Giorgio Cafiero

Russia’s foreign policy in areas of the Arab world and Africa where the Soviets once wielded significant influence decades ago has become increasingly assertive in recent years. One such area is Sudan, a pro-Soviet country from 1969, when Gaafar Nimeiri took power, until the communist-backed coup of 1971.

Since Aug. 13, speculation has been rife that the Sultanate of Oman will soon follow the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) lead and formalize full-fledged ties with Israel. Yet, at least thus far, Muscat has refused to join the UAE, Bahrain, and now Sudan in normalizing relations with Tel Aviv. As a moderate Arab country, where tolerance is firmly embedded into the national ethos and the Ibadi sect of Islam, Oman appears to be maintaining a balanced position on the overall Arab trend toward normalizing relations with Israel. Muscat’s positive reaction to the Abraham Accords is not a major change in strategy and is more illustrative of Oman’s longstanding position on normalization.

On September 15, President Trump presided over a ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and the foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Abdullatif Al Zayani, respectively, signed a general declaration of principles, called “The Abraham Accords.” Numerous analysts have focused on the regional impact of the normalization of relations between Israel and these two Gulf Arab countries. However, this development has worldwide geopolitical implications — including for China.

When the Saudi-led coalition launched military operations against the Houthi insurgents on March 26, 2015, all of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, except for Oman, joined the multinational force. As has become clear, each of the Arab Gulf sheikdoms has its own national interests and unique history of relations with Yemen and Yemeni factions, and these have shaped their changing perceptions of the war over the past five and a half years. Kuwait’s role in Yemen’s multidimensional conflict is a case in point.

Throughout Donald Trump’s presidency, the U.S. has largely retreated from a leadership role in the MENA region, resulting in Washington mostly outsourcing its Libya foreign policy to Egypt, Russia, and Washington’s partners in NATO and the GCC. Yet the U.S. diplomatic establishment is growing frustrated with the beleaguered North African country’s ongoing turmoil, as Washington increasingly sees Egypt and the UAE as undermining American interests in Libya.

Russia acts as a “key if quiet player” in southern Yemen, where its approach has been based on strategic neutrality. The goal has been to position Moscow as a greater stakeholder in mediation between the various Yemeni parties and outside players. Moscow has engaged the Southern Transitional Council, the UN-recognized Yemeni government led by President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, the Houthi rebels, as well as the three main regional powers intervening in Yemen — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran.

While much of the focus on Russia’s foreign policy toward the MENA region is on Syria and Libya, the dire situation in Gaza is another area where Moscow seeks to play a growing role. From Putin’s perspective, Moscow must involve itself in the Palestinian cause in order to further facilitate Russia’s “return” to the region. In practice, this has entailed Moscow and Hamas improving their relations, underscored by numerous visits and communications between high-ranking Russian government officials and Hamas representatives in recent years.

Sports diplomacy is the deliberate, strategic use of sporting events by states to create a favorable international image — the “continuation of policy by other means,” whereby sports, nationalism, commerce, and diplomacy are inextricably linked.

Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, many analysts have examined the role played by a handful of key outside actors, such as Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Yet China has received comparatively little attention in most discussions about the Syrian crisis. A deeper look at Sino-Syrian relations and Beijing’s policies vis-à-vis Syria is long overdue as this bilateral relationship is set to become increasingly important to both China’s ambitious foreign policy as well as the Syrian government’s vision for reconstruction and redevelopment.

The announcement of Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said’s passing on Jan. 10 marked the end of an era. Now that the Arab world lost its longest-serving leader, none of the Gulf states has a ruler that was on the throne when the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981. Most Omanis have never known another leader and this transition period, marked by three days of mourning, is an emotional time for those in the sultanate.

Having raised eyebrows among many European officials with rhetoric targeting Syrian and other Middle Eastern/North African refugees in Hungary, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán sees the return of Syrian refugees to their home country as serving vital Hungarian and European interests. As Hungary continues to align closely with Russia while deepening its ties with Turkey and other non-Western governments, Budapest’s foreign policy is eroding an EU consensus.

On Nov. 23, Malaysia’s prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, announced that his country will stage an Islamic summit in Kuala Lumpur from Dec. 19-21. The event, on the theme of “The Role of Development in Achieving National Security,” will feature representatives from the host country as well as Indonesia, Pakistan, Qatar, and Turkey. Around 450 leaders, scholars, clerics, and thinkers from 52 countries will attend, along with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, Indonesian President Joko Widodo, and Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan.

Fears of a large-scale war in the Middle East remain heightened as the U.S. continues ratcheting up sanctions against Iran while Tehran takes measures to scale back its restrictive commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The latest sign of Iranian retaliation against the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear accord was its decision, confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Nov. 11, to begin refining uranium at its Fordow underground enrichment facility.

While the Turkish military offensive against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria might, once again, bring Moscow and Tehran together tactically in support of Assad’s rule and Syrian sovereignty, the two powers have fundamentally different visions for the war-ravaged country’s future.

The celebratory scenes in Khartoum last month were a marked contrast from the bloodshed in Sudan’s capital earlier this year. After eight months of unrest following the ouster of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in April, Sudan’s military council and the Alliance for Freedom and Change — represented by Ahmed al-Rabie — signed a power-sharing agreement on Aug. 17. This deal offers hope that Sudan can complete a peaceful transition to civilian rule.