The front cover caption of a recent Economist Magazine said Pakistan, the World’s Most Dangerous Country.

It is true that the most serious threats today seem to converge in Pakistan.

For the same reasons, Pakistan is a very important place for the United States.

Pakistan is a nuclear armed nation next to a much more powerful adversary, India, also nuclear armed
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It is the second largest Muslim state in the world with a population of 165 million people.

The majority of Pakistanis are under 25 and illiterate; 30% are unemployed.

Pakistan has in its midst an active militant jihadist element that threatens to ignite a young and frustrated population.

Regional, tribal and ethnic tensions undermine the state.

Pakistanis see themselves as a constitutional democracy but for more than half of its turbulent history the military has ruled.

These factors make Pakistan highly combustible. It is almost unimaginable what would happen if Pakistan were to ignite. Pakistan sits at a geographic crossroads. Today it has also arrived at the intersection of its future course as a nation.

For far too long, many Americans and the Washington establishment have looked at Pakistan from the optics of US Afghan policy. Our primary focus is counter terrorism cooperation along the Afghan border region.

I believe we have missed the big story. The challenge for the next President is to develop a policy that addresses the unique complexities of this extremely important country.

Over the next several years, Pakistan will either become the nation that the clear majority of its people want – a modern democracy based on constitutional law. Or, it could implode under uncontrollable pressures and fall under autocratic rule by Islamist extremists.

For that reason it is critically important that our policy is based on more than short-term US interests. We must take measures today that will help Pakistan fulfill the promise of its founding father Mohammed Ali Jinnah for a modern, democratic state.

To effectively address our friction points, we need to know how the Pakistanis perceive the US and our motives. And we need to build trust in a population that is profoundly wary of US intentions.

This will not be easy. Pakistan is a highly spiced stew of ethnic, tribal, regional, feudal, ideological, economic and religious rivalries

Today perhaps all I can modestly accomplish is to unveil a few of the complexities of US-Pakistan relations in two key areas -- counterterrorism cooperation along the Afghan frontier and the return to civilian democracy to which the Pakistani people aspire.

COUNTER TERRORISM COOPERATION

Let me go back a few years – to September 11, 2001: Before the fire at the Pentagon had been put out, and long before our nation understood the full impact of our national loss in New York and Pennsylvania, Pakistan emerged as our most important partner in the Global War on Terrorism.

As the American Ambassador to Pakistan, I was instructed to pose the threatening question to Musharraf – “Are you with us or are you against us?” Never has a reply been more fateful in our long diplomatic history with Pakistan.

His answer, “We will support you unstintingly,” were welcome words. For the most part, US-Pakistan counter terrorism cooperation has been strong and productive.

Fast-forward to today, seven years later. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda thrive within Pakistan. The stakes just got higher this year. Al Qaeda has expanded its focus from the west, which it calls the “far enemy” to the government and army of Pakistan, the “near enemy” And the American Director of Intelligence warned Congress just last week that Al-Qaeda operatives hiding in Pakistan could be a direct threat to the US homeland. .

What went wrong?

I believe we missed an early opportunity to win the cooperation of the local Pakistani tribal people in our struggle against al Qaeda.

You need to remember that the al Qaeda militants are foreigners to the region. They come from Libya, Egypt, Chechnya, and Uzbekistan. Taliban from Afghanistan are foreigners but share the same tribal backgrounds as the local Pushtun people.

From the very early days in September 2001, when President Musharraf agreed to help us fight al Qaeda, he promised to arrest foreign terrorists and turn them over to US custody. Musharraf stipulated that Pakistani citizens involved in terrorism were under Pakistan’s authority.

I recall a meeting with General Tommy Franks in late 2001 in which Musharraf told us, “the local people know everybody in the region. They know who the foreigners are walking through their villages. If you win their support, they will help you. You can’t do it without them.”

Perhaps one of our failures was to blur al Qaeda and Taliban adversaries. Perhaps if had been more discerning of the origins of Taliban adversaries we could have won the support of Pakistan based Pushtuns. Pushtuns live by a strong code based on hospitality, honor, revenge and faith.

In that same meeting, President Musharraf urged Franks to provide development assistance so the Pakistani army could move quickly into the border region area with a program to build schools, clinics and roads to win the hospitality of the Pushtuns.

We didn’t follow through on that request. The US missed the opportunity. It appears al Qaeda did not. Today they are protected by many key Pushtun leaders.

Only recently in Pakistan a new power group calling themselves Pakistan Taliban has emerged. This group did not exist at the start of the war on terrorism. Pakistan Taliban now assist cross-border strikes on US and NATO forces and has declared war on the Pakistan army, central government.

The rise of militant jihadism within Pakistan, quite apart from being an import from abroad, is the largest threat to the country. It is a product of our war on terrorism.

CIA Director Michael Hayden testified to Congress on February 5 saying, “Pakistan has now recognized that this is an existential threat to their very survival.”

The Pushtun tribal people are not the only group we have alienated. US official and public criticism of Pakistan Army efforts along the Afghan border regions has undercut cooperation.

On the face of it, there is reason to worry about Pakistan army effectiveness. Early efforts were encouraging and by 2003 the Afghan Taliban had been pretty much defeated. Today we see resurgence.

General Hayden told Congress the number of terrorist attacks and deaths in the last year were greater than the past six years combined.

Al Qaeda in Pakistan hideouts brazenly broadcast messages and Internet communications. The number of suicide bombers in Afghanistan trained in al Qaeda hideouts in Pakistan sharply increased this year.

This week the Musharraf government has again supported a truce with Taliban forces in Pakistan, even though a similar negotiated truce with militant tribal leaders in 2005 allowed the Taliban to regroup and rebuild.

As a result, some American commentators and officials blame the Pakistanis for not doing enough. They agitate for unilateral US operations.

In short, we are saying, if the Pakistan Army can’t do the job we will send American troops on our own to clean up militant hideouts.

All of us in the auditorium can sympathize with this impulse. Let’s just get the job done.

There is no doubt of the importance of our campaign to eliminate al Qaeda and militant jihadists strongholds along the Afghan border to the security of the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

But we cannot ignore the risks of an aggressive military operation. The first step in building a workable policy is to understand how the Pakistani people see the US.

Our public calls for unilateral action deeply offend the very people we most depend on for success. We risk a backlash that may in fact result in fueling the spread of extremism deeper into Pakistani society.

The first groups we offend with our calls for unilateralism are the top ranking Pakistani military leaders.

President Musharraf has defiantly rejected unilateral action. He ardently defends the effectiveness of the Pakistani army and rejects the implication that US troops could be more effective than Pakistani troops.

I spoke recently to the General in Charge of Pakistani’s Joint Services. With eyes flashing he made the case that Pakistan has paid a dear price in the war on terrorism. Over 3000 soldiers died in the fight.

He noted that Pakistan deploys 100,000 troops in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). This represents a force twice the size as the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan

The second group of Pakistanis we alienate are the mid and junior ranks of the Army. These soldiers resent being dragged into a war to fight against their own citizens and Muslims at the behest of a foreign power.

The number of incidents is increasing of soldiers who refuse orders to fire on villagers and who turn themselves over to local tribal forces.

As bad as this may seem, there is a much greater danger that the local people are turning against their own army because of its counterterrorism operations.

A very telling episode illustrates this point. It occurred in 2005 immediately after the disastrous earthquake in northeast Pakistan. At that time Musharraf, the Army and even the US were widely appreciated for the humanitarian rescue of earthquake victims.

A Pew Center opinion survey showed that public approval of the United States had spiked to 45% from 23% the year before.

Within days of a predator strike on a school in Bajuar along the border of Afghanistan, US approval ratings dramatically dropped to 13% -- where it hovers today. The strike targeted an al Qaeda leader but, instead, killed 83 civilians, most of them women and children.

President Musharraf publicly claimed that he had ordered the bombing raid. He had to do this. A unilateral bombing by the US that killed civilians would have been an act of war.

Two days later a suicide bomber walked into an army installation taking the lives of several soldiers. This was the first attack by a suicide bomber on the Army. Since then, al Qaeda inspired suicide bombers have repeatedly turned on the Pakistani government, army, and officials and most recently Benazir Bhutto.

An army not trusted by its people cannot defend them. In part, this is an explanation for why some tribal leaders along the frontier have declared open warfare on the Pakistan army and government.

Finally, our war on terrorism in Pakistan has created anti-American sentiment within the larger Pakistani population.

Pakistanis see the terrorist strongholds along the frontier as product of our war in Afghanistan. They feel victimized by the spillover into Pakistan’s tribal regions.

It is not a recent development. Pakistanis blame the United States for encouraging the growth of militant Islamists during the war against soviet occupation of Afghanistan. These same militant groups are the very extremists threatening Pakistan we are now battling.

In short, Pakistanis see the US operating in its own interests while ignoring the needs of Pakistani people.

The public is angered that we have spent over $11 billion dollars essentially “renting” the Pakistani army while making far fewer investments into programs that benefit the people. Our USAID program for education, health and democracy programs are one tenth of our military investments.

The new Chief of Army, General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani by all reports has a realistic appreciation for the danger to Pakistan posed by militant jihadists. If in the past, the Army thought it could play a double game by secretly supporting militant Pakistani jihadists groups so that they could menace India in Kashmir.

They are now “near enemy.” Islamabad now is the target of militant terrorism.

I believe we should hold back on second-guessing the Pakistan army. We must respect the professionalism and trust that they understand their people better than we do.

Defense Secretary Gates recently acknowledged this point. It is important during this red-hot period of American presidential campaigns that our political leaders also refrain from comments that might inflame the population against the US and the Pakistani army.

In the process we may have lost sight of the most important element in any security operation -- success depends on the support of the people.

DEMOCRACY

Ultimately we will be successful if our policies are based on a clear understanding of the perceptions of the local people. We should be seen as aiding them to meet their aspirations, not our own interests.

In fact, we have more in common than divides us. We both fear extremism as the most dangerous threat to Pakistan.

The majority of Pakistanis have respect for their constitution and rule of law in the western tradition. The majority also understands what we may not, and that is the battle of militant Islamism is fought over law. Will the nation be governed by rule of law based on a constitution, or is it based on God’s law -- Sharia law?

The impatient response to extremism is with bullets and bombs. Perhaps a more enduring and ultimately successful strategy is through the ballot box and the pocketbook.

Ask any Pakistani about election politics and the first fact they will relate is that fundamental Islamists parties in Pakistan never do well in elections.

Pakistan’s long history of military dictatorship does not counter the fact that the nation is deeply committed to democracy.

The public welcomed the bloodless military coup that established Pervez Musharraf as a military dictator in 1999, but only because he promised to end corruption and restore civilian democracy quickly.

That time is overdue. The people have succeeded in finally getting Musharraf to take off his uniform and hold elections. Regrettably, the public perception is that the United States has acted in ways to undermine the return to democracy.

American analysts often define the struggle in Pakistan as between moderation and extremism. Pakistanis believe the more important contest for the future is between military dictatorship and civilian democracy. We have to get them to appreciate that both intersect

To be specific, Pakistani political elites criticize the United States for supporting Musharraf’s military regime because they believe we value the fight against terrorism more than democracy.

Pakistani democrats were perplexed when President Bush described Musharraf as “indispensable” to the war on terror at a time Musharraf was dispensing with constitutional protections, sabotaging judicial independence, rigging free and fair elections, and resisting return to civilian rule.

Pakistanis resented US meddling in earlier efforts to block the return of Nawaz Sharif because of our assessment that he would undercut Musharraf’s political chances.

Some popular support for Benazir Bhutto eroded owing to her close ties to us and to our role in negotiating her return.

On the other hand, the Administration has taken a number of positive measures.

Pakistani democrats appreciated Secretary Condoleezza Rice’s firm call for free and fair elections, return to civilian democracy and for Musharraf to take off his uniform and lift Emergency Rule.

They also noted that by early November, Rice had dropped the reference to Musharraf as indispensable. Her line now is that the United States’ relationship is with the people of Pakistan.

STEPS WE CAN TAKE TO REPAIR THE RELATIONSHIP

My final point this afternoon is to take a forward look at US-Pakistan relations.

What measures should the Bush Administration take on an urgent basis to stabilize Pakistan and improve US relations? What course should the next President consider?

First, we must take concrete steps to demonstrate our commitment to the Pakistani people. Secretary Rice has hit the right note on several occasions since November when she said our relations are with the people of Pakistan. We must now go beyond words with actions.

The most effective way to build a relationship with a people is to help meet their immediate need -- alleviate their most pressing fear.

Millions of Pakistanis face serious bread shortage, eight percent inflation and high food prices. Nothing speaks louder to a hungry and frightened family than providing food. The US should announce immediately that we will provide surplus wheat.

Secondly, the United States has provided Pakistan over $11 Billion in aid since 2002 but more than 90% was security related assistance. It had little impact on the poorest civilian sectors of the society.

Senator Biden has proposed a comprehensive aid program that shifts US assistance from defense to social sectors. His plan supports job creation, education and health. In the long run, a shift in US aid priorities would do much to calm dissent and stifle the attraction of militant jihadism than would bombs and bullets.

Third, the United States is respected in Pakistan and throughout the world for the righteousness of our core values of democracy, fairness, and justice. We must act on those values. The most compelling gesture our President could make to win the support of Pakistani people would be to firmly call for the reinstatement of the former Supreme Court Justices, including Iftikar Chaudhry. The US should continue to support the rule of law, protection of people, clean and fair elections contested on a level playing field.

Fourth, the shortest road to undercutting the hold militant jihadist groups have in Pakistan runs through New Delhi. The United States should get actively involved at a high level in pushing for a negotiated resolution to the Kashmir dispute.

A resolution of the Kashmir dispute would eliminate the pretext for support for militant groups such as the Laishkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. These groups count on some popular and government backing because they are used to strike against Indian forces in Kashmir. They must be eliminated.

Normalized relations between India and Pakistan would be an economic boon for both countries.

Finally, there is a great deal of concern about the prospect that Pakistani nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of militant jihadists. In fact, there is little likelihood of this scenario as long as the bombs remain under secure command and control safeguards, stored in safe-locked bunkers. US-Pakistan military to military relations are strong and we are providing technical assistance in ways to safeguard nuclear weapons in those bunkers.

The bombs are most insecure, however, when they are removed from bunkers and prepared in times of a threatened invasion. This happened at least twice when India mobilized against Pakistan since 2001. Again, resolution of the tensions with India would remove the prospects that Pakistan’s bombs would be deployed from their lock-down bunkers.

Pakistan is in a period of transition. We must better recognize this process and adjust our policies. We cannot just blindly follow the course we have taken. The election this month is likely to accelerate the transition but also trigger a period of instability. We must be prepared.
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