Jason M. Brodsky

Israel’s targeted killing of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has not only caused a succession crisis for Hezbollah, but has also highlighted the problem of succession for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Coupled with the death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash earlier this year, Nasrallah’s assassination has scrambled the dynamics of the supreme leadership transition with an aging 85-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei at the helm, and is likely the reason his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, a key figure in the Office of the Supreme Leader, has recently emerged from the shadows.

Masoud Pezeshkian assumed office as Iran’s president during a period of crisis. The evening after his inauguration, Israel killed Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh, who cheered on the Oct. 7 massacre in Israel, in a Tehran guesthouse. Whereas some Western media outlets hailed Pezeshkian’s arrival by dubbing him as a “liberalizer” whose administration foreign actors are trying to spoil, his choices for cabinet and executive positions reflect the limitations of the power of the presidency.

Iranian strategy in the Middle East has long centered on nurturing regional proxies and partners — a so-called “Axis of Resistance” — to mount an existential threat to Israel by encircling it in a ring of fire. The bloody war between Israel and Hamas sparked by the latter’s Oct. 7 massacre is the first large-scale implementation of this Axis of Resistance doctrine. Quds Force commander Esmail Ghaani’s lasting contribution will be the network’s entry into the battlefield in a comprehensive and coordinated manner.

When the Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi, visits New York for the opening of the UNGA this week, he will try to project a sense of confidence and argue that the Iranian regime is purportedly committed to building ties with its neighborhood by promoting and referring to its membership in various regional dialogue forums. Yet their existence has historically not moderated Iranian behavior.

As Israel grapples with fundamental questions of identity and societal fissures years in the making, Iran and its Axis of Resistance continue to employ their escalation-ready approach of pushing the envelope in multiple geographic theaters, launching cyber operations to foment disunity in Israeli society, and attempting to neutralize the regional gains Israel has made after signing the Abraham Accords with several Arab neighbors in 2020.

In the 1950s-1970s, the bilateral relationship between Israel and pre-revolutionary Iran provided a road map for the process leading to a normalization in ties between the Jewish state and Arab countries in the 2020s.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is at its core an ideological army, not a national one, and its notorious enmity toward Israel is an aberration in Iranian history. But many Israelis to this day think Iran could be a natural partner as long as the country gave up its pursuit of ideologically driven regional dominance, disavow calls for the destruction of Israel, and were instead to again allow the regular army, the Artesh, to pursue Iranian national interests.

Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani has served for 10 years as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Iran’s top policymaking body in both domestic and foreign policy matters. A number of recent developments have aroused speculation that he could soon vacate his seat. Such a change would be an important signpost of how the Iranian establishment is posturing itself against the backdrop of continued revolutionary sentiment among significant segments of the population.

The departure of Hossein Taeb from his post as the head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Intelligence Organization triggered a wave of reshuffling in the command structure of the guardsmen. But the story is more than just a reaction to Iran’s unsuccessful terrorist targeting of Israelis in Turkey and counterintelligence lapses. There are internal power struggles and a natural maturation of the Islamic Republic’s security structure that also likely figured into the decision to remove Taeb.

A senior Chinese military delegation landed in Iran for a visit in late April. The readouts from Tehran were rather dull, but there is more to this visit than meets the eye. While a new “axis” may not necessarily be forming, there are troubling trendlines that Western policymakers need to counter.

Ahead of the seventh round of the Iran nuclear negotiations that ended on Dec. 3 in Vienna, many observers interpreted Ebrahim Raisi’s election to the presidency and his recent rhetoric as representing a distinct shift in Iran’s nuclear strategy. Indeed, in November, Raisi’s government’s official newspaper Iran explained that Tehran’s strategy in Vienna has changed, and that it has embraced a new approach looking to compel the West to agree with Iran’s terms for a “good deal.” Yet there is more continuity than change in Iranian decision-making on the nuclear file than meets the eye, and Raisi’s election by itself has not represented a fundamental rearrangement.