Munqeth Othman Agha is an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Institute. He is a doctoral student at the School of International Studies, University of Trento, and a researcher at the Syrian Memory Institute (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies). His research concentrates on the relationship between political violence and the urban environment, local governance, post-conflict reconstruction, and humanitarian and development aid, with a primary focus on the Syrian conflict. He has previously been published by the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and Institute of International Affairs (IAI).
Education
Ph.D. International Studies, University of Trento (2024)
MA Conflict, Security and Development, University of Sussex
MSc Development Economics, University of Clermont-Auvergne
Countries of expertise
Syria, Jordan
Issues of expertise
Post-conflict reconstruction; early recovery; local governance; political violence; social movements.
On Dec. 8, 2024, Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell. This is a fact, but it woefully understates the enormity, speed, and consequences of what has transpired. The brutal dictatorship that ruled Syria for more than 50 years disintegrated in fewer than 10 days. Celebrations erupted across public squares, thousands of Syrian refugees lined up at the borders of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon eager to return, and the release of political prisoners fueled hope for a new era after decades of despotism and conflict. However, concerns about Syria’s political future and territorial integrity quickly surfaced.
Early recovery and rehabilitation in regime-controlled areas of Syria: An assessment
The following is a short abstract, offering the main analytical findings and policy takeaways from a newly released Middle East Institute report on post-war reconstruction in Syria.
Inside Damascus’s Reconstruction Lab: Navigating the Framework of Return and Recovery
Since the end of the civil war in Syria, government officials have inaugurated high-end tourist projects and upscale urban housing schemes, while at the same time preventing Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons from returning to their ruined neighborhoods or rebuilding their demolished homes. The focus on luxury housing in a country devastated by conflict and within a city suffering from massive destruction and housing shortages encapsulates the contradictions of the regime’s policy for reconstruction and early recovery not only in Damascus but in the whole country.
Fires of Damascus: Protecting Syria’s homes and heritage from the failed and rapacious state
July 16, 2023, was a dark day for the ancient city of Damascus. A fire raged through the historic Sarouja neighborhood, reducing a number of heritage homes to ashes. Two months later, in September 2023, a residential building in the Syrian capital’s Malki neighborhood partially collapsed as a result of unauthorized excavation for a basement. While these events might not seem connected, they underscore an overarching issue: the vulnerability of Damascus properties in the face of natural and man-made crises, exacerbated by corruption, greed, and failed and vicious state policies.
Coercive deprivation: Unraveling the Assad regime’s policy on domestic reconstruction
Since the early years of the Syrian conflict, the Assad regime has systematically diverted local resources dedicated for reconstruction purposes to rehabilitate facilities in areas and sectors that benefit it and its inner circle, as well as placed the burden of rehabilitating properties onto Syrians themselves. To finance this policy, the regime has exploited four key resources, including imposing multiple reconstruction taxes, diverting U.N. and INGO early recovery and rehabilitation projects, capitalizing on local-led crowdfunding campaigns, and forcing Syrians to bear the cost of repairing their own damaged properties.
Amid calls for refugee returns, Assad’s property grab continues
While calls for the immediate return of Syrian refugees have increased at the regional and international levels, it is imperative to closely examine the direct link between the regime’s policy of property confiscation and the possibility of refugee returns. Property confiscation does not only impact the direct owners and their immediate families’ livelihoods but also hinders the ability of thousands of displaced Syrians to return while leading those who still reside under regime rule to consider migration.
