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Viewpoints Special Edition

The Legacy of Camp David: 1979-2009
The year 1979 was among the most tumultuous, and important, in the history of the modern Middle East. The Middle East Institute will mark the 30th anniversary of these events in 2009 by launching a year-long special series of our acclaimed publication, *Viewpoints*, that will offer perspectives on these events and the influence which they continue to exert on the region today. Each special issue of *Viewpoints* will combine the diverse commentaries of policymakers and scholars from around the world with a robust complement of statistics, maps, and bibliographic information in order to encourage and facilitate further research. Each special issue will be available, free of charge, on our website, www.mei.edu.

In the second of these special editions of *Viewpoints*, we turn our attention to the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in Washington, DC on March 26, 1979. The treaty inaugurated an official peace between the two countries that had gone to war four times since Israel’s founding. This issue of *Viewpoints* examines the mixed results and legacy of the bold steps towards peace that were taken 30 years ago this month.
Preface

by Samuel Lewis 7

I. The Pursuit and the Price of Peace

Great Expectations and a Cold Peace, by Edward S. Walker, Jr. 10

Historial Context for the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, by Kenneth W. Stein 13

Egypt’s Role, 30 Years after Peace with Israel, by Shibley Telhami 16

Sadat in Oslo, by Menachem Klein 19

Nevertheless Peace..., by Ephraim Dowek 22

The US and the Egypt-Israel Peace: Observations of a Participant-Oberver, by Willam B. Quandt 25

Paying for Peace: American Aid to Egypt, 30 Years after Camp David, by Hanaa Ebeid 27

Egypt’s Altered Role in the Middle East, by Eyal Zisser 30

II. Perceptions of Peace

Children of the Naksa, Children of Camp David, by Mona Eltahawy 34

Egyptian Public Opinion: Israel Is Seeking Our Enmity, by Sobhi Essaila 37

Egypt’s Regional Role: A Deep Gap between Two Meanings, by Mohamed Fayez Farahat 42
The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Legacy of Camp David • www.mei.edu

Egypt-Israel since the Camp David Accords and Peace Treaty,  
*by Yoram Meital* 45

The Debate in Egypt over Peace and Normalization with Israel,  
*by Dina Shehata* 47

Troubled Borders: Egypt’s Lonely Predicament after Gaza,  
*by Adam Robert Green* 50

**III. The Fruits of Peace**

The Economic Impact of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, *by Paul Rivlin* 53

Cairo Peace Society: A Failed Attempt at Creating an Arab-Israeli Peace Lobby,  
*by Iman A. Hamdy* 55

For a United and Multicultural Middle East, *by Levana Zamir* 57

Agricultural Cooperation: A Prototype of Post-conflict Resolution,  
*by Samuel Pohoryles* 60

Hosts and Guests under the Threat of Terror: Israelis and Egyptians in Sinai,  
*by Darya Maoz, Natan Uriely, and Arie Reichel* 66

Scientific Cooperation for the Control of Soilborne Diseases of Major Crops,  
*by Jaacov Katan* 69

**From the Pages of The Middle East Journal’s “Chronology:”**

Egyptian-Israeli Relations in 1979 72

**Documents** 93

**Biographies of the Negotiating Teams** 116

**Maps** 125

**Selected Bibliography** 131
Preface

Samuel Lewis

Since the “Six Day War” in June 1967, countless American and other diplomats have sought almost continuously to broker peace between Israel and its surrounding Arab enemies. From that tangled history, one achievement stands tallest in a forest of scrub: the Egypt-Israel Treaty signed on March 26, 1979 on the White House front lawn by President Anwar Sadat, Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and President Jimmy Carter. That the peace agreement remains intact 30 years later would have confounded many who applauded enthusiastically at its signing, but were convinced that without parallel agreements with Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinians, its life span would be fragile and probably brief.

The still-born Oslo Accords in 1993 provided political cover for King Husayn of Jordan to finalize his own peace with Israel soon thereafter. That culminated many years of covert Jordanian-Israeli contacts and the King’s long-standing determination to reach peace with Israel as soon as the Palestinian dilemma could be resolved in a fashion that would not leave him open to attacks for betraying their cause. Other negotiations with Lebanon, with Egypt acting on behalf of the Palestinians, with Syria, and with the Palestinians directly after Oslo have all foundered. Terrorist attacks, harsh Israeli retaliation, guerrilla warfare, and outbreaks of major warfare with Hizbullah in Lebanon in 2006 and Hamas in Gaza in 2008 — all have interrupted or destroyed sometimes promising American mediation efforts. And yet, through all the years since 1979, peace between Egypt and Israel has held together, despite sometimes exceedingly heavy strains. It has become a rather cold peace, but peace nevertheless. Even at the moments of greatest stress, such as Israel’s attacks in 1982 on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Syrian Army in Lebanon, few influential voices in either country have advocated violation or abrogation of the treaty.

In this excellent collection of essays are found many perceptive explanations along with valuable descriptions of how the many facets of Israeli-Egyptian relations have evolved under the treaty regime. Stark cultural differences and unrealistic expectations still afflict both parties and have often produced much disappointment in one another’s behavior. But the durability of the treaty reflects the fact that it satisfied and still satisfies the basic national interests of both nations.

As an active participant in the whole Camp David process from 1977 to 1985, I conclude that success stemmed from several factors. First, Egypt and Israel were both ready...
for a serious effort to achieve peace, ripened by the heavy costs to both sides in the 1973 war. Second, Begin and Sadat had sounded each other out secretly via trusted emissaries and found that each side's basic demands might be met with effective help from an active American mediator. Third, President Carter had come into office deeply determined to achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace. When his effort to convene a broad peace conference seemed about to fail and Sadat's surprise trip to Jerusalem redirected the whole effort into a bilateral Egypt-Israel channel, Carter reluctantly adjusted his sights and committed the United States wholeheartedly and obsessively to help achieve what was actually achievable. Fourth, Sadat, Begin, and Carter were strikingly different personalities who all dominated their respective political polities in those crucial years, who all were driven to seek an historic achievement of peace, and who had the supreme self-confidence to take political risks when essential.

Others made great contributions, notably Moshe Dayan and Cyrus Vance, without whose unceasing exploration of how to break through negotiating road blocks, the treaty could have foundered. But it was essentially because the stars were aligned and powerful, determined leaders happened to be in power in the three capitals, that peace between Egypt and Israel was finally attained after 30 year of bitter, bloody wars. Now, 30 years later, that peace remains solid and essential.

The essays which follow greatly enrich our understanding of this extraordinary event and its continuing consequences. Sadly, we are still drudging through Middle Eastern sands in search of another such breakthrough.
I. The Pursuit and the Price of Peace
Great Expectations and a Cold Peace

Edward S. Walker, Jr.

Thirty-two years ago, in 1977, I was the head of the Political Office in our Embassy in Damascus when Anwar Sadat passed through Syria on his way to Jerusalem. There was understandable euphoria in Israel and the United States, but there was bewilderment in Cairo and deep hostility in Damascus and most of the rest of the Arab world. For those of us in the US Embassy in Syria, there was a shadow over the event. We had been working hard to open some doors in Syria and were beginning to have some traction. With the US embrace of Sadat’s gesture, those doors slammed shut. We had also been committed to a global agreement incorporating the Palestinian and Syrian issues. But what appeared to be emerging was a bilateral agreement between Egypt and Israel and the indefinite deferral of the Syrian and Palestinian problems. It was pretty clear to us at the time that if Israel could take Egypt out of the equation, then war would be impossible, and the incentive for Israel to make concessions for a global solution would be limited at best.

At the beginning, when Sadat made his trip to Jerusalem, it seemed likely that he believed his gesture would open the door, not only for peace between Israel and Egypt, but also for Palestinian statehood. By the time of the Camp David negotiations a year and a half later, Sadat had been so vilified in the Arab world and so well rewarded by the US that it was not too much of a stretch to conclude that he was willing to accept less on behalf of the Palestinians in order to achieve a bilateral peace agreement and return of the Sinai. In his talks with us, his characterizations of other Arab leaders were invariably dismissive and severely pejorative. President Carter worked hard to keep the door open for the Palestinians through the Camp David Framework Agreement, but as we found over the next three years of futile negotiations on autonomy, it was a fatally flawed agreement.

I worked with a team of US autonomy negotiators led by the President’s Special Negotiators, first Bob Strauss, then Sol Linowitz, and finally Dick Fairbanks. It was in fact a fool’s errand. To start with, the career US Ambassadors in the Arab world, aside from our Ambassador to Egypt, Roy Atherton, did not support the objective, or the approach. This became clear in 1980 when I accompanied Sol Linowitz, who had just taken charge of the autonomy negotiations for President Carter, to meet with our assembled Ambassadors in Cairo. They were candid in their criticisms of these indirect negotiations based on anything short of direct talks with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and
its Chairman Yasir ‘Arafat. Sol was livid. The President was committed. It was their job to make it work, not to second-guess the decision. If the Americans did not believe in the autonomy negotiations, then why should the Palestinians? In any event, the negotiations had already been rendered dead on arrival when the Palestinians refused to participate and Egypt had to represent them.

The parties were then split over interpretation of a settlements freeze that Sadat and Carter believed they had secured at Camp David. Sadat thought that the “freeze” would be for the period of the negotiation of the autonomy agreement. Begin contended that is was for the designated period for negotiation of the peace treaty with Egypt — three months. And furthermore, it was not a freeze, only a temporary cessation of building any new settlements. Strengthening existing settlements was not prohibited and neither were new military settlements known as NAHALs. Those that had been set up in the past were usually converted to civilian settlements in due course. At the end of three months, settlement activity began anew and at an accelerating pace. Sol Linowitz told me that he had gone over the record carefully and that, indeed, Menachem Begin was correct in his interpretation. Carter and Sadat had not been sufficiently rigorous in policing the language used and pinning down the agreement.

The reality is that Prime Minister Begin never intended the autonomy negotiations to lead to anything even remotely looking like a Palestinian state or even real autonomy. He was quite candid about his goal for the Palestinians of limited administrative authority for basic housekeeping tasks. We simply chose not to listen. Or perhaps we did not want to listen and thereby rain on the Camp David parade of Sadat and Carter.

Yosef Burg, head of the National Religious Party, was the leader of the Israeli team and while well intentioned, had significant opposition in his own party to any concessions in the West Bank. And Ariel Sharon, also on the Israeli team, seemed to have been put in place to ensure that progress was not made. He advocated that we abandon the effort to define what autonomy meant and turn instead to deciding the fate of Jerusalem. As he told me, “If we can reach agreement on Jerusalem, then the rest will be easy.” He was possibly right, but as we found out in the course of the autonomy negotiations, any time we touched on the issue of Jerusalem, there was a crisis. The Israeli objective during these talks, more than anything else, appeared to be to keep the Americans reasonably happy, solidify the treaty with Egypt, and give nothing away to the Palestinians.

The rigidity was by no means all on one side. The Egyptian team had little pressure to make concessions from President Sadat, who by this time was far more concerned about ensuring that all the Sinai was returned, than he was about the Palestinians. The interesting thing is that Sadat’s very success, ultimately, in achieving this goal of full return, has made it that much harder to find a solution on the Golan or the West Bank and Gaza.

Hafiz al-Asad, brought close to the brink of an agreement on the Golan with Israel by President Clinton in their summit of March 2000, balked at having to accept less than Sadat achieved on return of territory. The animosity between
these men since Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem meant that Asad would lose significant face at home at the possible expense of his leadership if he came up with less than full withdrawal from the Golan. There were other reasons for the failure of President Clinton’s effort to bring Israel and Syria together, but I am convinced that the real reason Asad balked at the end was the fear of looking weak compared to Sadat.

From the inception of Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem through the Camp David Accords, both Israel and Egypt had inflated expectations of their peace accord. Sadat thought that the Israelis would take his concerns and interests into account after he had made such a bold opening and destroyed Egypt’s leadership position in the Arab world. He was wrong. Israel’s dealings with Lebanon, Hizbullah, and the Palestinians have nothing to do with Egypt and never will. But Israel too had inflated expectations of peace. When I was in Cairo in the mid-90s the Israeli Ambassador was constantly frustrated by his inability to warm up the relationship. Israelis had expected that peace would bring acceptance and normal friendly relations, not the cold peace they got. If there ever had been the hope of a warm peace, however, it was refrigerated in the follow up to Camp David and the autonomy experience, and it was put in the freezer when Israel invaded Lebanon.
Historical Context for the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty

Kenneth W. Stein

President Anwar Sadat was the diplomatic engine that drove Egyptian-Israeli agreements. Without him there likely would not have been an Egyptian-Israeli Treaty and subsequent relationship as we have come to know it. Sadat and Menachem Begin continuously tested each other’s readiness to negotiate with one another. Sadat even admonished President Jimmy Carter in early October 1977 not to do anything that would get in the way of direct negotiations between them. It is fair to say that the Carter Administration’s role was important in narrowing differences, in charting procedural courses, and in forcing the sides to agree to disagree at the September 1978 Camp David summit. However, Sadat emerged as the “Most Valuable Player.”

Before the October 1973 war, Sadat and Israeli leaders tested each other’s intentions about reaching a diplomatic agreement that was much less than a peace treaty. Those exchanges produced mutual awareness that there was an intention to reach a non-belligerency agreement. In 1976 and 1977, Cairo and Jerusalem continued their private exchanges, sometimes through third parties. From the middle of 1977 through the signing of the treaty in 1979, they picked up the pace of exchanges, engaged in a deeper probing of each other’s intentions, and carried out dozens of direct and indirect talks, some through Morocco and Romania. They used the Carter Administration as a vehicle to exchange ideas. There is no doubt that in the 60 days prior to Sadat’s November 19, 1977 visit to Jerusalem, Sadat and Begin had established an open and direct channel apart from Washington.

After the Jerusalem visit, the frequency, intensity, and detail of their exchanges grew. With and without American presence, direct talks took place between high Egyptian and Israeli officials in Washington, Egypt, Israel, and at Camp David. Both sides were willing to use American mediators as conduits for offering new or revised ideas to the other side, so that whatever concession might be offered would ultimately be granted to Washington as mediator, and not embarrassingly to the other side. Along the diplomatic path, Sadat sought to protect Egypt’s place in inter-Arab politics by covering himself with language that suggested he was not making a separate peace with Israel. And where he could, Sadat squeezed Israel for as many concessions for the Palestinians as possible. Nevertheless, he did not let the Palestinian cause get in the way of his objective of recovering all of the Sinai.

At major turning points in Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, Sadat’s vision, will, courage,
and impatience were critical to making agreements happen. In 1972 and 1973, Sadat, acting through National Security Adviser Hafez Ismail, engaged in secret talks with Henry Kissinger. Sadat floated an idea to Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to have the Israelis withdraw from the Suez Canal with Egyptian police placed in Sinai. This was to evolve into a non-belligerency agreement. It never happened.

No one disagrees that Sadat went to war in October 1973 to regain Egyptian honor, restore a portion of Sinai, and initiate a diplomatic process stewarded by Kissinger. He did that. After the war, Sadat eagerly pushed for the private meeting of Arab and Israeli generals 101 kilometers from Cairo. That meeting resulted in an agreement with maps which Kissinger’s negotiating team used as the basis for the first Egypt-Israeli disengagement signed in January 1974. Sadat encouraged Kissinger to take control of the diplomatic choreography by going to the very public December 1973 Middle East peace conference in Geneva. Sadat needed the conference as a fig leaf to communicate to the Arab world that he was not moving separately with Israel. But it was an agreement already negotiated; Meir wanted to use the Geneva conference to bolster the Israeli public’s support for her Labor Party in the December 1973 parliamentary elections.

In the late spring of 1975, an impasse developed about how the next Egyptian-Israeli agreement would be monitored. President Gerald Ford tells us in his memoir, *A Time to Heal*, that “if that the proposal to station civilian technicians in a Sinai buffer zone had come originally from Sadat, they [the Israelis] might have rejected it out of hand; …if Sadat’s proposal could be perceived as an American — or even better, an Israeli — plan, it would have a far greater chance of acceptance. In order to retain ‘face’ in the Arab world, Sadat would have to deny that he had offered any peace plan to the Israelis.” Ultimately this idea was the key to making the second disengagement agreement operative.

In 1976, Sadat broached the idea of a treaty or an agreement with then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. According to Abrasha Tamir, head of Strategic Planning in the Israel Defense Force, Rabin had the copies of treaties in hand, but said “no thank you” to Sadat. In early 1977, Rabin and Begin remained eager to reach another agreement. Recalled Shlomo Avineri, the Director General of the Israeli Foreign Minister’s office, the Romanian government wanted Rabin to come on a visit; there was a message from Sadat. Rabin turned down the invitation. What is certain is that Rabin mentioned the notion of a treaty with Egypt to Carter in their private discussions during Rabin’s otherwise “dreadful” March 1977 visit with the latter. According to Israel’s number two diplomat in Washington at the time, Hanan Bar-On, Rabin told Carter that “the next step [with Egypt] is a ‘treaty’ between us.” In his first meeting with Carter in April 1977, Sadat said — as Carter told me in an interview — that he would “if necessary sign a treaty with Israel.” In a July 17, 1977 *al-Ahram* interview, Sadat also said that he would sign a treaty with Israel. Coincidentally, the interview was published the day that Menachem Begin landed in Washington for his first meeting with Carter. Sadat also addressed the issue of a treaty with Israel at a meeting of the Arab Socialist Union. A month later, when US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was traveling through the region, Sadat asked him to obtain draft treaties from the Israelis. According to William Quandt,
the assistant to the National Security Adviser for the Middle East, who was traveling with Vance, Sadat told Vance: “collect them and you ‘stitch’ them together.” And in September, Egyptian Deputy Minister Hassan Tuhami and Dayan met in Morocco, preceded by secret meetings between other national security officials from both countries.

And so it progressed, while the Carter Administration was consumed with convening an international Middle East conference, focused on bringing the Soviet Union into the diplomatic process as a co-convenor of a conference that neither Sadat nor Begin really wanted. Sadat and Begin sought each other out. It had taken more than four years of Sadat’s probing and Israeli willingness to take a chance that eventuated in his visit to Jerusalem and all that transpired in 1978 and 1979 to reach the historic treaty.

The treaty cleared the path for Palestinian-Israeli mutual recognition and for the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Treaty. It created a diplomatic category whereby Arab states could recognize Israel’s existence and physical presence but not yet fully accept the political legitimacy of a Jewish state. Like no other diplomatic document in the Middle East in the 20th century, the Egyptian-Israeli treaty demonstrated that local national objectives and not foreign powers can transform regional politics and international relations.

Critical lessons are to be learned from the Egyptian-Israeli negotiating experience. First, local leaders and their people must be ready for an agreement. Leaders must demonstrate courage and will, and clearly articulate the defense of national interests. Exclusive of the first two axioms, no amount of external cajoling will create a durable agreement; it is the parties who have to shape their agreement. Fourth, outside parties can assist respective sides cross the negotiating finish line, but not pre-empt or dominate the details negotiated. Fifth, it is only an agreement or series of understandings arrived at between the parties, and most likely through protracted pre-negotiations, that will make a durable agreement possible. And sixth, the same national interests that made an agreement possible can be bolstered by outside powers with monitoring, financial assistance, and a means to adjudicate disputes.

Like no other diplomatic document in the Middle East in the 20th century, the Egyptian-Israeli treaty demonstrated that local national objectives and not foreign powers can transform regional politics and international relations.
Egypt’s Role, 30 Years after Peace with Israel

Shibley Telhami

When Anwar Sadat waged peace with Israel 30 years ago, Egypt’s position in the Arab world had already declined despite its surprisingly effective performance in the 1973 war, or maybe because of it. The spike in oil prices that came after the war transformed the economic distribution of power, turning Egypt — by far the largest Arab state — into the fourth ranked economic power in the Arab world. Egypt needed to rebuild its military following the war, which required half of its budget and made it more dependent for economic support on the very countries that it historically had sought to lead. These circumstances were certainly factored into Sadat’s calculations. But there was another strategically significant factor behind Egypt’s move to liberate the Sinai Peninsula and to reconfigure the regional picture in its favor: the role of the United States.

Sadat believed that “99% of the cards” were in held by the United States, which had the upper hand globally and regionally and was the only country in a position to influence Israel. In the context of the Cold War, he believed that Egypt was in a good position to compete strategically with Israel as the key American ally in the region. At Camp David, both Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin arrived with the primary mission of leaving the summit with improved relations with the United States at the expense of the other — even more than reaching an agreement with each other.

While the thought of a serious Egyptian-Israeli competition for alliance with the United States seems odd in 2009, the picture looked different in 1978. Former Defense Minister Ezer Weizman expressed his concerns this way: “My objections to excessive American involvement in the negotiations with Egypt stemmed from a simple consideration: I foresaw that US interests lay closer to Egypt’s than to ours, so that it would not be long before Israeli negotiators would have to cope with the dual confrontation as they faced a Washington/Cairo axis.” In the end, President Jimmy Carter was able to use this competition to help clinch a deal.

The most important accomplishments for Egypt have been to regain the Sinai and to maintain a state of peace. In contrast to the 30 years preceding the Camp David Accords, during which Egypt fought four major wars, the period since has been marked by relative peace and stability, despite major regional and global upheavals. Although Egypt was isolated in the Arab world immediately after the Accords, it slowly regained its influence — in large part owing to the disastrous policies of Saddam Husayn toward...
Iran and Kuwait. And the relationship with the United States has remained relatively strong, despite short-term tensions, with Egypt receiving significant American economic and military aid and the United States receiving important military and political cooperation. But at another level, Egypt’s relative regional and global position has eroded.

To begin with, the thought that Egypt can compete with Israel has been fully discarded since the end of the Cold War, with many Egyptians concerned that the relationship with the US has become primarily a function of the relationship with Israel. Although many in the American military and intelligence establishments have continued to value the role that Egypt plays in America’s Middle East policy, this view has been less prevalent in Congress and the American media.

Regionally, Egypt has remained an important player, but is far from playing the leadership role to which it aspired. In part, the decline of Iraq — a powerful Arab state that had aspired to compete for Arab leadership and had taken the lead in securing Arab opposition to Egypt following the Camp David Accords — created a vacuum of power in the Arab world that inevitably raised the relative importance of Cairo. Egypt will always be an influential Arab state. But even in the absence of Iraqi competitive power, smaller regional players have been visibly influential on issues of the day. In addition to Saudi Arabia, which has by far the largest Arab economy and the influence that goes with it, Syria, and even small but rich Qatar have demonstrated the ability to influence regional politics and Arab public opinion.

But the most striking aspect of the regional distribution of power is the relative decline of Arab state power and influence — even with the Arab public. The rise of Iranian power and the growing engagement of Turkey in Arab affairs after the 2003 Iraq war have been increasingly visible. For Egypt, this has been both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge was demonstrated particularly in the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war and the 2008-2009 Gaza war.

Historically, Egypt’s Arab leadership was driven by its political and military advantages, especially with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has been the prism through which most Arabs view the world. Prior to the 1979 peace treaty, Egypt was the only state with a powerful enough military to successfully fight Israel. During the era of peacemaking in the 1990s, Egypt played a central role, mostly because Cairo could argue that its influence with the United States and Israel could help the Arabs, especially the Palestinians, by delivering Arab-Israeli peace. So long as progress seemed possible, Egypt was seen as important.

Since the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in 2000, however, it has been clear that Arab leverage broadly, and Egyptian leverage in particular, has not been able to deliver. The wars in Lebanon and Gaza highlighted the frustration of the public, as well as elites, with the limited clout that Arabs could bring to bear either politically or militarily. The most striking example of these consequences have been the ascendance of Turkey and its Prime Minister, Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, in Arab public eyes as well as the increasing influence of Iran, which has backed Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. There was particular anger with Egypt for its perceived hostility to Hamas, which has become popular across the region, for its inability to stop the fighting early and for its perceived reluctance to open the Gaza-Egypt border.

These challenges also have again brought the Palestinian issue close to home with Egyptian concerns that the absence of Palestinian-Israeli peace will push Gaza on Egypt’s lap with far-reaching consequences, including for Egyptian domestic politics. These challenges have propelled Egypt into a new diplomatic role to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, at a time when the new Obama Administration in the United States has signaled greater interest in Middle East diplomacy. Egypt also sees an opportunity in the broader Arab decline and the rise of non-Arab states, Turkey and Iran; the Egyptian discourse is heavily focused on the perceived Iranian threat and even includes emerging expressions of concern about “Ottoman ambitions.”

But in the end, the regional assessment will be made on objective instruments of influence and on what is delivered. As Egypt approaches the post-Mubarak transition, Egyptian elites are uneasy about where Egypt is today — apart from its domestic political and economic challenges. Egypt’s regional influence will remain tied to what happens on the Israeli-Palestinian front, where the two-state solution — the basis of policy since Camp David — is near the end of the road. What happens on that front will inevitably be central to the triangular Egyptian-Israeli-American relationship that resulted from the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty 30 years ago.
Sadat in Oslo

Menachem Klein

The Camp David Accords contain five built-in problems in its section on the Palestinians.

First, the Accords did not specify how to move from five-year interim autonomy for the Palestinians to final status. Hence Israel saw the interim stage as applying for a long period while Egypt assumed that in five years autonomy would unavoidably develop into independent statehood for the Palestinians.

Second, Israel agreed to suspend its demand to annex *de jure* 1967 Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, but did not commit itself not to annex *de facto* these areas through the building of settlements.

Third, Arab East Jerusalem was excluded from the suggested autonomy despite its central status for Palestinians and Muslims. Following the signing of Camp David Accords, Israel expanded its settlements in and around the city in order to tighten its annexation. Israel respected freedom of worship in the Old City holy sites and argued that having done so, it had fulfilled its Camp David obligations with regard to Jerusalem.

Fourth, the Camp David Accords acknowledged the Palestinians as a people and the legitimacy of their claims but not the Palestinians’ right to self-determination in an independent state or the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as their legitimate leadership and representative.

Fifth, the accord formulated the complete Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian, but not from Palestinian, territory occupied in 1967. The latter was left open. The Camp David agreement created a precedent *vis-à-vis* Egypt, but said that the settlement with the Palestinians would be different. Nowhere in the Camp David Accords does it state that United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 applies also to the occupied Palestinian territories.

Due to these problems, Israelis and Palestinians who played key roles in achieving the Oslo Agreement do not share the same view on the impact of Camp David on their product.

*FIVE PERCEPTIONS ON THE ROLE OF CAMP DAVID 1979 IN OSLO 1993*

In their memoirs, those actors express four different attitudes: total disregard; rejec-
tion of Camp David as having been irrelevant; acknowledgment of selective use of Camp David; and the view that the origins of the Oslo agreements are in Camp David. The fifth approach is that of an American actor, then-NSC staffer William Quandt, in Camp David. According to his analysis, there is a deep contradiction between the two documents.

Total disregard of the impact of President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David Accords on the Oslo agreement is the approach of Yossi Beilin and Uri Savir (both of whom were Israeli negotiators) and Mamduh Naufa (a member of the Palestinian Oslo negotiation steering committee).

Rejection of Camp David as irrelevant is the approach taken by Mahmud ‘Abbas (Abu Mazen, Palestinian negotiator) and Hanan ‘Ashrawi (PLO negotiation team member to the 1991 Madrid peace conference and follow-on talks in Washington). Both write about meetings with senior Egyptian officials to inform them regarding the negotiation with Israel. ‘Abbas and ‘Ashrawi argue that the Camp David agreements regarding the Palestinian issue was made along the lines of an American concept and method which the Palestinian leadership rejected.

Selective use is Abu ‘Ala’s (a Palestinian negotiator) approach to the Camp David Accords. According to him, the Egyptian-Israeli peace process affected the Palestinian track in three ways. First, in terms of substance Abu ‘Ala took up the Israeli proposal in Camp David to withdraw only from the Gaza Strip. Second, in terms of participants, the Israeli lawyer Singer, who had taken part in Camp David, also took part in Oslo. Third, in terms of structure, Camp David and Oslo followed a gradual approach, which originally had been suggested by the American administration after the 1973 war.

The view that the origins of Oslo agreements are in Camp David is held by Yair Hirschfield (an Israeli negotiator). According to Hirschfield, Oslo negotiators copied parts of the Camp David Accords, which they pasted into the Oslo Accord. The fifth approach, however, is that of William Quandt (participant in Camp David as a US National Security Council staff member). Quandt’s view is just the opposite of Hirschfield’s. He finds two fundamental differences between Camp David and Oslo. First, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in Camp David were strong leaders, while Ehud Barak and Yasir ‘Arafat in Oslo could not hold their coalitions together. Second, in Camp David in 1978, President Jimmy Carter put pressure on both sides regarding substantive matters, whereas only on a few occasions did President Bill Clinton in Camp David 2000 express his views on the substance of the Accords. When Clinton did so, he was closer to the Israeli side than to that of the Palestinians. Clinton did not adopt his predecessor’s lesson that without putting pressure on Israel, no agreement is achievable.

SUMMARY

The question of who is wrong and who is right in the debate on the impact of Sadat’s peace initiative on the Palestin-
Klein...

ian track is less interesting than the question of what shapes the above mentioned writers’ selective memories. Three out of the five attitudes above are understandable. The differences between the two cases justify minimizing the impact of Camp David on Oslo or utterly disregarding it. The two opposing views — that of Hirschfield saying that Oslo was patterned on Camp David and Quandt arguing that Oslo was fundamentally different from Camp David — call for explanation. It seems that Hirschfield wants to empower the Oslo agreement with the successful Camp David model, while Quandt aims to disassociate Camp David from the failed Oslo experience.

We appreciate Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem to a great degree because it brought peace between Israel and Egypt, not because of the Palestinian chapter in the Camp David Accords. This chapter offered one more interim agreement between Israelis and Palestinians that has failed to produce peace. Presumably, when Israel and Palestine, and Israel and Syria, end their conflicts with peace agreements, we will acknowledge the impact of Sadat’s journey to Jerusalem on these future agreements.
Nevertheless Peace...

Ephraim Dowek

After diplomatic analysis, one might reach the conclusion that Israel had struck a bad bargain when it returned to Egypt a territory four times its size in return for what is commonly referred to as a “cold peace.” However, peace per se has no temperature; it is neither cold nor warm. It either exists or it does not. Relations may be cold or warm, intimate or shaky, but peace is an essential prerequisite for any kind of relationship to develop. Without a doubt, Israel and Egypt have been at peace for the last 30 years. Peace has withstood major difficulties, surmounted numerous obstacles, and has proven its durability. One can say forcefully that the relationship between Israel and Egypt stands on its own two feet, independent from the overall context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the foreseeable future, a major upheaval in this relationship is unlikely to occur. The possibility that the wheels of history may turn backwards and return us to the military confrontations of the past is remote.

Peace is a strategic choice — and not merely a tactical one — made consciously by both Egypt and Israel. Neither the wars in Lebanon nor the many years of civil uprising in the Palestinian Territories (the Intifadas) have succeeded in opening breaches in the structure of peace. The verbal and diplomatic clashes and the violent incidents over the years did not weaken the determination of both countries to avoid being dragged back to military confrontation. Peace, like war, has its own dynamics — the more years that go by, the stronger it becomes and, in tandem, relations between the parties to peace also deepen and evolve. Gradually, both countries become more careful not to cutoff the bridges of communication between them or resort to extreme steps that might imperil the mutual gains they derive from the peace in terms of political, financial, and economic returns.

True, relations between the two countries did not develop at the desired pace and are, most of the time, icily cold. Cold winds are constantly blowing from Cairo, and the Egyptian authorities are hampering normalization as a matter of deliberate policy. Heinous public attacks on the Israeli leadership continue, the anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli campaigns in the press do not stop even for a single day, and Egypt persists in spearheading anti-Israeli moves in the international arena. Furthermore, Egypt opens new fronts of contention with Israel, and continues to depict it as its number one enemy! The pendulum of relations between the two countries continues to swing from cold to warm and vice versa. Divergences, even on minor points, or stalemate in the peace
process, bring about a revival of attacks and a large portion of peevishness.

Nevertheless, one should not ignore the ground level of relations that Egypt has allowed to flourish for the last 30 years: embassies and open channels of communication; oil and gas supplies; free passage in the Suez Canal; open borders; tourism (at least in one direction); regular connections by land, sea, and air; a tenuous flow of commercial and cultural exchanges; assiduous enforcement of all military commitments, etc. This is certainly a great asset for the present and a good springboard for the future.

However, we should not ignore the facts of life or take wishful thinking for reality. Egypt is, first and foremost, an Arab country that strives, understandably and legitimately, to foster Arab interests as long as they do not collide with its own national interests. Egypt is not, and cannot be, an impartial intermediary or an “honest broker.” Egypt was and remains a party to the conflict and, no doubt, strives to obtain the best deal for the Arabs (and for itself) around the negotiating table, though not, as in the past, on the battlefield. Clearly, Egypt wants to widen and strengthen peace in the region, and is working to achieve this goal. Yet Egypt does not view the foundations of peace through Israeli eyes. It has an altogether different outlook and its own agenda and set of prerogatives. It does not wish to share hegemony in the region with Israel, and is not ready to allow the latter’s integration as an equal partner. Egypt does not conceal its goal to reduce Israel to its “natural size,” and implements a concerted policy to forestall what it defines as Israeli economic, cultural, and political infiltration into Egypt and other Arab countries. It has set in place a sophisticated defense system to prevent this from occurring, and volunteers to teach its Arab brethren how “to put a brake to Israel’s appetite” and limit relations with Israel to a bare minimum.

In spite of being understandably frustrated by these practices, Israel should not be deterred from persevering on the path of peace. Peace with Egypt is the cornerstone for building a Middle East where Israel will coexist with its neighbors without fear of suddenly being attacked and pushed into the sea. I do not rule out that, with time, the dynamics of peace will bring about a more open relationship between Israel and its neighbors, based upon reciprocal dignity and mutual interests. However, at the present stage, and for many years to come, this possibility remains a beautiful dream and a worthy (but remote) target.

The return of the Arab League to Cairo in 1991 marked not only Egypt's rehabilitation from the stigma of betrayal but also the vindication of its long-term strategy and tactical moves, making it a valid partner in bringing a comprehensive peace to the region. Israel can and should seek Egypt’s help, but should not rely on its goodwill and impartiality as if the two countries were on the same side of the divide. As I have pointed out, Egypt cannot be an honest broker, but certainly can contribute to help clarify Arab positions, foster mutual flexibility, and promote reciprocal understanding. It would be a mistake to neutralize Egypt from the peace process, but in the same way it would be a mistake to put Egypt at the center of the process, and thereby become the ultimate arbitrator.
The relations between Egypt and Israel have crystallized into a very unique pattern: a one-sided rivalry reaching a zero-sum situation on the part of Egypt, a kind of one-sided cold war. The assumption that Israel can establish a close cooperation (a kind of collusion) and coordinate positions with Egypt has not been — and is unlikely to be — sustained in reality.

Though peace is strong, the million dollar question is: What will happen when President Husni Mubarak, or his immediate successor, leaves the stage? Will peace continue to prevail or collapse? Will relations improve or deteriorate to total paralysis? Will the Middle East witness a new set of Egyptian-Israeli wars?

The answer to these questions depends on who comes after Mubarak. As long as the regime remains an emanation of the military establishment, as it has been since Nasir’s revolution, Egyptian policies towards Israel will remain within the present parameters. However, we cannot exclude a fundamentalist takeover, as occurred in Iran. In this case, the situation would be totally different, bringing with it the direst of possibilities — though logic and good sense say that governments act as a function of their supreme interests which, in the case of Egypt, favors the continuation of peace with Israel. Unfortunately, conciliation and religious extremism do not, and cannot by definition, go hand in hand. Clearly, it is impossible to work out halfway solutions or sensible compromises with religious fanatics absolutely convinced that the only and ultimate truth rests with them. One should hope and pray that moderation will prevail over extremism, and that the leaders of tomorrow will have the wisdom to take a long-term view of their strategic interests and the courage displayed by those who brought about the Egyptian-Israeli peace 30 years ago and maintained it despite all difficulties.
I think that I was “present at the creation” of the current Egypt-Israel-United States triangular relationship. In October 1973 I was serving on the National Security Council staff. Egypt and Syria had just launched a surprise attack on Israel. My boss, Henry Kissinger, was furious and seemed convinced that Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat was crazy. President Richard Nixon was nowhere in sight, listening to his tapes in Florida, hoping to find some way out of the Watergate morass. On about day two of the war, Sadat sent a back channel message via the CIA to Nixon and Kissinger. In it, he explained why he had gone to war, but he went on to say that when the war was over he was counting on the United States to help solve the Arab-Israeli conflict once and for all. Kissinger had never met Sadat, but he was sufficiently intrigued with this signal that he worked hard over the ensuing weeks to ensure that the crisis ended without a devastating defeat of Egypt by the more powerful Israeli armed forces.

From his first meeting with Sadat in November 1973, Kissinger concluded that Sadat was someone with whom he could work. Thus began an intense period of US-led diplomacy that eventually resulted in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of spring 1979. Along the way, it had become clear to Sadat that the kind of relationship that he wanted with the United States — military and economic aid, plus a “special relationship” akin to the US-Israel relationship — was only possible if he made peace with Israel. In short, the Egypt-Israel relationship, for Sadat, was a means to a larger end: a strategic realignment with the world’s strongest power.

I was also present at the Camp David Summit in September 1978 when Sadat just about gave up on the idea of peace with Israel. He decided to leave in order to show his frustration with Israeli negotiating tactics. President Jimmy Carter went to see him and told him that he simply could not leave. If he did, he would not only lose the President’s friendship, but also the US-Egyptian relationship as a whole would come to an end. Sadat said something like: “Then I have no choice, do I?” In his mind, the goal of securing the new relationship with the US was central; peace with Israel, even largely on Begin’s terms, was the price he would have to pay.

Not surprisingly, the Egypt-Israel relationship never really warmed up. Egypt was still too much a part of its surrounding Arab and Islamic environment to feel entirely at ease dealing with Israel in a friendly manner while Israel still occupied the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights, to say nothing of intervening in Lebanon. The remarkable fact
Quandt...

is that the Egypt-Israel relationship has stood the test of time as well as it has, not that it remains a “cold peace.” Were it simply a matter of Egyptian public opinion, diplomatic relations would probably have been severed long ago. But Egypt’s leaders have understood that any such act would end the American aid they have come to value.

Once, during the George H.W. Bush Administration, on the eve of Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, US-Egyptian relations came close to reaching a breaking point. Much of the early aid given to Egypt had taken the form of credits, and Egypt was now at the point when its repayments on those loans to the United States would exceed the amount of new aid it would be receiving. If Egypt were to default on its debt payments, Congress would be obliged to suspend all future aid. This situation was politically and economically untenable for the regime of Husni Mubarak. Bush and his able Secretary of State, James Baker, understood this, but they needed a convincing rationale to persuade Congress to agree to debt relief for Egypt. Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait provided the pretext. Mubarak condemned the invasion and shortly thereafter agreed to join the anti-Iraq military coalition that expelled Saddam’s troops from Kuwait. In return, $7 billion of military debt was written off the books by the United States, and all subsequent aid has taken the form of grants.

During one of my frequent visits to Egypt, an Egyptian colleague asked me an interesting question. He said that the Egyptian-Soviet relationship had started with high hopes in the mid-1950s, but had ended with mutual recriminations some 20 years later. Wasn’t it likely, he asked, that the same thing would happen in the US-Egyptian relationship? Not necessarily, I replied. Part of Egypt’s frustration with the Soviets was that their aid did not really help Egypt achieve its national goals vis-à-vis Israel. In 1956, 1967, and even in 1973, Russian arms in Egyptian hands performed poorly against the Israelis. By contrast, American diplomacy had been able to get Israel to return all of Sinai. True, the other aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict were unresolved, but Egypt’s narrow national interest had been successfully upheld with US support, and any prospect of further moves toward Arab-Israeli peace would still require US help. So, Egypt would have an ongoing interest in maintaining its relationship with Washington, even if there were bound to be points of tension and disappointment.

Other aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict were unresolved, but Egypt’s narrow national interest had been successfully upheld with US support, and any prospect of further moves toward Arab-Israeli peace would still require US help. So, Egypt would have an ongoing interest in maintaining its relationship with Washington, even if there were bound to be points of tension and disappointment. Up until now, that has proven to be true.

I do still worry, however, about the quality of both the Egypt-Israel peace and the US-Egyptian relationship in a Middle East that is in turmoil, with US prestige at an all-time low, with the Palestine crisis at a boil, and with Islamist political movements gaining ground. Perhaps President Barack Obama will be able to reverse some of these threatening trends. Certainly many in Egypt welcomed his arrival in the White House. But unless he can quickly show a new face of American policy in the Middle East, many in Egypt and elsewhere will be frustrated and angry. Despite 30 years of a robust Egypt-Israel-US triangle, this is no time to be complacent.
Paying for Peace: American Aid to Egypt, 30 Years after Camp David

Hanaa Ebeid

In a subtle argument on the role of national interest in foreign aid, Robert Keohane asserted that there exists a “grand bargain” in US foreign assistance, by which tangible benefits are traded for intangible and deferred benefits in what may be termed as “generalized reciprocity.”

This grand bargain has engaged the US, Egypt, and Israel in a triangular relationship since, or rather by virtue of, the Camp David peace agreement and the massive aid package that followed. Since the peace accords in 1979, Egypt has become the most important US ally in the Arab world. Since that time, Egypt has been the second largest recipient of American economic and military assistance — Israel being the first. From the late 1970s until the late 80s, Egypt and Israel received almost 50% of total US economic assistance. Egypt alone received annual Economic Support Funds (ESF) that amounted to more than Asia and the Near East combined, Israel excluded.

The underlying rationale was that in order to maintain long-term peace, both Egypt and Israel should reap the economic benefits of peace. This peace dividend hypothesis has been the overarching driver of US economic assistance to Egypt.

A set of subsequent corollaries defined the US strategic objectives of economic assistance to Egypt: to foster economic and social development within Egypt and thereby to create the preconditions for a permanent peace; to foster a process of reconciliation and peace in the region through demonstration effect; and to contain Islamic fundamentalist and radical ideologies and promote moderation.

AID FOR PEACE

5. Zimmerman, Dollars, Diplomacy, and Dependency, p. 83.
Ebeid...

Despite the intensity and continuity of aid flows to Egypt since the Camp David accords, US economic assistance to Egypt is hardly visible to the public. USAID, which manages and disburses almost 40% of the total amount of foreign aid to Egypt, has always maintained a low profile in claiming credit for such massive transfers. This could be attributed to the aid bureaucracy’s self-definition of developmentalism and of being motivated by a set of concerns different from those of the State Department, but could also be a conscious endeavor — on all sides of the relationship — to disassociate aid from the ups and downs of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, this has created a chronic visibility problem for American aid to Egypt, which was tolerated or downplayed until September 11, 2001.

Nevertheless, American economic aid and USAID have always attracted considerable criticism on political and economic grounds. A recurrent criticism voiced in the Egyptian media has been that of the project-bound nature of aid to Egypt, as opposed to the “no strings attached” policy towards Israel. Not infrequently, aid politics were depicted as serving US political and economic interests, creating food dependency and having no impact or a negative impact on Egyptian development or well-being.

Besides the scant public awareness or appreciation of aid, the favorability of the US has been in sharp decline in Egypt, which begs the question, how can the second largest recipient of American aid become so anti-American? The response to this question is very complex. Part of it lies outside the realm of aid policies, in the field of American foreign policy. However, the pattern and policies of American aid to Egypt has arguably contributed to this state of affairs.

Whereas the objective has always been to maintain peace and development, or peace via development, priorities and activities of the AID mission to Egypt have evolved in four overlapping phases: the infrastructure phase, the public policy reform phase, the economic growth and structural adjustment phase, and the economic liberalization phase.

A common characteristic has persisted throughout these phases, namely prioritizing infrastructure and economic reform policies. Infrastructure projects alone consumed almost $6 billion since 1975 including electricity, telecommunications, waste water, and drinking water programs, the last consuming almost half of the total allocations.

More importantly, the main stakeholders of aid activities have, until the end of the 1990s, included the government, the private sector, and service-oriented non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Support to civil society was targeted to service and welfare organizations, while support to advocacy groups was out of the question. In other words, aid policies were designed in a fashion which failed to build up a solid constituency among the public, through participatory development projects or broad engagement of civil society, either towards consolidating bilateral relations or towards peace and moderation. In this context, the politics of aid saw fit to ignore or tolerate the inconsistency between public attitudes towards the US and Israel on one hand, and government attitudes on the other, giving primacy to the latter.

Post-September 11th revisions to American foreign policy and aid policies reflected a shift in mindset on aid to allies from peace through development to democratic peace. The main changes in aid policy towards Egypt manifested in a readiness to further engage nongovernmental stakeholders and an effort to push forward a political reform agenda while minding the publicity issue through a conscious branding policy adopted by the USAID field mission in Cairo.

Moreover, the association of aid with relations to Israel became more visible. Israel started to figure explicitly in the aid relations in a manner of conditionality rather than building up a constituency for peace. This especially has been the case in withholding $200 million in military funds for Egypt upon alleged accusations of weapon-smuggling from Egypt to Gaza.

The visibility of aid and the underlying Israeli factor came at a time when the image of the US as an even-handed broker in the Middle East was hitting a low point, and Arab-Israeli relations were experiencing major crises, e.g. the war on Lebanon in the summer of 2006 and the December 2008 military assault on Gaza. Hence, the new policies again failed to gain public sympathy or build up a constituency for peace.

FAILING MODERATION

Thirty years on, the Egyptian-Israeli peace has held. Cold, half-hearted, or incomplete, sustaining peace could be argued to be one of the main advantages of US economic assistance. Egypt has also been, as expected, a role model for a limited number of Arab countries. However, Egyptian leadership by example is losing moral ground with the absence of a meaningful process for peace and the rise of radicalism, especially in light of the recent surge in Palestinian civilian suffering. Judged by its objectives, the strategy of paying for peace has failed to build momentum for moderation and peace and curbing radicalism, which is the ultimate guarantor of genuine, lasting, and comprehensive peace.

Egypt’s Altered Role in the Middle East

Eyal Zisser

The signing of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty in Washington, DC in March 1979 was a dramatic and especially significant development in the history of the Middle East. The agreement improved Israel’s strategic standing in the region and fundamentally changed the strategic balance between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Many Israelis today wonder about the fruits of the Israeli-Egyptian peace and the absence of any warm bilateral relations between the two countries. Others complain about regional threats and dangers confronting their country. They tend to forget or ignore the situation in which Israel found itself on the eve of the peace agreement, and they certainly tend to repress the fact that until Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, Egypt was considered to be Israel’s main enemy and even an existential threat. Thus, the signing of the peace treaty with Egypt removed a heavy cloud that had cast a shadow over Israel since the founding of the state in May 1948.

Still, Israelis have reason to be disappointed with the results of the 1979 peace treaty. Contrary to the hopes of many Israelis, the agreement did not lead to the end of the Arab-Israel conflict, or even to any breakthrough in Israel’s relations with the surrounding Arab world. In this sense, there is a certain degree of validity to the claim made by Damascus every now and then that without Egypt, an all-out regional war is unlikely — but without Syria it will not be possible to achieve an overall stable and enduring peace.

On the eve of the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the predominant view in Israel was that Egypt played a central role in the Arab world. From this there emerged the expectation that Egypt would play a leading role among the Arabs in promoting peace, as in the past it had promoted confrontation and war with Israel. This Israeli viewpoint was anchored, of course, in memories of Egyptian President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir, who was perceived in the 1950s and 1960s as the leader of not only the Egyptians, but also the Arabs, and certainly as the key figure in influencing Arab public opinion and the Arab “street” in general, even in those Arab states known to be opponents of Egypt.

However, it quickly became clear to many Israelis that Anwar Sadat’s peace initiative and the resulting signing of the peace agreement with Israel were, perhaps more than
anything else, expressions of Egypt becoming absorbed in itself and its own domestic problems. This self-absorption, the result of the country’s growing social and economic difficulties, naturally led to Egypt’s losing its centrality in the Arab world and having its political weight in the region reduced. Indeed, to this day many Egyptians argue that Nasir’s obsession with playing a leading regional role is what brought Egypt all its difficulties and troubles.

For the most part Israel ignored this aspect of the Egyptian move toward peace, just as it ignored the price Egypt had to pay for signing the peace agreement, namely, isolation in the Arab world. To be sure, Egypt gradually found its way back into the Arab consensus, but it did not succeed in regaining the leading position it had once held. Furthermore, the Arab world of the 1980s, 1990s, and even the 2000s, is a much different one than that of the 1950s and 1960s. The later years have witnessed a much more divided and weak Arab world with no center of gravity. Each Arab state has found itself on its own.

During the 1990s and afterwards, there were numerous illustrations of Egypt’s diminished status in the Arab world. If Egypt played any role at all in the efforts to advance the negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors in the 1990s, it was only a marginal one. Egypt took no part in the preliminary work that was necessary in order to convene the Madrid Conference and set in motion a new Arab-Israel peace process under American sponsorship. The Oslo Agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was signed behind Egypt’s back, as was the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan, which angered the Egyptians, who thought Jordan would reap the fruits of peace at Egypt’s expense. Finally, Syria refused to allow Egypt to take part in its peace talks with Israel.

Matters reached a new low in 2000, close to the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada. Egypt left the United States and Israel empty-handed when they asked it to help them advance Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Egypt made it clear that it would not exert pressure on Yasir Arafat to moderate his positions and, indeed, that it would back any position the Palestinians might adopt. The Egyptians explained that they were taking this approach because they were concerned about public opinion in Egypt, which was committed to the Palestinian cause.

Egypt’s reduced stature has also become fully and sharply evident in light of the events in Gaza in recent years. Here it is important to note that Egypt ruled the Gaza Strip with a firm hand during the 1950s and 1960s. However, today, it looks as if Gaza rules Egypt and dictates its policy. Moreover, Egypt is finding it difficult to assert sovereignty over the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt has been unable to prevent either weapons smuggling from Sinai into Gaza or terrorist acts directed against the Egyptian tourist infrastructure along the Gulf of Aqaba coastline. In addition, the Egyptian regime does not conceal its concern over the domestic implications of the situation in Gaza in general and of Hamas’ taking control over the area in particular.
In sum, for Israel, the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Agreement has turned out to be a strategic asset of major importance. For Egypt, too, the peace is an asset of dramatic significance for the future of the country. Yet, many in Israel had even greater hopes and expectations for the agreement. They hoped that Egypt would serve as a bellwether for other Arab states on their way to peace and would maintain and exercise the leadership role it had played in the Arab world prior to 1979 in a way compatible with Israeli interests. However, these hopes were disappointed. Israel has been compelled to accept the fact that the Egypt of the 2000s is not the Egypt of the 1950s and 1960s. It is no longer the central and leading player, but rather a country preoccupied to an unprecedented degree with its own domestic issues and problems.
II. Perceptions of Peace
Children of the *Naksa*, Children of Camp David

*Mona Eltahawy*

I was born at the end of July 1967, which makes me a child of the *Naksa*, or setback, as the Arab defeat during the June 1967 war with Israel is euphemistically known in Arabic. Wars mark time and generations in the Middle East, and so there was no Summer of Love for us in 1967. Instead, we Children of the *Naksa* were born not only on the cusp of defeat but also of the kind of disillusionment that whets the appetite of religious zealots.

My parents’ generation grew up high on the Arab nationalism that Egyptian President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir brandished in the 1950s. By 1967, humiliation was decisively stepping into pride’s large, empty shoes. Two of my uncles fought in the 1973 war against Israel but soon after I turned ten, in November 1977, Egyptians sat glued to their television screens watching President Anwar Sadat reach out to the enemy that Egypt had fought four times.

My family lived in London at the time, so I turned to those who witnessed Sadat’s daring visit to give me a sense of how my compatriots reacted. To mark the 20th anniversary of his surprise visit to Israel, I wrote a series of stories for Reuters News Agency that were both my way of revisiting that history but also preparing for a history of my own.

“The roads in Cairo were empty. Egyptian television followed his visit every step of the way. People were bewildered at the visit and Sadat’s courage,” Salama Ahmed Salama, former managing editor of the official *al-Ahram* newspaper, told me.

Two years after Sadat visited Jerusalem, Egypt became the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel. But his peace overtures to the Jewish state were on the list of grievances of the Muslim militant soldiers who assassinated him in 1981 as he watched a military parade marking the beginning of the 1973 war with Israel, the last war the two countries fought against each other.

Soon after I wrote that series marking the 20th anniversary of Sadat’s visit to Israel, I moved to Israel, where I became the first Egyptian to live and work for a Western news agency. I wanted to see things for myself and not have to rely on the “official” narrative given by our media.

To this day I remain under the suspicion of State Security. When I returned to Egypt after a year in Israel, a state security officer — whose nom de guerre was Omar Sharif — held up a thick file that he said was full of orders to have me followed and my phone tapped.

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When I interviewed Jihan al-Sadat in 1997, she told me that Sadat visited Israel to save Egyptian and Israeli children from fighting more wars: “He said that while his motorcade drove through the streets there, women with tears in their eyes were holding up children.”

“He said: ‘I couldn't hear what they were saying but I felt they were telling me your message has arrived and these children won't fight any more wars when they grow up.’ He was looking out for our children. We lost a lot of them in wars,” Jihan al-Sadat said. I call those children saved from war the Children of Camp David — the name of the town in Maryland where Egyptian and Israeli negotiators worked out details for the peace treaty at the end of 1970s. For their entire lives, Egypt has been at peace with Israel. They have no vivid memories as my brother and I do of air raid sirens that prompted us to darken our homes during the height of the 1973 war.

So how do those young Egyptians regard Israel?

When I visited Israel again in 2007 to speak at a Tel Aviv University conference marking the 30th anniversary of Sadat’s visit, I conducted an informal survey of several of those Children of Camp David. I sent out my questions through the social networking site Facebook, which has become a popular forum for political activism in Egypt and other parts of the Arab world. Unsurprisingly, I found that although those young people disagreed on their positions regarding Sadat’s peace initiative, they all shared a negative attitude towards Israel. Unless Israel made peace with the Palestinians and ended its occupation, they said, they would never accept it.

And when I visited Israel yet again in January 2009, the day after the ceasefire that ended its offensive in Gaza, the messages I received on Facebook asking me if I could “smell the burning flesh in Gaza” from my hotel room in Tel Aviv, condemning me for “rewarding” Israel by my visit, and asking me to take roses to my “godfather and uncle Ariel Sharon” were further reminders of that continued hostility. I went to Israel to speak at another Tel Aviv University conference, this time, ironically, on young people in the Middle East — ironically because although the Children of Camp David have never experienced war with Israel, it is clear we have lost another Egyptian generation to conflict with Israel.

I am not saying that Arab anger at Israel is misplaced. Israel all too often lives up to its reputation as a bully. Its disproportionate reaction in Gaza to the Hamas rockets fired at southern Israeli towns was but the latest example of greater fluency in the language of warfare than in that of difficult negotiations. Israel’s blockade of Gaza punishes the enclaves’ civilians more than its Muslim militant Hamas rulers.

But the coat hanger that Israel has played for the past few decades for a variety of Arab ills is wearing thin. You might think society would have evolved differently in the two countries that have peace treaties with Israel — Egypt and Jordan — or that their treaties have rendered conflict out of the question. Think again.
Eltahawy...

Have Egypt or Jordan logged better records on human rights or political freedoms because of those treaties? Has development or progress taken the place of war? Ask the thousands of political prisoners and the silenced dissidents of both countries.

Egypt has been at peace with Israel for 30 years. For the past 28 years, Egypt has had the same President — Husni Mubarak, who was Sadat's Vice President and who was standing on the podium when the militants emptied their rifles into Sadat. Politically, Egypt is stuck. It faces the possibility that the most powerful country in the Arab world will witness a transfer of power by inheritance to Husni Mubarak’s son, Gamal. This in a country which proudly rid itself of a monarchy in 1952.

While Mubarak has remained faithful to Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel, his regime continues to use the Arab-Israeli conflict as a convenient target of popular anger. Egyptian security services, which are brutal in their crackdowns of anti-government demonstrations, are more patient with anti-Israel demonstrations. During the war in Gaza, Egypt’s refusal to open its border with Gaza was seen as siding with Israel. Two bloggers who wrote about Gaza were arrested on the same day.

My latest visit to Israel was to present a paper on how the internet is giving a voice to the voiceless in the Arab world. The internet has become the place where young people, especially in the Middle East, are able to express the taboos of the “real world.” Although the governments of Egypt and Jordan discourage their citizens from visiting Israel and Arabs from other parts of the region cannot visit, it is in the “virtual world” of the internet that Jews and Arabs are starting to tentatively traverse that “psychological distance” that Sadat was determined to close with his 1977 visit.

Online, some Arabs and Jews are meeting — sometimes arguing and sometimes learning things about each other. The Gaza war sent millions of people online to blog, twitter, and form groups on Facebook supporting one side or the other. The internet might have been another front in the war but it also offered alternative points of view. For those who wanted to meet, online was the place to go.

Here’s what one Egyptian woman told me — online at Facebook — about visiting Israel:

We have to go there for the sake of knowledge and information — or how else we will understand? We have to ally ourselves with secular and leftist Jews because there is great potential in them … but of course doing this means that you face all types of nasty accusations!! We clearly need a new approach to the cause that breaks away from old nationalistic discourses.

Sadat would have been proud.
Although 30 years have passed since the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the official attitude towards peace between the two countries has not yet been reflected at the grassroots level. Meanwhile, developments regarding a settlement of the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis have largely eliminated any hope for a change in the opinions of the Egyptian people towards Israel — which is perceived as an aggressive state with which it is not possible to coexist.

The Palestinian issue represents a fundamental Egyptian concern. According to a 2002 opinion poll conducted by the Center for Political and Strategic Studies at the Al-Ahram Foundation, approximately 60% of the Egyptian public expressed the view that the Palestinian problem is the most important political problem facing Egypt.

To illustrate the importance of this statistic, it is important to note that only 7.5% of the Egyptian public believes that the second most important political problem facing Egypt is the absence of democracy and related political issues.

In addition, according to other opinion polls conducted by the Center in 2005, 71.5% of the Egyptian public held the view that the Arab-Israeli conflict represents the main obstacle to reform in Egypt.

In fact, the negative Egyptian disposition toward peace with Israel is explained by the limited acceptance of Israel by the Arab states as a result of the stumbling peace process. The rejection of Israel in the region is associated primarily with what Israel does and Israel’s failure to seek greater acceptance.

Israel’s humiliating actions with regard to the settlement process in Palestinian areas make coexistence even more difficult. Since the beginning of the last century, Israel’s failure to genuinely seek recognition for her place in the Middle East differs radically from the process initiated by the signing of the Camp David peace treaty with Egypt. If Israel holds land taken by force, then acceptance by the Arab countries would be impossible, something which many Israelis are reluctant to acknowledge.

It may not be an exaggeration to say that Israel carries at least the bulk of the responsibility for the “cold peace” between Egypt and Israel at the grassroots level. In light of
what Israel does, prospects for a warmer peace with Israel can be nothing but bleak, and possibly non-existent in the event of escalating provocations toward the Palestinians, the Syrians, and the Lebanese.

In fact, Israel has failed to maximize the benefits of the peaceful overtures made by Egypt. Furthermore, Israel has continued to play very well the tune of hatred and hostility created by a century of conflict. Whereas, despite the cold peace, Egypt’s appreciation of the importance and the usefulness of peace for them reveals their own emphasis on the peace process.

Another public opinion poll conducted by Al-Ahram Center for Studies on regional cooperation in the Levant before the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 reported that 85.1% of Egyptians believe that peace with Israel had a positive impact on the Egyptian economy during the past ten years, and about 74.4% of them believed that this positive impact would extend into the next ten years. However, these ratios had declined significantly when re-administering the same survey, about four months after the outbreak of the Intifada (uprising) to about 68.8% and 71.1% respectively.

Here, too, it must be noted that this decline in positive Egyptian opinion on the impact of peace with Israel, while clearly reflecting the impact of Israel’s actions in the first Intifada, was much less than that of the past, which could be regarded as an indicator of the optimism of the Egyptian people and their confidence that the peace process could get back on track and thus positively influence the Egyptian economy. However, this decline in the assessment of the Egyptians clearly reflects the impact of Israel’s current actions on the attitudes of the Egyptian people.

The result is more apparent in the Egyptian assessment of the status of political relations between Egypt and Israel, and the willingness of Egyptians to strengthen those relations: While 49.2% of the Egyptians in the poll conducted just before the Intifada observed that relations between Egypt and Israel were good, the percentage went down in the second poll to only 26.9%, and the percentage of those who agreed on working to strengthen those relations, went down from 33.8% in the first poll to only 17% in the second poll.

It must be noted that the percentage of those who agree on strengthening the political relations between Egypt and Israel is almost half of the percentage of those who view the political relations between Egypt and Israel to be good, which indicates a lack of confidence on the part of Egyptians in Israel’s future actions, based on what Israel is currently doing.

The same situation was repeated in the respondents’ assessment of Israeli-Egyptian economic relations, where it decreased from 36.5% in the first survey to 22.9% in the second poll, and the percentage of those who agree on strengthening the economic relations with Israel, went down from 31.7% to 10.9%.

In short, Israel was unable to maintain even a low level of support and acceptance among the Egyptian people, especially...
with regard to the strengthening of political and economic relations between the two countries.

Surprisingly — and clearly an indication that the Israelis are seeking the hostility of the Egyptians — is that although the Middle East project, which if achieved, represents the height of Arab acceptance of Israel in the region, it enjoys a low level of support in the Egyptian street compared with the other regional projects.

Egyptians, by a margin of 2.3%, believe that the Middle East alternative is beneficial for the Egyptian economy. It was supposed that the Israelis should be trying to increase that percentage, and strengthen the position of those supporting the Middle East proposal, as they seek to obtain legitimacy as a normal state in the region. However, the public opinion poll taken after the Intifada has proved, once again, the proportional relationship between what Israel does and to what extent the people of Egypt welcome a relationship with Israel — where the percentage of those who see the benefit of the Middle East alternative went down to approximately 0.7%. This means that the acceptance of this alternative has declined by about 70%.

Meanwhile, the Egyptians’ assessment of the feasibility of implementing the Middle East alternative dropped from 1.9% in the first survey to 0.4% in the second survey, a decrease of almost 79%.

In the end, the real danger in what Israel is doing with regard to the peace process is that Israel’s actions can cause its immediate Arab neighbors and all the other Arab countries to feel disappointed, which may lead to escalations that will certainly not be favorable to Israel, or will at least lead to the prevalence of attitudes that oppose Israel’s attempts to integrate into the region.

As Israel’s actions in the occupied territories increased, so did the proportion of popular rejection of Israel among the Egyptian people. In fact, Israel appeared to be seeking the hostility of the Egyptians, which in fact happened in recent times.

Moreover, the clearly biased attitude of the United States towards Israel further alienates Egyptian public opinion against Israel itself, especially in light of what was revealed by the survey of Al-Ahram Study Center in 2005: that about 90% of Egyptians are not satisfied with the manner in which the United States deals with the Arab-Israeli conflict. This cannot cause any degree of warmth in the relations between the people of Egypt and Israel, or help to break the psychological barrier between Egyptians and Israelis.

One wonders how Israel and those who sympathize with her can speak about the possibility of a warm peace between Israel and Egypt in light of the massacres which Israel has committed against the Palestinians, reaching a peak in the killings (1,300 dead, a quarter of which are children) in Gaza in December 2008.

This essay was translated from the original Arabic by Basem El-Zaawily.
الرأي العام المصري: إسرائيل تستجد عذراً

صحيح عملية

رغم مرور ثلاثين عاماً على معاهدة السلام المصرية الإسرائيلية، فإن التوجه الحكومي أو الرسمي نحو السلام بين الدولتين لم يعكسي بعد على المستوى الشعبي، بل إن تطورات النسوية بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين قد قطعت إلى حد بعيد على أي أمل في تغيير الموقف الشعبي المصري من إسرائيل، باعتبارها دولة عدوانية لا يمكن التعامل معها. فالقضية الفلسطينية تمثلها مصرياً جوهرياً، إذ عبر ما يقرب من 60% من الرأي العام المصري في استطلاع أجرته مركز الدراسات السياسية والاستراتيجية بمجلس الأزهر في عام 2002 أن المشكلة الفلسطينية هي أهم مشكلة سياسية تواجه مصر. وتوضيح أهمية تلك النسبة نشير مثلاً إلى أن 7.5% من الرأي العام المصري يرون أن أهم ثاني مشكلة سياسية تواجه مصر هي مشكلة مذاب أنواع مختلفة، والمشكلات المتصلة بالاقتصاد السياسي. إضافة إلى ذلك قد أدى 71.5% من الرأي العام المصري في استطلاع عبر الإنترنت الإيجابي من الإصلاح في مصر. وفي الواقع فإن غياب توجهات سلامية لدى الرأي العام المصري تجاه إسرائيل يكمن تفسيره بالنظر إلى حدودية ما تتمنى إسرائيل بقبولة في الشرق الأوسط من جانب الدول العربية. فرغم القبول قد اقتربت بعدد تقدم أو تعثر عملية السلام. وفي الوقت الذي يرتبط فيه قول إسرائيل في المنطقة بما تفعله في العالم الأول، فإنها فشلت حتى الآن في الالتزام بمنحى قبولها في المنطقة، باعتبارها دولة يمكن • على الأقل • التفاوض معها نتيجة تناولهم للمهمة من مخططات عملية التسوية. كما شملت في إدراج أن متطلبات رحلة البحث للاقتصاص مكان لها في الشرق الأوسط التي بدأت منذ بداية القرن الماضي، تختلف جذرياً عن متطلبات رحلة البحث في المنطقة التي بدأت منذ توجهها نحو السلام بتوقعات أمان في مدى مع مصر، فإذا كانت القوة قد اضطربت المسقط، فإنها لن تستطيع أن تشن القبول لإسرائيل بين الدول العربية. وهي الحقيقة التي يبدو أن قسم كبير من الإسرائيليين ما زال يرفض التسليم بها.

وعلماً أن يكون من المبالغة القول أن الإسرائيليين هم من يتحمل مسئولية أو على الأقل الجزء الأكبر من مسئولية الوضع الراهن بتسامح ون福特 على المستوى الشعبي، فلا يمكن للسلام مع إسرائيل أن يكون إلا أنبدأ بادية، وربما يصل إلى حالة التقدم في حال تصعيد الاستقرار الإسرائيلي لكل الفلسطينيين والسوريين واللبنانيين. وحقيقة الأمر فإن الإسرائيليون قد فشلا في تنفيذ التوجهات السلامية المتوقف لدى المصريين، وكثر من ذلك فقد أعادوا العزف على أوامر الكهنة وعندما يخفف ذكره عن درجة تفضيل عالية لخيار السلام مع إسرائيل لدى المصريين. في استطلاع الرأي العام الذي أجري مركز الدراسات الأهرام حول التفاعلات الإقليمية في الشرق العربي قبل اندلاع الانتفاضة الأقصى عام 2000 أفاد 85.1% من المصريين بأنهم برونو أن السلام مع إسرائيل كان له تأثير إيجابي على الاقتصاد المصري خلال العشر سنوات الماضية، وحوالي 74.4% منهم يرون أن هذا الأثر الإيجابي سيستمد خلال الـ15 سنة المقبلة. بيد أن تلك النسبة قد أخفضت بشكل ملحوظ حينما أعيدت تقييم نفس الاستطلاع بعد حوالي أربعة أشهر من اندلاع الانتفاضة إلى حوالي 68.8% و 71.1% على التوالي. وهنا أيضاً يجب ملاحظة أن التفاوض في نسبة المخاطر في مواجهة الأثر للمصريين مع إسرائيل في المستقبل كانت أقل بكثير منها في حالة تفاقم الأثر في الماضي، وهو ما يمكن اعتباره مؤشراً لتفضيله. وربما تناول الشعب المصري أن تعود عملية السلام إلى سياقها الطبيعي ما سوف يعكس بالإجاب على الالتزام المصري، إلا أن تلك الانخفاض في تقييمات المصريين يشير توضيح إلى تأثير ما تفعله إسرائيل على توجهات الشعب المصري بشأنها.
وتنبَّه ذلك النتائج أكثر بالنظر إلى تقييم المصريين لحالة العلاقات السياسية بين مصر وإسرائيل، ومع زيادة الاستعداد لتقدير تلك العلاقات، في حين يرى 49.2% من المصريين في الاستطلاع الذي أجري قبل الانتفاضة أن العلاقات بين مصر وإسرائيل جيدة، انخفضت نسبة في الاستطلاع الثاني إلى 26.9 فقط، وانخفضت نسبة من يؤفون على العمل على تقوية تلك العلاقات من 33.8% في الاستطلاع الأول إلى 17 فقط في الاستطلاع الثاني. ومن ناحية أخرى، فيَّفِي ملاحظة أن نسبة المواقف على تقوية العلاقات السياسية بين مصر وإسرائيل تُقَرَب من نُرَوْن أن العلاقات السياسية بين مصر وإسرائيل جيدة، وهو ما يشير إلى عدم ثقة المصريين في إسرائيل مستقبلاً استنادًا لما تفعله حاليًا. وتُكُرر نفس الوضع مع تقييمهم للعلاقات الاقتصادية حيث انخفض من 36.5% في الاستطلاع الأول إلى 22.9% في الاستطلاع الثاني، وانخفضت نسبة المواقف على تقوية العلاقات الاقتصادية مع إسرائيل من 31.7% إلى 10.9% باختصار فإن إسرائيل لم تستطع الحفاظ حتى على المستوى المُنخفض من التأييد والقبول لدى الشعب المصري، خاصة فيما يتعلق بتقديم كل من العلاقات السياسية والاقتصادية معها.

ومما يثير الدهشة ويُشَير بوضوح إلى استجابة الإسرائيليين عداء المصريين، هو أنه على الرغم من أن مشروع الشرك أوسطي، الذي يمثل حالًا تحققه - بُرَوْر القبول العربي لإسرائيل في المنطقة، يحظى بنسبة تأيد متندئة في الشارع المصري مقارنة ببعض المشروعات المُتَطَوَّرة لترسيب العلاقات في المنطقة، وخصوصاً المشروعات ذات الطابع العربي، حيث يرى المصريون أن البديل الشرك أوسطي هو بديل مفيد للاقتصاد المصري بنسبة 2.3% فقط كان من المفترض أن يحاول الإسرائيليون زيادة تلك النسبة، وتدعيم موقف التيار الداعي للشرك أوسطي، باعتبار أنهم يعانون لاستخراج شهادة رسمية تُقَبِّلهم دولاً طُبِيعيًا في المنطقة، إلا أن استطلاع الرأي العام بعد الانتفاضة قد أثبت مرة أخرى - العلاقة الحميمة بين ما تفعله إسرائيل ومدى ترحب الشعب المصري لِأَيْ أَطَار للعلاقة تكون إسرائيل طرفًا فيها، حيث انخفضت نسبة من يرون فائدة للبديل الشرك أوسطي إلى حوالي 0.7% فقط، أي أن نسبة قبول هذا البديل قد انخفضت بنسبة حوالي 70%. كما انخفضت نسبة تقييم المصريين لِإِمْكاَنِيَّة تنفيذ البديل الشرك أوسطي من 19% في الاستطلاع الأول إلى 4.0% في الاستطلاع الثاني، أي نسبة 79% تقرِيبًا.

وفي النهاية، فإن الخطر الحقيقي لما تقوم به إسرائيل فيما يتعلق بعملية السلام هو إصابة الأطراف العربية في دائرة الطوق، ومن خلفية الشعب العربي بالاحتباس الذي ربما يؤدي إلى انفجارات لا تكون بالتأكيِّد على صالة إسرائيل أو على الأقل إلى شروع توجهات غير مُلمَّمة لمحاولات إسرائيل لِالنُهْدَائِي في المنطقة، على نحو ما أدا إليه تصرباتها في الأراضي المحتلة من زيادة نسب الراضي الشيعي لِإِسْرَائِيل بين الشعب المصري، وظهرت كأنها تستطيع عداء المصريين، على نحو ما حدث بالفعل في الأونة الأخيرة. علاوة على ذلك فإن موقف الولايات المتحدة المنحاز بشكل سافر لِإِسْرَائِيل يُسِتَعَدُى هُو الآخر الرأي العام المصري تجاه إسرائيل ذاته، خاصة في ظل ما كشف عنه استطلاع مركز دراسات الأهرام في عام 2005 من أن حوالي 90% من المصريين غير راضين عن الطريقة التي تُتَّمَّها الولايات المتحدة مع الصحراء العربي الإسرائيلي، وهو أمر لا يمكن له أن يُعْتَبُر أي قدر من الدفع في العلاقات الشعبية بين المصريين وإسرائيليين، أو على الأقل بسَر حوار نفسي لدى المصريين نحو الإسرائيليين. وإن الموفق يُعْجِب كيف لِإِسْرَائِيل والمعطيات مع ما يحدث عن إمكانية سلام عادثة بين إسرائيل ومصر في ظل ما تقوم به إسرائيل من مجازر ضد الفلسطينيين وصلت إلى ذروتها في عملية الإبادة الجماعية (1300 شهيد ربعهم من الأطفال) في غزة ديسمبر 2008.
Egypt’s Regional Role: A Deep Gap between Two Meanings

Mohamed Fayez Farahat

Egyptian-Arab public opinion has historically been divided into two major schools of thought on the role of Egypt in the Middle East. According to the first school of public opinion, Egypt has a responsibility and a historical regional role to play in the defense of Arab interests and causes, particularly in the area of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue. This point of view encompasses two main intellectual groups, the national-Nasirist and the Islamic camps, each of which is armed with its own arguments and historical-national/historical-Islamic justifications. Therefore, from the historical, pan-Arab, and religious perspective, Egypt’s regional role is inevitable. The second school of public opinion, which is associated with the slogan, “Egypt First,” rejects these “imperatives.” It emphasizes instead the importance of the national interest of Egypt and Egyptian national security as the sole determinants of Egypt’s regional policies.

The national-Nasirist and the Islamic schools have been critical of both the Egyptian policymakers and the school of “Egypt First.” These accusations have ranged from defeatism to collusion and conspiracy with other international parties against Arab interests and the Palestinian cause.

Although we cannot ignore the connection between the developments in the Palestinian problem and its influence on Egyptian national security, one cannot give credit to the national and Islamic groups in their assessment of Egyptian national security. They depart from a vague understanding of Egypt’s security, and they set high standards for Egypt’s regional policies. Their assessment contains problematic concepts regarding Egypt’s regional role and the relationship between the state and those acting under the state. They also depart from a muddled understanding of foreign policy, considering it to be determined in the first place by the states and not by non-state actors.

In this context, it is logical that the supporters of this school argue that Egyptian regional policy during the last three decades has failed, particularly since the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. They base this conclusion on standards regarding the achievement of goals such as “building an effective regional Arab system” (keeping in mind that for them effectiveness here only means adopting a confrontational Arab policy against Israel), the imposition of a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or other objectives which they consider to be the fundamental (perhaps the only) standards by which to assess Egypt’s foreign policy.
However, failing to achieve any of the previously mentioned goals does not necessarily signify that Egyptian regional policy has been ineffective. Egypt's regional policy has succeeded in maintaining at least the framework and public perceptions of Arab regional order, and in preventing the collapse of this framework. It also has sustained the dialogue on how to make the framework operational, and has maintained the Palestinian issue as a pivotal issue in the Middle East.

In other words, the Egyptian foreign policymaker has accepted — in light of his clear awareness of the size of national capabilities and the real ability of the Arab regional organization within the structure of the distribution of these capacities at the international level — to preserve the minimum of these objectives, or at least maintain the basic conditions for the logical continuation of Arab discourse on vital Arab issues.

Egypt could not have achieved these goals — although modest from the standpoint of supporters of Egypt's more dominant regional role — without its policymakers having managed most of the crises in the Middle East effectively, both those concerning Egypt specifically and those related to the regional order as a whole. To a large extent, there has been a normative logic to the manner in which the Egyptian administration has dealt with such crises.

In this context, three such crises are instructive: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the assassination attempt on Egyptian President Husni Mubarak in Addis Ababa in June 1995, and the December 2008-January 2009 crisis in Gaza. In spite of the differences between these three crises, the important commonality in the way Egypt managed them is the long-term perception of the implications of Egypt's behavior on the concepts and basic principles of the Arab regional structure and on the Palestinian issue.

Egypt's participation in the international coalition liberating Kuwait, in the final analysis, illustrated its determination to preserve the basic concepts on which “the Arab regional organization” was established: first and foremost, the respect for the sovereignty of the member states; regional integration and respect for the members of the organization; non-interference in internal affairs; and resistance to the use of force or the threat of force to settle bilateral disputes and differences.

Had Egyptian decision-makers sided with Arab factions that took ambiguous positions on the principle of invasion and the use of force, that could have led to the elimination of these important principles and could have established different norms not only contrary to the rules and the experiences of the foundations of regional systems, but also to the rules and principles of international law.

In order to determine whether Egyptian decision-makers managed this crisis effectively, analytically it might be useful to distinguish between the issue of the Iraqi invasion and that of the use of force against Iraq. Here two questions arise.

First, had the Egyptian position — together with the Arab camp that rejected the invasion — provided the necessary and suf-
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ficient condition that justified the use of military force against Iraq? And second, was the position of some Arab states in favor of the invasion a sufficient condition for the prevention of international forces from the use of armed force against Iraq?

Perhaps the answer to these questions reflects the large difference between the position towards the invasion and the use of armed force against Iraq, and thus the differentiation between the Egyptian position and the use of force; considering them to be two distinct issues decided largely by different determinants. To be sure, Egyptian foreign policymakers, in spite of their efforts, were unable to halt the use of military force against Iraq. But the use of force was dictated by certain parameters, the most important of which was the shift in the nature of the international order both at the level of its values and standards and at the level of the distribution of economic and military capacities in the region. Furthermore, the Iraqi invasion posed a threat to the national security of other Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, which saw in the international powers the main mechanism to meet this threat, keeping in mind that Egypt was not an original party to the crisis. Nevertheless, Egypt was able to gain recognition for the important idea of maintaining the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of the Arab regional order, as established during the decades prior to the invasion.

The same analysis applies to the way Egypt dealt with the second crisis, which could conceivably have evolved in the same way as the first crisis, including the possibility of using military force against the Sudanese regime. Considering the deterioration of Sudanese-American relations during that period, triggering the US to take advantage of this crisis against Sudan as evidenced by the rapid adoption of Security Council resolutions on that occasion (Resolutions 1044, 1054, 1070), the Egyptian foreign policymaker was able to stop the escalation of the crisis towards a military action. This was due to a number of factors (especially the fact that Egypt was a party to the crisis), whether by standing strong in the face of some of the demands of Egyptian internal opinion calling for escalation against the Sudanese regime, or a vote to oppose the Egyptian-imposed sanctions against the Sudanese regime.

In the case of the recent crisis in Gaza, if Egypt had cut diplomatic relations with Israel and opened the crossings, heed-ing the demands of the “Egypt’s regional role” camp and in response to Egyptian public opinion and the appeals to the army of Hassan Nasrallah, such actions undoubtedly would have led to confusion in the regional order. Such actions would have confronted us with entirely different strategic results, perhaps the most serious of which would be to hand over the keys of the region to non-state actors (e.g., Hamas, Hizbullah, and other radical religious movements), to legitimize the Iran-Hamas-Hizbullah “axis,” and perhaps lead to open war in the region.

An analysis of Egyptian strategy in dealing with such crises yields two important insights. First, it reveals the ability of Egyptian foreign policymakers to take pragmatic policies and positions, in contrast with the non-traditional regional policies of many of the other regional actors. Second, it reveals the ability of Egyptian foreign policymakers to manage most crises with considerable autonomy from the public orientations of the internal political factions.
The 1978 Camp David Accords signed by Anwar Sadat, Menachem Begin, and Jimmy Carter were a watershed in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They shattered one of the most deep-set assumptions shared by Arabs and Israelis: that it was impossible to reach a political accommodation based on painful concessions by the two national communities. Camp David offered both a model for resolving the conflict with Israel and made clear the cost of attaining peace. The signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel six months later was a crucial breach made by key parties in the wall of Israeli-Arab hostility. The actions of Israeli and Egyptian leaders were needed to remove more and more bricks from that wall, bit by bit, even though at the same time other actions they took set new bricks in place. For neither side could ignore events taking place in the adjacent portions of the wall. Egypt was and is a major Arab state and Israel was and is engaged in ongoing confrontation with most of the Arab peoples, notably the Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese. Continuing violence and antagonism between Israel and Arabs, mainly the Palestinians, steadily eroded the Egyptian-Israeli relationship. All along, Arab and Israeli detractors slammed the Camp David formula on a variety of grounds, reinforcing the uncorroborated impression that only the governments were committed to the signed agreements whereas the peoples remained skeptical.

Peace with Israel should be examined in the context of the overall re-orientation of Egypt’s domestic, regional, and global policies. More than any other term, the “Open Door” (al-infitah) policy expresses the fundamental transformation that began in Egypt during the end of the 1970s. According to this policy, there is a direct linkage between the possibility of achieving stability on the borders along with accomplishing economic relief and decreasing the domestic challenges that the society and regime are facing. As part of this process, a strategic alliance evolved between Egypt and the United States, which included intensive American economic, military, and technological aid to Egypt.

The Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was the cornerstone of America’s position in the Middle East. From the end of the 1970s, the US increasingly emerged as the lighthouse for leaders navigating their way out of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Peace with Israel was part of a package deal consisting of economic, military, and political components. “Pax Americana” in the Middle East was to serve both the interests of the parties seeking a political settlement and US interests. Mutual interests have formed the background for the foundation of the special relations between Egypt and the United States. Despite differences of opinion on many issues, Egypt-US relations...
have been strengthened over the last three decades. Relations with the United States and, as a part of them, the peace with Israel were and still are basic factors in Egypt's orientation of its internal, foreign, and security policies.

However, over the past few years, Egyptian society has become increasingly critical of US Middle East policy. There is incessant criticism in Egypt of what is perceived as American double standards in policymaking. The claim has been that the American government did not hesitate to use political, military, or other means against countries such as Iraq and Syria, yet refrained from taking similar actions while Israel was breaching international agreements and harming Arabs in general, and Palestinians in particular. (Examples cited in Egypt were Israel's excessive use of force against the Palestinian population, its evasion of commitments according to the agreements signed with various Arab parties, and its refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty). Many Egyptians believe that Zionist and Israeli individuals and institutions played an integral role in determining Egyptian-American relations. Despite this, even today, the conditions and needs that caused the United States and Egypt to develop such broadly based relations still exist. At the same time, the relations between both countries will consistently be re-examined.

The peace and mutual interests between Egypt and Israel have stood the test of sharp challenges. The sides have remained faithful to their obligations, in spite of President Sadat's assassination and the outbreak of Israeli-Arab violence, particularly during the war in Lebanon and the first and second Intifada. Cairo holds Israel as mainly responsible for the deterioration in the peace process — primarily because of what the Egyptian public and leadership see as provocative policies by Israel's government. These include delays in fulfilling agreements with the Palestinians and unilateral acts such as its settlement activities, as well as Israel's ongoing military operations, primarily in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Although these challenges placed great stress on the fragile relations between Egypt and Israel, they did not change their fundamental approach and commitment to the agreements between them.

The changes in US Middle Eastern policy since September 2001, the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation at Camp David (July 2000), the al-Aqsa Intifada, and the confrontation between Israel and Hamas has marked the low ebb in the relations between Israelis and Palestinians. Israel's assault on Gaza Strip (December 2008-January 2009) put Husni Mubarak's regime under heavy conflicting pressures, an expression of which is the growing gap between the leaders and general public opinion. While the public pushes the government to give a strong helping hand to the Palestinians, the government finds itself in the very difficult situation of trying to promote the view that Hamas' control of Gaza threatens Egypt's national security, while seeing the disproportional use of force by Israel as a danger to the stability of Egypt and the region as a whole. Egypt's leaders have placed the efforts to put an end to the dangerous cycle of violence between Israel and the Palestinians as the top priority of their current policy. In this context, Egypt welcomed President Barack Obama's commitment to accelerate US involvement in the search for stability and peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Egypt expected Washington to oblige Israel to moderate its positions, as well as to restrain its use of power against the Arabs. Furthermore, Egypt's leadership believes that a continuation of the current escalation undermines the foundations of the two pillars of peace: certainty and stability. A lack of certainty and stability is seen by Egypt as having threatening ramifications not only for the Israelis and Palestinians, but also for Egypt itself and for the whole Middle East.
“The External in the Arab world is Internal.”¹ This expression underscores the centrality of foreign policy issues in the domestic politics of the Arab world. This was true during the colonial period when most Arab countries were still subject to colonial rule and when international relations between great powers had a direct impact on the fortunes of these countries. However, even after independence, foreign policy issues have continued to occupy a central place in the domestic debate in most Arab countries, arguably much more so than in the rest of the post-colonial or developing world.

This paradigm is especially true in the case of questions of war and peace with Israel, particularly in those countries that have been directly affected by the Arab-Israeli conflict, namely Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. However, even those Arab countries that are geographically removed from the conflict such as the Maghrib countries and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are not unaffected by the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Questions of war and peace with Israel have been a constant fixture in the domestic debate in Egypt since the 1940s and have often constituted the main fault line between different political forces in Egyptian society. The demise of the Egyptian monarchy through the actions of the Free Officers movement in July 1952 has been directly attributed to the defeat of the Egyptian military by Israel during the 1948 war.

Anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism became central features of the new governing Arab nationalist ideology adopted by the Nasir regime in Egypt. This tendency was further reinforced after the successful nationalization of the Suez Canal and the failure of the tripartite aggression on Egypt in 1956. However, the devastating defeat of the Egyptian military in the 1967 war with Israel dealt a lethal blow to the Nasirist project. Despite the defeat, Arab nationalism as an ideology continued to enjoy wide resonance among broad segments of the Egyptian and Arab publics. Anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism were also incorporated into the discourse of Islamist opposition groups, which have become important players in Egyptian politics since the 1970s.

During the 1970s and particularly after the 1973 war, which was perceived as the first military success by the Egyptian military against Israel, then-Egyptian President Anwar

¹. Nahla Shalal, Workshop on Critical Dialogs between Islamists and Secularists in the Arab World, Cairo, January 2009.
Sadat effected a fundamental reorientation of Egyptian domestic and regional politics. On the domestic level, Sadat oversaw limited economic and political liberalization. On the international level, he shifted Egypt’s alliances away from the Soviet bloc towards the United States and Europe. Sadat also pursued a negotiated settlement with Israel in order to reclaim the Sinai. In 1977, Sadat made a groundbreaking visit to Jerusalem to demonstrate his willingness to pursue peace and normalization of relations with Israel.

The 1977 visit to Jerusalem and the subsequent signing of the Camp David Accords and the peace treaty with Israel in 1979, created an important fault line in the Egyptian domestic debate. On one side of the debate were those who supported the peace treaty and the proposed normalization of economic and cultural relations with Israel. On the other side were those who opposed a separate peace with Israel in the absence of a comprehensive and fair resolution of the overall conflict, and those who opposed peace with Israel altogether.

Polarization over peace with Israel continued as a result of the persistence of the conflict on other fronts. Periodic outbreaks of violence such as the 1981 Israeli bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel, the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada in 1987, the 1996 Qana massacre in Lebanon, the failure of the peace process and the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000, the Israel-Hizbullah war in July 2006, and most recently the Israeli attack on Gaza in December 2008, have kept the debate over peace very much alive. Such events have continued to empower radicals in the opposition and to give force to their arguments that peace with Israel is illusory. Moreover, forces in the opposition have capitalized on these incidents to mobilize against the ruling regime, which they portray as complicit in objectionable Israeli policies and which they often accuse of treason for not reacting forcefully to Israeli actions. The assassination of Sadat in 1981 by a member of the militant Islamic group al-Jihad was in large measure a reaction to the peace treaty with Israel.

Upon assuming power in 1981, President Husni Mubarak attempted to balance conflicting international commitments and domestic pressures by adopting a strategy of cold peace vis-à-vis Israel. This strategy entailed respecting the terms of the treaty while refraining from pursuing economic and cultural relations with Israel. Moreover, the Mubarak regime tried to position itself as a mediator between Israel and the Palestinians, and invested considerable time and resources trying to push the two sides to reach a final settlement. Finally, during periods of heightened conflict, and in order to assuage public opinion, the Mubarak regime often adopted a strong rhetorical position against Israel in the media and took some punitive actions such as recalling the Egyptian ambassador from Israel.

After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the consequent ascendance of Iran and its regional allies as a threat to the status quo, the Egyptian regime began to abandon its balancing strategy in favor of closer cooperation with Israel.
Shehata...

In 2005, the Egyptian government signed a trade agreement with the US which requires closer economic cooperation between Egypt and Israel. Moreover, an Egyptian company with close ties to the government has signed a controversial agreement to export natural gas to Israel at subsidized prices. Finally, common opposition to Hamas, Hizbullah, and Iran has led to increased security cooperation between the two countries. This was made manifest during the recent attack on Gaza when the Egyptian government refrained from taking actions against Israel, even those of a symbolic nature.

Growing regional polarization and increased cooperation with Israel have led to increased domestic polarization in Egypt and have significantly widened the gap between the regime and its domestic allies on the one hand, and Islamist and nationalist forces in the opposition on the other. Such polarization continues to divert attention away from domestic issues of democratic reform and economic development. This was most recently demonstrated when a number of opposition MPs withdrew nine requests to Parliament to discuss the question of education in order to extend the discussion of the Israeli attack on Gaza.

Clearly, domestic polarization over questions of peace and normalization with Israel has impeded political and economic progress in Egypt. The absence of any real movement towards the resolution of the conflict and the periodic outbreaks of violence has discredited moderate voices and enabled radical forces to gain strength and credibility. Such conditions create an environment hostile to positive progress in the areas of democracy and economic development in Egypt.
Troubled Borders: Egypt’s Lonely Predicament after Gaza

Adam Robert Green

If the bulldozing of Gaza demonstrated the determination of Israel and Hamas to persist with familiar strategies, it also revealed the lonely predicament of Egypt. From Israel’s formation in 1948 to the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Egypt was intent on Israel’s destruction. Yet following Egypt’s defeat that year, President Anwar Sadat set in motion a process that culminated in the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979, thereby making Egypt the first Arab state to officially recognize Israel. Two years later Sadat was assassinated, but his successor Husni Mubarak continued a trajectory of normalization with Israel. By 1991, Foreign Minister ‘Amr Musa remarked that peace with Israel was “not a luxury but a need.” Even as violence against Israel prevailed along all other borders, Egypt acted as negotiator, mediator, and critic of both Israeli and Palestinian militancy. The tenability of that approach, however, has come under strain since the recent conflict in Gaza.

Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, recognizing that the return of the region to the Palestinians was the *sin qua non* of a political resolution. Yet far from appeasing the Palestinians, Israel’s withdrawal strengthened the extreme wing of the resistance. Hamas, which formed out of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood in 1988 to pursue the annihilation of Israel, obtained power by election in 2006. Hamas’ ascendancy and kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June of that year, provoked the return of Israeli forces, which enforced a crippling economic blockade, restricted trade, and carried out military operations against Hamas forces. Israel’s blockade was an attempt to undermine the leadership of Hamas, and forcibly convince the population of a semi-independent Gaza to adhere to the more moderate political character and ideals of the West Bank’s Fatah (whose political objective is a return to the pre-1967 borders only, not the destruction of Israel proper).

Hamas responded by speculative missile attacks which, apart from the fragile truce brokered by Egypt in the summer of 2008, provoked Israel to tighten the blockade. Hamas, in turn, stepped up its offensive and launched nearly 300 rockets and mortars into southern Israel between the 19th and 27th of December. Israel’s response took the world by surprise. Sixty-four combat aircraft dropped 108 laser-guided munitions on 40 Hamas targets, commencing a broad operation intended to deal ‘painful and surgical blows’ to the Hamas infrastructure. Israeli planes, soldiers, and tanks attacked Rafah on the Egypt border, South Gaza, the Islamic University in Gaza City, Zaytun, Bayt Hanun, Jabalya, and Bayt Lahiya before entering the myriad streets and alleys to fight tooth and nail against Hamas. But “Operation Cast Lead” caused the deaths of many hundred Palestinian civilians, the wounding of thousands more, and a collapse of electricity and aid.
supplies across Gaza. Israel’s rage and the impossible precision required for fighting Hamas soldiers operating within the civilian population proved to be a catastrophic combination.

No state or international body intervened. The awkwardness of a presidential transition and the United States’ ultimate allegiance to Israel rendered it ineffective. Iran, meanwhile, plainly subsidises Hamas and its objectives. The United Nations — the only “impartial” body — was roundly ignored in its calls for a ceasefire. The only positively neutral entity (in the sense of being to some degree committed to both sides instead of neither) is Egypt, but its predicament is extremely awkward in light of its demographic composition and zigzagging history of allegiance.

Egypt supports the Palestinians’ rights to Gaza, but opposes Hamas for three main reasons. The militants regularly breach the Egypt-Gaza border when smuggling weapons through underground tunnels, they operate autonomously in Egyptian territory, and most importantly they embody the worrisome spread of Iranian influence. So fraught is the relationship that on occasion Turkey has had to mediate between Egypt and Hamas as Egypt tries to mediate between Hamas and Israel. Since the Egypt of today prefers to strengthen relations with the US, the EU, and, broadly speaking, the “global North,” it stands to gain from the destruction of Hamas. However, the massive loss of Palestinian civilian life in Gaza made condemning Hamas a risky business. Egypt’s predominantly Muslim population demanded the government rather denounce Israel as well as open the Rafah border to aid and movement (turning a blind eye to the smuggling of arms that would follow). While senior Egyptian figures did criticize Israel, with the Foreign Minister Ahmad Abul Ghayt criticizing its disregard for international consensus in pursuing the attack, the government kept the border sealed. Anti-government demonstrations flared up; Egyptian police quelled street protests in the Fatah and Azhar mosques in Cairo. The government appeared even more isolated when Saudi Arabia, which enjoys a comparatively good relationship with the United States and frequently rebuts Iranian calls to arms against Israel, put regional differences aside in denouncing the Zionist state in stronger terms than Egypt had.

Undeterred, Mubarak, along with Ghayt, Nicolas Sarkozy, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and others, are now attempting to implement an ‘international’ policing of the Israel-Egypt border crossings, a military presence that would detect new digging and monitor the Sinai Peninsula for aboveground smuggling. Such a presence would be both pragmatic, preventing Hamas from importing arms into Gaza and provoking further IDF attacks, and symbolic, sending a powerful message that Egypt does not support terrorism. But while such a message may be well received in Brussels or Washington, it will provoke anger at home. Egypt’s Muslim population will resent the government’s attempt to gain political leverage out of a conflict whose greatest victims are innocent Palestinian Muslims. Furthermore, if Egypt fails to prevent Hamas from smuggling arms into Gaza (a likely scenario, given the assistance Hamas receives from Sinai Bedouins, who receive handsome payment for digging tunnels), Egypt will be in the worst of all possible positions — criticized by Arab nations for supporting Israel and criticized by the “global North” for turning a blind eye to Hamas. If Mubarak accomplishes the near impossible goal of securing the border without alienating his own population, Egypt’s achievement will be immense.
III. Fruits of Peace
The Economic Impact of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty

Paul Rivlin

This essay examines the development of economic relations between Egypt and Israel since the signing of the peace treaty in 1979, with emphasis on trade between the two countries. The first and most important point is often forgotten: The treaty was followed by 30 years of peace between two countries that had fought five wars. It brought to an end huge human and economic losses; this has been its main benefit, recognized as such by the governments of the two countries.

The treaty envisaged the development of economic, cultural, and other relations between the two countries. In addition, Egypt pledged to sell oil to Israel. Oil sales have taken place despite periods of tension between the two countries. Both sides have benefitted from the exchange, which significantly reduced fuel transport costs for Israel. Trade in other goods and services has been very limited and the levels disappointing. The main reason for the low level of bilateral trade in goods was Egypt's unwillingness to trade with Israel. Egypt closed its public sector to Israeli companies and limited its private sector, too. Tourism has been entirely one-sided because Egyptians were essentially prohibited from visiting Israel by their government. The number of Israelis visiting Egypt has been limited by threats of terrorism and by media hostility in Egypt, though since 1979 thousands of Israelis have visited Egypt, especially Sinai. Scheduled flights between the two countries have been maintained, although the Cairo-Tel Aviv bus service no longer operates. With American encouragement, the two countries cooperated in the construction and running of an experimental agricultural village in Egypt using Israeli know-how and technology. For many years, agriculture was the leading sector in cooperation between the two countries, but in recent years its importance has receded. At the end of 2004, the Egyptian, Israeli, and US governments signed an agreement to create eight “Qualified Industrial Zones” (QIZs) in Egypt that came into force in February 2005. The agreement permits goods made in Egypt with a specified minimum Israeli content to enter the US duty free. As there is no free trade agreement between Egypt and the US, Egyptian exports to the US are subject to duties and other restrictions. The QIZ agreement has made it possible to expand industrial exports and create thousands of jobs — vital to the Egyptian economy.

The QIZs are located in the Greater Cairo area, in Alexandria, and in Port Said on the Suez Canal. In order for goods to have duty-free access to US markets, they must contain a minimum 11.7% Israeli share in the value added. The method of calculation is designed to encourage a wide range of activities. Two Israeli clothing factories in Egypt lie in these zones. In 2005, it was reported that 15,000 jobs had been created in Egypt as a result of...
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Rivlin...

the trilateral agreement. Egyptian apparel exports to the US rose by 5.3%. According to official Egyptian sources, without QIZs, Egyptian garment exports to the United States would have decreased in 2005 under the pressure of Chinese competition. In 2004, Egyptian exports of textiles, textile products, and garments were $563 million. In 2005, they increased by nearly 9% to $613 million and in 2006 they rose by 31% to $806 million. During the first nine months of 2006, Egyptian apparel exports to the US reached $464 million, 46% higher than in the same period in 2005. In 2005, 93 Egyptian garment exporters participated in QIZs; in 2006, their number rose to 160. In the first nine months of 2007, the volume of the Egyptian QIZ exports to the USA reached $580 million, a 23.2% rise compared with the same period in 2006.

As QIZ-related activities increase and new geographical areas grow more dedicated to and competitive at exporting to the US market, more QIZ zones may be added to the already-existing ten QIZs, upon the approval of the government of the United States. In early 2005, the QIZs started operating in seven designated industrial locations in Egypt. Starting with an initial 397 qualified companies in these seven locations, QIZs have rapidly expanded to encompass over 15 currently designated industrial zones, with nearly 700 qualified companies, and more qualifying each quarter, amounting to more than $1 billion annual revenues.

In 2000-2004, Israeli exports to Egypt averaged $38 million a year and were on a downward trend. In 2005-2008 they averaged an estimated $128 million annually, in large part because of the QIZ agreement. In 2000-2004, Egyptian exports to Israel (excluding oil) averaged $22 million a year and in 2005-2008 they averaged $90 million (including fresh vegetables, raw cotton, textiles, wood products, and chemicals). This was not directly related to the QIZs and reflected the improvement of economic relations between the two countries. It also confirms research findings that the potential for trade in goods other than oil and gas is greater than was traditionally thought. The figures for the first half of 2008 show a slight decline in trade, but it is too early to know what the significance of this is.

In 2005, Egypt and Israel signed a $2.5 billion preliminary agreement on sales of Egyptian natural gas to Israel. Egypt agreed to supply 1.7 billion cubic meters, or 60 billion cubic feet, of natural gas a year via an undersea pipeline from the north Egyptian town of al-‘Arish to the southern Israeli coastal city of Ashkelon. Included were options to extend the 15-year deal a further five years and to increase the quantity by 25%. In 2006 the Egyptian-Israeli consortium, EMG, began laying down a 100-kilometer undersea pipeline to bring the gas from al-‘Arish to Ashkelon, at a cost of $470 million. The work ended in 2007, and gas began to flow on May 1, 2008, though there have been interruptions because of gas shortages in Egypt, disputes about prices, and possibly because of political reasons.

Economic relations have not become a basis for closer links between the two states of a kind that will prevent or reduce conflict as occurred with the creation of the European Economic Community. In fact economic relations have been the victim of political developments. The QIZ agreement has jump-started economic relations, but political problems remain. The potential for further developing bilateral economic relations exists. Nevertheless, it will depend on political developments, especially an understanding that the gains from trade accrue to both sides.
Cairo Peace Society: A Failed Attempt at Creating an Arab-Israeli Peace Lobby

Iman A. Hamdy

This essay seeks to shed light on a brief episode in Egyptian-Israeli relations represented in the activities of the Cairo Peace Society from 1998 to 2000. The significance of this experience far exceeds its brief history since it marks the only attempt at creating an alliance between Arab and Israeli “peace groups,” the failure of which reveals the incompatibilities of Arab and Israeli visions of peace.

Twenty years after the signing of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, the Cairo Peace Society was established in 1998 by 30 Egyptian intellectuals, academics, and businessmen. It was founded as the counterpart of the Israeli Peace Now movement with the objective of creating an Egyptian “peace lobby” that could work with like-minded Israelis to create a social environment conducive to peace and suggest common ground for their governments to build on while negotiating a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The society constituted the Egyptian chapter of the International Alliance for Arab-Israeli Peace established in Copenhagen in 1997 following two years of informal talks between Egyptian, Israeli, Palestinian, and Jordanian intellectuals and politicians under the auspices of the Danish Foreign Ministry. Headed by the late ex-ambassador and lawyer Salah Bassiyuni, it soon acquired “unofficial legality” as President Husni Mubarak met with its members and declared his full support for their initiative that sought to win over Israeli public opinion for the cause of peace. Soon afterwards, it was licensed by the Ministry of Social Affairs in an exceptionally short time despite the difficulties and restrictions imposed by the government on the establishment of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The two most important events carried out by the society were a joint meeting with Peace Now in Cairo in June 1998 which issued a statement on the principles of peace in the region, and the sponsorship of a widely publicized international conference on peace in July 1999 that hosted Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian, and international figures to promote the enhancement of the peace process shortly after Ehud Barak came to power. The aim of these two activities was to target the Israeli public and enhance the position of the Israeli peace camp within its own society by showing that the Arab peoples were also interested in peace.

While the foundation of the society was welcomed by the government, it was met with a great deal of suspicion and hostility among the Egyptian public, especially as it touched upon the very sensitive and controversial issue of normalization with Israel. Many sus-
pected that the society had close links with the political authorities due to the speed with which it had acquired its official status. Hence, the image the society had was that of an elitist group imposed from above, thus lacking credibility and unworthy of public attention. In fact, had it not been for the media campaign launched against the society by its opponents, it almost would have gone unnoticed. Meanwhile, despite the fact that the majority of the Egyptian people support peace, they nonetheless are against conducting relations with Israel until the Palestinian issue is resolved. As successive Israeli governments have proven over the years that they have no interest in ending their occupation of the Palestinian Territories, the call for any sort of dialogue with its people seems futile for most Egyptians. Moreover, those who engage in these activities are driven to be on the defensive and are subject to accusations that they are normalizing relations with the Zionist state.

The most adamant opposition to normalization still comes from intellectuals and professional syndicates, the same constituency to which members of the society belonged. That is one of the reasons for the uproarious opposition of intellectuals to this group, which culminated in the anti-normalization public conference held in Cairo on the same day that the Cairo Peace Society hosted the July 1999 conference. For its part, the movement did little to address these criticisms and promote its vision in Egypt. Its activities mostly took the form of closed seminars with “selected” intellectuals to discuss peace-related issues and exchanged visits with Peace Now members. A prominent Egyptian intellectual noted that had the Cairo Peace Society declared that it was working on behalf of the government to create a peace lobby in Israel, it would have been well-received by the people as a patriotic endeavor. But its insistence on being an NGO calling for dialogue between peoples when the Israeli government was consistently usurping the rights of the Palestinian people made it seem, in the eyes of its opponents, a treacherous voice that betrayed the Arab cause.

Despite the criticisms it faced at home, the Cairo Peace Society continued to be active until the eruption of the 2000 Intifada, which proved to be a deadly challenge to the creation of the Arab-Israeli peace lobby. Failing to issue a joint statement with Peace Now condemning what the Egyptians saw as the excessive violence employed by the Israeli government against the Palestinian people, the Cairo Peace Society decided to sever relations with its Israeli counterpart. In their view, the unwillingness of Peace Now and the Israeli “left” in general to stand against their government’s brutality indicated their lack of commitment to the cause of peace. Meanwhile, Peace Now accused the Cairo Peace Society of being interested in dialogue only when “the sun is shining and the sky is blue.” Here it became clear that the two sides had different visions with regard to this endeavor. The Israelis thought of dialogue as an end in itself (i.e., to maintain bridges with the Arabs and enhance warm relations between the two sides), while the Egyptians considered it a means to create a peace lobby in Israel that could pressure the government to put an end to occupation and accept the creation of a Palestinian state. In this sense, both sides proved to be speaking different languages.
For a United and Multicultural Middle East

Levana Zamir

It all began on November 19, 1977, when President Anwar Sadat landed at Ben-Gurion Airport. After 30 years of war and bloodshed between Israel and the Arab countries, a dream had come true. I remember the intense emotion. Thousands of Israeli citizens in the streets acclaimed the ra’is on his way to Jerusalem. For two days, millions all over the world watched TV reports of this visit and witnessed a beautiful page being written in history.

In the face of Sadat’s act of heroism, the Israeli leaders of 1977 bravely took up the challenge. They all agreed to sit down and talk, without preconditions, until a peace agreement was signed between Israel and Egypt in March 1979.

The exchange of embassies in Cairo and Tel Aviv in February 1980 led to the establishment of the Israel-Egypt Friendship Association, a non-profit organization in Israel. Like any other such association, it was formed with the intent of facilitating cultural exchange, the basis for a real and lasting peace.

During the first years, the enthusiasm from both sides was great and the cultural exchange fruitful and intensive, with many cultural activities in Israel as well as in Egypt. The Association initiated and organized numerous events, including cultural evenings in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem on Egyptian Literature, featuring Egyptian guests such as the renowned intellectuals Dr. Hussein Fawzi and Dr. Ahmed Gomaa. An Exhibition by the Egyptian painter Mahmoud Said was held at the National Theatre Habimah in Tel Aviv and was attended by the Egyptian Minister of Culture Mahmoud Radwan (February 1982). An Israeli-Egyptian Exhibition of paintings was held at the Meridien Hotel in Cairo in May 1982, under the auspices of the Egyptian Ministry of Culture and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Under the auspices of the Friendship Association, the National Egyptian Group of Folklore Dance gave a gala performance at the Mann Auditorium in Tel Aviv (1982), attended by Dr. Youssef Shawky, Deputy Minister of Minister of Culture; and an Egyptian play by Naguib Mahfouz was performed in Hebrew at the Haifa Theatre (1983). In addition, the Friendship Association hosted many official Egyptian guests on their visits to Israel.

As President of the Israel-Egypt Friendship Association, I had a personal meeting with Jehan Sadat, the wife of the president, at the Presidential Palace in Giza, Cairo (1982). I also met with Egyptian officials; together, we initiated joint cultural activities.
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Ezer Weizmann invited me to be part of his entourage on his visit to Cairo in December 1994.

However, during the years of “cold peace” and with the stagnation of Israel-Egypt normalization, cultural exchanges slowed down on the Egyptian side. The Association’s activities continued to take place, albeit in Israel only. We held many conferences on the Israel-Egypt Economy of Peace in order to encourage business between the two countries, with the participation of Egyptian ambassadors, Israeli ministers and professionals. We offered scholarships and grants to Israeli students for studies on Israel-Egypt relations. We also continue to hold annual gala events on Egyptian folklore and culture in Tel Aviv, in cooperation with the Egyptian Ambassador in Israel introducing oriental and Egyptian folklore to the Israeli public.

The QIZ Agreement (Qualified Industrial Zone), signed in December 2004 by Israel, Egypt, and the United States provided for an industrial joint venture allowing free trade of products to the United States, certainly warmed Israeli-Egyptian relations. In the third millennium, ideological solutions no longer work.

Thirty years after the signing of the peace treaty, “normalization” between the Israeli and Egyptian governments continues developing in all fields except for culture. Egyptian artists’ and writers’ organizations still ban any kind of relationship with Israel. Normal interaction with Israeli citizens is out of the question. Those who do interact with Israelis are followed by the Mukhabarat (the Egyptian security authorities). A special permit is needed from the Egyptian Ministry of Interior for Egyptian citizens to visit Israel. Unless the permit is sought for official business, it is difficult to obtain.

Egyptian authorities’ opposition to normal interaction at the popular and cultural level with Israel is officially linked to the Palestinian conflict. Lately however, some Egyptian intellectuals have noticed that the authorities’ opposition to popular and cultural normalization reflects the latter’s concern about the “non-desirable” influence of Israeli liberalism. As a result, a number of these intellectuals have raised their voices about the importance of coexistence and the recognition of “the other.” In his book The Other Opinion, published in Egypt in 2001, Amin al-Mahdi, an Egyptian publicist in Cairo whose point of view often creates controversy in the Arab media, argues that only with a return to liberalism and democratic policy in Egypt could peace occur in the Middle East. He deplores the “second Exodus” of Jews from Egypt and the lack of normalization of relations between Egyptian and Israeli citizens: “A durable peace has to be established
on a basis of culture, historical roots and mutual influence as a bridge for mutual understanding.”

Amin al-Mahdi is not alone. In another book published in Cairo, *The Jews of Egypt*, Muhammad Abul-Ghar describes the prosperous era of the Egyptian Jews and their contribution to Egypt. This new trend is now reaching the Egyptian movie industry, with movies like *Imarat Yacoubiyan* (The Yacoubian Building) expressing longing for the liberal epoch in Egypt. In a recent interview on Egyptian TV, the famous artist Husayn Fahmi expressed openly his longing for the bygone age of monarchical liberalism in Egypt. In the second part of her film *Salata Baladi*, which received many international prizes but is still banned in Egypt, the courageous Egyptian producer and director Nadia Kamel asks: “Why is normalization with Israel still forbidden to Egyptian citizens, while the Egyptian Government is enjoying such normalization in almost every other field?”

Normalization between Egyptian and Israeli citizens at the popular and cultural level is the essential vehicle for fostering mutual recognition of “the other.” Unless and until normalization proceeds — enabling multicultural exchange and sharing of historical roots, arts, music, and folklore — mutual recognition and, therefore, the prospects for peace in the region will be further delayed.

A united and multicultural Middle East is not a new concept. During the London Conference in 1939, attended by representatives from all Arab countries, David Ben-Gurion — then Chairman of the Jewish Agency — advocated four guiding concepts. One was “a Jewish State willing to belong to a future Middle Eastern Confederation.” In the third millennium, when countries from the European continent are merging to become a single entity after years of animosity, the “Mediterranean Option” — Israel’s Western culture merging with its Oriental surroundings and Arab countries turning more towards the West (with each side retaining its own identity) — eventually could lead to peace in a united Middle East.
Agricultural Cooperation: A Prototype of Post-conflict Resolution

Samuel Pohoryles

Following Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, still in an atmosphere of national astonishment, teams were put together for normalization talks with Egypt. The foundations for agricultural cooperation were laid earlier. At a meeting of the Egyptian Agriculture Ministry’s directorate, in the meeting room that I later learned to know so well, Professor Yusuf Wali, then a scholar at Ain Shams University and an advisor to Agriculture Minister Muhammad Daoud, said, “there is no need to wander afar seeking advanced agricultural methods, because right here, nearby, we have a neighbor with advanced agriculture, with sophisticated technologies, new species of tomatoes, citrus and flowers. And some of them even speak Arabic. This is the fastest, the best and the cheapest way for us.”

In November 1979, the first visit of an Israeli agricultural delegation, headed by Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon, was prepared. At that time, there were no direct flights so we flew in a small military Dakota. In Cairo, I presented a detailed plan prepared by our teams, in the context of a presentation boasting Israel’s agricultural achievements and the potential for exchanging agricultural know-how with Egypt.

On March 24, 1980, the first official agreement for agricultural cooperation was signed with the participation of the Foreign Ministry. The discussion was substantive and concrete, and all the issues mentioned promptly turned into executive agenda items. The talks lasted twelve days. But on the very first day, the head of the Egyptian delegation, Dr. M. A. Kheireldin, addressed me with an important revelation: “you actually do not have horns!”

An important component of this agreement was the formation of the Joint Israel-Egypt Agriculture Committee as a statutory body to steer the overall activity. After the agreement was signed, the Israeli delegation left for a thorough, professional, detailed visit to Egypt. We agreed to launch the first development project of greenhouses in Gimiza, at the Delta, to serve 25 villages. We agreed on identifying additional areas for agricultural cooperation.

About a month later, I received an invitation to visit Sadat’s home village and his private home (where shortly thereafter we changed the nature of the crops and the irrigation). The President received us in his living room. Next to him was his deputy, Husni Mubarak. The President opened the meeting saying:

I have read a lot about the Israeli agriculture, about its tech-

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...technology, and in my opinion it is comprehensive. We need your strategic help to reform Egypt’s agriculture. It seems to me that your expertise is in developing vast arid areas. Which is why I propose to you: go to these regions — to Nubaria, to the Western Desert; to the region in which university graduates settled, between Alexandria and al-Alamein. This is your advantage. We need your help in fighting Rift Valley Fever, in exchanging scientists, in fruit orchards that you have developed, in species of fruit and vegetables.

During all the years of our activity in Egypt, we have set a principle that the Egyptians are the ones determining the emphases.

On May 19, 1981, a delegation headed by Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon left Israel for a meeting with Sadat. I left for Egypt on a flight a day earlier and stayed at the Meridian Hotel, while the minister and his entourage crossed the Suez Canal on a ferry loaded with watermelons and continued to Cairo in a vehicle. Sharon went through the path known to him from battle. President Sadat accepted Sharon’s proposals for development with great enthusiasm. Hence, in accordance with Egypt’s agricultural policy, we launched the Nubaria project, which included orchards, vegetables, melons, spices and other crops. With time, it accounted for 40% of the total apples grown in Egypt. Also added were peaches and melons of the Makedimon and Galia species.

In addition, we developed a series of trilateral projects, mainly with the University of California, San Diego, and the Hansen Institute for World Peace, aided by the Middle East Regional Cooperation Program (MERC), together with the German-Israel Fund and the governments of Denmark and the Netherlands. MERC and the Hansen Institute for World Peace invested $40 million in these projects. In addition, there was Egyptian funding of $20 million. Another $40 million were invested by private Israeli sources in private projects and farms. The cumulative impact is impressive.

This is how the projects developed:

The Cooperative Arid Lands Agricultural Research (CALAR) program, in cooperation with The University of California, San Diego, together with the Hansen Institute for World Peace, the Institutes for Applied Research of Ben Gurion University, including the Volcani Research Center, the Agriculture Faculty of Hebrew University and Egypt’s Ministry of Agriculture, Ain Shams University and the religious Al-Azhar University — lasted 13 years.

Models of agricultural technology exchanges at similar ecological systems — in cooperation with the US Department of Agriculture and professors from Stanford and St. Louis, Hebrew University’s Faculty of Agriculture and the two countries’ ministries of agriculture — lasted six years, yielding important results.

The Marriott agro-industrial project, which focused on agricultural development in new regions, on industry and settle-
Pohoryles...

ment, in a cooperative framework, similar to that of CALAR, with the added participation of the Einstein Foundation – lasted ten years.

Nubaseed — a very important project that was launched in 1986 in Nubaria at the Western Desert started with 280 dunams of vegetables and melon seeds in greenhouses and was broadened in two years to 600 dunams with extremely sophisticated irrigation. Peaches and apples were added, in cooperation with the Israeli Hazera Company — lasted about 18 years.

The regional veterinarian project started as a five-year project with a budget of some $4 million and lasted about ten years.

Chronologically, the first and only project in the Delta at Gimiza, near Tanta, in partnership with the Agridev company, lasted eight years and was a unique pilot project of sophisticated technology for Delta farmers.

Some 2,500 Egyptian university graduates received joint training at three facilities in Israel — Brur Hayil, Rehovot and Shfayim — and at the Egyptian Training Center in Marriott.

In May 1989, the US Department of Agriculture invited me to Washington for an award ceremony, to receive the US government’s award for “outstanding dedication to building strong relationships among Egypt, Isarel and the United States in the agricultural sciences.” The ceremony was held on July 10, with the participation of Agriculture Secretary Clayton Yeutter. Similar honors were awarded to my colleague Muhammad Dessouki and to Congressman Henry Waxman, for demonstrating vision and leadership in developing legislation to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East, in the spirit of the biblical verse, “They will beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks.”

Today, following almost 30 years of agricultural cooperation, joint agricultural activity with Egypt still takes place, through the Peres Center for Peace and through other channels. The Peres Center runs, among other initiatives, the Wheat in the Service of Peace project to develop durum wheat in the East ‘Uwaynat region, the Red Palm Weevil project to protect palm trees, where most of the know-how comes from Egypt, a comprehensive project named the Integrated Crop Management Program, which focuses on tomatoes and strawberries, and the Dairy Farm Development project.

Agricultural cooperation with Egypt, which has been one of the first global prototypes of post-conflict resolution, helped create an infrastructure of agricultural relations, applicable in and outside our region. These working relations remained close and sustainable throughout political ups and downs and despite of numerous difficulties occurred. This ongoing partnership shows that cooperation between former enemies is feasible and even necessary. For the last 30 years it has benefited Egypt and Israel, and I had the privilege to see how it all started.
בנובמבר 1979, הוחלກلعוזון של לשחרה הלך ואריך שיריוווסת במקוון. לא עדיף ולא היה סימן יישור סדרות וט흡ות במטפס דקוק עבוק. סוחSdkן. שימיבתי מכונאת מפורעת אשת חכמה על כי היציבות של נברトー מכסה. בacimiento ההיאנית את חיביו הלך ואריך שיריוווסת במקוון, של-shared את הסוף מאריך בליגוונים. הסיוווה התנהלה מברך 12 ימים, ולא בראש בצע יראה של השיחות, כי את ראש המשאullah המצרית, מומחית הרלדיאן.
בנולי השבוע: "באמים לא קל קרינה!".

ב-24apur 1980 עם התום הסכם פורמל, ראשו, בשילוב משד ההז, על שיתוף פעולתה במקוון. מריכים שה强奸 במטפס ויה הכתובת העדדו הלך ואריך השיחות שילת יישור סדרות וט흡ות במטפס של מאריך בبقاء הסוף מאריך בשילוב משד ההז, על שיתוף פעולתן במקוון. מריכים שה强奸 במטפס ויה הכתובת העדדו הלך ואריך השיחות שילת יישור סדרות וט흡ות במטפס של מאריך בبقاء הסוף מאריך בשילוב משד ההז, על שיתוף פעולתן במקוון. מריכים שה强奸 במטפס ויה הכתובת העדדו הלך ואריך השיחות שילת יישור סדרות וט흡ות במטפס של מאריך בبقاء הסוף מאריך בשילוב משד ההז, על שיתוף פעולתן במקוון. מריכים שה强奸 במטפס ויה הכתובת העדדו הלכ

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63
Pohoryles (original Hebrew)...
Pohoryles (original Hebrew)...

فورים הקומפלקס האנזר-תנשיטי של מריצ'אר, יושב עسكان בفىיה הקלאים, בשטח
더שים, בתועשה ויתישבות, המסגרת شيئופית זומה - בחסות קר

יאנשטיין - נמשך 10鹬ים.

פורים חשב ביוון - מבטיח, יושב החולג ב-1986 בונרכיה במדבדה המשריצי התחל

עם 280 דוגם של ידועי קולנוע בישראל במתום והרחב תור שלחטי - 600 דוגם

ב㎜חריה מתاحتمال ביוון - זוספ על אפרסキー והופעות, עץ - בשיתוף עם תריצ

"הזור" הישראלי, ונמשך כ-18鹬ים.

פורים החתי הנוריה, האזורי החול כפרייקט לחתם שנותי ב-4-5יים, דולר ונמשך כ-10

שימש.

פורים החתי בנלד וארהוש ממקהלת כתוביות למישריה באזורי נוספים, בשיתוף

תריצ "אירניד", ונמשך 8 שנותי והיוו "חותרי" כפרייקט פילוט לטכנולוגיה מתוחכמת

לקלאמ, הלידותי.

- כ-2500 בגרי, יונייביטיסיוניט עגרי, הדרכה משותפת בשילושה מקדימה יישואלי

החבר של החוקר, ברוהמוב ובшимור - ברקמודה הדרכה מטרח, באזורי.

במא 1989 הודיע על מפרסד הקלאדות של איראניד התויה ב-5 דגמי בך, ממסומן "לושיגוץ

לטיקו הענקת אוט של ארנסו הבורית, יושב מעอง, על ידי המשリアル "עובר

מסוית" ייצא עם ממילש בתויה שיתוףקוק בתויה כל פרמי, ירשא ואיראניד התויה

בתויה מדרת הקלאדות." התויה התויה ב-10 השנים, ברקמודה התויה כליזון

יונס, ג'ובどのように קובלו במקבלי של עותי ממקדמת דסוקי הנורח הקיסר הנורא

וקדם, על גלי חוזן ומגנוזים בפיקוח התויה להודו השילום במטרה התויה תור

הдобס載ו על הפסיק התויה, "היתנה הרובוט לאתי והוניותה/tmpsונאן/.

כימו, לאחר כמות שלישים שנות וישוח ישים עד התויה, מתכנת פועל התויה הקלאית

משותפת עם ממציא, מנורת הפרל שלושה וזמ אבקсимה השיחים. מרכז פרד, מור

ביי ראש, את פוריצ'יט הקוליקות " الهندית_flow הוניס", לפי התויה:" המ qedRom מארח

יאונט, פוריצ'יט "היצוג ההדוק האדום" להגנה על עצי התויה השיחים, שוודור

המקדים, ובמעפג ממציא, פוריצ'יט מקוד מארח בשם "משמך גיולים משולב", שלול

ה➱מקדות שנبعثו ותות.She, פוריצ'יט פיתוח משק התויה.
Hosts and Guests under the Threat of Terror: Israelis and Egyptians in Sinai

Darya Maoz, Natan Uriely, and Arie Reichel

The relationships between tourists and locals in countries that have been traditionally unfriendly or hostile to each other are often examined by studies that utilize the “contact-hypothesis” concept.¹ The focus of these studies is on the results of tourist-host contact in terms of attitudinal change. For example, will Israeli tourists have a more positive image of Egyptians as a result of visiting Egypt? Yet, while these studies address the nature of the tourist-host contact as a determinant of tourists’ attitudinal change, they do not elaborate on the mechanism through which the nature of the contact is constructed and established. In the case of countries with a background of conflict, the host-guest contact might involve negative feelings, such as fear, hostility, or mistrust. It is clear that such feelings should be ignored — or at least suppressed — in order to create an appropriate ambiance for both the tourists and their hosts. To date, tourism studies have not investigated the behavioral mechanisms utilized by tourists and locals to develop a positive atmosphere, one that is detached from the existing tension between their countries. This study examines the encounter between Israeli-Jewish tourists and Egyptian hosts at tourist resorts in the Sinai Peninsula over a two-year period (2004-2006) which was marked by terror attacks.

Relying on qualitative research methods, such as participant observation, semi-structured in-depth interviews, and informal conversations with Israeli tourists and Egyptian hosts, this essay addresses the following questions:

- What behaviors do Israeli tourists and Egyptian service employees employ in order to construct an atmosphere conducive to relaxed tourism despite the geo-political conflicts and the threats of terror in the Sinai?
- Is the serene atmosphere constructed in the Sinai resorts resilient enough to endure the terror attacks that occurred in Sinai during the research period?
- Do the behaviors that construct the serene atmosphere reflect sincere feelings and attitudes?

With respect to the first question, the study reveals five practices through which both parties alike emphasize constructive elements of interaction and avoid possible impediments to peaceful encounters: avoiding conversation about politics, addressing Sinai as an isolated “ex-territory,” defining their relations as “friendship,” stressing cultural similarities, and distinguishing between “good” and “bad” Israelis and Egyptians. The capability of both guests and hosts to suspend negative attitudes and to construct a “bubble of serenity” in this region corresponds to their tourism-related interests. The quest of Israeli tourists for an inexpensive and relaxed vacation and the readiness of the Egyptian service employees to supply it for economic benefits overcomes decades of hostility between the nations of these individuals. Both parties appear to understand the importance of positive interactions for their tourism-related interests and, thus, seek such a positive tone in their interactions. In this regard, tourism appears to be an appropriate venue for initiating normalization processes between countries with a history of conflict.

The answer to the second question regarding the resilience of the “bubble of serenity” concerns the dimension of time. Specifically, the study reveals a cyclical pattern in which the behaviors that construct the peaceful encounters were provisionally abandoned after terrorist attacks and then gradually reinstated as soon as the crisis subsided. The tendency of both parties to burst the “bubble of serenity” right after the terror attacks sheds light on the limited resilience of the bubble. Specifically, it seems that the bubble is not resilient enough to endure obstructions, such as the terror attacks that occurred in Sinai during 2004-2006. The burst of the bubbles indicates that when major external occurrences, such as terror attacks, transcend a certain threshold they change the situational circumstances and consequently affect the nature of the guest-host encounter. Apparently, paramount forces external to tourism cannot be excluded from the analysis of guest-host encounters.

Yet, the data of this study also reveals that as soon as the crisis subsides, the bubble is quickly re-created, pointing to its resilient nature. Thus, from the perspective of a two-year period, the revealed cyclical pattern of shattering and reinstating the bubble suggests that the bubble appears to be rather resilient. Overall, these cyclical patterns capture the ambivalent nature of tourism: a phenomenon that consists of provisional manifestations of human behavior but responses to durable needs, such as tourists’ desire for pleasure and the hosts’ desire for economic benefits.

The answer to the question of whether the practices that construct the bubble of serenity reflect upon genuine or insincere attitudes and practices remains elusive. The inclination of guests and hosts to abandon the bubble practices right after the terror attacks does not necessarily provide evidence for the practices’ supposed inauthentic nature. The tendency of both parties to perform or alternatively to avoid the aforementioned five bubble practices appears to be less related to their genuine or insincere nature and more related to events. Specifically, the practices that construct the bubble as well as the attitudes and behaviors that cause it to shatter appear on the “front stage” or remain at the “back stage” in response to changes that occur in the situational circumstances. In this regard, the current study questions...
the central role given in the tourism and hospitality literature to the issue of authenticity in social interactions. Instead, the findings are interpreted in line with Goffman's dramaturgical approach\(^2\) by stressing the importance of situational circumstances, while analyzing social interactions.

The current study includes several limitations, such as the use of English and Hebrew for interviewing Egyptian hosts; interviewing different respondents before and after terror attacks; and excluding the relations of Israeli tourists and Egyptian hosts with the local Bedouins. While this may have a bearing on the validity of the results, the unique situation in Sinai provided the researchers with a rare opportunity to explore interactions between tourists and service employees of countries that have been traditionally hostile to each other.

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Scientific Cooperation for the Control of Soilborne Diseases of Major Crops

Jaacov Katan

Pests and pathogens (disease causing microbes) cause heavy losses to all major crops throughout the world. Along with other stress agents, such as drought, these harmful organisms are responsible for food shortages, especially in developing countries. Pests and pathogens do not recognize borders; therefore, cooperative multinational efforts are needed in order to reduce and alleviate their harm. It is this concept that led to fruitful and long-standing scientific cooperation between our group in Israel and Egyptian plant pathologists.

Diseases of roots and other below-ground plant organs are caused by soilborne pathogens (disease-causing organisms), such as fungi, bacteria and nematodes. These pathogens cause heavy losses to most major economically important crops by affecting both yield and quality. In severe cases, they may cause total destruction of the crop, forcing the farmer to either abandon the land or shift to less susceptible, but also less profitable crops. In other words, these pathogens can have social, as well as economic consequences. Therefore, many methods have been developed to control them. They include breeding for resistant cultivars, crop rotation, fungicide application, cultural and biological control methods, and soil disinfestation. However, in an era of heightened environmental concern, emphasis is now being placed on developing methods of disease control which are both effective and environmentally friendly, over pesticides which may be environmentally harmful.

In 1976, our group in Israel developed a new non-chemical method for the control of soilborne pathogens and weeds, based on the use of solar energy, termed soil solarization (also called solar heating). The basic idea is to cover (mulch, tarp) the moistened soil with transparent polyethylene during an optimal period, thereby heating the soil and killing harmful organisms such as pathogens and weeds. The concomitant stimulation of beneficial biological processes has also been observed. This method can only be applied in regions with high temperatures and intense solar irradiation, and as such, the Middle East seems especially appropriate for soil solarization. Since its publication in 1976, solarization has been studied in over 60 countries, including most Middle Eastern countries, and its effectiveness has been demonstrated in many of them.¹

In 1980, the Egyptian Minister of Agriculture, the late Dr. Daoud, visited our institution.¹ J. Katan and J.E. DeVay, J.E., eds., Soil Solarization (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1991).
in Israel, and the soil solarization method was presented to him. He was impressed and invited me to visit Egypt and discuss this issue with Egyptian colleagues and others involved in plant pathology. In March 1981, I visited the Plant Pathology Institute at Giza, met with the plant pathologists there and discussed the aforementioned issues: He also presented a seminar, which was followed by a thorough discussion. That meeting marked the beginning of the joint planning and implementation of experiments, jointly with Drs Mohamed Abdel-Rahim and Mokhtar Satour, to assess the potential of soil solarization in Egypt. We were able to set up the first field experiments in Egypt in June 1981, supported by a small fund from the German-Israel Fund for Research and International Development (GIFRID). However, the major work was done in the following years, within the framework of two consecutive multidisciplinary joint Egyptian-Israeli AID projects, headed by Professors Samuel Pohoryles and Dan Yaron. The objectives of these studies were to:

1. Assess the effectiveness of solarization, under specific climatic and agricultural conditions in Egypt, in controlling various pathogens of major vegetable crops. Comparable studies were carried out in Israel.
2. Assess the effectiveness of soil solarization in crops under furrow irrigation, a common irrigation method in the Middle East. This was the first time that this issue had been examined.
3. Assess the effectiveness of soil solarization in controlling white rot disease of the onion in Egypt, another issue which had never been examined. This disease is of major importance in the south of Egypt.
4. Create knowledge-transfer systems within and between the two countries.
5. Expose young scientists to sophisticated research methods.
6. Carry out multidisciplinary research which included crop protection, agronomy, soil science, machinery, meteorology, knowledge transfer and economics.

The results of the above studies were impressive and met our expectations. Solarization was clearly found to be highly effective in Egypt and in Israel: many weeds and pathogens of vegetable and flower crops, such as tomato, onion, broad bean, and clover, were well-controlled. Yields were increased by 25 to 430%. A long-term effect for two or even three consecutive seasons was recorded, and in some cases, solarization also improved the quality of the yields. Fundamental studies on physical, chemical, and microbial changes in the solarized soil were carried out. It was found, for the first time, that solarization also decreases soil salinity under Egyptian agricultural conditions. The results of these studies enabled economic analyses. Solarization was found to be especially effective in strawberry and in greenhouse crops where it was well-adopted by Egyptian farmers. Both researchers and extension personnel in Egypt and in Israel were involved in these studies. Long-term experiments on onion diseases were carried out in parallel in Egypt and Israel, and
The results benefited both countries and were transferred to the farmers of each.

it was found for the first time that, in Egypt, white rot in onion can be effectively controlled by solarization.

The above joint studies were carried out in close and full cooperation. They involved many mutual visits between the two countries, joint planning of the experiments, and joint analyses of the results, as reflected by the joint scientific publications2 and joint presentations at international conferences. Dr. Mokhtar Satour and the late Dr. Mohamed Abdel-Raheem led the research in Egypt and had close cooperation with Professor Katan. The results benefited both countries and were transferred to the farmers of each. Above all, personal relationships developed. Although not among the previously noted objectives of the project, three Palestinian graduate students carried out studies on solarization and related issues under my supervision.

It should be emphasized that pests do not recognize borders. Therefore, joint efforts by scientists from neighboring countries are essential for effectively achieving our goals to the benefit of agriculture. Unfortunately, we could not obtain support to continue this joint research with either Egyptian or Palestinian partners. It is worth mentioning here that the late Dr. Avi Grinstein from the Volcani Institute, Israel, was very active in promoting and strengthening the relations between Egyptian and Israeli scientists.

From the pages of *The Middle East Journal’s “Chronology:”* Egyptian-Israeli Relations in 1979
Since it began publication in 1947, each issue of *The Middle East Journal* has contained a section chronologically detailing events of note in the region for the preceding three months. Today, this section is dubbed the “Chronology,” although in the earliest issues of the *Journal*, it was called “Developments of the Quarter.” The Chronology is organized by country and issue, with each section providing a day-by-day account of the relevant events and developments. Mirroring the *Journal*, the Chronology’s coverage of the region spans from North Africa in the west to formerly Soviet Central Asia, to Pakistan in the east.

Given the longevity of *The Middle East Journal*, the Chronology is an indispensable resource to those interested in the politics and history of the modern Middle East — in the pages of the *Journal*, readers can essentially read a daily accounting of the events in a particular country from 1947 through today. Entries for the Chronology are written as they occur and represent a real-time window not only into the events of the region, but into the overall context of the time and place in which they occurred.

The following pages contain reproductions of the Chronology entries written for the Arab-Israeli conflict during 1979, as the signing of the Accords came to fruition. They provide a unique and detailed look into a series of events that have left an indelible mark upon the region.
CHRONOLOGY

November 16, 1978–February 15, 1979

Arab Israeli Conflict

(See also, Lebanon)

1978

Nov. 16: Egyptian Vice President Husni Mubarak met with US President Jimmy Carter and US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in Washington on the question of linking a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel to the solution of the Palestinian problem. [NYT]

Vance had called on Israel to recognize the 1967 borders. [NYT]

Egyptian Vice President Mubarak and Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman met on the question of linkage. [NYT]

Nov. 17: US Secretary of State Vance called Egyptian proposals on linkage "constructive". [NYT]

Nov. 19: A bomb exploded on a bus on the West Bank, killing 4 people. Al-Fatah claimed responsibility. [NYT]

An explosion near a cinema in Tel Aviv wounded 2 people. [NYT]

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat said that he would agree to the stationing of UN peacekeeping troops between Israel and a future Palestinian state as a "reliable" security guarantee. [NYT]

Nov. 21: The Israeli Cabinet approved a peace treaty draft but rejected Egyptian demands for linkage of the treaty to a timetable for Palestinian autonomy on the West Bank and Gaza. [NYT]

Egypt said it was recalling its chief negotiator from Washington for consultations. [NYT]

Nov. 22: Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan said the draft peace treaty was a package that should not be reopened and that Egypt should "take it or leave it." [NYT]

Nov. 24: The Egyptian newspaper al-Ahrām published what it described as the text of the draft peace treaty. [NYT]

Vance said the peace treaty negotiations were still "an open issue" because the parties had not yet reached agreement. [NYT]

Nov. 23: Israel published the text of the annex to the draft peace treaty. [NYT]

Nov. 26: The New York Times reported that Israeli authorities had "in the last few days" detained or arrested 15 West Bank residents opposed to the Camp David accords. [NYT]

Nov. 27: It was announced that leaders of Jordan and the PLO had agreed on a policy of noninterference in each other's internal affairs. [NYT]

Nov. 30: A bomb exploded in Jerusalem, killing 1 person. Security officials believed the victim was transporting the bomb. [NYT]

US President Carter said he was "dissatisfied and disappointed" at the length of time required to produce a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. [NYT]

US Senate Majority leader Robert Byrd transmitted to Israeli Premier Menahem Begin a letter from Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat. [NYT]

The US appealed to the UN General Assembly to put aside "sloganeering" and support the Camp David accords. [NYT]

Middle East News Agency reported that Egyptian President Sadat would not go to Oslo to accept the Nobel Peace Prize. [NYT]

Dec. 1: Egyptian Premier Mustafa Khalil met with Carter in Washington on Egyptian proposals for the peace treaty negotiations. [NYT]

Dec. 2: Egyptian Premier Khalil met with Vance and then postponed a scheduled departure from Washington in order to hold further discussions. [NYT]

Dec. 4: An Israeli military court sentenced a reserve soldier to 20 years imprisonment for murdering an Arab in "a private act of revenge." [NYT]

Israeli forces demolished a house occupied by families of detained terrorists in each of 2 villages in the West Bank. A temporary order forbidding the demolition in 1 village had been issued by an Israeli Supreme Court Justice. [NYT]

Israeli Premier Begin sent a reply to a message from Sadat. [NYT]

Dec. 5: Egypt condemned the Israeli demolitions on

List of Abbreviations


189
A senior official on the US Air Force plane carrying Vance to Washington said he did not think the Israeli position had advanced the peace negotiations. [NYT]

Dec. 16: Palestinian youths from the West Bank town of Halhul blocked a highway protesting recent Israeli land seizures. Israeli soldiers dispersed the demonstrators and a curfew was placed on Halhul. [NYT]

Dec. 17: A bomb exploded on a bus in Jerusalem, injuring 21 people. The PLO claimed responsibility. [NYT]

Dec. 19: Two men were arrested in New York on charges of plotting to bomb the Egyptian Government Tourist Office in Manhattan. [NYT]

The Knesset endorsed the Israeli peace stand and charged that US criticism was “one-sided” and “unjust.” [NYT]

Dec. 20: The New York Times reported that Israel had halted withdrawal of nonessential military equipment from Sinai because of the deadlock in the peace negotiations. [NYT]

The US announced that Egypt and Israel had agreed to meet “without preconditions” in direct talks in Brussels along with Vance. [NYT]

Israeli launched air strikes against Palestinian positions around Tyre in Lebanon. [NYT]

Dec. 21: Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon fired rockets at the Israeli town of Qiryat Shemona. Israeli artillery opened fire on the Lebanese town of Nabatiyah. [NYT]

Dec. 22: Israel charged that the UN Relief and Works Agency was distributing food packages in the Gaza Strip even though the Israeli occupation government had wiped out unemployment there. [NYT]

Dec. 24: Khalil and Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan met with Vance in Brussels. An official statement said the direct talks had been a “useful and full exchange of views.” [NYT]

Dec. 25: Sadat said that Arab opposition to Egyptian peace efforts served “begin’s interests and objectives.” [NYT]

Dec. 27: Israeli soldiers ousted members of Gush Emunim from 2 illegal West Bank settlements set up earlier in the day near Jerusalem. [NYT]

Dec. 29: Begin pledged that new Jewish settlements would be set up on the West Bank but said no decision had been reached on when or where the settlements would be established. [NYT]

Dec. 31: The Israeli army prevented Gush Emunim settlers from starting an illegal settlement near Nablus. [NYT]

1979

Jan. 1: Soldiers halted construction by Gush Emunim of a Jewish settlement north of Jerusalem. [NYT]

Jan. 2: The Israeli army ousted Gush Emunim nationalists from an illegal encampment set up during the night. [NYT]
Jan. 4: Gush Emunim militants scuffled with Arabs at a roadblock set up near Nablus by the militants. Security forces removed the roadblock. [JP]

Jan. 5: Israeli Energy Minister Yitzhak Modai said Israel would “not go through with a peace treaty” with Egypt unless it were assured of access to oil from the Sinaí. [NYT]

Jan. 6: PLO official Abu 'Iyad said in Paris that there would be “no Palestinian submissive activities from the day we have a state to run.” [JP]

Jan. 8: Gush Emunim militants near Nablus ended 9 days of “squatter” after receiving “encouraging” assurances that the government would permit them to establish a settlement in the area. [JP]

Jan. 9: Two Palestinian terrorists serving life prison sentences in Turkey for a terrorist attack at Istanbul airport in 1976 escaped from prison. [NYT]

Jan. 11: Iranian Premier Shâhpûr Bakhtiyâr called for Iran to “fully support” its Arab neighbors, “especially the Palestinian people,” to achieve “their legitimate rights,” and said Iran would not resume oil shipments to Israel. [NYT]

Jan. 13: Israeli troops killed 3 Palestinian guerrillas who were attempting to over a hotel in Maalot. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility for the attack. [NYT]

About 2,000 Israelis demonstrated to urge Begin to approve new Jewish settlements on the West Bank. [NYT]

Jan. 15: The New York Times cited an Israeli official as announcing that 2 new military outposts would be established on the West Bank and 1 existing military outpost would be converted to a civilian kibbutz in the week. [NYT]

Jan. 16: Israeli military sources reported that Israel had shelled suspected guerrilla bases at Ras al-Ayn on the Lebanese coast. [NYT]

US Ambassador atLarge Alfred Atherton, Jr., arrived in Jerusalem to try to renew peace talks between Egypt and Israel. [NYT]

The New York Times reported that US Ambassador to the UN Young had said that US diplomacy was hampered by the lack of an “effective relationship with the Palestinian people.” [NYT]

Jan. 17: US Ambassador atLarge Atherton met with Begin and Dayan in Israel on the peace negotiations. [NYT]

Jan. 18: A bomb exploded in a market in Jerusalem, wounding 21 people. The PLO claimed responsibility. [NYT]

Jan. 19: Israeli troops entered Lebanon and killed 40 Palestinians and Lebanese. Some civilians were reported among the dead. [NYT]

Palestinian guerrillas fired rockets at 2 Israeli towns in retaliation for the Israeli raid. No deaths were reported. [NYT]

At the end of 3 days of talks between Atherton and Israeli officials, Begin said “new ideas” had been put forward but “no definite decisions” had been taken. [NYT]

Jan. 20: The New York Times reported that Israeli Agriculture Minister Sharon had divested to the Knesset that a Cabinet committee had voted not to allow Israeli Arab villagers to return to Berem and Lkrit in north Israel. The villagers had been ejected from the villages in 1948 but were assured they could return when the fighting had ended. [NYT]

Sadat accused the Soviet Union of initiating “conspiracies” in the Middle East. [NYT]

Jan. 21: Begin said the Israeli Cabinet had reached a decision on the new US peace proposals but said the decisions would not be made public until they were communicated to Egypt. [NYT]

Jan. 22: A bomb killed Palestinian guerrilla leader ‘Ali Hasan Salâmah in Beirut. Four bodyguards and 5 bystanders were also killed. The Palestinian news agencyWAFA accused Israel of responsibility for the blast. [NYT]

Israeli gunners shelled the Palestinian town of Nabatiyeh. At least 3 people were killed. [NYT]

Greek Catholic Archbishop Hilarion Capucci, who had been released from an Israeli jail in 1977, arrived in Damascus to attend a meeting of the Palestine National Council. [JP]

Jan. 23: Palestinian gunners fired rockets into Israeli towns. Israel shelled targets in Lebanon. [NYT]

Israel denied charges on Lebanese state radio that Tyre had been shelled but warned that it would attack civilian targets in Lebanon if Palestinian shelling of Israeli towns continued. [NYT]

Dayan warned that Arabs living in Israel risked expulsion if they sided actively with the PLO. [NYT]

Jan. 24: The Israeli Cabinet raised objections to compromise peace treaty proposals drawn up by Israeli and US negotiators. Begin said the sides would have “further discussions.” [NYT]

The Vatican said that Archbishop Capucci had flown to Syria without authorization. [NYT]

Jan. 25: Atherton met with Egyptian officials in Cairo on the peace treaty proposals. [NYT]

Jan. 26: Atherton met with Khâilî in Cairo on the peace proposals. [NYT]

The New York Times reported that Israel had ordered 6 Israeli Arab students to leave Hebrew University because they were suspected of circulating a leaflet supporting the PLO. [NYT]

Jan. 27: Atherton ended talks in Cairo and said there was still a “gap” in the positions of Egypt and Israel. Later he flew to Israel. [NYT]

Jan. 28: A bomb exploded in the Israeli town of Nahanya, killing 2 and wounding 34. [NYT]

Jan. 29: Four Israeli Arab university students publicly endorsed terrorist actions and said they rejected the idea of a Zionist state. [NYT]

Jan. 30: The Israeli army blew up the homes of 4 suspected or convicted Palestinian guerrillas in the West Bank. [NYT]

Feb. 1: US Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for a “fundamental review” of US policy towards Saudi Arabia because it had been “far more of a detriment to peace than we are willing to admit.” [NYT]

Israel banned a news conference for foreign cor-
Petroleum Affairs

(See also, Iran, Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates)

1978

Dec. 14: Delegates arriving in Abu Dhabi for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Ministerial Conference said that OPEC members were in "complete agreement" that a rise in oil prices would be effected at the conference. [NYT]
Dec. 16: An OPEC Ministerial Conference opened in Abu Dhabi. [FBIS]
Dec. 17: OPEC decided to raise the price of oil by 14.5% in quarterly increments during 1979. An initial 5% would be imposed on the first day of 1979. [NYT]

US President Jimmy Carter urged that the oil price rise be "reconsidered" before its implementation. [NYT]

Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Shaykh Ahmad Zakî Yamâni said that the world could "bet that we will have a freeze for the price of oil in December next year." [NYT]

1979

Jan. 29: Middle East Economic Survey reported that Saudi Arabia had decided to raise its ceiling on crude oil production by 1m barrels per day in the first quarter of 1979 in order to help alleviate the crude oil shortage resulting from the Iranian crisis. [MEES]

Feb. 15: The UAA raised the price of its light crude oils by up to 7%. [JP]

Afghanistan

(See also, Pakistan)

1978

Nov. 22: Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmiera Peoli met with Deputy Premier Hafizullah Amin in Kabul. [FBIS]
Dec. 3: President Nur Mohammad Taraki arrived in Moscow for talks with Soviet leaders. [NYT]
Dec. 5: Afghanistan and the Soviet Union signed a 20 year treaty of friendship and cooperation in Moscow. [NYT]

1979

Jan. 14: An energy and agricultural agreement with Yugoslavia was signed in Belgrade. [MEED]

General

1978

Dec. 5: A spokesman for the Polisario Front said that Mauritania had broken off peace talks with Polisario on Western Sahara. [JP]

1979

Jan. 1: Mauritanian Chief of State Mustafa Ould Mohammad Salek said Mauritania would "take all the necessary measures to definitely get out of the war" in Western Sahara if efforts to reach a general agreement remained "impracticable". [FBIS]
CHRONOLOGY

February 16, 1979–May 15, 1979

Arab Israeli Conflict

(See also, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon)

1979

Feb. 17: US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown met with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in Ismailia. [NYT]

Feb. 18: Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasir Arafat said in Tehran that the Iranian revolution had "turned upside down" the balance of forces in the Middle East. [NYT]

A Senegalese soldier in the UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was arrested in Israel while he was transferring explosives to a "terrorist". Israel closed the frontier with Lebanon. [JP]

Feb. 19: The PLO opened offices in a building in Tehran previously occupied by the Israeli legation. [NYT]

Feb. 21: US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance opened talks between Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Egyptian Premier Muṣṭafā Khalil at Camp David. [NYT]

The UN Human Rights Commission adopted a resolution accusing Israel of war crimes in the occupied Arab territories. A second resolution affirmed the right of the Palestinian people to a "fully independent and sovereign state in Palestine." [NYT]

Feb. 22: A second round of talks was held at Camp David. [NYT]

Feb. 23: The US said that Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Fahd had cancelled a scheduled visit to Washington because of "health concerns." The Saudi Embassy in Washington said the trip had been postponed by mutual agreement. [NYT]

Feb. 23: The talks ended at Camp David. "Some progress" was reported to have been made. [NYT]

Feb. 27: An Israeli Cabinet statement said that recently submitted US peace proposals were "inconsistent with the Camp David agreement." [NYT]

The Israeli Cabinet refused to permit Israeli Premier Menahem Begin to attend a summit conference with Egypt in the US, but authorized him to meet with US President Jimmy Carter alone. [NYT]

Feb. 28: US President Carter said that "absolutely insignificant difficulties" were preventing the conclusion of a peace treaty. [NYT]

Israeli Premier Begin said that "grave issues" separated Israel and Egypt in their peace negotiations. [NYT]

March 1: Begin said in Israel that it was "the duty of the United States to convince the Egyptians to change their attitudes." [NYT]

Begin arrived in Washington and said he could not be pressed into signing a "sham document." Later he met with Carter. The talks were described as having been conducted "in a more friendly atmosphere." [NYT]

March 2: Carter and Begin met in Washington. Carter said later that Israel and Egypt were "within inches" of a peace treaty. [NYT]

March 3: Carter and Begin held a "crucial" session in Washington. [NYT]

March 4: Carter and Begin met again. Carter offered new suggestions. [NYT]

March 5: Israel accepted the peace suggestions put forward by Carter. [NYT]

The Lebanese towns of Nabatiyeh and Hasbayyah and a Palestinian camp near Tyre were shelled by heavy artillery. The Israelis were accused of the shelling. [NYT]

It was announced that Carter would fly to Egypt and Israel to continue the peace negotiations. [NYT]

March 7: Carter left Washington for Cairo to carry on peace negotiations. [NYT]

Bombs were placed on 3 tourist buses operating from Jerusalem. Twelve people were injured. [NYT]

March 8: Carter met with Egyptian President Sadat in Cairo on the US peace proposals. Later officials on both sides said that "unresolved issues" remained. [NYT]

List of Abbreviations


349
March 9: Carter and Sadat travelled to Alexandria by train. Sadat told reporters that he was on the "verge of an agreement." [NYT]

March 10: Carter spoke before the People's Assembly in Cairo and said a treaty between Egypt and Israel was a "first step" toward a comprehensive peace. He said he was "personally committed" to move on to negotiations on "issues of concern to the Palestinians." [NYT]

At the end of discussions with Sadat, Carter said that some "difficult issues" remained to be resolved. [NYT]

Israeli forces killed 4 Palestinian guerrillas on the occupied West Bank. The Palestinian Popular Struggle Front claimed responsibility for the operation. [NYT]

Carter arrived in Israel for talks with Israeli officials. [NYT]

March 12: The Israeli Cabinet approved some revised US proposals, leaving other questions open. [NYT]

Carter and Begin spoke before the Israeli Knesset. Begin said a peace treaty would be signed only after Knesset approval. [NYT]

Iran called on the UN Security Council to compel Israel to restore the "human rights of the Palestinian people" in the occupied territories. [NYT]

March 13: Palestinian guerrillas in south Lebanon and Israeli forces exchanged artillery fire. Israeli gunboats shelled Damur, near Beirut. [NYT]

Carter met with Begin and later flew to Cairo. Sadat accepted compromise peace proposals submitted by Carter. [NYT]

Carter said that "all the main ingredients of a peace treaty" had been defined. [NYT]

March 14: Israel exchanged 66 Palestinian prisoners for a captured Israeli soldier in Geneva, Switzerland. A Red Cross spokesman said 10 other Palestinians had been released but had remained in occupied territory. [NYT]

Demonstrations against the proposed treaty were held in the West Bank and east Jerusalem. [NYT]

March 15: The Egyptian Cabinet voted unanimously to approve the draft peace treaty with Israel. [NYT]

Israeli security forces and armed Jewish settlers fired on Arab demonstrators in Halhoul on the West Bank, killing 2 people. [NYT]

March 17: US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski arrived in Riyadh and met with King Khalid. [FBIS]

PLO leader 'Arafat met with Jordanian King Husayn in Jordan on the Middle East situation. [NYT]

March 18: Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman and Egyptian Defense Minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali met to establish a timetable for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. [NYT]

Brzezinski arrived in Amman and met with King Husayn. Later he flew to Cairo to brief Sadat on the results of his mission to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. [NYT]

March 19: The Israeli Cabinet voted 15 to 2 to approve the peace treaty. [NYT]

March 20: Begin told the Knesset that there would "never be a Palestinian state" on the West Bank and that Jerusalem would "never be divided again." [NYT]

King Husayn accused the US of "arm-twisting" to win support for the peace treaty. [NYT]

March 22: The Israeli Knesset approved the peace treaty by a vote of 95 to 18. [NYT]

The UN Security Council voted 12 to 0 with 3 abstentions to create a 3 member commission to "examine the situation relating to settlements in the occupied Arab territories." [NYT]

Arab League Secretary General Mahmoud Riyad resigned his post, effective at the end of the month. [NYT]

March 23: Carter said that the US wanted "direct relations" with Palestinians in the occupied territories but found it "a problem" to deal with the PLO. [NYT]

Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan and US Secretary of State Vance met in Washington on a "memorandum of agreement" concerning the treaty. [NYT]

A senior PLO official was assassinated in Islamabad, Pakistan. [FBIS]

March 24: Vance met with Begin in New York concerning the memorandum of agreement. [NYT]

A meeting of the Arab League began in Mogadishu, Somalia. [NYT]

Syria said it would not seek an oil embargo against the US if the peace treaty were signed because it would "divert attention from the high treason" of Egypt. [NYT]

March 25: Sadat met with Begin in Washington and invited him to visit Cairo after the signing of the treaty. [NYT]

Two bomb blasts shattered windows of the US Embassy in Damascus. [NYT]

March 26: The peace treaty was signed by Sadat and Begin in ceremonies in Washington. Carter signed the treaty as a witness. [NYT]

'Arafat vowed to "chop off the hands" of the signers of the treaty. [NYT]

March 27: Begin and Sadat spoke separately before US Senators and Representatives at the Capitol. [NYT]

Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam said in Paris after talks with French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing that any European Common Market support of the peace treaty would be taken "as defiance" by the Arabs. [NYT]

Egypt said it was "freezing" its relations with the Arab League. [NYT]

Ministers of Arab League member states and the PLO met in Baghdad to discuss the peace treaty. Sudan and Oman declined to attend. Egypt was not invited. [NYT]
March 28: Sadat objected to a memorandum of agreement between the US and Israel which covered US action toward Israel in the event of Egyptian violation of the treaty. [NYT]

Disagreements arose at the Baghdad Conference. The delegations of the PLO, Syria and Libya walked out of the meeting. [NYT]

Jordan announced it was recalling its Ambassador to Egypt but said it was not breaking relations. [NYT]

March 29: The Baghdad Conference was suspended for 24 hours to allow the delegations to consult with their governments. [NYT]

Saudi Arabia said that it was ready to apply only the “limited sanctions” against Egypt agreed upon in Baghdad in November. [NYT]

March 30: No agreement was reached in Baghdad. It was decided to postpone the closing session of the conference to the following day. [NYT]

March 31: The Baghdad Conference adopted resolutions calling for immediate withdrawal of each state’s Ambassadors from Egypt, complete severance of diplomatic ties within 1 month, suspension of Egypt from membership in the Arab League and transferal of Arab League headquarters to Tunisia. [NYT]

Sadat returned to Egypt. Hundreds of thousands of people lined the route from the airport to greet him. [NYT]

April 1: The Israeli Cabinet ratified the peace treaty. [NYT]

The Egyptian Cabinet termed the political and economic measures taken at the Baghdad Conference “null and void.” [NYT]

April 2: Begin arrived in Cairo on a visit and was met by Egyptian Vice President Husni Mubarak. [NYT]

Three men fired rocket grenades at the US Embassy in Beirut. [NYT]

Israel said it had captured a freighter in the Mediterranean carrying Palestinian guerrillas to a raid in Israel. [NYT]

April 3: Begin returned to Israel from Cairo and said some “very important agreements” had been reached during the visit. [NYT]

April 5: The New York Times reported that the US State Department had issued a visa to PLO official Shafiq al-Hij to enter the US. [NYT]

April 7: Egypt recalled its Ambassadors from 7 Arab countries. [NYT]

April 8: The Central Council of the PLO decided “to step up military activities against the Israelis in the occupied territories.” [NYT]

April 10: A bomb exploded in a Tel Aviv market, killing 1 person. The PLO claimed responsibility. [NYT]

Israeli jets struck at targets at Damur and in the area of Tyre in Lebanon. Four people were reported killed. [NYT]

April 11: Palestinian guerrillas fired rockets at the Israeli town of Qiryar Shemona in reprisal for the air raids. [NYT]

Israeli planes struck at Damur and Palestinian positions near Tyre. [NYT]

Israeli gunners and Lebanese Christians bombarded Palestinian positions in southern Lebanon. [NYT]

Sadat announced that a nationwide referendum would be held in April to approve the peace treaty. [NYT]

April 15: Israeli soldiers killed 4 Palestinian guerrillas who had entered Israel from Jordanian territory. [NYT]

April 16: An Israeli patrol intercepted 6 Arab guerrillas on Israeli territory near the Lebanese border. The clash left 1 Israeli soldier and the 6 guerrillas dead. [NYT]

Palestinian guerrillas were foiled in an attempt to take over an Israeli airliner at Brussels airport. Two Palestinians were arrested. The organization “Black March” claimed responsibility. [NYT]

April 17: An Israeli schoolboy spotted a bomb on a bus. The bomb blew up shortly after the bus was emptied. [NYT]

The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries announced the expulsion of Egypt and imposed an oil embargo on it. [NYT]

The PLO dissociated itself from the guerrilla attack at Brussels airport. [NYT]

April 18: Egypt was suspended from the Arab Monetary Fund. [NYT]

April 19: Egyptians went to the polls to approve the peace treaty and a proposal to dissolve the People’s Assembly. [NYT]

Israeli Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon told Israeli settlers the Golan Heights would not be given up in any peace settlement with Syria. [NYT]

April 20: It was announced that 99.95% of Egyptian voters had approved the treaty. The dissolution of the People’s Assembly was also approved. [NYT]

April 22: Four Palestinian guerrillas attacked Nahariya in Israel, leaving 4 Israelis dead. Two of the terrorists were killed and 2 captured. [NYT]

Israelis ships shelled a Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli, Lebanon, in reprisal for the terrorist raid. [NYT]

The Israeli Cabinet approved the construction of 2 new Jewish settlements on the West Bank. [NYT]

Kuwait severed diplomatic relations with Egypt. [NYT]

April 23: Saudi Arabia broke diplomatic relations with Egypt. [FBIS]

April 24: Israeli gunboats shelled the Lebanese coast between Tyre and Sidon. Israeli jets raided sites near Sidon and Nahariya. [NYT]

Mauritania cut diplomatic relations with Egypt. [NYT]

April 25: After a delay, Israel and Egypt exchanged treaty ratification documents in the Sinai. [NYT]

Israeli gunboats shelled Tyre and nearby Pales-
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352

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

tinian camps. Israeli artillery fired on villages in south Lebanon. [NYT]

Israeli Defense Minister Weizman said in Egypt that the FLO should "stop shooting and start talking." [NYT]

Qatar and the UAA broke diplomatic relations with Egypt. [FBIS]

April 26: A ceasefire between Israel and Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon was implemented after Israeli gunboats had shelled positions near Sidon and Israeli artillery had fired on Habbayah. [NYT]

Weizman met with Sâdâr in Ismâliya on plans for normalizing relations between Israel and Egypt and on Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. [NYT]

Bahrayn, Lebanon and Morocco cut diplomatic relations with Egypt. [FBIS]

April 27: Tunisia broke off diplomatic relations with Egypt. [FBIS]

April 28: Yemen severed diplomatic relations with Egypt. [FBIS]

April 29: Egyptian and Israeli military officers met in Sinai to negotiate details of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. [NYT]

The Israeli Cabinet voted to allow prosecutors in military courts to seek the death penalty for terrorist acts of "inhuman cruelty." [NYT]

April 30: An Israeli cargo ship sailed through the Suez Canal. [NYT]

Iranian Ayaṭ Allâh Rûh Allâh Khumaynî ordered the provisional government to sever diplomatic relations with Egypt. [NYT]

The New York Times reported that the Israeli newspaper Haaretz was supporting the claims of a Palestinian journalist that he had been severely beaten by Israeli policemen while under detention. [NYT]

Djibouti severed diplomatic relations with Egypt. [NYT]

May 1: Sâdâr accused Saudi Arabia of using pressure and monetary inducements to persuade other Arab states to break relations with Egypt. [NYT]

May 2: Begin said Israel would "never withdraw from the Golan Heights." [NYT]

May 3: Israeli occupation authorities ordered Bir Zeit University to be closed indefinitely as a result of demonstrations the day before. [NYT]

Soldiers entered Bethlehem University to break up stone throwing incidents. Israeli authorities ordered the school closed for 4 days. [NYT]

May 4: Israel said the Camp David accords did not obligate it to withdraw from the West Bank, Gaza Strip or the Golan Heights. It said it would remain in "defined security locations" in the occupied territories. [NYT]

May 6: Israeli jets struck a Palestinian refugee camp and a Lebanese village near the port of Tripoli. [NYT]

May 7: Begin proposed that Lebanese President Ilyâs Sarîs meet with him to discuss the "signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon." [NYT]

Lebanon rejected the proposal to negotiate a peace treaty. [NYT]

Israeli jets raided a "guerrilla camp" at the south Lebanese village of Reîhan. [NYT]

May 8: Israeli jets attacked "concentrations of terrorists" south of Sidon. Later, their jets struck the Palestinian camp at Reitan. [NYT]

May 9: Israeli soldiers crossed into southern Lebanon to pursue 3 Palestinian guerrillas who had raided Israel. [NYT]

Representatives at the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Fes, Morocco, suspended Egypt from participation. [NYT]

May 10: Israel ordered the deportation of 2 US students because they had participated in a demonstration on the West Bank. [NYT]

A UNIFIL soldier from Senegal was found guilty of smuggling explosives into Israel. He was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. [JP]

May 11: Scuffles broke out near Bethlehem between Jewish members of the Peace Now movement and the militant Jewish nationalist movement Gush Emunîm. [NYT]

May 14: A bomb exploded in Tiberias, Israel, killing 2 people and wounding 32. [NYT]

The 2 US students left Israel. [NYT]

Saudi Arabia said that the Arab Organization for Industrialization, an arms consortium founded in Egypt, would be disbanded because of the conclusion of the peace treaty. [NYT]

Petroleum Affairs

1979

Feb. 21: Libya raised its oil prices by 5%. [NYT]

Feb. 26: Kuwait raised its oil prices by 9.35%, retroactive to February 20. [NYT]

Feb. 27: Saudi Arabia and Iraq said they would not raise oil prices in the first quarter of 1979. [NYT]

Feb. 28: The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) formally approved the price increases by several of its members. [NYT]

The New York Times cited "oil company sources" as saying Oman had raised its oil prices more than 7% retroactive to February 15. [NYT]

March 8: Libya said it would cut production by 12 to 18%, beginning April 1. [NYT]

March 26: OPEC Oil Ministers met in Geneva to discuss oil price levels. [NYT]

March 27: OPEC raised the basic price of crude oil by 9%, effective April 1, and allowed each OPEC nation to add "market premia" to the basic price. [NYT]

Algeria and Libya announced price increases on crude oil of about $4 per barrel. [NYT]

April 15: Iran announced it would raise oil prices by 15% over the basic rate set by OPEC in March. [NYT]
CHRONOLOGY

May 16, 1979—August 15, 1979

Arab Israeli Conflict

(See also, Lebanon)

1979

May 16: Israeli President Yitzhak Navon visited Jewish settlements on the occupied West Bank. [NYT]

May 17: Israel sentenced 8 Arab students to prison terms for their parts in demonstrations in Bethlehem earlier in the month. Six other students were acquitted. [NYT]

May 18: Israeli Premier Menahem Begin offered to meet with Jordanian King Husayn to negotiate a peace treaty but said Israel would not withdraw from the West Bank. [NYT]

Israeli seaborne troops assaulted Palestinian guerrilla sites between Sidon and Tyre. [NYT]

May 19: Jordan rejected the Israeli invitation for peace talks. [NYT]

May 21: The Israeli Cabinet approved guidelines for Israeli negotiators in future talks on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Statements declaring that Israel would oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state and that Israel would claim sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza at the end of a 5 year transitional period were also adopted. [NYT]

May 23: A bomb exploded in the Israeli town of Petah Tikvah, killing 3 people. [NYT]

Israel flew retaliatory air raids against the Lebanese town of Damur, killing 20 people. [NYT]

Egypt and Israel announced that their borders would remain closed after the upcoming Israeli withdrawal from the town of El Arish in the Sinai. [NYT]

May 24: Israeli jets struck Nabatiyeh and 2 other south Lebanese villages. Israeli artillery pounded areas of south Lebanon. Lebanon termed the attacks "arrogant defiance of international conscience." [NYT]

US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance met with Israeli Premier Begin in London. [NYT]

US Secretary of State Vance flew from London to Egypt and met with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in Alexandria. [NYT]

Israeli settlers in the Sinai opposing the loss of land they had been using clashed with Israeli soldiers. [NYT]

May 25: Israel returned El Arish and a coastal strip of the Sinai to Egypt during withdrawal ceremonies in El Arish. [NYT]

Egypt and Israel opened negotiations in the Israeli town of Beersheba on matters concerning the West Bank and Gaza. [NYT]

Vance said a start must be made to deal with "the problem of Palestinians living outside the West Bank and Gaza" so they would know that an "accepted and respected place" existed for them in the international community. [NYT]

May 27: Begin and Egyptian President Sadat met in El Arish and later in Beersheba with Vance in attendance. [NYT]

A bomb exploded at a bus station in Jerusalem. No one was injured. [NYT]

May 28: Israel freed 16 Arab prisoners as a "good-will gesture" to Egypt. [NYT]

May 29: Three Israeli Navy vessels sailed through the Suez Canal. [NYT]

May 30: The UN Security Council voted to extend its peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights. [NYT]

Israel approved 2 new laws that called for an "immediate" Israeli withdrawal from the occupied West Bank and Gaza. [NYT]

May 31: Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman said that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were "parts of the land of Israel." [NYT]

June 1: A UN conference on trade and development meeting in Manila voted to extend assistance to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other "liberation movements." [NYT]

June 2: An Islamic leader in occupied Gaza who supported the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty was assassinated. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) claimed responsibility. [NYT]

June 3: The Israeli Cabinet voted by 8 to 5 with 3 abstentions to permit a new settlement on the West Bank. [NYT]

The DFLP threatened to assassinate the mayor of Gaza. [NYT]

List of Abbreviations


479
THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

June 4: Israel requisitioned 200 acres of Arab owned land for the new settlement. [NYT]

The US said the new settlement was “illegal and an impediment to peace.” [NYT]

Israeli Navy vessels sank a speedboat carrying Palestinian guerrillas on a raid. All on board the speedboat were killed. [NYT]

Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan met with Sadat in Asmara. [NYT]

The Israeli Army razed a house in the West Bank district of Ramallah that they said was inhabited by a member of Al Fatah. Four other houses were walled up. [NYT]

June 5: Canadian Premier Joe Clark said the Canadian Embassy in Israel would be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. [NYT]

At the end of a visit to Washington, French Foreign Minister Jean François-Poncet refused to endorse the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. [NYT]

June 6: The PLO said it had begun closing down its offices in Tyre and pulling its guerrillas out of villages in southern Lebanon in order to prevent Israeli attacks on Lebanese civilians. [NYT]

June 7: The new settlement of Elon Moreh was begun near Nablus. [NYT]

Lebanese state radio charged that Israeli artillery had fired on nine southern Lebanese villages. [NYT]

June 8: Israeli jets struck four villages near the Lebanese town of Naqariyeh, killing one person. [NYT]

June 9: About 3,000 Israeli demonstrators of the “Peace Now” movement protested near Nablus against the new settlement. [NYT]

June 10: Arabs demonstrated in Nablus against the new settlement. Israeli soldiers ordered shopkeepers to reopen businesses and Israeli officials forced reporters to leave Nablus. [NYT]

June 11: Begin said Israel would “pay no attention” to world criticism of the new settlement. [NYT]

Egyptian and Israeli negotiators met in Alexandria to discuss Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank. [NYT]

June 12: Negotiations in Alexandria were concluded. Israeli Interior Minister Yosef Burg met with Sadat on the progress in the negotiations. [NYT]

June 13: The Israeli military government banned a demonstration against the closing of Bir Zeit University on the occupied West Bank. [NYT]

June 15: Israeli Agriculture Minister Sharon accused the US of making “two-faced statements when speaking to Israel about the Arabs” and said the US wanted to create “the background and infrastructure” of a future Palestinian state. [NYT]

June 16: Israeli military authorities informed the Mayor of Nablus that a march through Nablus to protest a new settlement would not be permitted. [NYT]

Israeli radio reported that certain West Bank leaders had met in London and Rome with Egyptian Ambassadors. [NYT]

June 17: Arab demonstrators protesting against the new settlement clashed with Israeli soldiers in Nablus. [NYT]

Israeli Defense Minister Weizman announced his resignation from the ministerial team negotiating with Egypt on West Bank autonomy. [NYT]

A Nigerian UN peacekeeping officer was arraigned in Israel on charges of smuggling arms to Arabs in Jerusalem. [NYT]

June 18: Israeli jets struck at “terrorist bases” in southern Lebanon. [NYT]

June 19: The chairman of the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), Jawad Hashim, said the AMF had stopped all financial dealings with Canada because of its intention to move the Canadian Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. [AN]

June 20: An Israeli high court issued a temporary injunction on work on the Elon Moreh settlement. The Court President said that land requisitions should have been given to the Arab owners of the land before work began. [NYT]

June 21: An explosion in a house near the West Bank town of Janin left 3 Arabs dead. [NYT]

June 23: Canadian Premier Clark met with ambassadors from Israel and a number of Arab countries and announced that he had formed a fact-finding mission to decide whether to move the Canadian Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. [NYT]

June 24: A van carrying explosives blew up in Tel Aviv, killing 2 Arabs. [NYT]

Israeli jets struck 8 villages in southern Lebanon, causing at least 25 casualties. [NYT]

The Israeli Cabinet granted a request by Weizman that he be removed from the team negotiating on the West Bank and Gaza. [NYT]

June 25: Representatives of Israel, Egypt and the US held discussions in the Israeli town of Herzliya concerning the West Bank and Gaza. [NYT]

Israelis artillery pounded southern Lebanese towns following a Palestinian rocket attack on a northern Israeli settlement. [NYT]

The bodies of 11 Israeli soldiers killed in 1973 were returned to Israeli authorities in ceremonies at Al Arish. [FBIS]

June 26: Talks in Herzliya were concluded. [NYT]

June 27: Syrian jets clashed over Lebanon with Israeli fighters that had been sent to strike at Palestinian targets. At least 4 Syrian planes were shot down. [NYT]

The US said that Israel’s use of US supplied jet aircraft over Lebanon was of “serious concern.” [NYT]

Israel decided to set up 6 paramilitary agricultural settlements in military outposts in the occupied Arab territories. [NYT]

A paramilitary settlement in the West Bank was turned over to a civilian cooperative group. [NYT]

June 28: Palestinian and Israeli gunners traded artillery fire across the Lebanese border. [NYT]

Begin disclosed that he had told the US that Israeli military actions over Lebanon were “legitimate national self defense.” [NYT]

June 30: An American woman jailed in 1978 on charges of spying for the PLO was released from an Israeli prison and deported from Israel. [JP]

July 1: The Israeli Cabinet agreed to continue to send its armed forces against targets in Lebanon. [NYT]
July 2: US Special Ambassador for the Middle East Robert Strauss met with Begin in Israel on Israeli settlement policy and other issues. [NYT]

July 3: US Special Ambassador Strauss flew to Alexandria to confer with Sadat. [NYT]

A UN spokesman said that Palestinians had captured and later released 28 UN troops in south Lebanon the previous week. [NYT]

July 4: A no confidence motion against the Israeli government was defeated in the Knesset. The motion had been brought because of the commutation of prison sentences against Israeli soldiers for the murder of Arabs. [NYT]

American Quaker welfare workers said the Israeli government had told them to stop providing legal aid to Arabs in the West Bank. [NYT]

July 5: Egyptian and Israeli negotiators met with Strauss in Alexandria. The negotiations broke down over the preparation of an agenda. [NYT]

July 6: Israeli soldiers entered Lebanon and blew up 2 houses used by Palestinian guerrillas. An Israeli announcement said 2 guerrillas had been killed in a gun battle and that prisoners had been brought to Israel for interrogation. [NYT]

The negotiators in Alexandria agreed to establish "working groups" on 2 divisive issues in the discussions. [NYT]

A bomb exploded in East Jerusalem, injuring 3 tourists. [NYT]

July 7: Four people were killed in the Israeli town of Kfar Manda when a bomb exploded. [NYT]

 Strauss met with King Husayn in Jordan. [FBIS]

PLO leader Yasar Arafat arrived in Vienna and met with Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. [FBIS]

July 8: PLO leader Arafat met with Austrian Chancellor Kreisky and Social Democrats International President Willy Brandt. A communiqué expressed "extreme concern" over Israeli "settlement activities in the occupied territories." [NYT]

Israel protested against the reception accorded Arafat in Vienna and called its Ambassador to Austria home "for consultations." [NYT]

An Israeli Army patrol entered Lebanon and killed 3 Palestinian guerrillas it said were heading for a raid on Israel. [NYT]

July 9: Kreisky said the discussions with Arafat "served the cause of peace." [NYT]

July 10: Begin arrived in Alexandria and visited a synagogue. Later he met with Sadat for talks on Palestinian autonomy. [NYT]

July 11: Begin and Sadat ended talks in Alexandria. [NYT]

July 12: Begin returned from talks in Alexandria and landed at Atarot Airport in occupied East Jerusalem. [NYT]

The Israeli Supreme Court issued a temporary injunction stopping work at a Jewish settlement on the West Bank. [NYT]

Libyan Head of State Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi said in Damascus that Libya would replace every fighter plane Syria might lose in battles with Israel. [NYT]

July 13: Four Palestinian gunmen stormed the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara, killing 2 people and taking 20 hostages, including the Ambassador. One of the hostages was later released. The PLO denied responsibility for the attack. [NYT]

July 14: A delegation from the PLO negotiated with the gunmen in Ankara. Three hostages were released. [NYT]

Two hostages trying to escape the Embassy were injured in a fall. One later died. [AN]

A UN commission made public a report to the Security Council that criticized Israel for having shown "disregard for basic human rights" in the occupied territories. [NYT]

July 15: The terrorists, after mediation by the PLO, released 9 hostages and surrendered to Turkish authorities. [NYT]

July 19: The New York Times reported that the US and the Soviet Union had worked out an arrangement whereby military observers of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) would replace the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai when the UNEF mandate expired. [NYT]

Israel criticized United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) troops in Lebanon and charged that the UN considered "cooperation in the field with the terrorists as vital." [NYT]

July 20: Israeli commandos landed on a beach at Saksayke in southern Lebanon and ambushed a car carrying 3 Palestinians and a Lebanese. [NYT]

The UN Security Council approved a resolution calling on Israel to cease "on an urgent basis" the establishment of Jewish settlements on occupied Arab land. [NYT]

July 22: Israeli jets bombarded Damour and 2 other Lebanese villages, killing at least 15 people. [NYT]

The New York Times reported that the toll of those "believed killed" in Israeli air attacks on Lebanon in the past 4 months had risen to "more than 200, most of them Palestinians and Lebanese civilians."

Israel said it would not accept a US-Soviet plan for the UNTSO force in Sinai. [NYT]

July 23: The US condemned the Israeli raid on Lebanon and charged that it was carried out at dusk "when the roads were filled with motorists returning from excursions to the beaches and the mountains." [NYT]

July 24: The UN agreed to the withdrawal of UNEF forces in the Sinai after the Soviet Union had refused to agree to extension of the mandate. UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim said he would act "to insure the further functioning" of UNTSO observers in the Sinai. [NYT]

July 25: Zuhayr Muhsin, a high official in the PLO and leader of the Palestinian guerrilla group al-Sa'iqa, was critically wounded by gunmen in Cannes, France. [NYT]

Israel returned 2,500 square miles of the Sinai to Egypt at a ceremony in Bir Naseeb. [NYT]

The Israeli Supreme Court lifted a temporary injunction against the establishment of an Israeli settlement on the West Bank. [NYT]
A bomb exploded at a bus station near the Israeli town of Natanya, injuring 12 people. [NYT]

July 26: Al-Sā'īdāh leader Muhsin died, aged 43. [NYT]

July 27: Israeli Ambassador to the US Ephraim Evron met with Vance on the problem of a UN force in Sinai. [NYT]

The Commander of the Christian militia forces in south Lebanon, Sa'd Haddad, said he would pursue PLO guerrillas "inside U.N. lines" in the future. [NYT]

July 30: A UN Security Council debate on Palestinian rights was recessed until the end of August in order to permit the study of a proposed resolution by the US. [NYT]

Aug. 2: An Israeli army force raided targets 9 miles into Lebanon during the night, killing at least 5 people. [NYT]

Aug. 3: Sadat said that Egypt was "not against amending Resolution 242." [NYT]

The New York Times reported that Muhammad 'Azzām had been named head of al-Sā'īdāh. [NYT]

Aug. 5: A spokesman for the Israeli Cabinet said the PLO, a "syndicate of murderers," would "never be any partner to negotiations with Israel." [NYT]

Lebanon said it had protested to the UN Security Council over the Israeli army raid. [NYT]

A bomb exploded in East Jerusalem, wounding at least 2 people. [NYT]

Aug. 6: Representatives of Egypt, Israel and the US met in Haifa to discuss Palestinian autonomy. [NYT]

Aug. 7: The meetings in Haifa ended. An agenda outlining election procedures for Palestinian autonomy was published. [NYT]

Vance said that a violation by Israel of a 1952 military aid accord "may have occurred" during Israeli raids in Lebanon the previous month. [NYT]

Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan said that US "concern about quantities of oil" had resulted in "a real change" in US policy towards the Palestinians "at Israel's expense." [NYT]

A US State Department spokesman said that US diplomatic efforts in the negotiations on Palestinian autonomy were "in no way" linked to "oil policy." [NYT]

Aug. 8: Israeli Ambassador to the US Evron met in Washington with US President Jimmy Carter. Differences between the 2 countries concerning the Middle East situation were discussed. [NYT]

Aug. 11: Carter said the US would "not deal" with the PLO unless they accepted "the right of Israel to exist" and acknowledged that UN Resolution 242 was "binding on them." [NYT]

Aug. 13: The State Department said that US Ambassador to the UN Andrew Young had met briefly with a PLO official the previous month after the official had "arrived unexpectedly" at a meeting Young was attending. [NYT]

Aug. 14: US Ambassador to the UN Young said that he had acted on his own in meeting with a PLO representative and had not asked the State Department for "instructions" beforehand. [NYT]

Israel protested that Young had held a "business meeting" with the PLO official. [NYT]

The State Department disclosed that Young had been reprimanded for the meeting and that he had acted "without authorization." [NYT]

Aug. 15: Young resigned his post. [NYT]

Israel reported that Israeli naval commandos had landed on the coast of southern Lebanon and destroyed 2 vehicles during the night. [NYT]

### Petroleum Affairs

**1979**

May 19: A spokesman for the Iranian National Oil Company said Iran had asked major oil buyers to accept voluntary cuts in oil supplies of up to 15%. [NYT]

June 8: Iraq announced it was raising oil prices to about $20 per barrel. It said it would sell on a "most favored seller" basis. [NYT]

June 19: Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani said he would "not rule out" the possibility that Saudi Arabia would increase oil production by 1m barrels per day. [NYT]

June 20: Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Fahd said Saudi Arabia had no plans to raise oil production above current levels. [NYT]

June 26: A conference of oil ministers of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) met in Geneva, Switzerland. [NYT]

June 28: The OPEC Conference ended in Geneva. It was decided to set the market crude oil base price at $18 per barrel, and allow member countries to add a maximum market premium of $2 per barrel and to set a maximum price of $23.50 per barrel. [NYT]

Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAA said they would charge the base price of $18 per barrel for their oil. [NYT]

July 9: At an economic summit conference meeting in Tokyo, the leaders of 7 industrial nations agreed to set ceilings on oil imports through 1985. [NYT]

The Paris-based magazine al-Mustaqbal published an interview with Libyan Head of State Mu'ammar al-Qadhāhī in which he was quoted as saying that Libya would "stop producing oil—except what we need for our own domestic consumption." [AN]

July 1: Libyan Head of State Qadhāhī said that "further technical studies" were needed before Libyan oil exports would be cut off. [AN]

July 2: Saudi Arabia said in an official radio broadcast that it would increase production of crude oil by an unspecified amount. [NYT]

July 10: Qatari News Agency reported that Oman had raised the price of its crude oil to $22, retroactive to July 1. [NYT]

July 28: The New York Times cited oil industry sources as saying Algeria had cut oil exports by 20%. [NYT]
CHRONOLOGY

August 16, 1979–November 15, 1979

Arab Israeli Conflict

(See also, Algeria, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey)

1979

Aug. 16: Iranian Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni described Israel as the "enemy of humanity throughout the world" and called for a day of solidarity with the Palestinian people. [NYT]

Aug. 17: US Special Envoy Robert Strauss met with Israeli Premier Menahem Begin in Israel and proposed that Israel support a US sponsored UN Security Council Resolution on Palestinian rights. Israel rejected the proposal. [NYT]

Aug. 18: US Special Envoy Strauss met with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in Ismailia and presented the US proposal for a Security Council Resolution. [NYT]

An Israeli naval patrol intercepted a seaborne raiding party off Naqura, north of the Lebanese border with Israel, capturing 3 Palestinians. A fourth guerrilla was believed drowned. [NYT]

Aug. 19: Troops of the UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) clashed with Palestinian guerrillas in southern Lebanon and took 9 guerrillas prisoner. [NYT]

Strauss met with Israeli Premier Begin in Israel. [NYT]

Aug. 20: Israeli jets struck 3 targets near the Lebanese port of Tyre. At least 6 people were wounded. [NYT]

Strauss returned to Washington from the Middle East. He characterized the results of meetings with Israeli and Egyptian officials as "not good." [NYT]

The president of the US black group Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), Joseph Lowery, met in New York with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and later said the SCLC supported "the human rights of all Palestinians, including the right of self-determination." [NYT]

Aug. 21: Israeli Chief Rabbi of the Sephardic Jews Ovadia Yosef said that the return of West Bank territories would be "permissible" in order to prevent another war with the Arabs. [NYT]

Israeli and Lebanese Christian gunners shelled 26 villages in southern Lebanon. Eleven people were killed. [NYT]

Egyptian and Israeli officials ended discussions on Palestinian autonomy in Alexandria. [NYT]

A Lebanese was arrested in Geneva on suspicion of having assassinated al-Sa'iqa leader Zuahy Muhsin the previous month. [NYT]

Representatives of the SCLC met with Israeli Chief Delegate to the UN Yehuda Blum in New York. SCLC President Lowery said the group continued to support "the human rights of all Palestinians." [NYT]

Aug. 22: Strauss said that US President Jimmy Carter had accepted a recommendation to abandon plans to sponsor a Security Council Resolution on the Palestinians. [NYT]

Aug. 23: UN Forces said that Lebanese Christian and Israeli forces had clashed with a UN patrol near Baraachit. [NYT]

Israeli soldiers raided the Lebanese village of Baraachit, blew up 2 houses and seized arms. [NYT]

Egypt supported and Israel opposed an Arab sponsored Security Council resolution calling for "national independence, self-determination and sovereignty" for the Palestinians. [NYT]

Aug. 24: The Security Council postponed a vote on a proposed resolution concerning the Palestinians and adjourned debate indefinitely. [NYT]

Aug. 26: The Israeli Cabinet reaffirmed its policy of conducting strikes on southern Lebanon. [NYT]

Aug. 29: Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan conferred in Gaza with a prominent Palestinian Arab supporter of the PLO. [NYT]

In an address to the Security Council, US Ambassador to the UN Andrew Young called on Israel to "end its policy of pre-emptive strikes" in Lebanon. [NYT]

List of Abbreviations

A bomb exploded in Jerusalem, wounding 1 person. [NYT]

A bomb found on a bus carrying Arab tourists from Nazareth was dismantled. [NYT]

Aug. 31: US President Carter said that he had "never met an Arab leader that in private professed the desire for an independent Palestinian state." [NYT]

Czechoslovak Special Envoy Vasile Pungun met with Begin on the Middle East situation. [NYT]

Sept. 4: Egyptian President Sadat arrived in Haifa aboard the presidential yacht for talks with Israeli leaders on Palestinian autonomy. [NYT]

Sept. 5: Begin and Sadat met in Haifa and agreed on joint Israeli-Egyptian patrols in Sinai after withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force there. [NYT]

A bomb exploded in Jerusalem, injuring 1 person. [NYT]

An aide to Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan said that Dayan had held at least 6 meetings with Palestinian PLO supporters since April. [NYT]

Sept. 6: Sadat and Begin ended talks in Haifa. Sadat said that the 2 leaders had agreed on "the vital necessity to make progress on the Palestinian question soon." [NYT]

The New York Times reported that Israeli troops had driven off Palestinians attempting to slip across the Jordan River on a raid during the night. [NYT]

The US State Department dissed itself from 2 votes cast by the US representative at the UN Human Rights Commission's Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination. The votes were in support of resolutions critical of Israeli policy. [NYT]

Sept. 7: Israeli military authorities in the Gaza Strip said they had arrested 70 alleged terrorists, including the mpole of a Palestinian who had recently met with Dayan. [NYT]

Sept. 8: Strauss arrived in Cairo and met with Sadat. Later he said the meeting had been "constructive, positive and encouraging." [NYT]

The Nonaligned Summit Conference ended in Havana. A declaration issued by the Conference endorsed the right of the PLO and Arab states "to reject and oppose any solution or settlement detrimental to the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people." [NYT]

Sept. 11: Strauss met with Begin in Israel. [NYT]

Sept. 12: Strauss met again with Begin and later said he had urged Israel to continue a ceasefire in Lebanon. [NYT]

The West German Embassy in Israel confirmed reports that an Israeli military court had sentenced 2 West Germans to 10 years imprisonment after 3 years of secret court proceedings. The 2 had been arrested in 1976. [NYT]

Sept. 13: Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman arrived in Washington for talks on "future weaponry" for Israel. [NYT]

PLO Leader Yasir Arafat met with Spanish Premier Adolfo Suarez in Madrid. [NYT]


PLO leader Arafat met with Spanish Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja during his visit to Spain. [NYT]

Sept. 15: A bomb exploded in the Tel Aviv suburb of Bar Yom, injuring a policeman. [NYT]

Sept. 16: The Israeli Cabinet ended a regulation prohibiting Israeli citizens and businesses from buying land in the occupied Arab territories. [NYT]

Sept. 18: The New York Times reported that Weizman and US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Harold Saunders had engaged in an "acrimonious debate" in front of journalists on the subject of Israeli bombing in Lebanon. [NYT]

The US said the Israeli decision to allow its citizens to buy land from Arabs in the occupied West Bank seemed "contrary to the spirit and the intent of the peace process." [NYT]

Egypt issued a statement "strongly condemning" the Israeli decision to allow Israeli citizens to purchase land in the West Bank. [NYT]

Sept. 19: A bomb exploded in Jerusalem, killing 1 person and wounding 38. A second bomb was dismantled. [NYT]

Arafat arrived in Amman for talks with Jordanian King Hussein. [NYT]

Egypt, Israel and the US announced agreement on a formula for monitoring the execution of provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty that would require increased US ground and air surveillance of the Sinai Peninsula and Egyptian and Israeli observers to set up checkpoints in a buffer zone. [NYT]

Israel announced that Begin would not meet with US black leader Jesse Jackson during his upcoming visit to Israel. [JP]

Sept. 20: A group of SCLC leaders met with Arafat in the outskirts of Beirut. [NYT]

Sept. 21: The SCLC leaders announced they had invited Arafat to attend conferences they were organizing in the US. [NYT]

The PLO said that Israeli forces had carried out a raid in southern Lebanon and were repelled by Palestinian forces. Israel denied the charges. [NYT]

Sept. 24: Syrian and Israeli jets clashed over Lebanon. Four Syrian planes were shot down. [NYT]

US black leader Jackson met with Jordanian King Husayn in New York on the Middle East situation. [NYT]

Jackson arrived in Israel and met with Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek. [NYT]

Sept. 25: Israel returned portions of occupied Sinai territory to Egypt. [NYT]

Jackson ended a tour of Israel and the occupied West Bank and entered Jordan. [NYT]

Sept. 26: Egypt, Israel and the US opened the sixth round of Palestinian autonomy talks in Alexandria. [NYT]

Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Butrus Ghali said that the Israeli decision to permit
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CHRONOLOGY

Israelis to buy land from the Arabs in the occupied territories had created "a new crisis of confidence." [NYT]

Sept. 27: The negotiations on Palestinian autonomy ended in Alexandria. The Israeli chief negotiator, Interior Minister Yosef Burg, said the time was "almost ripe for Palestinians joining our negotiations." [NYT]

Sept. 28: Jackson arrived in Lebanon and met with Lebanese Premier Salim al-Husni. [FBIS]

Sept. 29: Jackson met with Arafat in Beirut and offered himself as mediator between the PLO and the US government. [NYT]

Oct. 1: Jackson met with Sadat in Cairo. Sadat called the fact finding tour "very important." [NYT]

Oct. 2: After meeting again with Sadat in Cairo, Jackson flew to Beirut and left for Damascus. [NYT]

Oct. 6: Arafat inaugurated the first PLO office in Turkey during a visit to Ankara. [NYT]

Oct. 7: The Israeli Cabinet approved in principle a plan to monitor the execution of provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty that had been announced the month before. [NYT]

Syrian planes shot down an unmanned Israeli reconnaissance plane as it flew through Syrian airspace north of Damascus. [NYT]

Oct. 8: A bomb exploded in the West Bank city of Hebron, wounding 2 Arab youths. [NYT]

Oct. 10: Israeli settlers built 2 houses outside the settlement of Kadumim in defiance of the Israeli Army. [NYT]

Oct. 11: Israeli troops expelled 30 Jewish settlers from the Amona settlement near the settlement of Kadumim. [NYT]

Oct. 14: The Israeli Cabinet voted unanimously to expand 7 Jewish settlements on the West Bank. It decided not to seize privately owned Arab land for the expansion. [NYT]

Oct. 15: More than 1,000 members of the Jewish nationalist group Gush Emunim set up illegal outposts at 40 sites on the West Bank. Israeli Army personnel arrested 30 people. [NYT]

US black civil rights leader Bayard Rustin and 6 other black leaders met with Israeli labor officials in Israel. [NYT]

Oct. 17: Strauss said that it was "doubtful" whether negotiations on Palestinian autonomy could be completed "by the end of May." [NYT]

Oct. 18: Egyptian, Israeli and US officials ended a round of talks in Alexandria on Palestinian autonomy. [NYT]

Oct. 21: Weizman arrived in Cairo for talks on Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. [NYT]

Oct. 22: The Israeli High Court of Justice ordered the dismantling of the Elon Moreh settlement on the West Bank near Nablus. [NYT]

Oct. 23: US Republican Party Chairman Bill Brock confirmed "the enduring and unqualified support of the Party for the people and state of Israel" and reaffirmed Party policy that the PLO be excluded from direct talks on peace settlement. [NYT]

An Israeli military court convicted 2 Palestinians of murder in a raid on Israel in March 1978. [NYT]

Oct. 24: A bomb exploded at the Tel Aviv central bus terminal. [NYT]

Oct. 25: A Turkish military court condemned 4 Palestinian guerrillas to death for their part in a raid on the Egyptian Embassy in July. [NYT]

Israel sentenced 2 Arab guerrillas to life imprisonment for their parts in a raid in Israel that left 34 people dead. [NYT]

Israel, Egypt and the US began talks in London on Palestinian autonomy. [JP]

Oct. 26: Representatives of Egypt, Israel and the US met in London and agreed that future elections in the West Bank and Gaza would be "organized, conducted and supervised by authorized Israeli personnel and by local Palestinian Arabs agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators." [NYT]

Oct. 28: The Israeli Cabinet decided that the Elon Moreh settlement, which had been ruled illegal by the High Court of Justice, would be moved to a new site in the West Bank. [NYT]

Arab landowners in the West Bank town of Salfit appealed to the Israeli High Court of Justice against the seizure of their land for the Jewish settlement of Ariel. [NYT]

Oct. 29: Canadian Premier Joe Clark said the Canadian Embassy in Israel would not be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem until the status of Jerusalem was "clarified within a comprehensive agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors." [NYT]

Italian Foreign Minister Franco Malfini said that talks in Rome with PLO official Faruq Qaddum had been "very positive" and that for the present Italy extended "political recognition" to the PLO. [NYT]

Oct. 30: Weizman met with Egyptian Defense Minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali in Sinai on future Israeli withdrawal from parts of Sinai. [NYT]

George Habash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), announced the rejection of "any declared or undeclared truce in southern Lebanon." [FBIS]

Nov. 1: A meeting of the "Pan-Arab Front for steadfastness and confrontation" was held in Algiers. The Heads of State of Algeria, Syria and Libya attended the meeting. [FBIS]

Nov. 2: US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski "exchanged greetings" with Yasser Arafat at a reception in Algiers. [AN]

Nov. 4: Israeli Cabinet members repudiated a statement made by Interior Minister Yosef Burg, that the PLO could possibly become involved in negotiations. [NYT]

Nov. 5: Weizman met with Sadat in Egypt. Later Sadat said Egypt and Israel had "reached an understanding on the oil issue." [NYT]

Nov. 7: Palestinian military leader Iyad Ribawi resigned from the Palestinian National Council. [FBIS]

Nov. 8: The Israeli Supreme Court issued a temporary injunction barring the deportation of Nabil's Palestinian Mayor Bassam al-Shak's. [NYT]
Arab mayors from the West Bank met to discuss solidarity measures to be taken if deportation proceedings against Mayor Shaka’a were enacted. [FBIS]

The Israeli Cabinet ratified the Egyptian-Israeli oil supply agreements. [FBIS]

Brigadier Sayd Sallil, Chief of PLO military operations, left Kuwait enroute to Tehran, but denied that he was mediating between Iran and the US. [FBIS]

Khalil al-Wazir of the PLO Fatah Central Committee left Damascus for Tehran on an official mission to mediate with Iranian officials for the release of the US Embassy hostages. [FBIS]

The West German government released two Palestinians sentenced to two and one half years imprisonment for violation of explosive laws, following a scandal over the interrogation procedures. [AN]

Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman informed the Supreme Court of West Bank military authorities’ intention to proceed with the deportation of Shaka’a. [NYT]

Nov. 11: Shaka’a was arrested and imprisoned by Israeli military authorities. The arrest touched off the City Council’s resignation, a general strike, demonstrations in the West Bank and threats of resignation by other mayors and municipal officials. [NYT]

The Israeli Cabinet unanimously voted to add inhabitants to existing settlements in Judea, Samaria, the Jordan Valley, the Gaza, district and the Golan Heights.” The establishment of new settlements was postponed until the status of government-owned land could be checked by the Cabinet legal advisor. [FBIS]

Attorney Felicia Langer submitted an appeal to the High Court of Justice on behalf of Shaka’a. [FBIS]

Nov. 12: PLO special emissary to Iran Sallil returned to Beirut after several days in Iran. [FBIS]

Palestinian leader Sallah Khalaf denied that the PLO was mediating for the release of the 60 US hostages. [FBIS]

Eleven Israelis were wounded in a bomb explosion in southern Negev. [NYT]

Nov. 13: Israeli Ambassador to Portugal Ephraim Eldar was wounded and his bodyguard killed in an attack of unknown origin on the Israeli Embassy in Lisbon. [NYT]

Palestinian mayors in Israeli occupied territories began to resign in protest against the imprisonment of Shaka’a.

A 14-member Egyptian delegation arrived in Israel for joint autonomy talks with US and Israeli delegations. [FBIS]

A delegation of West Bank mayors met with Defense Minister Weizman and requested the release of Shaka’a. [FBIS]

‘Arafat arrived in Moscow accompanied by a high level Palestinian delegation for 2 days of talks with Soviet officials, including Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. [FBIS]

Nov. 14: The PLO denied responsibility for the attack on the Israeli ambassador in Portugal. [FBIS]

The first session of the West Bank and Gaza autonomy talks was concluded in Tel Aviv. [FBIS]

The mayors of all 25 cities in the occupied territories resigned in reaction to the resumption of deportation proceedings against Shaka’a. [NYT]

Nov. 15: The Mount Sinai region and St. Catherine’s were returned to Egyptian sovereignty, two months ahead of the peace treaty schedule. [NYT]

The US sent an official letter to Israel protesting the deportation proceedings against Shaka’a. [FBIS]

**General**

1979

Aug. 23: A US Federal District Court Judge ruled in an antitrust suit brought against member states of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries that the court did not have jurisdiction in the case. [NYT]

Oct. 11: Former Texas Governor John Connally spoke before the Washington Press Club and made the following points: Except for “minor border rectifications” Israel “must withdraw from the West Bank, Gaza and Golan”; all Israeli civilian settlements “must be withdrawn” from the occupied territories; the Palestinian people should “decide for themselves” whether they prefer the West Bank and Gaza to be governed “as an entirely independent entity or to be an autonomous area within the Kingdom of Jordan.” [WP]

Nov. 14: The Foreign Ministers of Syria, Libya, Jordan and South Yemen arrived in Tunisia for the Arab League Foreign Ministers meeting, a preliminary to the 10th Arab summit. [FBIS]

**Petroleum Affairs**

(*See also, United Arab Emirates*)

1979

Aug. 26: An empty oil tanker exploded in the Persian Gulf and was reported to be sinking. [NYT]

A second oil tanker caught fire in the Persian Gulf. [NYT]

Sept. 17: Kuwaiti Oil Minister Shaykh ‘Ali Khalifah Al Sabah said Kuwait had informed oil buyers that they would have to pay the spot market price for oil bought under contractual options for additional quantities. [NYT]

Sept. 26: Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Fahd said that Saudi Arabia would “extend the period of increased production” of its oil for 3 additional months. [NYT]

Oct. 3: Saudi Arabian Finance Minister Shaykh Muhammad Aba al-Khayl said that it was “increasingly difficult” for Saudi Arabia to maintain its policy...
CHRONOLOGY

November 16, 1979–February 15, 1980

Arab Israeli Conflict

(See also, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Turkey)

1979

Nov. 16: The Mayor of the occupied West Bank town of Nablus, Bassam al-Shak'ah, told his attorney that he would refuse solid foods until he was released from prison in Ramallah by Israeli authorities. [NYT]

Nov. 17: Israeli troops prevented West Bank mayors from gathering in Gaza for a 1-day hunger strike in support of Nablus Mayor Shak'ah. [NYT]

Nov. 18: The Israeli government set a 6-week deadline for final evacuation of the Elon Moreh settlement on the West Bank. The Supreme Court had ordered the evacuation. [NYT]

Two guerrillas were killed and 2 captured by Israeli naval forces off the coast of Nahariya. The guerrillas had set off from Lebanon. [JP]

Palestinians demonstrated on the West Bank and Gaza to protest against the detention of Shak'ah. [NYT]

Nov. 20: Representatives of Egypt, Israel and the US ended talks on Palestinian autonomy in Tel Aviv and reported that some progress had been made. [NYT]

Nov. 21: Israel returned 30 acres of the Elon Moreh settlement to their Arab owners. [NYT]

Nov. 22: The Israeli Supreme Court refused to release Shak'ah from prison pending judicial review of an order for his deportation. [NYT]

Nov. 25: Israel returned the Alma oilfield in the Gulf of Suez to Egypt in ceremonies at the Sinai town of El Tur. [NYT]

Nov. 26: A judicial hearing for Shak'ah before the Military Advisory Committee was postponed. [NYT]

Nov. 27: Six men attacked a girls' school at the Jalazoun refugee camp on the West Bank while the school was in session. The attackers smashed classroom windows, threw stones at women and children and fired bullets into the air. [NYT]

Shak'ah said he would not compromise with the Israeli government in order to receive lighter punishment. [NYT]

Nov. 29: The UN General Assembly voted by 75 to 33 with 37 abstentions to adopt a resolution that rejected the provisions of the Camp David accords which "ignore, infringe upon, violate or deny the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people." [AN]

Shak'ah ended a 2-week hunger strike in prison. [NYT]

Dec. 2: A Greek Orthodox monk was found dead at a monastery near Nablus. He had been killed by a hand grenade. [NYT]

Dec. 3: Israel reversed its decision to deport Shak'ah and released him from prison. [NYT]

The mayors of the West Bank and Gaza withdrew their resignations upon the release of Shak'ah. They had resigned to protest his detention. [NYT]

Dec. 6: The General Assembly voted by 102 to 17 with 20 abstentions to condemn partial agreements and separate treaties which violated the rights of the Palestinian people. [AN]

Dec. 8: US Special Envoy to the Middle East Sol Linowitz arrived in Cairo for meetings with Egyptian leaders on the progress of Palestinian autonomy negotiations between Egypt and Israel. [NYT]

Dec. 9: US Special Envoy Linowitz met with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat near Cairo. Later he said he was "not confident" that an agreement on Palestinian autonomy could be reached by the following May. [NYT]

The Israeli Cabinet gave permission for work to begin on a new settlement to replace Elon Moreh. Bulldozers began work on the new settlement. [NYT]

Dec. 10: Linowitz met with Israeli Premier Menahem Begin in Israel and said the meeting had left him "immensely heartened." [NYT]

Dec. 11: The Mayors of El Bireh and Ramallah were put on trial for allegedly shooting a policeman outside a courtroom more than 1 year earlier. [NYT]

Dec. 12: Israel announced that 6 Jewish settlers from the West Bank settlement of Shiloh had been arrested and charged in connection with the attack on the girls' school in the Jalazoun refugee camp. [NYT]

Linowitz and Israeli Interior Minister Yosef Burg flew to Cairo and met with Egyptian Premier Mu'atafa

List of Abbreviations


161
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162

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Khallil. Later Khallil said that “fresh ideas” had been brought. [NYT]
A bomb exploded outside a building housing the

Israeli Embassy in San Salvador. [NYT]

Dec. 13: Linowitz met with Israeli Premier Begin in Is-
rael. Later Linowitz said that “some real progress” had
been made in the negotiations. [NYT]

Dec. 15: Günther assassinated 2 PLO officials in Ni-
cosia, Cyprus. [NYT]

Dec. 16: It was reported that 1 of the Palestinians mur-
dered in Cyprus had been chief of guerrilla opera-
tions in the West Bank. [NYT]

Dec. 18: An Israeli missile boat docked at Port Said, Egy-
pt. It was the first Israeli naval vessel to dock at an
Egyptian port and Sádár met in Cairo to discuss the

Palestinian problem. [NYT]

Israeli soldiers used tear gas to disperse a demon-
stration near Hebron mourning the death of a local
Palestinian in Cyprus. [NYT]

Dec. 19: Egyptian, Israeli and US delegations concluded
a round of talks in Cairo on Palestinian autonomy.

[NYT]

Nationalists of the Arab Students Front swept stu-
dent elections for the Arab Students’ Committee on
the Hebrew University Campus in Jerusalem. [NYT]

Dec. 24: A Nigerian serving in UN Interim Forces in
Lebanon was expelled from Israel shortly after being
sentenced to prison for gunrunning for Palestinian
guerrillas. [NYT]

Dec. 28: Begin visited the Kiryat Arba settlement near
Hebron. He was heckled by Jews opposed to Pales-
tinian self rule. [NYT]

Dec. 30: The Israeli government voted to extend for 5
weeks the deadline for evacuation of the Elion Moreh
settlement. [NYT]

Dec. 31: Israeli Energy Minister Yitzhak Modai said that
the government planned to expropriate the East Jeru-
salem Electric Company, an Arab run concern. [NYT]

1980

Jan. 7: Begin flew to Aswan and met with Egyptian Pres-
ident Sádár. [NYT]

Six US Congressmen met with Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) leader Yásir ‘Arafat in Beirut and
urged the PLO to “halt military operations against Is-
rael from Lebanon.” [NYT]

Jan. 8: Linowitz met with Khallil and Israeli Interior
Minister Burg in Herzliya, Israel. Later he said that
“very significant progress” had been reached. [NYT]

Feb. 2: Linowitz met with Saudi Arabian Crown Prince
Fahd in Saudi Arabia concerning the progress of the
negotiations between Egypt and Israel on the Pales-
stinian question. [NYT]

Feb. 3: A bomb exploded in Rehovot, near Tel Aviv,
injuring 6 people. [NYT]

Feb. 4: Linowitz met with Moroccan King Hasan in Mar-
kesh on the progress of the Egyptian Israeli negotia-
tions on Palestinian autonomy. [NYT]

Feb. 6: The Egyptian parliament approved a law ending
the economic boycott of Israel. [JP]

Feb. 10: An Israeli Cabinet communique said the gov-
ernment had “no objection to Jews living in Hebron
as in any other part of Israel.” [NYT]

The curfew on Hebron was lifted. [JP]
CHRONOLOGY

Feb. 12: A US spokesman said that an Israeli decision to allow Jews to settle in Hebron "would be a step backwards in the peace process." [NYT]

"Israeli military sources" said the Soviet Union had supplied armored equipment and about 60 tanks to the PLO. The PLO denied the report. [NYT]

Feb. 13: The Israeli Knesset Finance Committee appropriated $1.3m for the purchase of land in the occupied territories from private Arab land owners. [NYT]

General

(See also, Afghanistan, Iran)

1979

Nov. 26: The US State Department said it had told its Embassies in about 10 Muslim countries to evacuate "voluntarily" extra non-essential diplomatic and private businessmen. The countries were not named. [NYT]

Nov. 27: The US issued a "travel advisory" urging all Americans to avoid non-essential travel to Bangladesh, the U.A.E, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Yemen, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Lebanon. [NYT]

Dec. 17: A US federal district judge ordered a halt to special immigration checks on Iranian students in the US. [NYT]

Dec. 27: A federal appeals court ruled that the US could conduct special immigration checks on Iranian students in the US. [NYT]

Dec. 29: The New York Times reported that US President Jimmy Carter had said he had told Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev on the hotline that the Soviet Union would suffer "serious consequences" in its relations with the US if it did not pull its forces out of Afghanistan. [NYT]

1980

Jan. 3: US President Carter asked the Senate to postpone its debate on the SALT II treaty with the Soviet Union because of the crisis in Afghanistan. [WP]

Jan. 4: Carter called the Soviet presence in Afghanistan "an extremely serious threat to peace." He announced that Soviet fishing privileges in US waters would be curtailed, that "no high technology or other strategic items" would be licensed for sale to the Soviet Union and that grain ordered by the Soviet Union from the US above amounts agreed upon by treaty would not be delivered. [NYT]

Carter said that "continued aggressive actions" by the Soviet Union would "endanger" the participation of the US in the Olympic Games in Moscow. [NYT]

Jan. 5: The Soviet Embassy in Moscow warned that any moves announced by Carter were "borrowed from the arsenal of the cold war." [NYT]

Jan. 6: Saudi Arabia withdrew from the 1980 summer Olympics to protest the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. [NYT]

Jan. 8: Carter ordered the withdrawal of 7 US consular officers from Kiev and the expulsion of 17 Soviet diplomats from New York. [NYT]

Jan. 11: Canadian Premier Joe Clark said his government questioned "the appropriateness" of holding the Olympics in Moscow. [NYT]

Jan. 12: Soviet President Brezhnev said that allegations that the Soviet Union had "expansionist designs" on Iran or Pakistan were "absolutely false." [NYT]

Jan. 20: Carter said that if the Soviet Union did not pull its troops out of Afghanistan within one month he would "not support the sending of an American team to the Olympics." [NYT]

Jan. 23: Carter said the US would use "any means necessary, including military force" to repel an attack on the Persian Gulf. He announced that he would seek authority to resume draft registration to "meet future mobilization needs." [NYT]

Jan. 24: The US said it was willing to sell China military support equipment. The US House of Representatives voted 386 to 12 to urge the US Olympic Committee to press for the transfer or cancellation of the Olympic Games. [NYT]

Jan. 25: Japanese Premier Masayoshi Ohira condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and said Japan was ready to make "sacrifices" to force a Soviet withdrawal. [NYT]

Jan. 28: It was reported that Morocco would boycott the Olympic Games. [NYT]

Jan. 29: The US Senate voted by 88 to 4 for a resolution calling for the US to boycott the Moscow Olympics even if Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan. [NYT]

Carter said that the US did not claim it could defend the Persian Gulf "unilaterally." [NYT]

Jan. 31: The Dutch Parliament voted to authorize the government to recommend that the Netherlands boycott the summer Olympics. [NYT]

Feb. 1: China said it was joining the Olympic boycott. [NYT]

Japan said that a boycott was "desirable" and urged its Olympic committee to take "an appropriate step." [NYT]

Feb. 3: Kenya announced it would boycott the summer Olympic Games if they were held in Moscow. [NYT]

Feb. 5: France and West Germany issued a joint call for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan "without delay." [NYT]

Feb. 8: Nigeria said its Olympic team was going to Moscow. [NYT]

Feb. 12: International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Lord Killanin said that 73 members of the IOC had unanimously agreed that the Olympic Games "must be held in Moscow as planned." [NYT]

US officials said that Carter had ordered an amphibious assault force to go to the Arabian Sea to demonstrate US military capability. [NYT]

Feb. 15: The European Parliament called for a boycott of the Olympics and an embargo on sales of surplus commodities to the Soviet Union. [NYT]
Documents
Until the advent of the Internet made many historical and official documents only a few clicks away, *The Middle East Journal* frequently published governmental, legal, and historical papers which pertained to the issue’s articles or to the events of the day. In the pages that follow, we reproduce the Documents section as published in the Summer 1979 (Vol. 33, No. 3) issue of the *Journal*, which contains the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, its annexes, and a number of relevant maps and exchanges of correspondence between Menachem Begin, Jimmy Carter, and Anwar Sadat.
DOCUMENTS

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty

The White House, Monday, March 26, 1979

Treaty of Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the State of Israel;

Preamble

Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;

Reaffirming their adherence to the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David," dated September 17, 1978;

Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is intended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis;

Desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live in security;

Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel is an important step in the search for comprehensive peace in the area and for the attainment of the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects;

Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the peace process with Israel guided by and based on the principles of the aforementioned Framework;

Desiring as well to develop friendly relations and cooperation between themselves in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace;

Agree to the following provisions in the free exercise of their sovereignty, in order to implement the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel":

Article I

1. The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

2. Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex I), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.

3. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex I, the Parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in accordance with Article III (3).

Article II

The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip. The Parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.

Article III

1. The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing
relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

a. They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
b. They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries;
c. They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.

2. Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice.

3. The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment by citizens of the due process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions of this Treaty is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex III).

Article IV

1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.

2. The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree.

3. A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I.

4. The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

Article V

1. Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations. Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non-discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal.

2. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Article VI

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.

3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral
conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositaries of such conventions.

4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.

5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

Article VII

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.

2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

Article VIII

The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty supersedes the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of September, 1975.

3. All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

4. The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Washington, D.C. this 26th day of March, 1979, in triplicate in the English, Arabic, and Hebrew languages, each text being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:

For the Government of Israel:

Witnessed by:

Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America

Annex I

Protocol Concerning Israeli Withdrawal and Security Arrangements

Article I

Concept of Withdrawal

1. Israel will complete withdrawal of all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

2. To ensure the mutual security of the Parties, the implementation of phased withdrawal will be accompanied by the military measures and establishment of zones set out in this Annex and in Map 1, hereinafter referred to as “the Zones.”

3. The withdrawal from the Sinai will be accomplished in two phases:

a. The interim withdrawal behind the line from east of El Arish to Ras Muhammed as delineated on Map 2 within nine months from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
b. The final withdrawal from the Sinai behind the international boundary not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty in order to supervise and coordinate movements and schedules during the withdrawal, and to adjust plans and timetables as necessary within the limits established by paragraph 3, above. Details relating to the Joint Commission are set out in Article IV of the attached Appendix. The Joint Commission will
be dissolved upon completion of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

**Article II**

**Determination of Final Lines and Zones**

1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties after the final withdrawal, the lines and the Zones delineated on Map 1 are to be established and organized as follows:

a. Zone A

(1) Zone A is bounded on the east by line A (red line) and on the west by the Suez Canal and the east coast of the Gulf of Suez, as shown on Map 1.

(2) An Egyptian armed force of one mechanized infantry division and its military installations, and field fortifications, will be in this Zone.

(3) The main elements of that Division will consist of:

(a) Three mechanized infantry brigades.

(b) One armored brigade.

(c) Seven field artillery battalions including up to 126 artillery pieces.

(d) Seven anti-aircraft artillery battalions including individual surface-to-air missiles and up to 126 anti-aircraft guns of 37 mm and above.

(e) Up to 230 tanks.

(f) Up to 480 armored personnel vehicles of all types.

(g) Up to a total of twenty-two thousand personnel.

b. Zone B

(1) Zone B is bounded by line B (green line) on the east and by line A (red line) on the west, as shown on Map 1.

(2) Egyptian border units of four battalions equipped with light weapons and wheeled vehicles will provide security and supplement the civil police in maintaining order in Zone B. The main elements of the four Border Battalions will consist of up to a total of four thousand personnel.

(3) Land based, short range, low power, coastal warning points of the border patrol units may be established on the coast of this Zone.

(4) There will be in Zone B field fortifications and military installations for the four border battalions.

c. Zone C

(1) Zone C is bounded by line B (green line) on the west and the International Boundary and the Gulf of Aqaba on the east, as shown on Map 1.

(2) Only United Nations forces and Egyptian civil police will be stationed in Zone C.

(3) The Egyptian civil police armed with light weapons will perform normal police functions within this Zone.

(4) The United Nations Force will be deployed within Zone C and perform its functions as defined in Article VI of this Annex.

(5) The United Nations Force will be stationed mainly in camps located within the following stationing areas shown on Map 1, and will establish its precise locations after consultations with Egypt:

(a) In that part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 Km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the International Boundary.

(b) In the Sharm el Sheikh area.

d. Zone D

(1) Zone D is bounded by line D (blue line) on the east and the international boundary on the west, as shown on Map 1.

(2) In this Zone there will be an Israeli limited force of four infantry battalions, their military installations, and field fortifications, and United Nations observers.

(3) The Israeli forces in Zone D will not include tanks, artillery and antiaircraft missiles except individual surface-to-air missiles.

(4) The main elements of the four Israeli infantry battalions will consist of up to 180 armored personnel vehicles of all types and up to a total of four thousand personnel.

2. Access across the international boundary shall only be permitted through entry check points designated by each Party and under its control. Such access shall be in accordance with laws and regulations of each country.

3. Only those field fortifications, military installations, forces, and weapons specifically permitted by this Annex shall be in the Zones.
THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Article III
Aerial Military Regime

1. Flights of combat aircraft and reconnaissance [sic] flights of Egypt and Israel shall take place only over Zones A and D, respectively.

2. Only unarmed, non-combat aircraft of Egypt and Israel will be stationed in Zones A and D, respectively.

3. Only Egyptian unarmed transport aircraft will take off and land in Zone B and up to eight such aircraft may maintained [sic] in Zone B. The Egyptian border units may be equipped with unarmed helicopters to perform their functions in Zone B.

4. The Egyptian civil police may be equipped with unarmed police helicopters to perform normal police functions in Zone C.

5. Only civilian airfields may be built in the Zones.

6. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those military aerial activities specifically permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in the Zones and the airspace above their territorial waters.

Article IV
Naval Regime

1. Egypt and Israel may base and operate naval vessels along the coasts of Zones A and D, respectively.

2. Egyptian coast guard boats, lightly armed, may be stationed and operate in the territorial waters of Zone B to assist the border units in performing their functions in this Zone.

3. Egyptian civil police equipped with light boats, lightly armed, shall perform normal police functions within the territorial waters of Zone C.

4. Nothing in this Annex shall be considered as derogating from the right of innocent passage of the naval vessels of either party.

5. Only civilian maritime ports and installations may be built in the Zones.

6. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those naval activities specifically permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in the Zones and in their territorial waters.

Article V
Early Warning Systems

Egypt and Israel may establish and operate early warning systems only in Zones A and D respectively.

Article VI
United Nations Operations

1. The Parties will request the United Nations to provide forces and observers to supervise the implementation of this Annex and employ their best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.

2. With respect to these United Nations forces and observers, as appropriate, the Parties agree to request the following arrangements:

a. Operation of check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts along the international boundary and line B, and within Zone C.

b. Periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions of this Annex will be carried out not less than twice a month unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

c. Additional verifications within 48 hours after the receipt of a request from either Party.

d. Ensuring the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran in accordance with Article V of the Treaty of Peace.

3. The arrangements described in this article for each zone will be implemented in Zones A, B, and C by the United Nations Force and in Zone D by the United Nations Observers.

4. United Nations verification teams shall be accompanied by liaison officers of the respective Party.

5. The United Nations Force and observers will report their findings to both Parties.

6. The United Nations Force and Observers operating in the Zones will enjoy freedom of movement and other facilities necessary for the performance of their tasks.

7. The United Nations Force and Observers are not empowered to authorize the crossing of the international boundary.

8. The Parties shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations Force and Observers will be drawn. They will be drawn from nations...
other than those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

9. The Parties agree that the United Nations should make those command arrangements that will best assure the effective implementation of its responsibilities.

Article VII
Liaison System

1. Upon dissolution of the Joint Commission, a liaison system between the Parties will be established. This liaison system is intended to provide an effective method to assess progress in the implementation of obligations under the present Annex and to resolve any problem that may arise in the course of implementation, and refer other unresolved matters to the higher military authorities of the two countries respectively for consideration. It is also intended to prevent situations resulting from errors or misinterpretation on the part of either Party.

2. An Egyptian liaison office will be established in the city of El-Arish and an Israeli liaison office will be established in the city of Beersheba. Each office will be headed by an officer of the respective country, and assisted by a number of officers.

3. A direct telephone link between the two offices will be set up and also direct telephone lines with the United Nations command will be maintained by both offices.

Article VIII
Respect for War Memorials

Each Party undertakes to preserve in good condition the War Memorials erected in the memory of soldiers of the other Party, namely those erected by Israel in the Sinai and those to be erected by Egypt in Israel, and shall permit access to such monuments.

Article IX
Interim Arrangements

The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians behind the interim withdrawal line, and the conduct of the forces of the Parties and the United Nations prior to the final withdrawal, will be governed by the attached Appendix and Maps 2 and 3.

Appendix to Annex I
Organization of Movements in the Sinai

Article I—Principles of Withdrawal

1. The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians from the Sinai will be accomplished in two phases as described in Article I of Annex I. The description and timing of the withdrawal are included in this Appendix. The Joint Commission will develop and present to the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations forces in the Middle East the details of these phases not later than one month before the initiation of each phase of withdrawal.

2. Both Parties agree on the following principles for the sequence of military movements.

a. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article IX, paragraph 2, of this Treaty, until Israeli armed forces complete withdrawal from the current J and M lines established by the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of September 1975, hereinafter referred to as the 1975 Agreement, up to the interim withdrawal line, all military arrangements existing under that Agreement will remain in effect, except those military arrangements otherwise provided for in this Appendix.

b. As Israeli armed forces withdraw, United Nations forces will immediately enter the evacuated areas to establish interim and temporary buffer zones as shown on Maps 2 and 3, respectively, for the purpose of maintaining a separation of forces. United Nations forces deployment will precede the movement of any other personnel into these areas.

c. Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have evacuated any area located in Zone A, units of Egyptian armed forces shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix.

d. Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have evacuated any area located in Zones A or B, Egyptian border units shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix, and will function in accordance with the provisions of Article II of Annex I.
e. Egyptian civil police will enter evacuated areas immediately after the United Nations forces to perform normal police functions.

f. Egyptian naval units shall deploy in the Gulf of Suez in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix.

g. Except those movements mentioned above, deployments of Egyptian armed forces and the activities covered in Annex I will be effected in the evacuated areas when Israeli armed forces have completed their withdrawal behind the interim withdrawal line.
Article II — Subphases of the Withdrawal to the Interim Withdrawal Line

1. The withdrawal to the interim withdrawal line will be accomplished in subphases as described in this Article and as shown on Map 3. Each subphase will be completed within the indicated number of months from the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

   a. First subphase: within two months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area of El Arish, including the town of El Arish and its airfield, shown as Area I on Map 3.
   b. Second subphase: within three months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area between line M of the 1975 Agreement and line A, shown as Area II on Map 3.
   c. Third subphase: within five months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the areas east and south of Area II, shown as Area III on Map 3.
   d. Fourth subphase: within seven months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area of El Tor—Ras El Kenisa, shown as Area IV on Map 3.
   e. Fifth subphase: Within nine months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the remaining areas west of the interim withdrawal line, including the areas of Santa Katrina and the areas east of the Giddi and Mitla passes, shown as Area V on Map 3, thereby completing Israeli withdrawal behind the interim withdrawal line.

2. Egyptian forces will deploy in the areas evacuated by Israeli armed forces as follows:

   a. Up to one-third of the Egyptian armed forces in the Sinai in accordance with the 1975 Agreement will deploy in the portions of Zone A lying within Area I, until the completion of interim withdrawal. Thereafter, Egyptian armed forces as described in Article II of Annex I will be deployed in Zone A up to the limits of the interim buffer zone.
   b. The Egyptian naval activity in accordance with Article IV of Annex I will commence along the coasts of Areas II, III, and IV, upon completion of the second, third, and fourth subphases, respectively.
   c. Of the Egyptian border units described in Article II of Annex I, upon completion of the first subphase one battalion will be deployed in Area I. A second battalion will be deployed in Area II upon completion of the second subphase. A third battalion will be deployed in Area III upon completion of the third subphase. The second and third battalions mentioned above may also be deployed in any of the subsequently evacuated areas of the southern Sinai.

3. United Nations forces in Buffer Zone 1 of the 1975 Agreement will redeploy to enable the deployment of Egyptian forces described above upon the completion of the first subphase, but will otherwise continue to function in accordance with the provisions of that Agreement in the remainder of that zone until the completion of interim withdrawal, as indicated in Article 1 of this Appendix.

4. Israeli convoys may use the roads south and east of the main road junction east of El Arish to evacuate Israeli forces and equipment up to the completion of interim withdrawal. These convoys will proceed in daylight upon four hours notice to the Egyptian liaison group and United Nations forces, will be escorted by United Nations forces, and will be in accordance with schedules coordinated by the Joint Commission. An Egyptian liaison officer will accompany convoys to assure uninterrupted movement. The Joint Commission may approve other arrangements for convoys.

Article III — United Nations Forces

1. The Parties shall request that United Nations forces be deployed as necessary to perform the functions described in this Appendix up to the time of completion of final Israeli withdrawal. For that purpose, the Parties agree to the redeployment of the United Nations Emergency Force.

2. United Nations forces will supervise the implementation of this Appendix and will employ their best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.

3. When United Nations forces deploy in accordance with the provisions of Articles I and II of this Appendix, they will perform the
functions of verification in limited force zones in accordance with Article VI of Annex I, and will establish check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts in the temporary buffer zones described in Article II above. Other functions of the United Nations forces which concern the interim buffer zone are described in Article V of this Appendix.

**Article IV — Joint Commission and Liaison**

1. The Joint Commission referred to in Article IV of this Treaty will function from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty up to the date of completion of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

2. The Joint Commission will be composed of representatives of each Party headed by senior officers. This Commission shall invite a representative of the United Nations when discussing subjects concerning the United Nations, or when either Party requests United Nations presence. Decisions of the Joint Commission will be reached by agreement of Egypt and Israel.

3. The Joint Commission will supervise the implementation of the arrangements described in Annex I and this Appendix. To this end, and by agreement of both Parties, it will:

   a. coordinate military movements described in this Appendix and supervise their implementation;
   
   b. address and seek to resolve any problem arising out of the implementation of Annex I and this Appendix, and discuss any violations reported by the United Nations Force and Observers and refer to the Governments of Egypt and Israel any unresolved problems;
   
   c. assist the United Nations Force and Observers in the execution of their mandates, and deal with the timetables of the periodic verifications when referred to it by the Parties as provided for in Annex I and in this Appendix;
   
   d. organize the demarcation of the international boundary and all lines and zones described in Annex I and this Appendix;
   
   e. supervise the handing over of the main installations in the Sinai from Israel to Egypt;
   
   f. agree on necessary arrangements for finding and returning missing bodies of Egyptian and Israeli soldiers;
   
   g. organize the setting up and operation of entry check points along the El Arish—Ras Muhammed line in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of Annex III;
   
   h. conduct its operations through the use of joint liaison teams consisting of one Israeli representative and one Egyptian representative, provided from a standing Liaison Group, which will conduct activities as directed by the Joint Commission;
   
   i. provide liaison and coordination to the United Nations command implementing provisions of the Treaty, and, through the joint liaison teams, maintain local coordination and cooperation with the United Nations Force stationed in specific areas or United Nations Observers monitoring specific areas for any assistance as needed;
   
   j. discuss any other matters which the Parties by agreement may place before it.

4. Meetings of the Joint Commission shall be held at least once a month. In the event that either Party or the Command of the United Nations Force requests a special meeting, it will be convened within 24 hours.

5. The Joint Commission will meet in the buffer zone until the completion of the interim withdrawal and in El Arish and Beer-Sheba alternately afterwards. The first meeting will be held not later than two weeks after the entry into force of this Treaty.

**Article V — Definition of the Interim Buffer Zone and Its Activities**

1. An interim buffer zone, by which the United Nations Force will effect a separation of Egyptian and Israeli elements, will be established west of and adjacent to the interim withdrawal line as shown on Map 2 after implementation of Israeli withdrawal and deployment behind the interim withdrawal line. Egyptian civil police equipped with light weapons will perform normal police functions within this zone.

2. The United Nations Force will operate check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts within the interim buffer zone in
order to ensure compliance with the terms of this Article.
3. In accordance with arrangements agreed upon by both Parties and to be coordinated by the Joint Commission, Israeli personnel will operate military technical installations at four specific locations shown on Map 2 and designated as T1 (map central coordinate 57163940), T2 (map central coordinate 593531541), T3 (map central coordinate 59331527), and T4 (map central coordinate 61130979) under the following principles:
   a. The technical installations shall be manned by technical and administrative personnel equipped with small arms required for their protection (revolvers, rifles, sub-machine guns, light machine guns, hand grenades, and ammunition), as follows:
      T1 — up to 150 personnel
      T2 and T3 — up to 350 personnel
      T4 — up to 200 personnel.
   b. Israeli personnel will not carry weapons outside the sites, except officers who may carry personal weapons.
   c. Only a third party agreed to by Egypt and Israel will enter and conduct inspections within the perimeters of technical installations in the buffer zone. The third party will conduct inspections in a random manner at least once a month. The inspections will verify the nature of the operation of the installations and the weapons and personnel therein. The third party will immediately report to the Parties any divergence from an installation’s visual and electronic surveillance or communications role.
   d. Supply of the installations, visits for technical and administrative purposes, and replacement of personnel and equipment situated in the sites, may occur uninterrupted from the United Nations check points to the perimeter of the technical installations, after checking and being escorted by only the United Nations forces.
   e. Israel will be permitted to introduce into its technical installations items required for the proper functioning of the installations and personnel.
   f. As determined by the Joint Commission, Israel will be permitted to:
      1) Maintain in its installations fire-fighting and general maintenance equipment as well as wheeled administrative vehicles and mobile engineering equipment necessary for the maintenance of the sites. All vehicles shall be unarmed.
      2) Within the sites and in the buffer zone, maintain roads, water lines, and communications cables which serve the sites. At each of the three installation locations (T1, T2 and T3, and T4), this maintenance may be performed with up to two unarmed wheeled vehicles and by up to twelve unarmed personnel with only necessary equipment, including heavy engineering equipment if needed. This maintenance may be performed three times a week, except for special problems, and only after giving the United Nations four hours notice. The teams will be escorted by the United Nations.
   g. Movement to and from the technical installations will take place only during daylight hours. Access to, and exit from, the technical installations shall be as follows:
      1) T1: through a United Nations check point, and via the road between Abu Aweigill and the intersection of the Abu Aweigill road and the Gebel Libni road (at Km. 161), as shown on Map 2.
      2) T2 and T3: through a United Nations checkpoint and via the road constructed across the buffer zone to Gebel Katrina, as shown on Map 2.
      3) T2, T3, and T4: via helicopters flying within a corridor at the times, and according to a flight profile, agreed to by the Joint Commission. The helicopters will be checked by the United Nations Force at landing sites outside the perimeter of the installations.
   h. Israel will inform the United Nations Force at least one hour in advance of each intended movement to and from the installations.
   i. Israel shall be entitled to evacuate sick and wounded and summon medical experts and medical teams at any time after giving immediate notice to the United Nations Force.
4. The details of the above principles and all other matters in this Article requiring coordina-
Article VI — Disposition of Installations and Military Barriers

Disposition of installations and military barriers will be determined by the Parties in accordance with the following guidelines:

1. Up to three weeks before Israeli withdrawal from any area, the Joint Commission will arrange for Israeli and Egyptian liaison and technical teams to conduct a joint inspection of all appropriate installations to agree upon condition of structures and articles which will be transferred to Egyptian control and to arrange for such transfer. Israel will declare, at that time, its plans for disposition of installations and articles within the installations.

2. Israel undertakes to transfer to Egypt all agreed infrastructure, utilities, and installations intact, inter alia, airfields, roads, pumping stations, and ports. Israel will present to Egypt the information necessary for the maintenance and operation of these facilities. Egyptian technical teams will be permitted to observe and familiarize themselves with the operation of these facilities for a period of up to two weeks prior to transfer.

3. When Israel relinquishes Israeli military water points near El Arish and El Tor, Egyptian technical teams will assume control of those installations and ancillary equipment in accordance with an orderly transfer process arranged beforehand by the Joint Commission. Egypt undertakes to continue to make available at all water supply points the normal quantity of currently available water up to the time Israel withdraws behind the international boundary, unless otherwise agreed in the Joint Commission.

4. Israel will make its best effort to remove or destroy all military barriers, including obstacles and minefields, in the areas and adjacent waters from which it withdraws, according to the following concept:

- a. Military barriers will be cleared first from areas near populations, roads, and major installations and utilities.
- b. For those obstacles and minefields which cannot be removed or destroyed prior to Israeli withdrawal, Israel will provide detailed maps to Egypt and the United Nations through the Joint Commission not later than 15 days before entry of United Nations forces into the affected areas.
- c. Egyptian military engineers will enter those areas after United Nations forces enter to conduct barrier clearance operations in accordance with Egyptian plans to be submitted prior to implementation.

Article VII — Surveillance Activities

1. Aerial surveillance activities during the withdrawal will be carried out as follows:

- a. Both Parties request the United States to continue airborne surveillance flights in accordance with previous agreements until the completion of final Israeli withdrawal.
- b. Flight profiles will cover the Limited Forces Zones to monitor the limitations on forces and armaments, and to determine that Israeli armed forces have withdrawn from the areas described in Article II of Annex I, Article II of this Appendix, and Maps 2 and 3, and that these forces thereafter remain behind their lines. Special inspection flights may be flown at the request of either Party or of the United Nations.
- c. Only the main elements in the military organizations of each Party, as described in Annex I and in this Appendix, will be reported.

2. Both Parties request the United States operated Sinai Field Mission to continue its operations in accordance with previous agreements until completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the area east of the Giddi and Mitla Passes. Thereafter, the Mission will be terminated.

Article VIII — Exercise of Egyptian Sovereignty

Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over evacuated parts of the Sinai upon Israeli withdrawal as provided for in Article I of this Treaty.
Annex III
Protocol Concerning Relations of the Parties

Article 1
Diplomatic and Consular Relations

The Parties agree to establish diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange ambassadors upon completion of the interim withdrawal.

Article 2
Economic and Trade Relations

1. The Parties agree to remove all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations and to terminate economic boycotts of each other upon completion of the interim withdrawal.
2. As soon as possible, and not later than six months after the completion of the interim withdrawal, the Parties will enter negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement on trade and commerce for the purpose of promoting beneficial economic relations.

Article 3
Cultural Relations

1. The Parties agree to establish normal cultural relations following completion of the interim withdrawal.
2. They agree on the desirability of cultural exchanges in all fields, and shall, as soon as possible and not later than six months after completion of the interim withdrawal, enter into negotiations with a view to concluding a cultural agreement for this purpose.

Article 4
Freedom of Movement

1. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, each Party will permit the free movement of the nationals and vehicles of the other into and within its territory according to the general rules applicable to nationals and vehicles of other states. Neither Party will impose discriminatory restrictions on the free movement of persons and vehicles from its territory to the territory of the other.
2. Mutual unimpeded access to places of religious and historical significance will be provided on a nondiscriminatory basis.

Article 5
Cooperation for Development and Good Neighborly Relations

1. The Parties recognize a mutuality of interest in good neighborly relations and agree to consider means to promote such relations.
2. The Parties will cooperate in promoting peace, stability and development in their region. Each agrees to consider proposals the other may wish to make to this end.
3. The Parties shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and will, accordingly, abstain from hostile propaganda against each other.

Article 6
Transportation and Telecommunications

1. The Parties recognize as applicable to each other the rights, privileges and obligations provided for by the aviation agreements to which they are both party, particularly by the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944 ("The Chicago Convention") and the International Air Services Transit Agreement, 1944.
2. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal any declaration of national emergency by a party under Article 89 of the Chicago Convention will not be applied to the other party on a discriminatory basis.
3. Egypt acquires that the use of airfields left by Israel near El Arish, Rafah, Ras El Nagb and Sharm El Sheikh shall be for civil purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations.
4. As soon as possible and not later than six months after the completion of the interim withdrawal, the Parties shall enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a civil aviation agreement.
5. The Parties will reopen and maintain roads and railways between their countries and will con-
sider further road and rail links. The Parties further agree that a highway will be constructed and maintained between Egypt, Israel and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage of persons, vehicles and goods between Egypt and Jordan, without prejudice to their sovereignty over that part of the highway which falls within their respective territory.

6. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, normal postal, telephone, telex, data facsimile, wireless and cable communications and television relay services by cable, radio and satellite shall be established between the two Parties in accordance with all relevant international conventions and regulations.

7. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, each Party shall grant normal access to its ports for vessels and cargoes of the other, as well as vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from the other. Such access shall be granted on the same conditions generally applicable to vessels and cargoes of other nations. Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace will be implemented upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of the aforementioned treaty.

Article 7
Enjoyment of Human Rights

The Parties affirm their commitment to respect and observe human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and they will promote these rights and freedoms in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

Article 8
Territorial Seas

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace each Party recognizes the right of the vessels of the other Party to innocent passage through its territorial sea in accordance with the rules of international law.

Agreed Minutes to Articles I, IV, V and VI and Annexes I and III of Treaty of Peace

Article I

Egypt's resumption of the exercise of full sovereignty over the Sinai provided for in para-

graph 2 of Article 1 shall occur with regard to each area upon Israel's withdrawal from that area.

Article IV

It is agreed between the parties that the review provided for in Article IV(4) will be undertaken when requested by either party, commencing within three months of such a request, but that any amendment can be made only with the mutual agreement of both parties.

Article V

The second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V shall not be construed as limiting the first sentence of that paragraph. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V, which reads as follows:

"The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba."

Article VI(2)

The provisions of Article VI shall not be construed in contradiction to the provisions of the framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI(2) of the Treaty, which reads as follows:

"The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other Party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty."

Article VI(5)

It is agreed by the Parties that there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails over other Treaties or agreements or that other Treaties or agreements prevail over this Treaty. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI(5) of the Treaty, which reads as follows:

"Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict be-
between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.”

Annex I

Article VI, Paragraph 8, of Annex I provides as follows:

“The Parties shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations force and observers will be drawn. They will be drawn from nations other than those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.”

The Parties have agreed as follows:

“With respect to the provisions of paragraph 8, Article VI, of Annex I, if no agreement is reached between the Parties, they will accept or support a U.S. proposal concerning the composition of the United Nations force and observers.”

Annex III

The Treaty of Peace and Annex III thereto provide for establishing normal economic relations between the Parties. In accordance therewith, it is agreed that such relations will include normal commercial sales of oil by Egypt to Israel, and that Israel shall be fully entitled to make bids for Egyptian-origin oil not needed for Egyptian domestic oil consumption, and Egypt and its oil concessionaires will entertain bids made by Israel, on the same basis and terms as apply to other bidders for such oil.

For the Government of Israel:

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:

Witnessed by:

Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America

March 26, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

This letter confirms that Egypt and Israel have agreed as follows:

The Governments of Egypt and Israel recall that they concluded at Camp David and signed at the White House on September 17, 1978, the annexed documents entitled “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David” and “Framework for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel.”

For the purpose of achieving a comprehensive peace settlement in accordance with the above-mentioned Frameworks, Egypt and Israel will proceed with the implementation of those provisions relating to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They have agreed to start negotiations within a month after the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the Peace Treaty. In accordance with the “Framework for Peace in the Middle East,” the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is invited to join the negotiations. The Delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The purpose of the negotiation shall be to agree, prior to the elections, on the modalities for estab-
lishing the elected self-governing authority (administrative council), define its powers and responsibilities, and agree upon other related issues. In the event Jordan decides not to take part in the negotiations, the negotiations will be held by Egypt and Israel.

The two Governments agree to negotiate continuously and in good faith to conclude these negotiations at the earliest possible date. They also agree that the objective of the negotiations is the establishment of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza in order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants.

Egypt and Israel set for themselves the goal of completing the negotiations within one year so that elections will be held as expeditiously as possible after agreement has been reached between the parties. The self-governing authority referred to in the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" will be established and inaugurated within one month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period of five years will begin. The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn, to be replaced by the self-governing authority, as specified in the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East." A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will then take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.

This letter also confirms our understanding that the United States Government will participate fully in all stages of negotiations.

Sincerely yours,

For the Government of Israel:
Menachem Begin

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:
Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat

The President,
The White House*

March 26, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

In response to your request, I can confirm that, within one month after the completion of Israel's withdrawal to the interim line as provided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, Egypt will send a resident ambassador to Israel and will receive a resident Israeli ambassador in Egypt.

Sincerely,

Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat

For the Government of the State of Israel:
Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of the State of Israel

March 26, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received a letter from President Sadat that, within one month after Israel completes its withdrawal to the interim line in Sinai, as provided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, Egypt will send a resident ambassador to Israel and will receive in Egypt a resident Israeli ambassador.

I would be grateful if you will confirm that this procedure will be agreeable to the Government of Israel.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

* EXPLANATORY NOTE

President Carter, upon receipt of the Joint Letter to him from President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, has added to the American and Israeli copies the notation:

"I have been informed that the expression 'West Bank' is understood by the Government of Israel to mean 'Judea and Samaria.'"

This notation is in accordance with similar procedures established at Camp David.
March 26, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to be able to confirm that the Government of Israel is agreeable to the procedure set out in your letter of March 26, 1979 in which you state:

"I have received a letter from President Sadat that, within one month after Israel completes its withdrawal to the interim line in Sinai, as provided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, Egypt will send a resident ambassador to Israel and will receive in Egypt a resident Israeli ambassador."

Sincerely,

Menachem Begin

The President,
The White House.

March 26, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to confirm to you that subject to United States Constitutional processes:

In the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, the United States will, on request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and will take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.

The United States will conduct aerial monitoring as requested by the Parties pursuant to Annex I of the Treaty.

The United States believes the Treaty provision for permanent stationing of United Nations personnel in the designated limited force zone can and should be implemented by the United Nations Security Council. The United States will exert its utmost efforts to obtain the requisite action by the Security Council. If the Security Council fails to establish and maintain the arrangements called for in the Treaty, the President will be prepared to take those steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

His Excellency
Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat,
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

March 26, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I wish to confirm to you that subject to United States Constitutional processes:

In the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt, the United States will, on request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and will take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.

The United States will conduct aerial monitoring as requested by the Parties pursuant to Annex I of the Treaty.

The United States believes the Treaty provision for permanent stationing of United Nations personnel in the designated limited force zone can and should be implemented by the United Nations Security Council. The United States will exert its utmost efforts to obtain the requisite action by the Security Council. If the Security Council fails to establish and maintain the arrangements called for in the Treaty, the President will be prepared to take those steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

His Excellency
Menachem Begin,
Prime Minister of the State of Israel.
Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the State of Israel

Recognizing the significance of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt and considering the importance of full implementation of the Treaty of Peace to Israel’s security interests and the contribution of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace to the security and development of Israel as well as its significance to peace and stability in the region and to the maintenance of international peace and security; and

Recognizing that the withdrawal from Sinai imposes additional heavy security, military and economic burdens on Israel;

The Governments of the United States of America and of the State of Israel, subject to their constitutional processes and applicable law, confirm as follows:

1. In the light of the role of the United States in achieving the Treaty of Peace and the parties’ desire that the United States continue its supportive efforts, the United States will take appropriate measures to promote full observance of the Treaty of Peace.

2. Should it be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the United States that there has been a violation or threat of violation of the Treaty of Peace, the United States will consult with the parties with regard to measures to halt or prevent the violation, ensure observance of the Treaty of Peace, enhance friendly and peaceful relations between the parties and promote peace in the region, and will take such remedial measures as it deems appropriate, which may include diplomatic, economic and military measures as described below.

3. The United States will provide support it deems appropriate for proper actions taken by Israel in response to such demonstrated violations of the Treaty of Peace. In particular, if a violation of the Treaty of Peace is deemed to threaten the security of Israel, including, inter alia, a blockade of Israel’s use of international waterways, a violation of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace concerning limitation of forces or an armed attack against Israel, the United States will be prepared to consider, on an urgent basis, such measures as the strengthening of the United States presence in the area, the providing of emergency supplies to Israel, and the exercise of maritime rights in order to put an end to the violation.

4. The United States will support the parties’ rights to navigation and overflight for access to either country through and over the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba pursuant to the Treaty of Peace.

5. The United States will oppose and, if necessary, vote against any action or resolution in the United Nations which in its judgment adversely affects the Treaty of Peace.

6. Subject to Congressional authorization and appropriation, the United States will endeavor to take into account and will endeavor to be responsive to military and economic assistance requirements of Israel.

7. The United States will continue to impose restrictions on weapons supplied by it to any country which prohibit [sic] their unauthorized transfer to any third party. The United States will not supply or authorize transfer of such weapons for use in an armed attack against Israel, and will take steps to prevent such unauthorized transfer.

8. Existing agreements and assurances between the United States and Israel are not terminated or altered by the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, except for those contained in Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, and 16 of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Israel (United States-Israeli Assurances) of September 1, 1975.

9. This Memorandum of Agreement sets forth the full understandings of the United States and Israel with regard to the subject matters covered between them hereby, and shall be carried out in accordance with its terms.

Cyrus R. Vance
For the Government of the United States of America

M. Dayan
For the Government of Israel
March 26, 1979

Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of the United States and Israel

The oil supply arrangement of September 1, 1975, between the Governments of the United States and Israel, annexed hereto, remains in effect. A memorandum of agreement shall be agreed upon and concluded to provide an oil supply arrangement for a total of 15 years, including the 5 years provided in the September 1, 1975 arrangement.

The memorandum of agreement, including the commencement of this arrangement and pricing provisions, will be mutually agreed upon by the parties within sixty days following the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel.

It is the intention of the parties that prices paid by Israel for oil provided by the United States hereunder shall be comparable to world market prices current at the time of transfer, and that in any event the United States will be reimbursed by Israel for the costs incurred by the United States in providing oil to Israel hereunder.

Experts provided for in the September 1, 1975, arrangement [sic] will meet on request to discuss matters arising under this relationship.

The United States administration undertakes to seek promptly additional statutory authorization that may be necessary for full implementation of this arrangement.

M. Dayan
For the Government of Israel

Cyrus R. Vance
For the Government of the United States

Annex

Israel will make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements through normal procedures. In the event Israel is unable to secure its needs in this way, the United States Government, upon notification of this fact by the Government of Israel, will act as follows for five years, at the end of which period either side can terminate this arrangement on one-year’s notice.

(a) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where no quantitative restrictions exist on the ability of the United States to procure oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel to meet all of the aforementioned normal requirements of Israel. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

(b) If the oil Israel needs to meet all of its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where quantitative restrictions through embargo or otherwise also prevent the United States from procuring oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel in accordance with the International Energy Agency conservation and allocation formula, as applied by the United States Government, in order to meet Israel’s essential requirements. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

Israeli and United States experts will meet annually or more frequently at the request of either party, to review Israel’s continuing oil requirement.
Biographies of the Negotiating Teams
PRINCIPALS

Menachem Begin. 6th Prime Minister of Israel. August 16, 1913 - March 9, 1992.

Israel's sixth prime minister, and the first to come from outside the Labor Zionist mainstream, Menachem Begin was born on August 16, 1913 in Brest-Litovsk, in Russian Poland. As a teenager Begin joined Betar, a youth group associated with Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky's ultranationalist Revisionist movement. After spending the 1930s active in central European Revisionist politics, Begin moved to mandatory Palestine in 1942 after a spell in a Soviet prison camp. There he led the Irgun, a breakaway Zionist militia dedicated to realizing the Revisionist dream of a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan. For the first 30 years of Israel's existence, Begin-led parties were the primary opposition to the country's Labor governments, first as Herut, then Gahal, and finally Likud. Begin first came in from the cold as part of a national unity government during the 1967 War, and rose to power a decade later in the landmark 1977 elections. Begin served as Prime Minister until 1983, when he resigned in the wake of public disenchantment with the war in Lebanon. Largely withdrawing from public life after his wife's death, Begin died in Tel Aviv in 1992.

Jimmy Carter. 39th President of the United States. Born October 1, 1924.

James Earl Carter, Jr. was born in Plains, Georgia, a small town several hundred miles south of Atlanta. After graduating from the US Naval Academy in 1946, he served as a submariner and was selected for the prestigious nuclear submarine program. Carter returned to Georgia to take over his family's agricultural supply business following his father's death in 1953, and began a career in local politics before moving on to the state senate in 1962. After a strong showing in the 1966 gubernatorial campaign, Carter won election in the next contest as a racial moderate, but in office amassed a record as an integrationist representative of the “New South.” Running as a Washington outsider in the first post-Watergate presidential election, Carter beat a crowded field to claim the 1976 Democratic nomination, and narrowly unseated the incumbent Gerald Ford. After losing to Ronald Reagan in his 1980 reelection bid, Carter applied himself to humanitarian work, establishing the Carter Center to advocate for causes including human rights, global health, and peacemaking. He was awarded the 2002 Noble Peace Prize for these post-presidential efforts.

Anwar Sadat. 3rd President of Egypt. December 25, 1918 - October 6, 1981.

Anwar Sadat was born to an Egyptian father and Sudanese mother in Mit Abu al-Kum, a peasant town in the Nile delta. He graduated from military college in Cairo in 1938 and began his career in the army soon thereafter. Sadat was imprisoned from 1942-44 for conspiring with the Germans to end the British presence in Egypt, and again in 1946-8 for his alleged role in a pro-British minister's assassination. He participated in the Free Officers Revolution that toppled King Farouk in 1952, and rose through the ranks of Gamal ' Abd al-Nasir’s government, chairing the National Union party and the National Assembly before serving two terms as Vice President. Sadat became Egypt's third President upon Nasir's death in 1970, and achieved a political victory against Israel in the October/Yom Kippur War of 1973, setting the stage for the peace treaty several years later. Despite these successes, Sadat's restructuring of the economy and recognition of Israel proved deeply unpopular domestically. He was killed by an Islamic Jihad assassin on October 6, 1981, during the annual victory parade in Cairo.
NEGOTIATORS

EGYPT

Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel [Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil], Minister of Foreign Affairs

Born near Cairo, Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil became an activist in Egypt's underground revolutionary movement. After serving in prison alongside Anwar Sadat for alleged involvement in the assassination of a pro-British official, Kamil graduated from Cairo University in 1947 with a law degree. Following the Free Officers Revolution in 1952, Kamil joined the Foreign Service and eventually became Ambassador to West Germany. In 1977, Kamil was tapped by President Sadat to become Foreign Minister after Ismail Fahmi resigned the post in protest of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Kamil himself later resigned, protesting the negotiations' failure to commit Israel to a withdrawal from the West Bank. Following his tenure as Foreign Minister, Kamil devoted himself to human rights activism within Egypt. He passed away in 2001 at age 74.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali [Butrus Butrus Ghali], Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

Butrus Butrus Ghali was born in Cairo to a prominent Coptic family. After completing a degree at Cairo University in 1946, Ghali went to France to continue his education, where he earned a doctorate in international law from the University of Paris. Returning to Egypt in 1949, Ghali became a professor at Cairo University and in that capacity held guest professorships in New York, the Hague, and Paris. In 1974, Professor Ghali became a member of the Central Committee of Egypt's ruling party. At Camp David, Ghali was appointed to succeed Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil as Foreign Minister and continued in that capacity until 1991. Ghali was then elected as Secretary General of the United Nations. After his term as UN Secretary General expired, Ghali served as Secretary General of the Francophonie and Chairman of the Board of the South Centre. He is currently Director of the Egyptian National Council of Human Rights.

Osama el-Baz [Usama al-Baz], Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs

After graduating from Cairo University, Usama al-Baz became Deputy Prosecutor General in Egypt's new post-revolutionary government in 1953. Baz obtained earned a Master's degree from Harvard University in 1961 and then joined the Egyptian Foreign Service. Baz served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs under President Sadat and later was appointed as Director of the President's Office of Political Affairs by President Husni Mubarak. Baz has been one of President Mubarak's closest advisors and often represents Egypt in international forums.

Ashraf Ghorabl [Ashraf Ghurbal], Ambassador to the United States

Ashraf Ghurbal was born in Alexandria in 1925. He attended Cairo University and earned a Master's degree from Harvard University. In 1949, Ghurbal joined the Egyptian delegation to the United Nations. He served on UN delegations in Geneva and New York until the mid-1960s. From 1967 to 1973, Ghurbal was the chief of the Egyptian Interests Sec-
tion of the Indian Embassy in Washington, the highest ranking Egyptian representative in the United States following the breaking of diplomatic relations in the wake of the 1967 War. After serving closely under President Sadat in Egypt during the 1973 War, Ghurbal was named Ambassador to the United States following the resumption of Egyptian-American relations. Ghurbal served as Ambassador until his retirement in 1985 and returned to the United States as a visiting professor at Georgetown University in 1987. Ambassador Ghurbal passed away in 2005 at the age of 80.

Ahmed Maher [Ahmad Mahir], Director to the Foreign Minister's Cabinet

Ahmad Mahir was born to a political family in Cairo in 1935. Mahir began his career in the Foreign Service after graduating from Cairo University. As a diplomat, Mahir represented Egypt in France, Congo, and Switzerland throughout the 1960s before becoming the Director of the Foreign Ministry. Mahir served as Ambassador to the Soviet Union during the last years of the Cold War. In 1992, he was appointed Ambassador to the United States. After seven years in Washington, Mahir retired to Egypt. In 2001, he was named Minister of Foreign Affairs, a position he held for three years.

Abdul Raul el-Reedy [Abd al-Ra'uf al-Ridi], Director of Policy Planning, Foreign Ministry

Abd al-Ra'uf al-Ridi entered the foreign service as an attaché in training after graduating from Cairo University in 1954. After earning a Master's degree at Columbia University in 1960, al-Ridi worked in the Foreign Ministry and from 1962 to 1972 served on Egyptian delegations to the United Nations in New York and Geneva. After working in international organizations for five years, al-Ridi founded and directed the Foreign Ministry's Office of Policy Planning. In 1979, al-Ridi was named Ambassador to Pakistan and one year later was appointed as Egypt's Representative to the United Nations. From 1984 to 1992, al-Ridi served as Ambassador to the United States, before returning to private legal practice in Egypt.

Nabil el-Araby [Nabil al-'Arabi], Legal Director of the Foreign Ministry

Born in 1935, Nabil al-'Arabi obtained a law degree from Cairo University and a doctorate from New York University. In 1976, Dr. al-'Arabi was appointed as Legal Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He served as chief negotiator in the Taba Arbitration and as Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva (1987-1991) and in New York (1991-1999). He served as Commissioner of the UN Compensation Commission until 2001 and as a Justice of the International Court of Justice in the Hague until 2006. Since 2008, Dr. al-'Arabi has been in private practice as a lawyer in Cairo.

Ahmed Abou al-Gheit [Ahmad Abu al-Ghayth], Office of the Foreign Minister

Born in Cairo in 1942, Ahmad Abu al-Ghayth graduated from Ain Shams University in 1964. The following year, he began his diplomatic career and was posted to Cyprus and to the UN before being named First Secretary to the Minister's Cabinet in 1977. After 1979, he served in different capacities in Moscow, Cairo, and at the UN before being named Ambassador to Italy in 1996. Three years later, Ambassador Abu al-Ghayth was appointed Permanent Representative to the United Nations. In 2004, he replaced Ahmad Mahir as Foreign Minister.
ISRAEL

Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister

The second child born on Israel's first kibbutz in 1915, Moshe Dayan was for many the epitome of the “New Jew” native to Palestine/Israel. A decorated leader of the pre-state Palmach militia and the young State of Israel, Dayan became an international icon as Chief of Staff during the Sinai War in 1956. Retiring from the military in 1959, Dayan moved into politics and served as Minister of Agriculture. During the Straits of Tiran crisis leading up to the 1967 War, Dayan was appointed Defense Minister and helped engineer Israel's quick victory in that war. Dayan resigned his post following the public outcry over the national leadership's handling of the lead up to the 1973 War. In 1977, with the election of Menachem Begin, Dayan crossed over to the Likud Party and was named Foreign Minister. In 1980, Dayan left Begin's government, insisting that withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza be tied to the peace process with Egypt. He founded his own party in 1981, but died of a heart attack shortly after elections.

Ezer Weizmann, Defense Minister

The nephew of Israel's first President, Chaim Weizmann, Ezer was born in Tel Aviv in 1924 to Russian-born parents. At age 18, Weizmann volunteered in the British army to fight the Nazis and in 1943 became a combat pilot. After World War II ended, he fought in both the Irgun and the Haganah before commanding Israel's first air force unit in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Weizmann served as Commander of the Air Force for over ten years, including during the 1967 War. He resigned in 1969 and moved to politics, where he joined Menachem Begin's party and briefly served as Minister of Transportation. Following Likud's victory in the 1977 elections, Weizmann became Defense Minister. Developing a close friendship with Sadat at Camp David, Weizmann became more “dovish” and resigned from Begin's government in 1980 along with Moshe Dayan over disagreements about the Palestinian territories. After a brief hiatus from politics, Weizmann formed his own party in 1984 which merged with the Labor Party two years later. In 1993, Weizmann was elected by the Knesset as President of Israel. He resigned in 1999 due to public pressure over charges of corruption. In 2005, Weizmann passed away at age 80.

Aharon Barak, Attorney General and Member-Designate of the Supreme Court

Born in Lithuania in 1936 as Arik Brick, Aharon Barak immigrated to then-Palestine with his family at age 11 after surviving the Holocaust. He studied law at the Hebrew University, where he later received a doctorate. In 1968, Barak was named Associate Professor of Law at the Hebrew University and in 1974 became Dean of the Law School. In 1975, Barak was awarded the Israel Prize and was appointed Attorney General. Three years later, he was named to the Supreme Court, where he served for 30 years, the last 11 as Chief Justice. Barak was known as an activist judge and champion of civil liberties, frequently challenging Knesset bills and army IDF directives. As required by law, Barak retired from the Court at age 70 and is considered by many within and outside Israel as one of the world's great jurists.

Avraham Tamir, Major General, Director of Army Planning Branch
Born in 1924 as Avraham Treinen, Tamir joined the Haganah and later became a leading officer in the Israeli army. He fought in every Arab-Israeli war until 1973 and was wounded in combat three times. During the ’73 war, he served as Ariel Sharon’s aide de camp and afterwards founded the Strategic and Policy Planning Branch, answering directly to the Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff. At Camp David, Tamir represented Israel’s security interests and helped coordinate the military withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. After retiring from the military, Tamir worked closely with Shimon Peres as Director of the Foreign Ministry while the latter was Foreign Minister and as Director of the Prime Minister’s Office and National Security Advisor while Peres was Prime Minister.

Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States

Born and raised in Tel Aviv in 1923, Simcha Dinitz went to the United States to pursue higher education after serving in the Haganah and the young Israeli army. After obtaining a graduate law degree from Georgetown University, Dinitz worked in Israel’s Foreign Ministry for many years, serving at the United Nations, in Rome, and in Washington. In 1973, Dinitz was appointed as Ambassador to the United States, where he helped orchestrate the US airlift during the 1973 War and participated in the Camp David peace process. Dinitz later returned to Israel and became Vice President of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. In 1984, Dinitz was elected to the Knesset for the Labor Party. Before the completion of his first term, he was appointed Chairman of the Jewish Agency, serving in that capacity until 1994. He passed away at age 74 in 2003.

Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor to the Foreign Minister

Born in Romania in 1931, Meir Rosenne immigrated to Israel at age 13. He received his higher education at the Sorbonne, where received a JD in 1960. He joined the Foreign Ministry, serving as Israel’s Consul in New York City until 1967. In 1971, Rosenne was appointed as Legal Advisor to the Foreign Minister with the rank of Ambassador. During his tenure, he represented Israel in international organizations and negotiated at both the Geneva peace talks and Camp David. In 1979, Rosenne was appointed Ambassador to France and Ambassador to the United States four years later. In 1987, Rosenne retired from the Foreign Ministry but remained in the United States for five years as President and CEO of the Israel Bonds Organization. Rosenne returned to Israel to practice law and lecture at Tel Aviv University. In 2000, he was awarded the Legion d’Honneur by French President Jacques Chirac.

Elyakim Rubenstein, Assistant Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Born in Tel Aviv in 1947, Elyakim Rubinstein began his career as a lecturer in political science at Bar-Ilan University at age 22. From 1973, he served as a lawyer in the Defense Ministry before being appointed Bureau Chief of the Foreign Ministry in 1977. Continuing in the Foreign Ministry until 1986, Rubinstein achieved the rank of Ambassador, was chief of the bureau of Israeli-Egyptian bilateral relations, and was Deputy Chief of Mission at the Israeli Embassy in Washington. From 1986 until 1994, Rubinstein served as Government Secretary, chairing numerous commissions and representing Israel both in international organizations and in peace negotiations. In 1997, Rubinstein was appointed as
Attorney General and in 2004 as Justice of the Supreme Court.

**Dan Pattir, Public Affairs Advisor to the Prime Minister**

Dan Pattir served as Media Advisor and Spokesperson to Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Menachem Begin. Since then, Pattir has been a prominent Israeli journalist, editing a legal journal, and serving on the board of numerous organizations. Currently, Pattir is Vice President of the Abraham Fund Initiative, an American-founded organization that makes grants to organizations that foster better relations between Arabs and Jews in Israel.

**UNITED STATES**

**Walter Mondale, Vice President**

A native of Minnesota and veteran of the Korean War, Walter Mondale served as Minnesota State Attorney General from 1960 to 1964 and sat as Senator for his home state from 1964-1976. In 1977, he was inaugurated as Vice President under Jimmy Carter. Mondale was the Democratic nominee for President in 1984 and was defeated by the Reagan-Bush ticket. As a private citizen, Mondale was both an attorney in a Minnesota firm and chairman of the National Democratic Institute. In 1993, President Bill Clinton named Mondale Ambassador to Japan and named him special envoy to Indonesia in 1998.

**Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State**

Cyrus Vance graduated from Yale, served in the US Navy, and worked in a New York law firm before joining government service. Vance was appointed Secretary of the Army by President John F. Kennedy and named Deputy Secretary of Defense by President Lyndon B. Johnson. In 1969, he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom. After serving as Secretary of State, Vance returned to practicing law, but participated in a number of diplomatic missions. In 1993, Vance served as a Special Envoy to Bosnia for the United Nations. After a long struggle with Alzheimer’s disease, Vance died at age 84 in 2002.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor**

The son of Polish diplomats living in exile in Canada, Zbigniew Brzezinski moved to the United States in 1950 to pursue a doctorate at Harvard University. After becoming an American citizen in 1958, Brzezinski relocated to New York to teach at Columbia University and joined the Council of Foreign Relations. Brzezinski became involved in politics, serving as an advisor to John F. Kennedy. He was a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State from 1966 to 1968; chairman of the Humphrey Foreign Policy Task Force in the 1968 presidential campaign; director of the Trilateral Commission from 1973 to 1976; and principal foreign policy advisor to Jimmy Carter in the 1976 presidential campaign. From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Brzezinski was National Security Advisor to President Carter. Following his four-year tenure in the administration, Brzezinski returned to his post at Columbia, where stayed until 1989. He
is counselor and trustee of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and co-chairs the CSIS Advisory Board. He is also the Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

**Hamilton Jordan, Chief of Staff**

Hamilton Jordan was born in 1944 in North Carolina, but raised in Albany, Georgia. While in college at the University of Georgia, he joined Jimmy Carter's failed 1966 gubernatorial campaign as a youth coordinator. Graduating in 1967, Jordan volunteered in Vietnamese refugee camps, being ineligible for military service due to medical issues. After returning to the US, Jordan again worked for Carter, this time in his 1970 gubernatorial campaign. As Carter's campaign manager and then executive secretary, Jordan engineered Carter's presidential candidacy and campaign victory in 1976. Jordan played an important role in the Carter Administration, and was named Chief of Staff in 1979. After the White House, Jordan worked as a marketing executive, unsuccessfully ran for Senate, and managed Ross Perot's 1992 presidential campaign. At age 63, Jordan passed away following a 20-year battle with cancer.

**Jody Powell, Press Secretary**

Joseph Powell, known as Jody, was born in Georgia in 1943. As a graduate student in political science at Emory University, Powell first formed a collegial relationship with state politician Jimmy Carter. Working as his driver and an advisor during Carter's 1970 gubernatorial campaign, Powell served as Carter's Press Secretary both in the governor's mansion and in the White House. After Carter left office, Powell did voice work for Ken Burns documentary films and is CEO of a public relations firm in Washington, DC.

**Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs**

Born in 1927, Harold Saunders earned a doctorate in political history from Yale University before joining the Air Force in 1956. Three years later, Saunders moved to Washington, where he lectured at George Washington University and worked as an analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency. In 1961, Saunders was appointed to the National Security Council, where he worked until 1974, serving under Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. President Jimmy Carter appointed Saunders Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and appointed him Assistant Secretary in 1978. After leaving the State Department in 1981, Saunders headed a major dialogue initiative between American and Soviet citizens as US co-chair of the Dartmouth Conference's Task Force on Regional Conflict. He has been a leading advocate of Track Two dialogue.

**Roy Atherton, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and Africa**

A decorated war hero from Pittsburgh, Alfred Leroy “Roy” Atherton joined the Foreign Service in 1947 upon completing his MA at Harvard. After five years of service in Germany, Atherton was posted as diplomatic secretary of the US Embassy in Damascus before being reassigned to to Aleppo and Calcutta. In 1965, Atherton established himself in
Washington at the State Department’s Near East and Africa Bureau, and moved his way up to being appointed Assistant Secretary of State in 1974. In 1979, President Carter named Atherton Ambassador to Egypt, a position he held until 1983. Atherton subsequently served as Director General of the Foreign Service. He passed away in 2002.

**Hermann Eilts, Ambassador to Egypt**

Born in Germany in 1922, Eilts immigrated to the US with his family. Eilts served in military intelligence during World War II and earned a Master’s degree from Johns Hopkins after the war. He then joined the Foreign Service in 1947. Eilts served as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 1965 to 1970 and as Ambassador to Egypt from 1973 to 1979. After retiring from the Foreign Service, Eilts served as Professor Emeritus at Boston University until his death at age 84 in 2006.

**Samuel Lewis, Ambassador to Israel**

Born in Texas in 1930, Samuel Lewis began a lengthy diplomatic career after earning a Master’s degree from Johns Hopkins University in 1952. Following assignments to Italy, Brazil, and Afghanistan, Lewis held senior posts in Washington, including as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs under President Gerald Ford. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter named Lewis Ambassador to Israel, a position he continued to hold under the Reagan Administration until 1985. In 1987, Lewis served as President and CEO of the United States Institute for Peace until he was appointed Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff by President Bill Clinton in 1993. Currently, Lewis is director of Partners for Democratic Change.

**William Quandt, Staff of National Security Council**

Born in California in 1941, William B. Quandt earned his doctorate in political science from MIT in 1968. After working at the RAND Corporation and lecturing at UCLA, Quandt was appointed as a Staff Member to the National Security Council in 1972 and then as Senior Staff Member in 1977. From 1979 to 1994, Quandt served as a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. In 1994, he was named the Edward R. Stettinius Jr. Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia.
Maps
All maps that follow are US government maps unless otherwise noted. For maps of the disengagement process, please see the “Documents” section of this Viewpoints, found on pages 93-115.
Egyptian units, paralysed by the breakthrough 6-8 June, managed only minor resistance except in the 5 positions indicated. Units were too mingled to make any accurate differentiation.
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