Samuel Ramani

Russia’s concern about an escalation of hostilities in Lebanon reflects its long-standing partnership with Hezbollah. Due to this multidimensional relationship, Russia has urged Iran to exercise restraint against Israel to prevent the outbreak of a destructive hot war in Lebanon.

Although Russia and China are in regular dialogue with the Houthis, the motivations that undergird the engagements of both countries differ markedly. The Houthis regard both Russia and China as partners against American unilateralism but have a warmer relationship with Moscow.

As the Wagner Group has an entrenched military presence in Syria, Libya, and Sudan, the evisceration of its senior leadership will have serious repercussions for Russia’s influence in the MENA region. Wagner’s military contractors are unlikely to depart, since they guard strategically valuable oil and mining facilities; but they are likely to now be swiftly integrated into the regular Russian Armed Forces.

Even though Russia and China’s strategic partnership has strengthened in recent years, the leaderships of both countries infrequently engage on Middle East affairs. Russia views China’s growing diplomatic assertiveness in the Middle East as a positive step toward a multipolar regional order. Nevertheless, Russia is trying to avoid being completely eclipsed by China as a prospective conflict arbiter. While the two countries concur on opposing unilateral sanctions and democratic uprisings in the Middle East, Beijing does not universally approve of Moscow’s positions on regional crises and its power projection strategy.

Although Russia has vested interests in the Burhan-Hemedti conflict, it is unlikely to actively pursue a blanket destabilization strategy in Sudan. Instead, it is likely to balance close ties with both warring parties and continue actively opposing a democratic transition in Sudan.

Official reactions in Africa to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have varied dramatically from country to country. While stopping short of implementing sanctions, most African countries condemned Russia’s invasion in a March 2 U.N. General Assembly vote. A sizeable minority, however, abstained or subtly displayed solidarity with Moscow. Such polarization can be seen in the differing postures of Libya and Sudan.

Iraq has refrained from taking a firm position on the war and political opinion on Russia’s conduct is divided along partisan and factional lines. The imposition of sanctions against Russia has complicated its energy investments in Iraq and prospective arms purchases from Moscow and could have a long-lasting adverse impact on the Iraqi economy.

Since late October, Sudan has been mired in a state of intense political turmoil. On Oct. 25, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan seized power in a coup d’état, placed civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok under house arrest, and declared a state of emergency. In response to intense international pressure, Burhan and Hamdok signed a 14-point deal on Nov. 21, which reinstated Hamdok as prime minister and resulted in the release of political prisoners. While this agreement thwarted Sudan’s descent into a military dictatorship, mass protests persist and the opposition Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) have rejected the deal.

Since the Taliban seized control of Kabul on Aug. 15, Russia has expanded its engagement with India and Pakistan on Afghanistan. Russian President Vladimir Putin held talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Aug. 24, which resulted in the creation of a permanent bilateral channel for consultations on Afghanistan. On Sept. 8, Modi’s national security advisor, Ajit Doval, met with his Russian counterpart, Nikolay Patrushev, and agreed to expand Russia-India cooperation against terrorism and drug trafficking. On Aug. 25, Putin spoke with Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan about the situation in Afghanistan, which resulted in Khan inviting Putin to visit Pakistan. Russia’s simultaneous engagement with India and Pakistan on Afghanistan is the latest iteration of its balancing strategy toward the two South Asian rivals.

Since late June, Russia has expanded its diplomatic involvement in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. While Russia has offered technical assistance to the GERD’s conflicting parties, it has refrained from inserting itself into the Nile dam dispute as a mediator and instead balanced the views of Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia in multilateral fora. Russia’s balancing strategy has been positively received in Sudan and Ethiopia but has created latent frictions with Egypt. Russia has persisted with this non-interference policy, as it has largely prevented a spillover of tensions over the GERD to other areas of cooperation with Egypt and believes that its position will help consolidate its partnership with Ethiopia.

On June 18, Ebrahim Raisi won a landslide victory in Iran’s presidential elections. After Raisi’s triumph, Maxim Suslov, the press attaché of the Russian Embassy in Tehran, transmitted a message from President Vladimir Putin congratulating Raisi on his win and pledging to strengthen Russia-Iran bilateral relations. Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali echoed​​​​​​​ Putin’s comments about Russia-Iran relations and noted that he was the first world leader to congratulate Raisi on his election as Iran’s next president.

Due to its relatively stable political institutions, geographic proximity to Libya, and UNSC seat, regional powers in the Middle East are competing for influence in Niger. Egypt and the UAE are trying to counter Turkey’s growing economic and security cooperation with Niger, Saudi Arabia and Iran wish to leverage its UNSC voting power, and Israel is testing the waters for a potential normalization of diplomatic relations. These rivalries are poised to intensify, as the Sahel’s geostrategic significance continues to expand.

On April 20, Chadian President Idriss Déby was killed by Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) rebels in the country’s northwestern Tibesti region. The sudden death of Déby, who seized power in Chad via a military coup in December 1990 and was re-elected on April 11 with 79.3% of the vote, risks plunging Chad into a state of prolonged instability.

Russia is quietly strengthening its partnerships with Iran-aligned militia groups throughout the Middle East. While Russia’s military alliance with Hezbollah in Syria is well-documented, its relationships with Iran-aligned militias elsewhere in the MENA region are often overlooked. Russia engages with Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq on security challenges, defends Hezbollah from terrorism allegations, and holds negotiations with the Houthis on ending the Yemen war. These relationships bolster the Russia-Iran partnership, further Moscow’s regional ambitions, and help Iran-aligned militias diversify their array of global partners.

On Feb. 4, President Joe Biden announced the end of U.S. support for the Saudi Arabia-led coalition’s offensive military operations in Yemen. This decision fuelled optimism about a U.S. return to negotiations over the JCPOA with Iran. Instead of engaging with the United States, Iran has supported the Houthi-orchestrated Marib offensive and stepped up its diplomatic efforts in Yemen.