say that the issue today is not whether King Hussein with PLO support will accept the Camp David framework and agree to negotiate within it. The issue is whether Jordan and the PLO will say simply that they are prepared to negotiate peace with Israel and establish normal relations provided Israel will reciprocate. A straightforward offer of peace on the basis of Resolution 242 would require a serious Israeli response, as did President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. To be sure, it would be tactically wiser and would save time if negotiations would somehow be linked to the Camp David process to which Israel has committed itself. There are reasonable ways of doing this because Camp David outlined a two-stage process for negotiation. It did not blueprint a solution.

Let me conclude now with two summary points.

First, the character of the Palestine problem is changing. For more than three decades, the heart of the problem has been whether the two peoples with claims in the same land could live together in mutual recognition, acceptance, and peace there. Surrounding that dimension of the problem has been the question of mutual recognition, acceptance, and peace between Israel and neighboring Arab states. For more than three decades, the basis for a compromise peace has been sharing the land and recognition of separate Jewish and Arab identities there. Now the world is in doubt about what Israel it is being asked to accept. Is it a Jewish state in part of Palestine west of the Jordan River? Is it an Israel committed to a compromise peace with all its neighbors, or an Israel ready for another generation or more of conflict for the sake of trying to force resignation to its control over all of Palestine? The United States has provided extraordinary support to an Israel committed to a just and lasting peace based on compromise with its neighbors. Neither the United States nor Israel has thought through what their relationship will be under the circumstances now emerging.

Second, in turning to Israel's eastern front, we have moved back again into the early stages of the peace process. The key issues now until actual negotiation can begin will not be issues of negotiating texts or diplomatic formulae. The key issues will relate to building an environment for negotiation -- constructing a political balance that increases incentives for a negotiated settlement, that makes more realistic the judgement on both sides that essential needs can be met in such a settlement, and that enhances the likelihood that a successful negotiation is possible. At the heart of that political balance will be the question of what the United States can and cannot support. There is no question that Arab acceptance of Israel is critical to peace, but it is increasingly difficult to crystallize that acceptance while Israel is uncertain about what its future shape will be. Stating the problem that way risks the charges that all the burden is being placed on Israel or that the United States is going to "pressure Israel." The problem is more profound. After thirty-five years, a compromise peace settlement could probably be negotiated for the Palestine problem as we have defined it throughout that period. The question is now how to deal with the Palestine problem as Israel is redefining it in the 1980's.

Miller: Thank you Mr. Saunders. Our next speaker has very kindly come to be with us at the last minute, but he comes well-prepared for sudden tasks since he has one of the most difficult jobs in Washington. He covers Capitol Hill for the Embassy of Israel. If there is any more mysterious place in the world for the outsider, I would like to know about it. Mr. Eran is a native-born Israeli. He graduated from the Hebrew University and has a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics where he wrote a thesis on aspects of Anglo-Egyptian relations. He has served in the Israeli army. He has been a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1966, and has served in the UN and in London. He was Deputy Director of the Bureau of Middle Eastern and Egyptian Affairs at the Ministry in Israel. His present post is Counselor in the Israeli Embassy in Washington. It is my pleasure to introduce Mr. Oded Eran.

FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Oded Eran

I see the faces here of many people who could talk on Israel just as well as I can. Bill Brown served in the American Embassy in Tel Aviv as Deputy Chief of Mission and he can certainly shed the same light on Israeli politics as I can; other people like Stoddard and Sterner are known names and old hands in the Middle East.

I think that I agree with most of the last five points made by Hal Saunders. Indeed, there is a need to go back to substantial talk between the United States and Israel. There cannot be any doubt about the centrality of the relations with the United States in Israel's foreign policy. The Camp David Accords and the Peace Treaty with Egypt in 1978-1979 are the best examples of what has been achieved through cooperation between the two states. There is a danger, however, that in its attempts to find solutions to the various aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the United States would take into account Arab interests and points of view which are in most cases diametrically opposed to those of Israel, and may even create dangers to Israel's security in the attempt to reach compromises. Thus, areas of friction were created in the past and are noticeable too in the context of the negotiations over a settlement in Lebanon. The way to avoid or minimize these frictions is by a more intensive bilateral dialogue between the U.S. and Israel.

The need of the United States to produce results in order to maintain its credibility is a potential area of friction, especially when negotiations towards an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict are linked to the developments in Lebanon. This may leave the veto power in the hands of those who oppose the process of Camp David. It is likely that King Hussein would link his agreement to open negotiations with Israel to the withdrawal from Lebanon, making it a precondition. As Israel made its agreement in principle to withdraw conditional upon the Syrian and PLO willingness to act likewise, it is conceivable that either the PLO or Syria or both would prevent Jordan from going into negotiations with Israel by refusing to withdraw from Lebanon.

The Camp David Accords seem to me the cornerstone for any negotiations for an overall settlement in the Middle East. These accords and the Peace Treaty with Egypt presented a dilemma for Israel -- peace versus territory. That was a painful dilemma which the Israeli negotiators in 1978-1979 and the Israeli Knesset had to solve. It was accentuated by the decision to dismantle settlments in the Sinai. It can be said without risk of exaggeration that the experience involved in the total withdrawal from Sinai was a traumatic one for the majority of the Israelis, and it reduced seriously the likelihood of Israel's public opinion accepting it again. In spite of the painful dilemma, there was a fairly wide consensus about the need to make the decisions which brought about Israel's total evacuation from the Sinai for a peace treaty, which contained recognition of Israel by Egypt.

The issue of Israel's national security, in its broad meaning, is one which is at the heart of the political activity and configuration in Israel. It should be emphasized that in the aspects of national security where a wide consensus exists -- opposition to the establishment of an independent state in the West Bank -- this opposition is shared by both of the ruling parties, chief among them the Likud and the Labor party, which is the largest party in opposition.

Another observation that should be made in this context is that the policy of building Jewish settlements on the West Bank was initiated by the Labor Party while it was in power between 1967 and 1977. Generally speaking, the Labor Party established these settlements in areas it regarded as having a defensive significance along the Jordan River. The resettlement of Jews in Hebron by the Labor Party had nothing to do, however, with security. This indicates that on the settlement policy too the polarization is not as wide as it is perceived or believed to be.

For a number of years, the Allon Plan was the unofficial Labor Party solution for the West Bank. It entailed a territorial compromise with Jordan leaving under Israeli control the eastern ridges of the West Bank's high terrain and the less densely populated area there. It amounted to an annexation by agreement of a large part of the West Bank. It seems to me that from the Arab point of view the Allon Plan should be more objectionable than even the narrowest possible interpretation of the autonomy as stipulated in the Camp David Accords. The present Israeli Government, though declaring it will present a claim, and realizing that others may do so as well, does not relate at present to the West Bank in terms of annexed territories.

Sixteen years have now passed since the Six Day War of June 1967. A whole new generation has been raised in Israel not knowing or remembering the period when Israel was separated from Judea and Samaria. These territories are now part of their experience and cognition. It seems that little attention was given to the impact of time on a substantial segment of the Jewish society in Israel and, for different reasons, on the Arab citizens in Israel. It is true that the same generation grew up with the Sinai under Israeli control, and the Sinai was returned to Egypt with this new generation accepting the decision, as it seemed at the time with equanimity. It would be wrong, however, to project the reaction to the solution regarding the Sinai as possible reactions to various solutions concerning Judea and Samaria. Most

Israelis have related differently to the Sinai and the West Bank, because of the geographical proximity, the historical experience both far and near to us (as near as the period before 1948), and because of the intensity of relations between Israel and the teritories of Judea and Samaria and their inhabitants.

The overriding interest of the majority of Israelis, so it seems, has to do with the security issues involved with the West Bank. For the time being the urge to translate other aspects of the individual interest in Judea and Samaria, whether religious or economic, into an act of settling there is confined to less than one percent of the Israeli society. As stated before, the settlement policy was initiated by the Labor Government after 1967, and even though it has been enhanced and accelerated since 1977, following the political turn-over in Israel, only 30,000 Israelis moved to live in Judea and Samaria. It can be said that the majority of Israelis lack interest as far as residence in Judea and Samaria is concerned but are appreciative of those who decide to reside there. It is interesting to observe that a new housing project in Judea and Samaria will be carried out by one of the Israeli Trade Union's affiliated companies, and the Israeli Histradut is no doubt dominated by the Labor Party.

The Israeli kaleidoscope produces another phenomenon worth looking into. It seems that the majority of the new settlers in Judea and Samaria are Israelis of Western origin; that is, they themselves or their parents were born in Europe or the United States. If that is true, it means that the motivation to reside in Judea and Samaria is lower among those who were born in Middle Eastern countries or to parents born there. On the other hand, it is apparent that this section of the Israeli society of Oriental extraction votes overwhelmingly for the Likud Party which has on its banner the call for Jews to return to live in the historic cradle of the Jewish people.

The right of Jews to settle in Judea and Samaria, or as they are known, the West Bank, is one of the aspects pertaining to the future of these territories. The settlements are tied to the whole demographic question. The size of the Jewish population between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean totals 3.5 million as opposed to 1.75 million Arabs.

The vision of the state of Israel including 6 million people of whom two-thirds are Jews and one-third are Arabs is not hard to imagine on the one hand, but it entails from the Israeli-Jewish points of view many profound and soul-searching questions which touch upon the essence of a predominantly Jewish state. These questions involve physical security, historic attachment and rights, and demographic and political realities as far as the Israelis are concerned. One illustration should, however, be borne in mind. When in 1948 the state of Israel was established, it had within the cease-fire lines 660,000 Jews and 250,000 Arabs.

Pending a satisfactory political solution, most Israelis are quite content with the status quo which has been in existence since 1967. It presents to them the best solution for many dilemmas, and the lack of any negotiations concerning the future of the West Bank makes any decision on the national level an exercise in futility. Otherwise, the attitude Israel should adopt towards the West Bank is no doubt one of the main issues on which political parties in Israel are divided.

The Likud Party, which has been in power since 1977, opposes creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank. It believes in the national rights of Jews to settle there. It was the government under the Likud Party which ratified the Camp David Accords which stipulate full autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank for a transitional period of five years and negotiated to determine its final status and its relationship with its neighbors. The Likud Party and indeed the present government maintain a claim over the West Bank which will be submitted when negotiations over the final status begin. The Likud Party is composed of two major sections: the Herut party, which was Prime Minister Begin's original party, and the Liberal Party. At the risk of generalizing, it can be said that the Herut faction contributed more to the ideology of the government concerning Judea and Samaria than the Liberal one. The latter has a few members in the Knesset who criticize the government every now and then on foreign affairs issues.

The Labor Party views King Hussein as a partner in negotiations for a solution for the West Bank. Though the Labor Party voted in favor of the Camp David Accords, its leaders will be willing to negotiate other alternatives, such as a territorial compromise with Jordan, i.e. the Allon Plan, although this was not adopted as the party's official line. A different compromise is possible, a functional one, which would leave most of the control in the hands of Jordan while security will remain under Israel's responsibility. The Labor Party's political spectrum contains those who are closer in their views to the Likud Party on issues concerning the West Bank and who voted against the Camp David Accords in the Israeli Knesset. On the other side of the Labor Party's spectrum are people who do not rule out a Palestinian state under all circumstances. The political variance inside the Labor Party concerning the future solution for the West Bank is no doubt greater than within the Likud Party. That makes it easier for the government, which is formed basically around the Likud Party, to come out with a clearer message on such cardinal topics.

For many years the political balance in Israel had been maintained by the National Religious Party, which has also been in the government's coalition during most of the years since the creation of the state. The NRP emphasizes the religious aspects of Israel's right or claim to Judea and Samaria, and some of its supporters are indeed to be found there. The NRP is caught, however, in a dilemma. The majority of its rank and file are Israelis who are interested first and foremost in the preservation and promotion of religious life in Israel, the question of Judea and Samaria being a secondary one to a very large extent. The NRP has to compete on questions of religious affairs with the Agudat

Israel Party and most recently with a splinter group which defected from its own ranks, "Tami." On the other hand, the NRP has to compete on issues concerning Judea and Samaria with a new party, "The Renaissance," which is comprised of people who defected from the Likud Party and the NRP. Thus, the NRP is stretched between the need to keep the rank and file and its position concerning the future of Judea and Samaria.

The Orthodox Jewish community in Israel is not homogeneous in its attitude towards Judea and Samaria and Jewish settlments there. For the Agudat Israel Party it is definitely a secondary issue with its main line and interest directed to the promotion of religious life and legislation in Israel. The attaining of these goals was the main reason for this party's joining the present government coalition rather than supporting policies towards Judea and Samaria.

The political map in Israel contains other forces which are not represented in the Knesset. One of them is the "Peace Now" Movement. It was created in the wake of Sadat's first visit to Israel in 1977. It was very active during the period which preceded the final signature of the Camp David Accords, and the Peace Treaty with Egypt. The "Peace Now" Movement does not support at present the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank. Only a few weeks ago it decided against maintaining contacts with PLO leaders. Yet "Peace Now" does not rule out a Palestinian state as an option in the future. The members of this movement are opposed to Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria and frequently demonstrate to that effect. Diametrically opposed to the "Peace Now" Movement is "Gush Emunim," which is not represented in the Knesset either. This movement is actively engaged in settling in Judea and Samaria, and most of its supporters come from these Jewish settlements. "Gush Emunim" has close allies in the Knesset and government in the form of "The Renaissance" Party, which was established just before the elections in 1981 and later joined the Government coalition.

It would not be an exaggeration to state that the political configuration in Israel today is influenced to a considerable extent by Israel's relationship at present and in future with the West Bank. Almost all the new political forces in Israel since the 1967 War have been a result of an ongoing debate on these issues in the Israeli body-politic. A decision-making phase was introduced to that debate following Predident Sadat's visit in 1977. The lack of any meaningful negotiations ever since 1979 may have the effect of lessening the polarization among the political forces in Israel. A decision by King Hussein to join the peace process may generate new dimensions into the Israeli internal debate. The importance of the Camp David Accords in this respect cannot be overemphasized. That is the only platform on which the majority of political forces in Israel will unite if negotiations are to begin with Jordan. The government of Israel is committed to these accords and an attempt to alter the basis of negotiations may bring about a protracted, deep and futile political rift among Israel's various political forces which may cause an undesirable delay in the negotiations. King Hussein faces therefore an historical decision, which is of course not an easy one. The path towards the opening of negotiations between Israel and Jordan will be shortened immensely if that decision is predicated on the Camp David Accords.

Miller: Thank you, Mr. Eran. Herbert Kelman is Richard Clark Cabot Professor of Social Ethics at Harvard University. He was born in Vienna and attended school in Antwerp. He received a B.A. degree from Brooklyn College and another degree in Jewish Studies from the Seminary College. He has an M.S. and a PhD. in psychology from Yale and has done research at Michigan and at various clinics and hospitals. He is a member of numerous professional psychological associations, serves on a number of editorial committee and boards, and has received innumerable awards, honors, and fellowships. He is a most decorated fellow. He is known in every corner of the world, particularly in the Middle East. He is regarded as the leading exponent of the use of social psychology to solve political problems, and has been undaunted in his attempt to solve them in the Middle East. Through strenuous personal effort, Professor Kelman has done a great deal to facilitate contact and dialogue between peoples who have very different points of view, particularly between Arabs and Israelis. In pursuit of this effort to bring people together, which he does not only from professional interest but also from deep compassion, Professor Kelman has had considerable recent conversations with Arab and Israeli figures. He has just come back from the Middle East and a new series of interviews with key leaders. There is no question that there are few better qualified to talk about the issues that now stand in the way of an effective peace settlement.

THE REAGAN PLAN AND THE PEACE PROCESS: ARAB AND ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS

Herbert C. Kelman

I have recently returned from a five-week trip (December 12, 1982 - January 13, 1983) to the Middle East, in the course of which I visited Israel, Tunisia, Syria, Jordan, and once again Israel. I came away with a picture that is mixed and confusing and constantly changing -- even over the short period of time that I spent in the region. What I shall present, therefore, should be viewed as a series of interim impressions, which I have not yet fully assimilated or organized into a well articulated analysis.

Assessment of the Reagan Plan

Before describing some of the reactions to the Reagan Plan that I came across, let me summarize my own assessment of it. This assessment is based on my own conception of the requirements for Arab-Israeli peace and on what I have heard on both sides of the conflict. I regard the Reagan Plan as fundamentally flawed, yet -- for better or worse -- it appears to be the only live vehicle for setting a new peace process into motion at this time. It is my hope, therefore, (1) that all of the relevant parties can be induced and enabled to engage themselves in negotiations based on the Reagan proposal -- and I include here not only Israelis, Palestinians, and Jordanians, but also the United States, since one of the still unresolved mysteries is the extent to which the U.S. government and President Reagan himself are committed to the Reagan proposals; and (2) that this will be done in such a way that the fundamental flaws in the Reagan Plan can be eliminated rather than perpetuated as the process unfolds.

What do I see as the fundamental flaws of the Reagan Plan? Perhaps these flaws can best be capsulized by pointing out that the Reagan Plan, so far at least, represents an American-Jordanian process, whereas the situation calls for an Israeli-Palestinian process. The conflict, of course, centers around historic Palestine. The Israelis and the Palestinians are the two peoples that will have to find a way of living together in that land. What is needed, therefore, is a resolution of the conflict that these two parties themselves have shaped, and to which they are committed. A proxy solution or an imposed solution is less able to deal with the issues that are of concern to the two parties, and to elicit their active commitment -- and therefore less likely to be sound and durable. The essential need is to set in motion a process conducive to reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis, based on the feeling that a fair and decent compromise has been achieved. The Reagan Plan seems to be designed to by-pass, rather than to advance, such a process.

Insofar as the Reagan proposals represent a way of promoting direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, I welcome them. The problem is that they appear designed to exclude meaningful participation on the part of the Palestinians by ruling out in advance the option of an independent Palestinian state and by denying the PLO any role in the process. Eventual PLO participation in the negotiations is necessary if there is to be a genuine Palestinian commitment to the outcome of these negotiations, because the PLO -- whether we like it or not -- is the only recognized representative of the Palestinian nation as a whole, and the only agency viewed as legitimate by Palestinians, the Arab world, and most of the international community. A process that excludes the PLO entirely is not likely to yield a solution that will be acceptable to Palestinians and responsive to their national aspirations.

An independent Palestinian state has become the essential, minimal condition for satisfying the Palestinians' need to achieve a modicum of justice and to express their national identity. Whether and how such a state can be established without threatening Israel's legitimate security concerns will have to be a central issue in any future negotiations. It is not necessary or even advisable for the United States to commit itself to the establishment of such a state at this point. However, to rule out this option in advance of negotiations makes it very difficult for any Palestinians to become involved in the process and to commit themselves to it. It also eliminates a formula that may well serve as the best basis for a historic compromise to the Arab-Israeli conflict. A small independent state, possessing the symbols of sovereignty (even though it may be considerably constrained in its military and foreign-policy options), may well provide the way out of the conflict that Palestinians, by and large, have desperately been seeking -- an honorable solution, which enables them to say that they have not been totally defeated.

Ruling out the option of an independent Palestinian state also makes it very difficult for any Arab state to give its full support to the process. To be sure, most Arab states have their own misgivings about an independent Palestinian state, but it would be a mistake to dismiss their support for such a state (as contained, for example, in the Fez Proposals adopted by the Arab Summit in September of 1982) as mere lip service. Despite their misgivings and anxieties about the establishment of a Palestinian state, their public insistence on it reflects the Arab consensus that such a state is a necessary ingredient of any honorable solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In my view, a solution that provides some national, sovereign presence to the Palestinians within Palestine -- a solution that allows Palestinians and Arabs in general to come away feeling that they have achieved an honorable, decent compromise, which has not given them everything they want or believe they are entitled to, but contains at least a modicum of justice -- has the best chance of leading to genuine Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. Palestine/Eretz Israel cannot, in the long run, contain two communities that are hostile toward one another. A peace agreement, therefore, must go beyond the cessation of hostilities and open the way to reconciliation, to future cooperation, and to a mutual commitment to live together. A U.S. policy that rules out (or "cannot support"), in advance of negotiations, an option that seems most conducive to reconciliation -- on the mistaken notion that no one wants it -- is therefore, short-sighted.

Despite these flaws, I recognize that the Reagan Plan is the only live vehicle for setting a new peace process into motion. There remains a strong need to promote direct Israeli-Palestinian interactions. At the moment, this need will probably have to be met outside the Reagan channel, but the U.S. government ought to be prepared, at least, to encourage and facilitate such interactions. Even if King Hussein decides (and I hope he will) to join a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, including non-PLO Palestinian representatives, and to enter into negotiations on the basis of the Reagan Plan, it would be a mistake to view this as a substitute for direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. It must be kept in mind that initiation of talks based on the Reagan Plan would simply be setting these negotiations aside for the moment, in order to get a formal process started. Within and outside of this process, however, the search for direct Israeli-Palestinian communication must continue. It is my view, as I shall elaborate at the end of my remarks, that this is the context in which a breakthrough on the Palestinian problem is most likely to be achieved.

In the meantime, let me turn to some observations on what I found among the various actors in the Middle East -- particularly the Jordanians, Palestinians, and Israelis.

Jordan

Perhaps the greatest change that has occurred within the past year is the change that can be detected in Jordan. There has been a major movement in Jordan's policies and positions which, at least for the moment, has brought it to center stage in the peace process. King Hussein's strong interest in moving this process forward and in becoming involved in it is motivated by a profound sense of urgency, which has been building up for some time, but which has been greatly exacerbated by the war in Lebanon.

A major source of the urgency felt by Jordan is the pace of the Israeli settlement program in the West Bank. Many observers, both Israeli and Arab, view the situation in the West Bank as rapidly approaching a point of no return. Meron Benvenisti, the former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, concludes from his detailed study of Israeli policies on the West Bank, that it is "five minutes before midnight." He and others argue that the incorporation of the West Bank into Israel will soon become an irreversible fact. An important element to keep in mind is that the new Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank is not geared to the ideologically or religiously motivated element who choose to settle in the West Bank in order to perform a duty or fulfill a dream. Rather, the new policy centers around the construction of vast suburban or ex-urban housing projects, which provide attractive opportunities to a large segment of the Israeli population, particularly young, middle-class families. They are able to obtain spacious apartments in pleasant surroundings, but still in close commuting distance to Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, at a much lower cost and under much better financing terms than those available for similar housing within the Green Line. New high-speed roads are being built to take the residents of these apartment blocks to their jobs in the city -- and one advertisement for such apartments that I saw even pointed out that it will be possible for residents to travel between their homes and the city without passing through any Arab towns or villages. The emergence of these housing developments in the West Bank provides very visible signs of the Begin government's seriousness in its intention to increase the Jewish population of the West Bank to 100,000 within the next few years. Such a population, drawn from wide segments of Israeli society, can be expected to create a strong constituency against a decision -- by any future Israeli government -- to withdraw from the West Bank.

King Hussein is painfully aware of these developments on the West Bank. He still has some ambition to play a role in the West Bank, particularly in Jerusalem. He has not entirely given up on the concept of a united kingdom, or a federation, or at the very least a confederation that would link the West Bank to Jordan. As the West Bank is "swallowed up" by Israel (a term Hussein used repeatedly in a speech he gave early in January), this possibility becomes more and more remote. Even apart from the future role of Jordan, Hussein is doubtless concerned that the loss of the West Bank and Jerusalem would go down in history as his failure. He was, after all, the last ruler of the area before it slipped away from Arab sovereignty.

A closely related -- and probably the most important -- factor that accounts for Hussein's sense of urgency is Ariel Sharon's scenario for Jordan. Jordanians have seen that Sharon has ways of turning his "wild ideas" into reality. They therefore take the pronouncements that "Jordan is Palestine" very seriously, particularly since they do not regard this notion as entirely idiosyncratic to Sharon. They are afraid that the increasing Israeli settlement on the West Bank, coupled with policies detrimental to the human rights and economic opportunities of the West Bank population, will create direct or indirect pressures on large segments of that population to move across the river into Jordan. According to the scenario they envisage, such a massive population influx could create unrest within Jordan. They see Sharon or his successor as deliberately manipulating the domestic situation in ways that would destabilize the Hashemite regime and provide the excuse for Israel to come into Jordan and "reorganize" it into a Palestinian state.

Hussein is also concerned about an inclination of the Arab world to unload the Palestinian problem entirely on Jordan. Thus, he perceives the possibility of pressures on Jordan to absorb large masses of Palestinians who will be encouraged or forced to leave not only the West Bank, but also Lebanon and perhaps other parts of the Arab world. Such a population influx, combined with tendencies toward radicalization in the Arab world, further enhances the threat to the Hashemite Kingdom perceived within Jordan.

For all of these reasons, the dangers of not acting now loom larger than the dangers of acting in the eyes of Hussein. This represents a major reversal of the situation of perhaps only a year ago when the status quo seemed safer than any of the other action alternatives available to Hussein. This does not mean, of course, that Hussein will act under any circumstances. The opposing forces to Hussein's participation in the peace process proposed by the U.S. government are still very powerful. It remains of critical importance to Jordan to have the support of the Arab states, and particularly of Saudi Arabia, which in turn requires a green light from the PLO. There is no doubt that the atmosphere has changed. There are more Palestinians now, both within Jordan and on the West Bank, who are urging the King to act -- even, if necessary, without PLO approval. The pro-Hashemite elements on the West Bank, which have been very quiet in recent years, seem to have been reactivated by the pressures of the present situation. I see no indication that the primacy of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people is seriously threatened, but the PLO leadership is increasingly challenged and questioned by West Bankers who are deeply concerned about the inexorable course of events. The mood in the West Bank has apparently encouraged Jordanian officials to exert greater pressure in their negotiations with Arafat. For example, they have confronted Arafat with the question of what he puts first in his ordering of priorities -- saving the land and people, or saving his organization. Some of the King's advisors have pushed for the concept of a unified state or a federation between Jordan and the West Bank, in lieu of the confederation concept favored by the PLO (although this difference does not appear to be a significant stumbling block). Finally, Jordanian officials have been hinting that, if the PLO failed to cooperate with them, the King would move on his own in urging leading West Bank figures to participate in the joint Jordanian-Palestinian negotiating team envisioned by the Reagan Plan.

My own prediction is that, in the final analysis, Hussein will not proceed without PLO approval. It is unlikely, in my view, that West Bank leaders would agree to serve on a joint Jordanian-Palestinian negotiating team without a green light from the PLO, nor is it likely that the King will press them to do so. I would also assume that the exact nature of any future relationship between Jordan and the West Bank and Gaza will be kept ambiguous. What I found significant, however, is the extent to which Jordan is actively seeking a role in negotiating the Palestinian problem, which would enable it to respond positively to the Reagan proposals. This clearly represents a major change in the Jordanian posture.

Ultimately, the key to Jordan's action is its assessment of the American resolve. Hussein will not enter into the process unless there is strong evidence, visible to him as well as to others, that the U.S. government is serious in its intention to carry through on the various commitments made in the Reagan proposals. If there is clear evidence of such an American resolve, then it is more likely, not only that Hussein will enter into the process, but also that Arafat will be able to support such a move.

The Palestinians

In the months since the PLO's departure from Beirut, Yasser Arafat has clearly been subject to two competing pressures. On the one hand, there have been pressures from many Palestinians on the West Bank, in Lebanon, and elsewhere for decisive action that would deal with their desperate situation. West Bankers, in particular, are concerned that time is running out and that there is a need for immediate, bold action to preserve a territorial base for a settlement of the conflict. Loyalty to the PLO remains high on the West Bank, but many staunch PLO supporters are urging the leadership to take whatever steps are necessary to arrest the incorporation of the territories into Israel. Arafat has been responsive to the concerns of these constituencies. On the other hand, Arafat has been subject to criticisms from pro-Syrian elements in the PLO, as well as from important elements within Fatah itself, for his various diplomatic efforts during recent months. He has been attacked for his support of the Fez Proposals, for his relative openness to the Reagan Plan, for his meetings with Israelis, and particularly for his negotiations with Hussein. The rapprochement with Jordan has been especially controversial, both because it generates powerful suspicions and objections from the Syrians, and because it reactivates the deep distrust and hostility toward Hussein among Palestinians themselves. Arafat has been accused of acting too independently, of giving away too much without receiving any tangible returns, and even of betraying the national cause.

Palestinian efforts at political accommodation have gone through many ups and downs since last September. In November, it seemed that the PLO "moderates" were in control. According to Eric Rouleau and others, Nayef Hawatmeh (of the DFLP) had come out in support of Arafat's line, George Habbash (of the PFLP) had indicated that he would not stand in the way of a political solution supported by the majority, and many Palestinians were beginning to say that it was time to recognize Israel and "get it over with." During this period, Arafat pursued his negotiations with Hussein quite actively and openly spoke of his readiness to meet with various kinds of Israelis. There were expectations in the air that the Palestinian National Council, once it convened, might come out with a dramatic pronouncement.

By the time I saw Arafat, which was on December 22, the mood had dramatically changed. Arafat appeared to be depressed, and he clearly felt beleaguered. He conveyed a sense of despair about the efforts that he had undertaken and he even said (although I took this only as a rhetorical statement) that he would have to go before the PNC and say that he had tried his best and failed, and now it was time for someone else to take over. Quite possibly, the time I saw him may have been a low point. Our meeting coincided with Hussein's visit to Washington and Arafat had just received some communication that clearly made him unhappy. Perhaps (and this is pure speculation) this was the occasion on which he learned that a declaration of readiness for mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO would not be accepted by the U.S. government as a sufficient basis for lifting its ban on talking to the PLO. In any event, Arafat's mood at the end of December illustrated the volatility of the situation. Arafat's departure from Beirut in September marked the high point of his prestige. With the massacres of Sabra and Shatilla later in the month, his standing began to decline. Part of the blame for the tragedy rested on his shoulders -- among other reasons, because he had placed too much trust in the United States. Suspicions of the United States, which had been high at the beginning of the war in Lebanon, were revived in the wake of the massacres. Still, Arafat was given free rein to pursue the political option. As it became evident that his efforts were not assuring a place for the PLO and for the concept of a Palestinian state in American calculations, the pressures on Arafat increased from all directions. The failure of the political option to produce visible results strengthened the hand of those who wanted to return to (or at least not to abandon) the military option. At the same time, it strengthened those Palestinians -- probably a small minority, even on the West Bank -- who look to Hussein as the vehicle for a solution. The change between November and December illustrates the ongoing struggle within the Palestinian movement and the extent to which the mood responds to signs of success or failure in the pursuit of political options.

Arafat is caught in the middle of a chain of suspicion, as he attempts to deal with the United States by way of Jordan. Some of his PLO colleagues -- particularly in the factions that move in the Syrian orbit -- are suspicious of Arafat, wondering what he is giving away as he negotiates with Hussein. But Arafat, in turn, is suspicious of Hussein, wondering what he is giving away as he negotiates with Reagan. In both cases, of course, being denied the opportunity to participate in the negotiations readily feeds suspicion; exclusion from the process represents the ideal condition for the arousal of suspicion. The suspicions within the Syrian-based elements of the PLO are, in part, a reflection of Syria's suspicion of Jordan and of the struggle between those two neighbors over control of the PLO. Though some elements of the PLO are more sensitive to Syria's reactions than others, the PLO leadership as a whole cannot ignore these reactions. Syria exercises critical control over the fate of a large Palestinian community, of some of the PLO's infrastructure, and particularly of whatever military capability the PLO has left. Furthermore, Syria provides an anchor for judging the acceptability of any Palestinian compromise: many Palestinians feel that they should not be asking for less than the Syrians are prepared to accept. The Syrian connection, thus, makes any thought of compromise -- especially when it is based on collaboration with Jordan -- vulnerable to the charge of selling out, unless it produces readily visible results.

My visit to Damascus early in January reinforced the conclusions that I drew from my meeting with Arafat: that it was unlikely that the upcoming session of the PNC (scheduled to convene in Algiers on February 14) would produce a major breakthrough. In Damascus, I met with Khalid Fahoum, chairman of the PNC, and two members of the PLO Executive Committee. They all gave me more or less the same scenario of what they expected to happen at the PNC meetings. They predicted that the basic theme would be unity; no divisive issues would be raised; the leadership would be re-elected; the current line of the PLO would be re-affirmed without any dramatic change (which I took to mean a continuing commitment to the armed struggle alongside a willingness to pursue political and diplomatic options); the Reagan proposals would be turned down; the proposal to have Jordan speak on behalf of the Palestinians would be turned down, but not the idea of future association (perhaps in the form of a confederation) between Jordan and a Palestinian state; rapprochement with Egypt would be turned down as of now; and the central role of Syria would be acknowledged.[1] After going through this scenario, one of my informants added an interesting -- and, in my view, extremely significant -- statement: The PLO's priority was Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. If they were convinced that Israel would in fact withdraw, they would be willing to accept any kind of arrangement. They would allow Hussein to speak on behalf of the Palestinians and take back the territories, and they would then work out the next steps among themselves. This statement suggests that, even for Palestinians operating in the atmosphere of Damascus, absolute positions become less absolute the moment some real opportunities appear on the horizon. This is an important reminder that the PLO's flexibility depends very much on the options available to it.

In this connection, it should be noted that Palestinian demands and expectations have shifted in the light of their perception of reality. "Rejectionism" certainly survives at the ideological level. In some respects, it is pervasive: there are very few Palestinians who accept the <u>right</u> of Israel to exist. At the political level, however, I saw virtually no sign of rejectionism. Even in Damascus, I did not hear anyone speak of the liberation of the whole of Palestine or propose a secular democratic state as a current operational goal. One may speak of rejectionism in the tactical sense, manifesting itself -- usually in line with Syrian policy -- in the rejection of specific frameworks for negotiation (such as Camp David, or the Reagan Plan, or the Fez Plan). But Syrian policy itself does not call for the dismantlement of Israel, but for Israel's return to its 1967 borders as a condition for peace.

The internal struggle within the PLO continued during the month of January. Criticisms of Arafat escalated, culminating in the Tripoli meeting which came out in opposition to the Fez proposals. At the same time, however, Arafat clearly recovered his momentum and went back into action. After Hussein's return from the United States to Jordan -- presumably with some assurances about the seriousness of U.S. intentions -- Arafat resumed his negotiations with the King. Also, he pushed forward in the matter of dialogue with Israelis, by openly meeting with Matti Peled, Uri Avnery, and Yaacov Arnon -- Israeli Zionists, who are leading figures in the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace. Arafat's interest in Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, incidentally, reflects his view that direct negotiations between these two peoples are not only an essential part of the process, but perhaps the most likely means of achieving a settlement.

In the meantime, the United States plays a central role in the thinking of Palestinians. Their attitude toward the United States is marked by a high degree of ambivalence. On the one hand, there is a profound distrust of the United States, much of it going back to the beginning of the Lebanon war. There is a widespread perception in the Arab World (and, of course for that matter, in Israel) that the United States was in collusion with Israel and that it had at least given its tacit approval to the Lebanon operation. Arab distrust was somewhat abated by the American role in arranging the PLO's departure from Beirut, but it re-emerged in the wake of the September massacre. It is startling to hear that Philip Habib, who is seen as a hero of peace in this country, serves as a symbol of betrayal to Palestinians and many other Arabs, because he had guaranteed the security of Palestinian civilians upon the departure of the PLO from Beirut and then failed to live up to that promise. On the other hand, Palestinians realize that there will be very little movement toward a solution without active intervention by the United States. Thus, along with their profound distrust, they display a sense of great dependence on the United States and a wish that they could profitably work with us.

In the final analysis, the key to what will happen at the PNC and thereafter is what the U.S. government is prepared to do. If there is reason to expect firm U.S. action -- measured by its ability to persuade Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and to freeze the West Bank settlement process, as well as by the nature of its commitments regarding the extent and timing of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank -- then Arafat would have a much freer hand in pursuing his negotiations with Hussein and Hussein, in turn, would be more likely to involve himself in the U.S.-sponsored process.

Israel

The Israeli government rejected the Reagan proposals immediately because they call for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and for association of these territories with Jordan. In rejecting the proposals, the Begin government has charged that they deviate from the Camp David agreements, which left the future status of the territories open. However, the Camp David agreements clearly envisaged autonomy as a transition from Israeli to Palestinian (or at least joint Jordanian-Palestinian) control over the territories, even though Israel reserved the right to submit its own claim for sovereignty at the end of the autonomy period. Thus, from the U.S. point of view, the Reagan Plan represents a reaffirmation of what has always been the American interpretation of Camp David.

The Israeli opposition reacted favorably to the Reagan proposals. Although the proposals differ in various respects from the "Jordanian option," which has long represented the official Labor Party position, they are sufficiently similar to have breathed some new life into that largely discredited Labor approach. From the point of view of domestic politics, the Reagan proposals gave the opposition a potential issue to bring before the Israeli public: they hoped to benefit from the contrast between their own ability to work harmoniously with the United States in the pursuit of a peaceful solution and the government's inability to pull out of its collision course with American interests and policies. The Israeli peace forces also reacted positively to the Reagan proposals, seeing them as a promising framework for negotiations that might attract moderate Arabs and Israelis to the peace process.

These differing Israeli reactions must be seen in the context of the high degree of polarization that marks Israeli society today. The polls indicate continuing support for the ruling Likud party and the official opposition remains disorganized and lacks coherent proposals for alternative policies. But there is pronounced opposition to the government's policies in the occupied territories and in Lebanon among significant segments of the population. The numerical size of the opposition is not unsubstantial, but what is most remarkable is the quality of this opposition. The opposition expresses disagreement with government policy not merely at the level of tactics, but at the level of fundamental goals. Critics see current policies as undermining the basic values of the society, as incongruent with the society's essential nature and threatening to its future existence. Again and again, one hears critics expressing the fear that the government policies--if allowed to continue and to evolve to their logical conclusion--will inexorably turn Israel into another Northern Ireland or, even worse, into another South Africa. Critics also express concern about the future of democracy in Israel itself--democracy not in the sense of electoral politics, but in the sense of freedom of dissent. To be sure, dissent within Israeli society remains extensive and uninhibited; there is no criticism of Israeli policies voiced anywhere else in the world that cannot also be heard in Israel itself. Yet there is concern about the increasing tendency--deliberately fostered by government officials--to label critics as traitors and to adopt accusations of treason as a standard practice in political debate.

The critics feel that Israel's options for a peaceful settlement are slipping away as the incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza into Israel is increasingly turning into reality. They see the new West Bank settlement policy, discussed above, as consolidating Israel's hold on the territories and creating large constituencies against withdrawal--not on ideological grounds, but simply because increasing numbers of Israelis will be living in attractive housing on the West Bank or will have relatives or friends living there. There is a growing sense of desperation among these Israelis about policies--of which the settlement activities are only the most visible component--that are designed to integrate the territories irrevocably into Israel and that, in the process, systematically deprive the Palestinian population of its rights. They are convinced that the only way to change these policies--and indeed to save their country--is to change the government. And yet they are not very hopeful about their ability to do so.

The strong public support that Begin still enjoys--and that accounts for the pessimism among his critics--does not necessarily signify a permanent shift to the right or to a hawkish position within the Israeli electorate. The major issue in this connection is how one interprets the Sephardi or Oriental vote, which has disproportionately gone to Begin's Likud.[2] There is no evidence to suggest that the heavy pro-Begin vote in this segment of the population reflects an ideological or religious commitment to holding on to the occupied territories. The nationalist ideologues and the religious zealots who are passionately committed to the "wholeness" of the land of Israel are virtually all Ashkenazim (i.e., Jews of European or American origin). Even the hypothesis that Jews from Arab countries find Begin's approach appealing because they resonate to policies that call for "being tough on the Arabs" is almost certainly an oversimplification. According to this view, the oppression that these Jews experienced in their countries of origin has inclined them to hostility and distrust of Arabs, which they express in their support of the Begin policies. There are considerable differences, however, in the experiences of Jews from the different Arab countries. Moroccan Jews, for example--who constitute the largest segment of the Sephardi population in Israel--have many warm feelings toward their country of origin (along with their memories of persecution) and continue to be attached to many of the elements of Arab culture. Thus, Jews from Arab countries cannot be viewed as a monolithic or permanent constituency for belligerent policies toward Arabs. No doubt, politicians may be able to play on anti-Arab sentiments (as well as, perhaps, on a more general preference for a simple and tough foreign policy) in huge segments of this population. Under different circumstances, however, Jews from Arab countries may be just as likely to resonate to policies that call for friendship and cooperation with Arab neighbors--as they apparently did at the time of Sadat's initiative.

The Likud's appeal to the Sephardi population seems to be largely based on two factors that are not directly related to its policies vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. First, large elements of this population seem to find Begin's personal and political style particularly appealing. Part of his appeal stems from his image as an anti-establishment figure, i.e., as a man who is outside of and held in disdain by the political and intellectual elites that ran the country and dominated its major institutions for almost thirty years. Interestingly, they still perceive Begin as anti-establishment, even though he has been in power since 1977 and seems firmly in control. This perception is closely related to the second, and probably most important factor accounting for the Sephardi population's disproportionate support of the Likud: their strong rejection of the Labor Party, which they hold responsible for the discrimination and neglect that they see as defining their experience in Israel. Their anger at the Labor Party is compounded by the feeling that the Labor-linked Ashkenazi elites have patronized them, looked down upon them, and considered them as burdens on the state rather than as valuable, productive contributors to national progress. In this respect, the hawkish views of the Begin government have a specific appeal to them.

By espousing these views, they can attack the Ashkenazi-Labor establishment from a base of superior legitimacy. It is now they, as militant superpatriots and loyal supporters of the government, who can accuse the critics--whom they still identify as the establishment--of being burdens on the state, of being insufficiently loyal and courageous, and of committing treason.

Whether or not the Israeli electorate has permanently shifted to the right, the polls agree that, as of now, Begin remains strong. There is no clear indication so far that his policies on the West Bank and in Lebanon have reduced his political support. The longer he remains in power, the greater the probability that the new realities created by his West Bank policies will be accepted by wider segments of the Israeli population, along with the assumptions and beliefs that underlie these policies. Given this favorable picture from Begin's point of view, are there any indications that Begin is politically vulnerable?

One potential source of vulnerability is the report of the Kahan Commission of Inquiry into the Sabra and Shatilla massacres, which will be issued in the near future. Many Israeli observers discount the potential political impact of the Report. They argue that, even if the Commission were to come up with a clear condemnation of the government, it would impress only those segments of the population that are already opposed to government policies; supporters of the government would not be shocked by negative findings and would not withdraw their support because of such findings. I am not entirely persuaded by this view. My guess is that a critical report would contribute to delegitimization of the government in the eyes of the large segment of the population that is at the center of the political spectrum and that already has doubts about the conduct of the war. Even if the political effects of such a report would not be immediately manifest (e.g., in the form of a massive outcry against the government), the delegitimization of the leadership would weaken it in the long run.

I would be particularly interested in observing the effects of a condemnatory report on the religious community in Israel, which has experienced considerable turmoil as a result of the Lebanon war. The war gave rise to a new, articulate anti-war group within the religious community and has strengthened the existing religious peace forces. Even within the National Religious Party, which is part of the governing coalition, some leading figures have begun to ask whether the principle of "the wholeness of the land" (to which most of the Party has adhered in recent years) justifies the moral costs entailed by the forcible attempt to incorporate the West Bank and Gaza into Israel. The NRP does not account for many votes at this point, but it remains a significant political force that might well contribute to a collapse of the present government.

A more important source of vulnerability for the government than the Kahan Commission's report is the growing feeling among the Israeli population that the war has not attained any of its purported goals. Even the goal of achieving "peace for the Galilee" by destroying the PLO infrastructure in Southern Lebanon has not been clearly achieved, although most Israelis would still justify what they at first saw as the limited purpose of the incursion into Lebanon. The extension of the war beyond the 40 kilometers that were originally proclaimed as the stopping-point and the expansion of the war's purposes beyond the limited one of securing the Northern settlements have become a source of intense controversy within Israel. As Israeli casualties continue to mount, more and more people are expressing serious doubt about whether such heavy costs are justified by Sharon's grandiose and--as many are now convinced--unattainable ambitions. Of special significance is the discontent expressed among the Israeli troops in Lebanon, who--for the first time in Israel's history--are questioning the justification for the sacrifices they are being asked to make. Repeatedly, I heard the story about a popular children's song that was given new words by soldiers in Lebanon. Literally translated, the song says: "Bring us an airplane; take us to Lebanon; we will fight for Sharon, and we will come back in a casket." When Israeli television showed a group of Israeli soldiers in Lebanon singing this song, it was criticized--as it has been on a number of occasions during this war--for political bias in its reporting. This song provides a graphic illustration of the point at which the Begin government is most vulnerable. The government is now in a trap from which there appears to be no elegant escape. It is reluctant to withdraw from Lebanon without visible signs that the war has indeed achieved some significant purposes. But, the longer it stays in Lebanon, the greater the accumulation of casualties and other costs, and the clearer the evidence to the Israeli population that the operation was ill-conceived and has failed.

Despite these potential vulnerabilities of the government, the opposition is pessimistic about the chances of dislodging Begin. A major source of their frustration is American policy. I have increasingly been hearing complaints from critics of the government that American failure to put pressure on Israel, or even to voice clear and consistent objections to Israeli policies, severely undermines their own efforts. They are convinced that the current Israeli policies spell disaster for the country in the long run, but they are unable to demonstrate this prognosis effectively because--at least in the short run--the continuing American support for these policies gives them the appearance of success. Repeatedly, they have predicted that certain government policies will not work because the United States cannot accept them, only to find the U.S. government supporting or at least tolerating these policies. Although the United States may on occasion rap the Begin government on the knuckles, it has given no clear indication of fundamental opposition to its approach. Thus, these critics argue, Begin can claim persuasively that U.S. objections to Israeli actions represent obligatory gestures, but that basically the American government likes what Israel is doing--that Israel's policies and postures advance American interests in the Middle East.

Many Israeli critics are not only disturbed, but also puzzled by the American reaction. Some--and these include not only leftist critics--have come to the conclusion that perhaps Begin is right: perhaps the current Israeli policies are in fact congruent with American strategic interests; perhaps Israel is indeed doing America's work (including America's "dirty work") in the Middle East and elsewhere around the globe;

perhaps the United States is supporting Israel--even though it finds some of its actions embarrassing and troublesome--because, in the final analysis, Israel serves American purposes as these are defined by the Reagan administration. If this conclusion is right, they see little hope for change in Israeli policy--or for Israel's future in the region.

The opposition elements in Israel saw hope in the Reagan Plan and continue to be ready to work with it, if given the opportunity to do so. Once again, in their view--as in the Jordanian and Palestinian view--the prospects of the Reagan Plan depend on vigorous U.S. efforts to create the necessary conditions for negotiation on the basis of the American proposals. They have become increasingly skeptical about Reagan's will--or even interest--to push in this direction. In the meantime, a significant segment of the Israeli political spectrum has moved beyond the Reagan proposals and has begun to think seriously about Palestinian nationalism and political rights, and to entertain the idea of a Palestinian state and of dialogue with the PLO. Very few have taken a firm stand on these issues, but many have come to recognize the limitations of the Labor Party's "Jordanian option" and the necessity (and possibility) of addressing the Palestinian problem more directly and creatively. At least 20% of the Members of Knesset can be counted as open to such new ideas. Despite this openness, however, there are powerful barriers to Israeli-Palestinian communication, to which I shall devote the remainder of my remarks.

Israeli-Palestinian Communication

Significant political elements in Israel and in the Palestinian community would agree with the proposition stated at the beginning of this paper: that genuine peace requires Israeli-Palestinian communication conducive to direct negotiations about how the two peoples can best share the land they both claim. On the Palestinian side, the central proponent of this view is Yasser Arafat himself; he has strong--though by no means unanimous--support for this approach in the Palestinian community, especially on the West Bank and Gaza. On the Israeli side, this view is held by the various peace groups, including the relatively broad-based Peace Now movement, and is gaining acceptance within the political opposition. While it does not represent the official Labor Party position, it is held by some political figures close to the Party's leadership and 20% or so of the Members of Knesset--as mentioned above--subscribe to it.

Even among the proponents of this view on both sides, however, there is strong resistance to direct communication, based on the close interweave of political constraints and psychological barriers. Israelis who talk to the PLO or Palestinians who talk to Zionists open themselves up to accusations of treason and may be committing political suicide. These political constraints gain added force from the individuals' own doubts, fears, and sensitivities. They are not absolutely certain that the accusations against those who talk with the enemy are entirely wrong--that they would not in fact be endangering or betraying their communities by engaging in such talks. As a result, before entering into communication, they often seek assurances that the other is not able to give.

Among Israelis, the central concern is that the PLO has never clearly renounced its commitment to the destruction of Israel (or "the elimination of Zionism in Palestine," as the Palestinian National Covenant puts it). Even some hard-headed realists, who accept the need to deal with the PLO, are repelled by the idea of sitting down to talk to members of an organization that they see as dedicated to the destruction of Israel. At the political level, the concern about talking to the PLO is based not so much on the fear that this would enhance the PLO's capacity to threaten Israel physically, but on the fear that it would compromise Israel's national claims. As long as the PLO considers the very existence of Israel to be illegitimate, the recognition of its rights in Palestine--implicit in the agreement to talk with its representatives--could be seen as tantamount to relinquishing Israel's own rights there.

Even Israelis who acknowledge the PLO's status as representative of the Palestinian people are unwilling, therefore, to talk with PLO officials without assurances that they are ready to recognize Israel. This concern accounts for the frequently heard complaint--for example, on the part of some Peace Now activists--that they have no partners for dialogue on the other side. This complaint seems strange when one considers the official level, where the PLO has at least given hints of its readiness to negotiate, while the Israeli government has totally rejected the idea. In one respect, however, the Israelis who ask where their counterparts are on the other side have a valid point. They <u>do</u> recognize Palestinian national rights. The recognition may be cautious--the Peace Now consensus statement, for example, speaks only of "the right of the Palestinians to a national existence," not of their right to self-determination and an independent state--but it clearly reflects an acceptance of Palestinian nationalism. On the Palestinian side, however (and, for that matter, among Arabs in general, including Egyptians) there are no political groups acknowledging the concept of Jewish nationhood and accepting the <u>right</u> of Israel to exist as a Jewish state. There are many, of course, who accept the reality of Israel's existence and who appear ready to come to terms with it on pragmatic grounds, but they find it very difficult to accept (or even understand)--at a historical or psychological level--the right of Jews to a national existence, expressed through a state of their own.

Israelis who are interested in furthering Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will have to accept this asymmetry, it seems to me, at the present stage of the process. They will have to realize that Palestinians are not only operating within a different political culture than Israelis, but--what is most important--they find themselves in a very different political situation. Israelis have a state of their own and, at least for the moment, an assured (if not universally recognized) national existence. This fact provides the base that allows the Israeli peace movement to step ahead of its government and to propose a peaceful compromise--not merely out of pragmatic considerations, but out of ideological acceptance of Palestinian rights. The Palestinians, by contrast, do not have a similar base from which to pursue their efforts for a political compromise. A liberation movement is not the ideal political environment for the development of an opposition peace movement. Deviation in a conciliatory direction is generally difficult in a liberation movement, which places a premium on unity in pursuit of the national struggle. What is particularly difficult is to ground proposals for a peaceful compromise in an ideological shift.

Thus, for any group of Palestinians to renounce their National Covenant or to recognize Israel's right to exist would be a psychologically difficult and politically costly act. They see (as most Israelis see) the national rights of the two peoples as mutually exclusive. For Palestinians, recognizing the right of Jews to a state in Palestine is the equivalent of relinquishing Palestinian rights in Palestine. Any such move would represent, in their eyes, an abandonment of their national ideology and of their national struggle. Under the circumstances, they cannot be expected to recognize Israel's national rights, unless they have firm assurances of the reciprocal recognition of Palestinian national rights on the part of Israel. Recognition of Palestinian rights on the part of Israeli peace forces--who clearly do not speak for the Israeli government--is not a sufficient inducement for such a major ideological shift.

Palestinian reluctance to recognize Israel's right to exist need not, however, deter Israeli-Palestinian communication, as long as Palestinians are interested in direct negotiations--as significant elements within the PLO seem to be. A pragmatically based interest in the search for a political settlement is all that is needed for the process of communication to begin. Out of such communication, a formula for mutual recognition, responsive to the basic concerns of both sides, can emerge. This formula could provide the framework for negotiating a settlement, even in the absence of fundamental changes in attitude. It should be recalled that the Egyptian-Israeli peace process also proceeded without such fundamental attitude changes. These changes can be fostered over time, after a mutually satisfactory peace agreement has been reached. My point, in short, is that Israelis interested in advancing negotiations with the PLO should not insist on explicit evidence of an ideological shift as a precondition for such negotiation.

Like their Israeli counterparts, Palestinians interested in Israeli-Palestinian communication are impeded by political constraints and psychological barriers. The basis of their concerns has already been described in my discussion of Palestinians' reluctance to revise their ideological positions--or to be seen as having done so. They are afraid that talking to Zionists would imply acknowledgment of Israel's right to exist and could thus be interpreted as relinquishing their own rights in Palestine. They are sensitive to the possibility that their readiness to talk might be used against them: by their Palestinian opponents, who might point to it as evidence that they have sold out; and by Israelis and Americans, who might treat it as a concession and as an opportunity to press them for further concessions. These concerns often express themselves in ways that discourage potential Israeli interlocutors from entering into dialogue. For example, they may say that they are interested in talking only to non-Zionist Israelis; or they may try to reassure their internal critics by pointing out that the Israelis they have talked to are "not really Zionists." Such statements have the obvious consequence of inhibiting participation in communication efforts by Israeli peace groups, like Peace Now, whose own domestic requirements make them particularly sensitive to any implication that their Zionist credentials have been compromised.

The concerns of Palestinians who are interested in political accommodation also express themselves in their various efforts to counteract any implication that they have undergone an ideological shift. Thus, they often insist that it was never the PLO's intention to destroy Israel and that those who ask them for assurances that they have abandoned this goal are merely engaging in diversionary tactics. Such denials may serve to reassure their own constituencies that they have not abandoned their ideology, but by the same token they reinforce Israeli fears that they have not abandoned their earlier intentions. Similarly, the desire to avoid any implications of ideological shift often causes PLO leaders to state their readiness for compromise in convoluted language--and then to criticize others for refusing to understand them. It also leads them periodically to reassert their commitment to armed struggle, while continuing to pursue political options. The result of all this is an anomalous situation, in which PLO leaders fail to receive proper credit for the changes that they have in fact undergone and to reassure those Israelis whom they would like to draw into communication. For the reasons already indicated, I believe that Palestinians cannot be expected to make unilateral declarations, recognizing Israel's right to exist, in advance of negotiations. Palestinians who are interested in furthering Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will, however, have to realize that their Israeli counterparts have legitimate reasons for concern about PLO intentions. To deny the reality of the problem can only impede the process of communication.

Ultimately, it is only through direct interaction that Israelis and Palestinians will be able to gain a clearer understanding of the obstacles confronting even the proponents of communication and negotiation on both sides. It is important that initial communication focus on the basic fears and hopes of both sides, rather than on the language of rights, which maximizes ideological and existential concerns. I consider it essential that such direct Israeli-Palestinian communication take place--either alongside of negotiations based on the Reagan proposals, if these are initiated, or in lieu of such negotiations, if the Reagan Plan collapses. Out of such communication, alternative proposals may emerge that address what I have called the fundamental flaws of the Reagan Plan.

In the meantime, I would offer several recommendations for U.S. policy in the coming months. First, the administration must demonstrate the seriousness of its opposition to the Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank and the incorporation of the territories into Israel, as specified in the Reagan proposals. A clear statement of the U.S. position, followed by consistent actions in support of that position, is far more important than sporadic pressures and expressions of displeasure. Second, the administration must develop a sounder understanding of the requirements of Palestinian nationalism and seek to accommodate rather than suppress it. Third, we should look for ways of enabling the administration to talk to the PLO, rather than ways of blocking such talks. Finally, it is important to encourage and facilitate "track-two diplomacy"--unofficial efforts to promote direct Israeli-Palestinian communication.

Such policies might ease the doubts and frustrations that the American posture has generated among Jordanians, Palestinians, and Israelis; might encourage movement toward implementing the Reagan proposals; and might begin to correct the fundamental flaws of the Reagan Plan.

Postscript

A good deal has happened in the four and a half months that have elapsed since I presented these observations. The Kahan Commission issued its report and Ariel Sharon was replaced by Moshe Arens as Israeli Minister of Defense. The Sixteenth Session of the Palestinian National Council convened in Algiers (and, incidentally, I had the opportunity to observe it). Hussein and Arafat resumed their negotiations on a possible Jordanian-Palestinian response to the Reagan initiative and came close to agreement, but the PLO leadership refused to go along. King Hussein announced that he would not enter into the process in the absence of PLO approval. Israel and Lebanon reached a troop withdrawal agreement, with some prodding from the United States, but--so far at least--Syria has blocked its implementation by refusing to withdraw Syrian troops on the terms negotiated by the other three. Fatah elements in the Bekaa Valley and in Syria have mutinied against Arafat's leadership--insisting on the priority of the military struggle over political explorations--and the resulting conflict within the Palestinian movement has yet to be resolved.

When Hussein announced his decision to stay out of the Reagan-initiated process, commentators raised the question whether the Reagan Plan was now dead. The subsequent events have persuaded most of them to answer that question affirmatively. Before attempting my own answer, I want to first raise another question: was the Reagan Plan ever alive? An answer to that question requires a distinction between the Reagan Plan as a blueprint and the Reagan Plan as a process. As a blueprint, I believe the Reagan Plan was never viable. It was marked by the fundamental flaws discussed at the beginning of the paper, which made it impossible for Palestinians--and hence difficult for other Arabs--to endorse it. In retrospect, another fatal weakness of the proposals was their total neglect of Syria's interests and role. As a process, on the other hand, the Reagan Plan was remarkably viable. Despite its flaws, many of the actors on the Middle East stage greeted it with interest and were ready to give it the benefit of the doubt. There appeared to be considerable relief in many quarters that the United States was becoming involved, was taking a clear position, and was acknowledging the central importance of the Palestinian problem.

The unanimous adoption of the Fez proposals at the Arab League summit meeting in September 1982 may well have been stimulated, in part, by the announcement of the Reagan Plan at the beginning of that month. In any event, the summit sent a delegation to Washington in order to find ways of bridging the Fez proposals and the Reagan proposals. Hussein was clearly interested in joining the process initiated by the President and, from all indications, made desperate efforts to create the conditions that would allow him to join. Arafat was careful not to reject the Reagan Plan outright and credited it with some "positive elements," even though it offered nothing to the PLO or to Diaspora Palestinians. He entered into negotiations with Hussein in order to find ways in which the PLO might be able to accommodate itself to the American ideas. These efforts produced an important innovation, which was later endorsed by the Palestinian National Council: an acceptance in principle of a confederation between Jordan and a Palestinian state, once such a state has been established.

The PLO's and PNC's support for a confederation, which is clearly a partial attempt to satisfy Reagan's call for a Palestinian entity in association with Jordan, has received surprisingly little attention in the West. I see it as a major concession to Israeli and American concerns about an independent Palestinian state, since it implies a willingness to accept a state that would be constrained in its military and foreign policies and that would be linked to the conservative, pro-Western Arab states. The PNC, while endorsing the confederation idea, did not agree to have Jordan speak on behalf of the Palestinians, and declared its "refusal to consider" the Reagan Plan "as a sound basis for a just and permanent settlement" to the conflict. The resolution stopped short of rejecting the Reagan Plan, although its language was harsher than that proposed by the leadership. It is interesting that Abu Iyad, in an interview at the end of the PNC meetings, stated that the addition of one word to the Reagan Plan--the word "self-determination"--would make it acceptable to him, even if the PLO were to be excluded from the process. After the PNC--and despite the ambiguity of the mandate he received--Arafat continued to explore with Hussein possible ways of relating to the Reagan process.

On the Israeli side, too, the Reagan Plan aroused considerable interest--not on the part of the government, but on the part of the opposition and the peace movement. It gave encouragement to these forces by proposing a process in which they, in contrast to the government, were able and eager to become involved. In sum, the evidence suggests that the Reagan Plan, as a process, was indeed viable. The Jordanian and Palestinian leadership, as well as significant political elements within Israel, were clearly looking for ways to join the process, despite its evident shortcomings. The Reagan proposals clearly succeeded in bringing Jordan much closer to involvement in the peace process than it had been for many years--by activating King Hussein, by encouraging the PLO to support a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, and by reviving interest in the Jordanian option within Israel.

The interest in the process was not sufficient to overcome the substantive shortcomings of the Reagan Plan from the Arab point of view. Furthermore, the Arab actors were not fully persuaded of American will and capacity to influence the behavior of Israel--to induce Israel, in the first instance, to withdraw its troops from Lebanon; then, to agree to a settlement freeze (even though Reagan promised Hussein in writing that he would try to stop the Israeli settlement activities <u>if</u> the King offered to join the negotiations); and, ultimately, to withdraw from the occupied territories. It may be disappointing, but it is not surprising that, in the final analysis, Arafat was not able to provide PLO legitimization for a process that excluded the PLO from the action without offering visible indications that it would satisfy the minimal Palestinian needs. Similarly, it is not surprising that Hussein decided not to go ahead without PLO approval and without substantial support from other Arab states. Though the current situation continues to be very dangerous from Hussein's point of view, the costs of unilaterally joining the negotiation process once again seem higher (or at least more immediate) than the costs of staying out. The U.S. partial success in promoting an agreement for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon does not alter the balance significantly for Hussein, particularly in view of the Syrian and Palestinian response. In Israel, the opposition has seen a marked improvement of the relationship between the Reagan and Begin governments--greatly facilitated by the replacement of Sharon by Arens--even though the Begin government has made no effort whatsoever to accommodate to the Reagan Plan. Thus, there seems to be no likelihood that the Reagan Plan can be revived as a useful starting-point for negotiations.

Nevertheless, the forces that have created such a strong interest--among politically significant elements in each community--in a peace process sponsored by the United States are still in place, even though they have been considerably weakened by recent events. The United States, therefore, is still in a position to play a constructive role in promoting negotiations. To rearouse the interest of relevant parties, however, the Reagan Plan would have to undergo some important substantive changes, designed to correct its fundamental flaws. The administration would also have to reconsider its definition of the relevant parties for negotiations. The chances of a renewed American initiative would be greatly enhanced by several policy emphases.

First, it is important for the United States to demonstrate, clearly, consistently, and vigorously, its opposition to the incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza into Israel. This should be American policy, regardless of Arab cooperation or non-cooperation with American efforts. The most immediate implementation of such a policy should be a serious effort to induce Israel to freeze its West Bank settlement activities--the kind of effort that Reagan promised to undertake if Hussein were to offer to join negotiations.

Second, it is essential for the United States to strengthen those elements in the PLO--notably Arafat and his supporters in the PLO leadership--who have shown an active interest in political accommodation, by demonstrating that their diplomatic efforts bear fruit. To that end, U.S. policy on the Palestinian problem will have to change--procedurally, to permit the administration to talk directly with the PLO; and substantively, to endorse the principle of self-determination for the Palestinian people.

Third, U.S. support for Jordan as a central actor in the process (though not as a stand-in for the Palestinians) should be reaffirmed. Not only are Jordan's own vital interests at stake, but the reactions to the Reagan Plan have demonstrated that Jordan can play an important role in the construction of a solution that would satisfy Palestinian national aspirations without threatening Israel's security.

Finally, future American efforts must take account of Syria's interests and provide a role for Syria in the process. Syria has demonstrated that it has the capacity to block Jordanian-Palestinian or Israeli-Lebanese agreements that it considers threatening to its interests or insufficiently attentive to its role. It will be necessary, therefore, to develop a broader framework for negotiations that will include Syria among the main parties and the future of the Golan among the central issues. An overarching framework, oriented toward a comprehensive settlement, would have two further advantages: it could draw on the Arab consensus reflected in the Fez proposals, and it could provide a role for the Soviet Union in the peace process.

NOTES

[1]These predictions turned out to be fairly accurate, at least with respect to the content of the PNC resolutions. It is interesting that my informants made no predictions about how the PNC would deal with the Fez proposals and with communication with Israelis--two issues that were in fact divisive, but on which the leadership prevailed. The appropriate response to the Reagan proposals was also a source of controversy. As predicted, the final resolutions did reject (or "refuse to consider") the Reagan Plan as a basis for a settlement, but they did not categorically rule out involvement in the process envisioned by the Reagan Plan.

[2]I want to acknowledge my indebtedness to Dan Rothstein, whose insightful work on the Sephardi community in Israel has contributed significantly to my interpretation of the Sephardi vote. I have also benefited greatly from my discussions of this issue with Naomi Chazan.

DISCUSSION

Q: Why has the USSR been kept out of the negotiating process?

A: Saunders: There are a number of practical reasons for their having been left out including their own lack of ability to pull themselves together. I hasten to say that all that may change. That may change now either because of the new Soviet leadership or because the United States may just run out of steam. Doors may close on the American process in the next year. At that point, we may have to reassess the situation. I think it is clear to most people that, in the long term, it is logically better to bring the Soviets in somewhere down the road, blessing whatever solution is achieved. I think the Soviets might be willing to come in later in the process, and avoid the pain of getting there.

A: Eran: Basically I can think of three reasons why Israel is opposed to a USSR role in an attempt to achieve some solution. While I do not want to say that this is the only reason or the basic reason, we do not have formal relations with the Soviet Union, so we cannot have diplomatic relations. That is a formal kind of excuse. The second reason is, I believe that the Soviet policy in the Middle East is based on conflict or continuation of the conflict on some sort of a low fire rather than solving the conflict. States will naturally approach the United States for technical and economic aid rather than the Soviet Union, and therefore, it is my belief that the Soviet Union pursued policies in the Middle East on the basis of the continuation of some sort of a conflict, as I said, on a low fire, but still continuation of the conflict. The third reason is that I believe that if you take the recent Soviet initiative, it contains the element of the Palestinian state and, as I said, I try to at least say in my presentation that is something that the majority of the Israelis oppose. Therefore, I think that initially we have a confrontation with a basic element in the "Soviet peace plan for the Middle East." This is not in contradiction, but in addition to what Mr. Saunders said.

Q: Why does Israel oppose the Reagan Plan or any approach apart from Camp David?

A: Eran: Let me go back to my statement. Maybe I can make myself more clear. A majority of the Israelis oppose an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank, and since King Hussein has not yet joined the peace process, I think that the status quo as it is now is preferable to an independent Palestinian state. This situation can obviously be changed if the King joins the process of Camp David, and we can then talk, that is, the transition will have occurred, and then the final stage is actual negotiations. That is what I meant, and if you read something else into my statement, then I want to make clear that this is what I meant because, once again, the majority of Israelis is concerned with the security element, concerned with the security on the West Bank.

Q: Do you think that King Hussein may have to pay the same price as Sadat did?

A; Eran: I think that if you ask me about King Hussein, my interpretation of King Hussein's position; if I were King Hussein and I sit in Amman and draw the balance sheet of pros and cons of joining the peace process of the Camp David or whatever you call it, there is very little incentive for it because whatever he does -- this is my own reading -- he puts his foot in the wrong place. Right now sitting on the fence is the best bet for him. He has an historical role arising out of the Camp David Accords and I hope that he rises to this important historical role of regenerating the peace process. This is, I believe, the feeling of the majority of the Israelis. I do not think if you asked you would find in Israel a quarrel on any side of the spectrum with a peace process based on Camp David.

Q: A point that is rarely brought up is the availability of water. Israel currently gets all of its water resources from turbid water or ground waters. A large portion of that water comes indirectly from the West Bank. For Israel to give autonomy would have serious economic consequences.

A: Saunders: The idea of the autonomy talks, the autonomy negotiations reached a point where there was recognition that there should be some kind of joint water authority, that is my phrase, not the negotiator's precise phrase. There is recognition that there is a common interest in the disposition of water, but I do not think that there was a feeling that that water in any way needed to preclude the withdrawal of Israeli military government and the establishment of an authority on the West Bank. A political separation, or at that point an administrative separation, was possible while still continuing collaboration in certain areas like the management of water and also, of course, in the area of assuring security.

Q: What would be the viability of a Palestinian state established on the West Bank and Gaza? Is there a danger of it becoming a Soviet satellite? Why does not the PLO repudiate its statement in its covenant of a goal to destroy Israel? What do you think of the Committee into the Beirut massacre?

A: Kelman: With regard to the first question, what do I predict for a Palestinian state? I am assuming that if a Palestinian state were to be established on the West Bank and Gaza, it would be the outcome of a negotiation process, and that such a sate would not be established unless there were the necessary kinds of security guarantees for Israel. My assumption -- and I think the assumption of most Palestinians who now talk about the establishment of an independent Palestinian state -- is that such a state would be considerably constrained. That is not an unprecedented thing. There are many states in the international system that are constrained. The Palestinian state would probably be very definitely constrained in the kind of military force that it can have, and it would probably be constrained in the kinds of political alliances it could form. I do not think that unless these conditions could be established the negotiating process would emerge with a Palestinian state. First of all I think that the links between the PLO and the Soviet Union are grossly exaggerated, but that is a separate story. I do not think that Arafat or at least the mainstream PLO leaders envisage a Palestinian state that is going to be a satellite of the Soviet Union. In any event, whatever the situation may be now, I do not think that it is either necessary or possible that an independent Palestinian state would be a Soviet satellite or would be a heavily armed state, or would really in any way represent a military threat to Israel.

With regard to the second question about the change in the covenant, well, that is a long story. The covenant is an ideological document and essentially the covenant is a document which was designed to say on the part of the Palestinians an injustice has been done to the Palestinian people and that what they are going to do is to right that injustice. I do not think there are many historical precedents of an ideological movement renouncing its basic ideological statements which essentially talk about its conception of justice, its conception of its rights and so on. I do not expect that the PNC will sit down and have a vote and renounce the covenant. What I expect is that the covenant will simply become irrelevant as it has increasingly become anyway. In other words, there are all sorts of things that have been done on the part of the Palestinian National Council meetings that have superseded the covenant and I think this is basically the way things are going to go. I do not expect that the covenant will be repealed and I do not think that it is going to be terribly important to anybody that it be repealed. On the last point, I did not quite hear it.

A: Eran: I do not think that this statement is very convincing -- that no one will be concerned with repealing or not repealing the statement.

A: Kelman: I am saying that, yes, as far as Israel is concerned also. You are talking about Israel now; I am talking about Israel when peace has been negotiated. You see, when peace has been negotiated, when arrangements have been made, when trust has been built, it is going to recede into irrelevance. It is going to be an historical document which is going to be of no particular interest. Yes, I am making the prediction, I am talking about a time when a serious, real peace process, a negotiation process is taking place which concerns itself with the needs of both of the parties. At that point, the question of what it says in the covenant is going to be quite insignificant. What will be significant is what kinds of agreements have been achieved on the ground, and what kinds of relationships have been established. No, I am making my prediction for Israel as well. Sorry.

A: Eran: Do not be sorry.

A: Kelman: On the third point, I am not sure what you were asking.

Q: What is your view of the Israeli Commission of Inquiry into the Beirut massacre?

A: Kelman: I think it is great. As a Jew, I am proud of the fact that this is taking place. I also think that, and of course the demonstration of 400,000 people that preceded it, is of the greatest historical significance. I think that it has a tremendous impact on the Palestinians. So, I think this is something to be proud of and something praiseworthy.

Q: Do you think that the Reagan plan has proven to be only a statement and lacks a strategy to carry it out and real commitment to its success?

A: Saunders: I would definitely agree with that. The Reagan initiative was an initiative and at this point it remains in question whether there is a strategy for following it through. I think there is a strategy that is quite possible. Just to lay it out in timetables, I would, in addition to everything that is going on now, lay out a scenario for the Begin-Reagan talks, whenever that takes place, in February or early March. I would essentially use those talks for the purpose of establishing or re-establishing a common U.S.-Israeli basis of operation. I would go so far as to make clear that there are real questions about the continuation of U.S. support for an Israel that has objectives that we cannot support. I foresee, not a crude threat to cut off aid, but a serious discussion between two friends about where we are going together. I would start at that point. The purpose of that would be to come up with, in very specific terms, a freeze on settlements on the West Bank. I would then take the freeze on settlements on the West Bank to Hussein and the Palestinians and say, well, this is what you asked for in December. On the basis of our being able to offer this now, we expect you to offer peace to Israel. At that point you would have a circle working; the statement of readiness by Hussein and supported by the PLO to make peace with Israel would then open the debate, which I think all the speakers here this afternoon have agreed would take place, such as that following the Sadat visit to Jerusalem. The unanswered question in my mind is a tactical question, and that is exactly where would you plug in the Jordanian participation into the negotiation process. There are two choices: one is to get Jordanians and Palestinians to move into a rejuvenated set of autonomy talks. On the other hand, it is very likely that Hussein would refuse to do that but might say on the other hand, if you complete those talks promptly, then I will join in the discussion of the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. I do not care what kind of autonomy we have, just get it done soon. I am ready to start talking about the final status of the West Bank and Gaza next July 1. I hope you will have autonomy in place by then. There will have to be some discussion on the mechanics of how Jordan joins the process, but I would say finally that you cannot move those negotiations forward until the President of the United States rejoins the process. The autonomy talks faded out, the Camp David talks faded out, when the President of the United States dropped out of the process in the summer of 1979. I think the only way -- now that there is a different President with a different mode of operation -- to reinvolve the President may very well have to be a Ford-Kissinger type situation where the President is right behind the Secretary of State, but you have got to have an authoritative team there ready to press autonomy to conclusion in a reasonable period of time.

DINNER SESSION: SUMMARY OF PARTICIPANTS' REMARKS

The evening discussions opened with a review by participants who had just returned from the Middle East. Focussing on the key role King Hussein of Jordan must play if there is to be any movement at all, it was reported that the feeling in Jordan is that Hussein has little time and few choices remaining to him. He must decide soon to step into the Middle East peace talks now, even though conditions are less than ideal, or lose the few chances for peace that may exist. The Jordanians remain critical of what they regard as anti-Arab American support for Israel, and are frustrated that Jordan and all of the Arab states were militarily powerless in the face of Israel's invasion into Lebanon. The sentiment within key Jordanian political circles is that the power and leverage of the OPEC period has peaked and is diminishing, that a decade of use of the power of the oil weapon has had little effect on the political map of the Middle East; that the stability of Arab regimes is more uncertain -- on the defensive as never before; and that once again Israel has proven that the military balance is tipped decisively against the Arabs for the foreseeable future. As a result, Arab populations are impatient with their present leadership, which has promised so much and delivered so little since the Arab-Israeli conflict began thirty-five years ago.

A bold, dramatic Hussein peace initiative would not, in the fashion of the Sadat visit to Jerusalem, inspire celebration in Israel. Israelis are far from satisfied with the evolution of peace with Egypt. Also, the high costs of the military victory in Lebanon and growing awareness that the war has not achieved lasting political benefits are at the heart of an emerging societal pessimism and political malaise in Israel. The Israeli government appears determined to resist entering into negotiations except within the peace framework to which they are signatories with an Arab state, the Camp David Accords. No other plan or set of proposals is acceptable to the Israeli government and the leading opposition groups in Israel's political system.

It seems clear, however, that Hussein is aiming for talks which go beyond the constraints that the Camp David framework places on West Bank negotiations. One tactic Hussein is trying to employ is to use Camp David as the initial step towards broader talks, which would involve a direct Jordanian role along the lines contained in the Reagan plan. If Hussein cannot obtain the support of the Palestinians to stand behind him, and if Israel continues its settlements on the West Bank, moderate forces in the Middle East represented by Hussein will be further discredited and weakened. Without progress in the near future toward a settlement, there is the real danger that a new round of radical and confrontational politics will emerge in the Middle East.

It was further reported that Israeli officials do not hide the fact that the working relationship between Israel and the United States is seriously strained. The view now held by the Israeli military and foreign policy establishment is that the United States is pushing for a settlement in the Middle East which could jeopardize Israel's security. At a minimum, they view the Reagan plan as an approach that would constitute less than full U.S. support for Israeli security objectives. For this reason, Israel will resist any deviation from the course set at Camp David until it is crystal-clear to them that the Arab camp will accept a peace satisfactory to Israel. In this context, the Reagan plan is seen by Israeli officials as an imposed solution, rather than an agenda for negotiations. Thus, Israeli acceptance of the framework of the Reagan plan is unlikely until the United States can convince Israel that the Reagan plan is an extension of the Camp David Accords and not a radical departure from its basic concepts.

The questions raised about the usefulness of the Camp David framework and its role in any future Middle East peace talks have revealed the underlying tensions that have grown up between Israel and the United States. There is certain to be an even greater divergence of policy and friendship between Israel and the United States if the Israelis continue to reject the idea of partition as the basis for an Israeli-Palestinian peace. The Israelis have repeatedly stated that the five-year transitional period in Camp David is the only formula they are willing to pursue at this time; the Israeli government believes that the Palestinians have little ability to exert power beyond efforts to use the media to support their cause and can only hope for a chance to negotiate. In the view of the present Israeli leadership, the PLO has been stripped of any other viable options, and therefore there is no reason to negotiate a West Bank-Gaza settlement.

The discussion group's analysis of Israeli perspectives continued with the observation that the Begin government is of the view that if the Reagan plan is not a replacement for Camp David, it is clearly a device for the eventual Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. The old Camp David framework has been refitted through the Reagan plan to bring Arabs such as King Hussein and the PLO into the peace process as equal partners.

The discussion group felt strongly that the United States must act forcefully and directly in the near future and bring both sides into negotiations if the Reagan approach is to have any credibility or usefulness. If there is no movement, the Israelis will step up the pace of settlement on the West Bank, and Hussein's efforts on behalf of the Palestinians will be undermined, further endangering his regime and possibly his life.

There was considerable discusion of the delay in the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. The Israelis clearly have no intention of leaving at this time after such a costly and hard-fought war. Former

American officials experienced in negotiations with the Israelis pointed out that in the past only explicit, detailed legal blueprints worked out in binding agreements led to productive exchanges between Israel and the United States. The Israeli government particularly under Begin tends to follow a highly particularistic and legalistic approach to negotiations, but experience has shown it can be brought into negotiations if there is an agreed-upon framework such as Camp David.

One issue certain to be troublesome in the future is the Jerusalem problem. For the moment, Israel will not discuss the question of sovereignty in Jerusalem in any respect. Former American officials were of the view that there will be no way to avoid facing this issue once a peace process begins to make progress. One agenda item required to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict is how Arabs and Jews can live together in Jerusalem in peace.

The view was expressed that the Jerusalem question will not be solved by creating two hermetically sealed states -- Israel and a West-Bank-Gaza Palestine. Peaceful coexistence without a Jerusalem settlement would be impossible. Once a settlement between Israelis and Palestinians is reached on the West Bank and Gaza, exchanges of population and adjustments from both sides might be possible under a peace with Jerusalem as a united city with divided sovereignty.

A prevailing view among American participants with experience in the area is that both Israel and the United States must take steps now to create a negotiating environment and conditions which will restore close United States-Israeli relations, now badly strained. There is no way that the United States can divorce itself from events in the Middle East or back away diplomatically from the Arab-Israeli conflict, as some suggest. If the American commitment to the security of Israel is to continue, the U.S.-Israeli strategic interests also require close, friendly relations with the Arab states. Consequently, the United States must quickly make clear to both sides what actions it will or will not support. Since both Arab rejectionism and Israel's West Bank settlement policies are unacceptable to the United States, one principal aim of American policy should be to remove these obstacles to peace.

While it is clear that Israeli military victories in the Middle East tend to enhance the belief that American weaponry is superior to that of the Soviets, the Soviets could nonetheless increase their influence in the region if a perception were to take root in the Arab world that the United States is unable to use its power to shape the course of political settlements. The danger of a stalled peace process is that unstable and fragile Arab regimes would have little choice but to turn to Moscow for arms and aid in the form of political pressures. If such an East-West confrontational political environment were to develop, which is now all but absent, the United States would lose its present influence and bargaining leverage in the Middle East.

American influence and standing in the Arab world would be severely diminished, and our strategic interests, access to oil and bases, would be adversely affected.

American policy interests in the Middle East will be enhanced if Hussein finds courage to become involved and Begin becomes more flexible. These breakthroughs can only take place through firm personal commitment by President Reagan and personal action on his part to take the lead in support of the plan that bears his name. The perception widely shared by almost all American, Arab and Israeli officials is that the plan has not received the presidential support needed at this juncture, and therefore neither Arabs or Israelis are prepared to take the risks needed for peace. It is becoming clear to all that Washington must now choose to pursue a settlement with full power and conviction or back away from its role as superpower broker and accept a loss of influence and prestige and a weakened strategic position in the area.

If Israeli policy continues to undercut overall American interests in the Middle East, it will face another generation of conflict with the Arabs. Further, it was the view of many in the discussion group that Israel would have to pursue these policies without the backing of the United States it has traditionally enjoyed. The death of American marines in Lebanon obviously has a magnified political impact in the United States. The danger is that the present difficulties and differences now encountered may increase or escalate to the point where domestic political sentiment in the United States may force the President to reassess the pattern of American support of Israel.

It was the view of the discussion group that the United States must not only state policy, but also act and use its power to make the policy a reality. Failure to make progress with the Reagan plan will have serious political implications in the United States and seriously weaken America as a global power. The Reagan plan assigns a role to Hussein which is only a first step towards an Israeli-Palestinian solution. The plan is premised on the belief that Hussein can ease the way into broader Arab-Israeli negotiations. Moreover, the idea for a Palestinian homeland confederated with Jordan is widely believed to be the first step towards an eventual Palestinian entity on the West Bank. This is the essence of the policy on which the United States has staked its reputation in the Middle East; it must now deliver.

A view was expressed that Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon is unlikely to take place in consonance with the Reagan plan timetable for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanese soil. The Syrian army in Lebanon is being used to achieve a stronger say in the Arab-Israeli negotiations. If Syria is not part of the settlement talks in Lebanon, it is likely to be a potential spoiler which could upset any wider Arab-Israeli rapprochement which might evolve.

The Israeli preference to deal with Arab regimes only within the

Camp David framework stems in part from what Israelis view as the Syrian threat. The Israelis believe it is indeed Syria's intention to foil any efforts for peace and to assist radical members of the PLO remaining in Lebanon. The discussion group felt that the Israelis and the Palestinians must talk directly to each other.

Many believe that a genuine offer of peace from Arafat would trigger a movement toward peace in Israel. Though the current political climate in Israel is a barrier to Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, estimates are that 20-25% of the present Knesset already believe that the PLO is a necessary participant in peace talks. A clear, moderately phrased offer from the PLO for a peace settlement would strengthen moderate forces in Israel.

Several speakers suggested that at the present time a proposal for joint talks with the PLO would be political suicide for an Israeli government, despite the fact that the Fez Conference has made it clear that most Arab states recognize the de facto existence of Israel and that Arafat has made it clear that the PLO is prepared to recognize the political legitimacy of the Jewish state. Clearly there is movement in the direction of compromise within the PLO. Participants close to Israeli political movements suggested that the Israeli government may also be more ready for a settlement than appears on the surface.

Two steps were suggested by some participants as ways to begin. First, recognize that once Begin entered the negotiations at Camp David he bargained hard, resisted every inch of the way, but eventually agreed to withdraw from the Sinai. Those close to the Israeli scene are of the view that Begin would follow the same pattern in Lebanon. Second, all parties recognize that the PLO must be brought directly into the political process despite historic objections on the part of the Israeli government to do so. In the view of many of the participants, this is the key tactical diplomatic problem to be resolved if the Palestinian-Israeli settlement process is to succeed.

Any significant steps toward a settlement will require sustained effort on the part of the United States. The Camp David experience indicates that once negotiations begin, agreement which was once viewed as impossible and concessions which seemed outside the realm of possibility can be attained if the United States brings the parties together and works in a sustained, patient way for a settlement.