Gregory Waters

Syria’s first post-Assad protests broke out on Dec. 25 after a video claiming to show the destruction of an Alawite shrine spread rapidly across Facebook. The video was quickly debunked as several weeks old, the shrine only partially damaged, and the damage occurring during the capture of Aleppo city rather than in an act of sectarian vandalism. But those first hours were enough to stir up the widespread fears lingering just below the surface among Syria’s Alawite minority, bringing many Alawites (as well as Sunnis) to the streets to denounce sectarianism.

Years of simmering tensions between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and local populations in northeast Syria have exploded this week into still-expanding battles across much of Deir ez-Zor. Conflict resolution requires the international coalition to engage with the Kurdish administration on deep political and administrative reforms. However, the violence in Deir ez-Zor may demand a more creative and locally driven approach to the northeast to foster a more resilient governance and security structure.

It has been an accepted fact that ISIS ceased being a territory-controlling entity in Syria after its March 2019 defeat in the town of Baghouz. Yet it is perhaps time to reevaluate this perspective on the group and its insurgent trajectory in the country. While recent massacres of civilians in central Syria have refocused some international attention on the desert region, known as the Badia, the renewed widespread battles between militants and regime security forces that have occurred in parallel to these attacks have gone unnoticed.

“Idlib is under siege” — this is the common sentiment shared with me by both local leaders and residents alike. The dual earthquakes on Feb. 6 not only rocked the physical foundations of the cities in Syria’s last opposition-held region, it cracked the social foundation of trust Syrians had with the international aid community.

In the center of Harem, Idlib, hundreds of Syrian families huddle around stoves and in tents as they look on at the row of collapsed apartments they used to call home. “This disaster hasn’t happened to Syria in a thousand years,” says Abu Ahmed, the director of the new camp. “The international community must witness what is happening to us and help.”

Despite his rural Sunni roots, one general has managed to play a part in nearly every step of the regime’s counter-revolution, all while building a web of networks across much of Syria as he worked his way up the complex internal ladders of the mukhabarat: Maj. Gen. Hussam Luka.

Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine has given rise to speculation that it might fully withdraw from Syria, creating a power vacuum that could ignite new fighting. Yet these fears are likely misplaced and a deeper examination of the current state of Syria reveals unique opportunities for engagement from the international community.

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine renewed focus on Moscow’s earlier military intervention in Syria, which often became framed as a “testing ground” for the weapons and tactics it now employs against Ukrainian cities. But crucially, the Russian forces backing Assad’s embattled regime also understood the importance of rebuilding the broken Syrian security forces into more effective fighting units.

Most of the reporting on Russian recruitment in Syria has involved half-truths, if not outright lies. While it does appear that some Syrians have signed contracts to fight in Ukraine, there is no guarantee these fighters will actually be sent there. The coverage of this topic has also missed a key aspect of who would actually be involved if Syrians really do deploy to Ukraine.

The central media apparatus of the Islamic State group is mis-reporting on the activities of its cells in central Syria. Rather than exaggerating their capabilities, something that it is conventionally assumed to be doing all the time, its Central Media Diwan appears either to be deliberately under-playing them, or, less likely, to be unaware of their full extent, possibly due to communication issues.

Five months into his job as commander of regime forces in Deir ez-Zor, Maj. Gen. Nizar Khader appears to have skillfully gained control over the diverse tapestry of loyalist forces in the region. Khader’s return to power in the east quickly put an end to the deadly disputes that had plagued the governorate’s security forces for years. He then launched a nearly three-month campaign, coordinated between Syrian, Iranian, and Russian forces, to push ISIS cells back into the province’s hinterlands, securing the crucial highway connecting Deir ez-Zor with Palmyra and Damascus to the west. His success, while impressive, will face its second major test soon as ISIS prepares for a potential Ramadan offensive.

In areas under the control of both the Syrian regime and Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES) in Deir ez-Zor Province, the governing bodies are failing to secure the loyalty and support of locals. The security structures built by the regime and the AANES have coopted and incorporated local tribes to a significant extent, but a lack of support from the central governing bodies amid increasing ISIS attacks threatens long-term stability in the province. These two regional dynamics are outlined and compared in this paper to illustrate the dual challenges both governance bodies face in appealing to locals and thwarting the resurgence of ISIS in the area.

After a brief but deadly Turkish offensive in Idlib, a new phase of the Syria war began on March 5 with the signing of a Turkish-Russian cease-fire deal. Reported deaths dropped drastically following the cease-fire, and this spring has been defined by the slow attrition of pro-regime forces due to the two ingoing insurgencies in south and central Syria and the two frozen frontlines in the northwest and northeast.

Immediately after the Syrian regime and its allies captured central Syria in late 2017, ISIS began waging an effective and deadly insurgency in the area. It first targeted urban centers along the western Euphrates before shifting focus in spring 2018 to the transport lines and mountains running along the M20 from Khunayfis to Shoula. These wide-ranging operations have killed a minimum of 860 pro-regime fighters of all ranks, units, and types. This report tracks self-reported regime losses in the region, as indicated on loyalist Facebook pages, community pages, and unit pages, from Nov. 10, 2017 through March 31, 2020.

In mid-October, five years after it was expelled from most of eastern Syria as ISIS swept in, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) returned to much of the northeast as part of a deal between the Syrian Democratic Forces and Damascus struck just days after Turkey launched an offensive against the region. By examining the distribution and make-up of units sent to the northeast we can better understand the strength of the SAA in the region and the current state of its broader deployments across the country.