Development Assistance and (de) Radicalization: An Argument for a Holistic Macro and Micro-Level Perspective

Janette Uhlmann

With rising political fragility and increased violence and radicalization in the Middle East, development assistance is increasingly called upon to offer approaches to countering radicalization. From a structural perspective, official development assistance[1] can substantially contribute to deradicalization within a community or small group, or even among individuals, by reinforcing local stability on these different levels.[2] Common macro approaches to deradicalization tend to focus on structural governance factors, such as improving macro-economic environments and living conditions, while more micro-level interventions focus on individuals. Such a clear division between macro and micro levels may be somewhat artificial, especially considering probable meso-factors leading to radicalization (e.g., social factors such as neighborhoods as recruitment hubs for radicalization), but such categories are still useful for illustrative purposes. This chapter argues that combining macro and micro-level development approaches can build effective conflict management interventions, including those with deradicalization as their objective.[3]

In looking at current approaches and development interventions for dealing with conflict, especially conflict arising from radicalization, most focus on issues and causes either at the macro level or the micro level, leaving clear gaps between these levels of approaches to conflict.[4] The majority of non-governmental actors (NGOs and civil society groups) focus on interventions at the individual and local levels, often combined with participatory processes, which are able to make a more direct impact on beneficiaries. Bilateral organizations (e.g., national aid agencies) and multilateral organizations (e.g., international finance and international development organizations) predominantly engage through macro-level interventions and interact mainly at the state level since governments are the main counterparts and clients of their work. Increasingly, they also engage with subnational actors, such as municipalities and local governments, as well as the private sector and civil society. They also apply more inclusive approaches by engaging these actors in decision-making processes and involving them in the implementation phases. A better understanding of the possible development interventions and their effectiveness toward the prevention of radicalization (or eventually disengagement) is also needed by those already involved in radical groups or causes, through different development actors. For example, failure to incorporate local perspectives and political economic realities into macro-level approaches are likely to lead to failure in identifying factors leading to radicalization. Conversely, an approach too focused on micro-level issues could fragment reality and obscure one's understanding of the "whole picture."

---

[1] Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined as official financing and technical assistance administered to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries.

[2] See in particular: OECD, "A development co-operation lens on terrorism prevention," A DAC reference document, 2003.

[3] M. Kenney, "Hotbed of Radicalization or Something Else?: An Ethnographic Exploration of a Muslim Neighborhood in Ceuta", *Terrorism and political violence* (Sept. 23), 2011:537-559.

[4] WorldVision, "Bridging the participation gap: developing macro level conflict analysis through local perspectives," Policy and practice paper, September 2013.

Development assistance uses macro-level interventions to restructure societal frameworks and infrastructure to make them less conducive to radicalization. These macro-level interventions include strengthening local governance and transparency, supporting community-driven development and inclusion, poverty eradication, and strengthening public governance. Each will be discussed in detail below.

Strengthening local governance and transparency

Informal economies can easily become infested by violent, intra-state groups or radical networks trying to build their influence, raise funds, or develop entrepreneurial capacities. By gaining such economic influence, terrorist or violent radical networks are better able to mobilize and sponsor militants, provide material support to targeted communities and, in the worst cases, try to impose coercive control over a population.[5] Naturally, areas with poor governance and a lack of social cohesion are seeing higher rates of radicalization. In response, strengthening local governance might be key to preventing the growth of radicalization toward violence. It is well-observed that recruitment into radicalized groups is particularly active in poor neighborhoods, especially in urban districts or slums. The Middle East is at particular risk, having one of the highest urbanization rates worldwide, as well as a high percentage of informal housing that reaches twenty to forty percent in some parts of the region. Inefficient and low-quality public services at municipal levels, weak governance, and corruption expose societies in the Middle East and North Africa to the risk of social unrest, instability, and an openness toward radical views.[6] Several well-known cases of violent radical groups (e.g., *Salafyia Jihadiya* and GICM) have appeared in Moroccan slums over the past few years. Another example is Arafat City, an informal town in Mauritania in the Nouakchott suburbs where houses are built on sand.[7] Although development progress has been significant, Arafat City is well-known for having raised local radical militants in the past. These examples are consistent with similar patterns in developed countries, especially in Western Europe, where violent radicalism has often flourished in disadvantaged neighborhoods.

One response to this is to improve local governance and community-building approaches. Decentralization brings power, influence, and resources closer to the local level and contributes to more accountability for local services. There is, however, a risk that they could be co-opted by clientelism from local networks. Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan are overwhelmed and struggling to deal with exploding populations due to the influx of Syrian refugees. Their municipalities and neighborhoods are, as a result, at risk of increased fragility and predisposition to radicalization.[8] Already struggling with providing satisfactory quality services to their own citizens, the governments of these countries are ill-equipped to respond to the skyrocketing needs of their expanding populations; even minimum municipal services, such as basic education, basic health services, and waste-treatment services are hard to come by for existing citizens, let alone

---

[5] Joan Esteban & Ray Debraj "On the measurement of polarization," *Econometrica* Vol. 62 No. 4 (1994): 819-52.
[6] Municipality is a governing urban administrative division usually having the powers of self-government or control over the jurisdiction
[7] "Commune De ARAFAT: Plan for Developpement Communal" ospun.cun.mr/images/pdc/Rapport-Arafat.pdf
[8] Syria-related Displacement in MENA (UNHCR March 2015: 3,913,420 refugees as of March 2015. Turkey, Lebanon and Northern Jordan displaying the highest Syrian refugee population density. 1,698,470 in Turkey, 1,184,320 in Lebanon, and 625,170 in Jordan).

refugees. Humanitarian assistance intervenes at the forefront of a crisis, while development assistance follows to address basic needs through emergency support to neighboring countries that have opened their borders to receive refugees.[9] These interventions aim to strengthen the resilience of communities affected by the spill-over from the Syrian conflict and have included both traditional development interventions to ensure the protection of basic services, and innovative community and peace building initiatives such as the World Bank's emergency program in Jordan (Jordan Emergency Services and Social Resilience Project) to mitigate the impact of Syrian refugees and the Lebanon Syrian Crisis multi-donor trust fund.

Despite this necessary external support, regional governments and local communities continue to struggle with mounting tensions and internal unrest due to increased competition for jobs and housing due to the large amount of displaced Syrians moving to these areas. Among the refugees, there are radicalized elements that continue to agitate in the camps and in the host countries. Moreover, the fragile situation in the camps makes the refugees vulnerable to the recruitment efforts of radical cells. While development and humanitarian assistance is crucial, more targeted actions may be needed to combat the drivers of radicalization toward extremism and to prevent its spread.

Supporting community-driven development and inclusion

In polarized societies, alienation and radicalization are often consequences of unbalanced power. After the start of the Arab Spring, development organizations and communities began widespread internal discussions about the legitimacy of regimes and the appropriateness of collaborating with autocratic states. They began reviewing and partially adjusting their engagement with Arab state governments. However, such development entities have limited insight into the political economies of subnational quasi-governments or local ruling groups in these countries, as they continually change with new actors constantly emerging, making it challenging for multilateral and bilateral donors to develop institutional partnerships with local authorities or government bodies at the subnational level. While their assistance at the local level has the potential to be particularly effective and meaningful due to being able to reach the beneficiaries more directly, it can also lead to paradoxical consequences. International development communities closely observe the central governments of developing countries, applying pressure to introduce and observe democratic processes, at least to the extent possible. Such pressure is less effective at the subnational level where government seats and positions are often acquired through cronyism and clientelism. Engaging such officials can be seen as strengthening their legitimacy and is therefore usually counterproductive to long-term development goals. In worst case scenarios, this clientelism could be exploited by terrorist organizations to gain control of territories that states no longer have the capacity to govern and exert de facto micro-sovereignty over them. Though these ill-gained micro-sovereignties are usually not given any legitimacy in terms of relationships with the international community, they can still have real—and often bloody—consequences on local communities. Examples of these

---

[9] Humanitarian assistance refers to the aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.

include the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (formerly known as ISIS), and the Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The RUF domination in Sierra Leone was based on historical factors reflecting the underdeveloped political economy of the country and also on ethnic tensions similar to those prevailing on the West African coast—a division between the creolized population living close to the sea, and creoles living in forest regions.[10] In the majority of post-colonial Sub-Saharan African countries with large ethnic diversity, including Sierra Leone, the period of decolonization was a polarizing time marked by economic underdevelopment and mismanaged resource bases, rampant unemployment, and the lack of economic opportunities for large segments of the population that resulted in widespread poverty or the economic exclusion of certain groups.

In cases such as these, conflict-resolution tools, especially those that place value and emphasis on diversity, can play an important role in preventing community polarization that can lead to one group gaining territorial control over another. An integrative approach, such as the Leadership Development Program discussed below, involving different communities can help fight negative stereotypes and build collaborative capacities.[11] Similarly, involving community or religious leaders can help to build a more unified and less polarized history or community narrative. Such "community deradicalization" efforts can mitigate prejudices and stereotypes that overvalue one community to the detriment of another, or give preference to men, leading to the subjugation of women.

The Leadership Development Program, led by the Tim Parry Jonathan Ball Foundation for Peace, works with those affected by political violence and acts of terror to help them deal with traumatic experiences in their pasts, and to use the experiences as catalysts for creating positive change. One way they do this is by bringing together conflicting community groups and working with them to develop mutual understanding and the skills to bring about change for themselves and their community at large. Community leaders are provided with training on how to deal with past, present and future conflicts.[12] In such programs, emphasis is placed on developing effective cooperation, interdependencies between groups, and participatory decision-making processes, which can help to alleviate problems that come from real or perceived differences in status among members.

Poverty eradication

Global poverty reduction is the key priority of the international development community, and increasing efforts to eradicate poverty is another instrument for combating radicalization. Although radicalization studies show that poverty and social conditions are not—by far—the only variables contributing to radicalization, they certainly can have a considerable impact.

---

[10] Alfred B Zack-Williams, "Sierra Leone: the political economy of civil war, 1991-98," *Third World Quarterly,* Vol 20 No 1 (1999): 143-162.

[11] Pennie G. Foster-Fishman et al., "Building Collaborative Capacity in Community Coalitions: A Review and Integrative Framework,"*American Journal of Community Psychology,* Vol. 29 No. 2 (2001).

[12]Radicalisation Awareness Network, "Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU's Response," RAN Collection, January 15, 2014. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/collection_of_approaches_lessons_learned_and_practices_en.pdf .

Many researchers have discussed the factors that lead economically marginalized individuals to engage with and join radical violent networks or movements.[13] These include authoritarian family patterns, low education levels, and holding uncompromising world views. Economic insecurity may lead some to look for immediate and simple solutions, including joining radical groups that provide a sense of identity, social recognition and offer material support. Even those who are better educated and come from middle class communities can be more susceptible to the messages of radical groups during economic downturns when they have fewer opportunities than before and also are more likely to feel the threats of unemployment, impoverishment, or political disenchantment. Radical circles may appear to offer simple solutions to complicated community or societal challenges, as well as ready-made outlets for expressing frustration with these issues or resistance against the authorities they perceive to have caused them. It is important to note that in addition to an individual's or a community's objective socioeconomic conditions serving as polarizers that can lead to radicalization, many researchers have pointed out that even the *perception* of poverty or of social injustice and unfair treatment can lead to radicalization.

In addition to reaching individuals by trying to improve socioeconomic conditions at local levels, development assistance can also be used to prevent community radicalization through interventions that touch on the deepest notions of good governance and political fairness in a society (e.g., "institutional values"). Such interventions aim to replace norms of nepotism and clientelism with transparency, accountability, and good governance by strengthening governing institutions, supporting democratization, the rule of law, and the administrative modernization necessary to usher in and support structural change.[14] However, to avoid the "neo-colonialism" syndrome of simply replicating a Western model of governance, it is crucial to approach such interventions with a broad and thoughtful portfolio of methods. It also requires an intentional focus on institutional capacity development, a comprehensive understanding on the part of donors of the local political economy, and realistic expectations about the learning processes and the time needed to work toward successful and sustainable change. This type of development intervention is not intended to make an impact in the short term, but rather to create and foster conditions within larger structural frameworks that will support lasting internal stability and governance equilibriums.

Once noticeable structural reforms have been achieved, they may lead to a domino effect that improves socioeconomic and political conditions at local levels, helping (however indirectly) to prevent radicalization. By first helping to improve perceptions regarding state legitimacy and opportunities for political participation, such interventions may help those vulnerable to radicalization find outlets for political expression other than violence.

Development assistance uses macro-level interventions to restructure societal frameworks and infrastructure to make them less conducive to radicalization.

---

[13] For instance: Sohail Abbas, "Probing the *Jihadi* Mindset," (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 2007); Claude Berrebi, "Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians," *Mimeo,* (Princeton University, 2003), or Saidi Manzar, "A link between poverty and radicalization in Pakistan," *Pak Institute for peace studies*, July 2010.

[14] "Principal elements of good governance" OECD Directorate for Public Governance and Territorial Development, *http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,3746,en_2649_33735_1814560_1_1_1_1,00.html*

Strengthening public governance

Another way development entities seek to reduce radicalization is by strengthening public governance through financial reforms. Reforms to banking regulation and corporate governance regulation, as well as the prevention of money laundering operations and illegal trafficking, are critical areas for the prevention of both radicalization and terrorism. Many international financial institutions and development banks, especially since 9/11, have instituted anti-money-laundering systems to fight against terrorism. For example, the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) was formally launched by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2004. In January 2006, GIABA's responsibilities were expanded to include leading regional efforts to combat the financing of terrorism. The Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing was created in 2004. In 2000, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) responded to calls from the international community to expand its Anti-Money Laundering (AML) efforts, especially those concerning the abuse of Offshore Financial Centers (OFC). IMF initiated an OFC assessment program to explore ways to incorporate AML work into its activities, particularly Article IV surveillance and the newly-established Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). "Work on developing an AML Report on Standards and Codes (ROSC) module was already ongoing when the tragic events of September 11, 2001 intensified the efforts and broadened the scope to include combating the financing of terrorism (CFT)." [15] Access to funding is top priority for terrorists, violent organizations, and radical circles. As such, any targeted prevention measures can help to track and encounter the flow of finances benefiting these groups.

Development assistance can offer effective measures for conflict prevention, but it is more limited in its ability to manage and diffuse active conflict. Similarly, preventing radicalization is a more achievable target for the development community than is engaging in the fight against existing terrorism. By mitigating the conditions that foster the spread of radicalization, as the approaches outlined above seek to do, the development community is best poised to contribute to international efforts to prevent radicalization, and possibly also to the process of deradicalization. More rooted in the socioeconomic arena than in the security arena, the prevention of radicalization (and possibly the process of deradicalization) offers many opportunities for development actors to offer meaningful interventions. This requires combining both traditional and innovative practices at the community level. A micro-level focus on individuals will allow us to observe complementary interventions and methods that can provide for more targeted actions.

 A Micro-Level Perspective on development, radicalization, and deradicalization

Micro-level development approaches are focused on achieving results at the individual level, while the impact of development policies, programs, and interventions are usually only analyzed at the macro level. Taking a bottom-up perspective, however, can be effective for decision-makers and donors to determine if micro-level approaches have yielded an impact at the more

---

[15]The International Monetary Fund, Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism – Topics, http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml1.htm.

aggregate level. This approach assumes a complimentary relationship between micro and macro-level approaches.

There is little data on the effectiveness of micro-level interventions into violent conflicts, including the factors leading radical individuals to escalate their actions to a violent or militant level. However, such cases are important for the development community to examine, as they represent the crucial step between radicalization and terrorism, and perhaps even war. This nexus seems to justify greater involvement from development actors. Using best practices derived from conflict resolution and conflict prevention methodologies, especially those with a community or individual focus, development actors could play a major role in promoting deradicalization, either directly or indirectly, through program development and support.

Although the data in these areas is not extensive, some innovative analytical frameworks have recently been developed to analyze the impact of political violence and conflict on individuals and communities. MICROCON, a program funded by the European Union, is the largest European program on conflict analysis and has provided data to support EU policies in many countries.[16] MICROCON uses a micro-perspective to place individuals and small groups at the center of analysis; this focus seems to lend itself to the study and analysis of radicalization as well as of conflict. An improved understanding of the process of radicalization would not only serve to bridge the knowledge gap, but would also aid in the analysis of conflict, as both focus on tensions at the local or community level, the threat of alienation and victimization, and the ways individuals interact with formal and informal institutions.

Many development organizations and programs use education as a way to prevent conflict and violence, particularly among disenfranchised youth. Some examples of United Nations programs and policies aimed at preventing radicalization among youth include:

- The Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change[17]
- Convention on the Rights of the Child[18]
- Children and Armed Conflict (The Machel Report)[19]
- World Program of Action on Youth[20]
- Youth Employment Network (See below),
- Millennium Declaration and the MDGs[21]

The United Nations, the International Labour Organization, and the World Bank partnered in 2001 to create the Youth Employment Network (YEN) in response to the commitment at the Millennium Summit, a major meeting among world leaders in 2000, to support goals for youth employment. YEN is a network that advocates to include youth

---

[16] Patricia Justino, Tilman Brück, and Philip Verwimp, "A Micro-Level Perspective on the Dynamics of Conflict, Violence, and Development," (Oxford University Press, 2013).

[17] For more information, visit http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?n=gaA.59.565_En.pdf

[18] For more information, visit http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx

[19] For more information, visit http://www.unicef.org/graca/

[20] For more information, visit http://www.un.org/events/youth98/backinfo/ywpa2000.htm

[21] For more information, visit http://www.un.org/fr/millenniumgoals/

employment on development agendas and serves as a platform for exchanging ideas on policies and programs to improve employment opportunities among youth populations. The YEN includes development agencies, governments, private sector organizations, selected youth groups, and NGOs.[22] Being able to respond to youth in situations of violent conflict requires, however, a thorough understanding of these situations as well as of how youth interact with unstable societal situations. While an international framework for analyzing and responding to youth in situations of violent conflict has not yet been created, some policy instruments do exist to deal with such challenges. They tend to take one of two main approaches to working with youth issues:

Some approaches to conflict prevention consider youth to be intrinsically connected to the issues of conflict and therefore target youth specifically. Others consider the issues of youth to be background or secondary to other conflict issues; they may include youth in their programming or approach but only indirectly. Those coming from a development perspective usually focus on improving employment and social integration as a way to prevent conflict or the escalation of violence among youth.

Facilitating life transitions for children and youth [23] should also be a priority considering the demographics of developing countries, most of which are experiencing a youth bulge, and are more vulnerable to transitioning into violent radicalism or becoming combatants.[24] Experts in youth conflict recommend offering psychosocial support [25] to children and youth affected by or engaged in conflict, especially in periods of demobilization, reintegration into society, or disengagement from radicalized groups or ideologies.

It is sometimes pointed out that disengagement from radical or violent groups or ideologies is more effective when the decision to disengage is taken by the individual (as was the case in Colombia with members of the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)) rather than as a collective decision (as was the one made by the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia).[26]

Some of the reasons individuals choose to leave violent or radicalized groups include: being personally traumatized by the experience, particularly by violent experiences; disenchantment with the group's values or leadership; fear of staying with the group; exhaustion with living a

---

[22] For more information, visit http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/yen/about/index.htm

[23] A. Rahim and P. Holland, "Facilitating Transitions for Children and Youth: Lessons from Four Post-Conflict Fund Projects," *Social Development Paper* No. 34 (Washington D.C: World Bank, 2006).

[24] 27 years for American jihadi arrested on the US soil, according to B.M. Jenkins, "Would-Be Warriors- Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001, RAND Report, 2010; 26 years old for M. Sageman, *Understanding terror networks,* University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. This median age, in the case of violent-armed groups child soldiers might be very different and of course, even younger by definition. See http://www.child-soldiers.org/global_report_reader.php?id=562 on this matter.

[25] For example:
http://www.ineesite.org/toolkit/docs/Conflict_Prevention_and_Post_Conflict_Reconstruction_may_2006.pdf

[26] Naureen Chowdhry Fink and Ellie B. Hearne, "Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism," International Peace Institute, 2008, https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/194/beyond-terrorism-deradicalization-and-disengagement-from-violent-extremism.

clandestine or illegal lifestyle; a desire for a "normal" civilian life, including getting married, finding a career, or beginning a family; and social pressure from family or friends—especially parents and partners/spouses—to leave the group.

It is also assumed that young ex-combatants can benefit more from psychosocial support provided by the family and local community than from institutionalized programs for the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder. This approach is similar to those taken by many deradicalization interventions. For example, the Unity Initiative (TUI) is "an Interventions Consultancy with the primary aim of dismantling reactionary absolutism, tackling violent extremism and promoting pluralism. The work of TUIs combines sanctioned counter-narratives, behavioral and linguistic sciences as well as providing supportive mechanisms to vulnerable individuals." Each individual project requires a "fact-based analysis and a strategy development process which can be tailored to address the specifics of that case."[27] TUI's interventions include community interventions, mentoring, family counseling, reintegration programs, the development of "safe spaces," ideological intervention, and education and training workshops.[28]

This psycho-social approach tends to prioritize enhancing self-esteem as the first step, followed by the incorporation of social aspects, such as mentoring and family reintegration, and then finally educational or vocational training. Although a systematic review of the effectiveness of these psycho-social approaches still needs to be conducted, it is clear that DDR (Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration) and disengagement/deradicalization share a similar desired outcome: that an individual who has suffered from trauma or disenfranchisement becomes someone able to move peacefully—and with sufficient self-esteem and the capacity to manage aggression and frustration—within a normal, open society. In addition to social reintegration, there must be economic reintegration focused on the individual level. This becomes much more effective when there is a commitment not only on the part of the individuals themselves, but also from local partners and entrepreneurs, particularly from micro-enterprise entities,[29] institutions guided by development actors,[30] and others on the front lines of deradicalization and disengagement.[31]

Conclusion

In conclusion, I argue that the development community has a legitimate role to play in both radicalization prevention and deradicalization for the varied reasons outlined in this chapter.

Combining macro and micro-level approaches within the context of development assistance can provide powerful solutions to these issues. While macro-level approaches establish a framework and are suited to support preventive approaches, micro-level approaches complement these

---

[27] http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/collection_of_approaches_lessons_learned_and_practices_en.pdf

[28] http://www.unityinitiative.co.uk/our-expertise/our-expertise.html

[29] T. Body, "Reintegration of Ex-Combatants through Micro-Enterprise: An Operational Framework," Pearson center for Peacekeeping, 2005.

[30] See ILO, "Socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants", Guidelines, Geneva, 2010.

[31] Interview with Dr. Jean-Luc Marret, IMPACT WP2.2., EU FP7 Program on deradicalization interventions and radicalization, October 14, 2014.

efforts by engaging the issues on an individual level. Together, the two approaches can provide a comprehensive and holistic blend of traditional and more innovative methods. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to suggest which approach is best for various development partners working in the field, it is helpful to remember that municipalities and communities are at the center of numerous existing development programs and play one of the most active and important roles in deradicalization and the prevention of radicalization.[32] Between governance improvement efforts at the municipal level and prevention interventions at the group and individual levels,[33] municipalities, communities and local partners might hold the most promise for change for international development actors.

---

[32] For example: http://www.nltimes.nl/2015/01/22/municipalities-plans-radicalization-report/, http://cphpost.dk/news/copenhagen-creates-group-to-fight-radicalization.12372.html.
[33] For example:
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/focus_areas/focus_local_governance.html.