This individual is a guest contributor. MEI is not able to assist with contact requests.
Eleonora Ardemagni is a Senior Associate Research Fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), a Teaching Assistant (“History of Islamic Asia”; “New Conflicts”) at the Catholic University of Milan, and an Adjunct Professor at the Graduate School of Economics and International Relations-ASERI (“Yemen: Drivers of conflict and security implications”). She was formerly a Gulf Analyst for the Nato Defense College Foundation. She is an MEI affiliate. Her research analysis focuses on foreign policy and security issues in Yemen and the Gulf monarchies, and on Arab armed forces and armed groups.
Saudi Arabia has stepped up its efforts to unify and restructure Yemen’s anti-Houthi forces after the rapid expansion and sudden implosion of the United Arab Emirates-backed secessionist Southern Transitional Council following Abu Dhabi’s military withdrawal from the country.
The May 6 cease-fire between the United States and the Houthi militia in Yemen has had a consolidating effect on the balance of power inside the war-torn state and hardened the status quo of the country’s civil war. In turn, the outcome of Israel and Iran’s subsequent 12-day war has the potential to temporarily shake up this status quo once again; but Yemen’s fracturing anti-Houthi coalition is unlikely to be able to exploit that opportunity.
The Houthis’ latest political and military moves are setting them on a collision course with the United Arab Emirates in the broader Red Sea region.
In recent weeks, Yemen’s main anti-Houthi leaders have increasingly been sending the same message to the US, urging it to provide support in the fight against the Houthis on the ground. The provision of military assistance is still hypothetical but seems more and more plausible given developments in Yemen, triggered by the Houthis’ continuing attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea.
Since 2015, Yemen’s largest governorate, Hadramawt, has been informally divided between two distinct centers of power with different military loyalties and external backing. The balance of power within the governorate is no longer fixed, however. Changes in Hadramawt’s military, political, and economic dynamics are reshaping power networks in the governorate and beyond, with implications for the conflicting agendas of the Saudis, Emiratis, and Houthis.
Despite formal agreements and vast financial resources, Saudi Arabia has largely failed to integrate the various armed groups in Aden and southern Yemen under one national security sector. This adds to Riyadh’s ineffectiveness in establishing military-political influence in southern Yemen or in limiting the UAE’s continuing leverage. In an effort to boost its influence, since late 2022 Saudi Arabia has established new armed formations in Aden and nearby governorates, such as the Nation Shield Force.
The battle for control of the Yemeni heartland and its energy resources has reached a turning point. Yemen’s internationally recognized institutions are, once again, in crisis. In fact, the current infighting within the “government camp” threatens both the long-stalled implementation of the 2019 Riyadh Agreement and the political legitimacy of the newly-established Presidential Leadership Council.
Efforts to restore confidence between the U.S. and the Arab Gulf states took a first step with the recent formation of a new naval task force, known as the Combined Maritime Forces-153 (CMF-153), to improve maritime security in the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden, including the hotspot of Yemen. Established in mid-April, the new task force intends to target weapons smuggling for Ansar Allah, as the Houthi militias are officially known, as well as human trafficking and the drug trade.
Over the past decade, police reform in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region has been mainly implemented through community policing programs, gender inclusion, and youth and expatriates outreach, with the overarching purpose of promoting a positive image of the police. This article discusses the case of Abu Dhabi, the re-branding of whose police forces aims to boost a carefully tailored nation-building process in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) while supporting the federal messages of tolerance and happiness.
Yemen’s strategic and oil-rich eastern governorate of Hadramawt stands at a critical turning point, as feuds between competing political and military groups are coming to a head. While the UAE and Saudi Arabia are likely to reach a political compromise, local political groups and militias may not so agreeable.
The war in Yemen is reshaping the armed forces of Arab Gulf states. It is the first time that Emirati and Saudi elite units are leading a war effort in their bid to counter Yemeni Houthi rebels and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, as well as a counterterrorism campaign against jihadi groups, mainly Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
The Horn of Africa is currently playing a pivotal role in the U.A.E.’s security interests at a time of international uncertainty, regional conflicts, and demanding domestic transformations. The U.A.E. is expanding its foothold in the region, with Eritrea to host its first military base abroad and another in Somaliland in the works. Abu Dhabi’s ‘pivot to the Horn’ strategy is designed to tackle three rising security concerns now: Yemen’s instability, freedom of navigation threats, and piracy.
