Toward Regional Cooperation
The Internal Security Dimension

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Abbreviations

AIM	Arab Interior Ministers Council
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
C.T.	counterterrorism
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
E.U.	European Union
EUROPOL	European Police Office
F.T.F.	foreign terrorist fighter
G.C.T.F.	Global Counterterrorism Forum
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAUSS	Naif Arab University for Security Sciences
POE	ports of entry
S.S.R.	security sector reform
SOPs	standard operating procedures
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
U.A.E.	United Arab Emirates

Contents

Summary

The Middle East and North Africa is one of the least integrated regions in the world, and in no area of potential collaboration is cooperation more lacking than in the internal security dimension. Among the reasons for this lack of integration is simply that the risks of cooperating with other internal security forces and institutions are quite evident, whereas the benefits of doing so are far less apparent. The most promising approach to security integration is to promote cooperation to reform and improve the delivery of internal security across the region in accordance with the principles of Security Sector Reform (S.S.R.). Such an approach could create a stable and more secure environment for ordinary citizens and their governments in the longer term. It could also pave the way for the further advancement and development of the region across other sectors.

Key Points

♦ Create a regional S.S.R. network of security sector officials, senior operational commanders, parliamentarians, civil society organizations, and regional S.S.R. experts to identify, develop, and disseminate security sector best practices

♦ Explicitly design and deliver regional capacity building activities for operational forces that enhance both their effectiveness and accountability

♦ Foster the sharing of best practices among parliamentarians for oversight and accountability practices in the internal security sector

♦ Identify "change agents" within the region's security sector institutions and forces, and empower them with targeted assistance and capacity building activities

♦ Support and expand nascent regional cooperation efforts in the technical and operational spheres to promote wider and deeper regional cooperation

Introduction

The paradox of regional cooperation in the Middle East and North Africa is that it is one of the least integrated regions in the world, despite the existence of numerous shared challenges—and even common interests. In no area of potential collaboration is that paradox more evident than in the internal security dimension.

The "internal security dimension" encompasses statutory forces with an internal security mission of public order and law enforcement. It includes the police; militarized police such as the national guard or gendarmes; prison guards; border guards; specialized tactical forces, like counterterrorism or crowd control units; maritime law enforcement fleets; and other law enforcement actors with an internal security function. It also includes the ministries that oversee them, such as the ministry of interior. The internal security sector is a component of

> **"The Middle East and North Africa is one of the least integrated regions in the world, despite the existence of numerous shared challenges."**

the state's security sector, which also includes the functions of national defense (armed forces, ministry of defense), intelligence, justice (ministry of justice, judiciary, prison system) and oversight and governance (parliament and their specialized committees, the executive, civil society).

The security sector is often described as a system, in that each of the component functions are closely interconnected. The function of the security sector is to protect the state—and the lives and livelihoods of its citizens—from both external and internal threats. For the internal security dimension, this includes the provision of public order and crime prevention, a broad category of activities that range from traffic enforcement, making and processing arrests, and collecting evidence to manning Ports of Entry (POE) at borders, protecting national institutions, and preventing acts of terrorism.

In the internal security sector, there is a much greater variation in how these systems are structured and how these duties are carried out across states than is the case for the defense sector. In the latter, the military rank and force structure looks much the same, for example, in Colombia, Jordan or Indonesia. In the internal security sector, however, these can vary widely. Some are civilian led, others are entirely uniformed. Some constabulary forces report to ministries of interior, others to ministries of defense. Prison management also varies widely, as do processes for evidence collection and prosecution. These differences exist even within like polities, exemplified by the differences between the French or Italian system of law enforcement and that of the United Kingdom, the United States, or Canada. Fundamental differences also derive from how law enforcement actors deliver their mission of public service, from models of democratic policing or community policing, which emphasize community engagement and public service, to more authoritarian models, which prioritize regime protection and repression.

Given these fundamental differences, it is not surprising that regional cooperation in the internal security dimension lags behind cooperation in other realms. Nonetheless, there are real benefits that can be derived from bilateral and even multilateral cooperation among law enforcement entities within the internal security sector across the MENA region.

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Given the goal—put forth in the framing piece of this study by Ross Harrison —of a more stable and prosperous Middle East by 2030, can regional cooperation among these law enforcement actors and institutions, despite the constraints inherent to the internal security dimension, measurably improve security and stability across the region?[1] Are the pillar countries Harrison identifies—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and Turkey—the

most appropriate stewards of this effort? And what, specifically, can be done to leverage today's nascent regional cooperation in the internal security dimension to realize this goal?

The Challenges of Cooperation in the Internal Security Dimension

The term "regional cooperation" brings to mind well-established organizations with regional mandates in the economic, political or defense spheres like the E.U., ASEAN, or NATO. But there is no like organization explicitly mandated to address shared issues in the internal security dimension, which is (with the possible exception of intelligence) arguably the least regionally integrated sector worldwide. Security specialists are correct to counter this argument with examples of institutionalized mechanisms like INTERPOL or EUROPOL, which do have an explicit mandate to coordinate information sharing among various law enforcement agencies in member countries. But there is no equivalent "MENAPOL" for the Middle East and North Africa—and certainly no framework for integrating the region's internal security sector like NATO does for the European defense sector.[2]

Among the reasons why regional cooperation in the internal security

> "The internal security dimension is arguably the least regionally integrated sector worldwide."

dimension lags behind cooperation in other realms is simply that the risks of cooperating with other internal security forces and institutions are quite evident, whereas the benefits of doing so are far less apparent. For the authoritarian regimes of the MENA region, most information about the internal security sector, such as the number and types of forces, budgets, and rules of engagement, are classified as "state secrets." Formal high-level cooperation, which often requires binding agreements, intrusive information sharing, and changes to domestic law, risks exposing this information to regional adversaries—and to their own populations.

Cooperation also presents risks for the region's small states. Exposing their capacity gaps in the internal security sector through cooperation with other states in the region raises the risk that these vulnerabilities could be exploited. The fear that cooperation could make these states less secure is even more acute for the region's transitioning democracies, where democratic practices are still being institutionalized and where the risk of reversion to the status quo ante is always present. This reticence to share even basic information is not a MENA-only phenomenon. A U.N. report on crime and justice statistics for European countries highlights "the disturbing observation" that calls for data often go unanswered by "countries that are known to possess the required data but do not respond."[3]

There is another reason for the lack of cooperation in the internal security dimension that applies not only to the MENA region but also to assessing the prospects for cooperation among law enforcement entities more generally. The nature of law enforcement itself—and its largely internal mission of security as opposed to an external mission of defense—does not intrinsically

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lend itself to cooperation with other law enforcement entities. Much of what law enforcement does day-to-day, such as processing traffic infractions, dealing with domestic disturbances, monitoring public demonstrations, securing large scale sporting events, or even responding to violent crime, is largely an internal or domestic activity (although this is changing as organized criminal actors like gangs increasingly operate internationally). Where regional cooperation could prove valuable, however, is in those law enforcement activities that come close to the dividing line between external defense and internal law enforcement. Thus, we do see cooperation in the internal security dimension among gendarmerie or national guard forces that protect land and maritime borders, or for Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units that have a counterterrorism or specialized protection mission. Their ability to deliver these missions and to capture and

prosecute perpetrators can be meaningfully enhanced by cooperating and sharing information with counterparts across borders.

However, there is an even more fundamental reason for the lower level of cooperation in the internal security dimension worldwide. Cooperation among national police forces, for example, to share information about specific criminal actors or crimes could impinge on citizen rights or violate due process. This is why there are restrictive legal frameworks for sharing evidence or police intelligence (as opposed to information) outside of established legal processes and for the burden of proof that these require, both of which fundamentally derive from democratic norms and the rule of law. Further complications arise from democratic standards of transparency and accountability. These deliberative processes serve to make law enforcement cooperation inherently difficult, if not burdensome and unwieldy, even among states that otherwise cooperate closely on matters of defense or trade.

In the MENA region, the prospects for regional cooperation have been further complicated by the events of the Arab Spring. Prior to the Arab Spring, the region's security forces cooperated, mostly in

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a bilateral fashion, to counter threats to their regimes and to repress internal dissent. For example, although there were important tensions among Tunis, Algiers, Tripoli, and Cairo, there was also a surprising degree of coordination among internal security forces along their shared borders, including coordinated operations and intelligence sharing.[4] Even across the closed border between Morocco and Algeria, security forces engaged in limited cooperation to repatriate wayward shepherds or to counter smugglers.[5] This cooperation was largely founded on shared interests—among which regime protection and even survival were among the most important. But in the aftermath of the collapse and overthrow of the regimes in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, this cooperation

largely ceased—not only because those shared interests had disappeared, but also because, in the case of Libya, there was no regime to cooperate with. As one senior border security officer in Tunisia explained, "On the border with Libya, we are doing the work of two. We have no counterpart across the border."[6]

Whereas the pre-Arab Spring regimes were authoritarian states that used their defense and internal security forces to protect the regime and repress dissent, the democratic-aspirant regimes that replaced them initially expressed a commitment to meeting the demands of the Arab Spring, including the creation of democratically accountable internal security sectors that could effectively protect these new states, meet the security needs of their citizens, and adhere to the rule of law. In the immediate post-Arab Spring, newly elected regimes began to take steps that could have fundamentally overturned the security apparatus of the old order.

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Although few of these reforms were successfully initiated—and even fewer implemented—the Arab Spring presented a serious, if not existential, threat to the many countries in the region who feared the diffusion of these democratic aspirations among their own citizens. The shared interests upon which regional cooperation had been built disintegrated, to be replaced by distrust, fear, and even active measures to undermine these nascent transitioning democracies.

In the years since 2011, however, the pattern of cooperation—mostly on a bilateral basis, but with some interesting regional initiatives, and focused mostly "on the ground" through operational, tactical or technical coordination—has carefully resumed, even with some of the post-Arab Spring countries. For example, within 24 hours of Tunisia's Ennahda-led regime stepping down in favor of the "technocrat" government, relations between Algiers and Tunis were reestablished, and their security forces began coordinating to counter the

terrorist threat along their shared border. These initiatives, and others like them, suggest that there is a modicum of regional cooperation and a more significant level of bilateral cooperation upon which future efforts can be built.

Defining a Strategic Purpose for Regional Cooperation

There is an implicit assumption that regional cooperation in the internal security dimension can further the goal of a stable Middle East—if not in the near-term, then at least a generation hence. But is it really in the interests of the international community to promote cooperation among security forces and institutions that, at best, struggle to meet the security needs of their governments and populations and, at worst,

> "These initiatives suggest that there is a modicum of regional cooperation upon which future efforts can be built."

operate with impunity, violate human rights, and even torture their own citizens? Are all of the pillar countries Harrison identifies—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Iran—the best stewards for this effort? And given that the dysfunctions in the internal security dimension are exactly that—internal dysfunctions—how can regional cooperation address those internal dysfunctions?

A Near-Term Approach: Narrow Technical or Functional Cooperation

One approach is to ignore these larger political issues—or at least defer them in the near-term—by focusing on continuing, and building on, technical regional cooperation, limited information sharing, and force professionalization efforts. Such an approach would promote cooperation among states in critical subregions with shared security challenges. Efforts would likely focus on purely tactical or technical cooperation, perhaps with limited operational coordination to counter a specific threat; enhancing the professionalism of the region's internal

security forces; or promoting coordination among security sector officials on critical shared threats, such as counterterrorism cooperation. This is currently taking place among some states, in a very limited form, in North Africa and the Sahel, as various ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates expand their operations. Many of these examples involve exercises, simulations, or scenario-driven engagements drawn from real world challenges "on the ground." Most of this cooperation is highly technical. Bigger political issues are strictly "off-limits."

Another example of a broader, but still limited cooperation, is found in the activities of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (G.C.T.F.), which was created in September 2011 to serve as an "informal, multilateral counterterrorism (C.T.) platform" to enhance global counterterrorism cooperation by identifying "critical civilian C.T. needs and mobilizing the necessary expertise and resources to address such

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needs."[7] With 30 members (29 countries and the E.U.), the forum operates internationally to convene C.T. policymakers and practitioners through six thematic and regional working groups with the United States and Turkey serving as co-chairs in 2015 (and the Netherlands and Morocco in 2016).[8] There are also "G.C.T.F.-inspired institutions," including the Hedayah Center of Excellence in Abu Dhabi and the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law in Valletta, Malta, which offer training to internal security sector officials and operational forces across the MENA region.[9] Although the focus of the G.C.T.F. is on promoting global counterterrorism cooperation, the activities of the working group, including the development of various "best practices" documents, also address broader law enforcement capacity issues. Such a platform could serve as a useful starting point for building deeper and wider regional cooperation in the internal security dimension.

Other potentially promising initiatives for promoting regional cooperation in the internal security dimension predate the Arab Spring. Notable among these are the efforts by countries like Morocco, Jordan, the U.A.E., and Turkey to promote training of more effective police forces in the region—initiatives that build trust and the operational capacity of the region's internal security forces to more effectively counter threats to the regions' regimes and citizens. For example, with support from the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (U.N.O.D.C.), the Dubai police anti-narcotics unit has trained counterparts from Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Qatar, Jordan, Morocco, Yemen and the Palestinian Territories to combat drug smuggling and abuse in the region at the Hemaya International Training Center.[10] Another initiative is the Arab Interior Ministers Council (AIM). Established in 1982, AIM was created to "develop

"Efforts to promote cooperation favor technical and functional over political issues."

and strengthen cooperation and coordination efforts" among Arab countries in the field of internal security and the fight against crime."[11] It coordinates with INTERPOL to host regular meetings of member states' INTERPOL heads, as well as holding annual meetings of its members.[12] It also includes subsidiary organizations and institutions, including the Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS), which offers training programs, and subsidiary offices with an internal security focus, including the Arab Office for Civil Protection and Rescue, the Arab Office for Crime Prevention, the Arab Criminal Police Office, and the Arab Office on Drug Affairs.[13]

Established coordination mechanisms like the G.C.T.F. and AIM suggest that regional cooperation in the internal security dimension is possible, that such cooperation is likely best focused on shared threats or challenges, and that efforts to promote cooperation favor technical and functional over political issues. Given their established relationships with international organizations like INTERPOL and the United Nations, these platforms could also serve as potential entry points for the international community to promote wider or deeper cooperation in the region in the future.

The benefit of such an approach is that it could potentially help stabilize critical subregions and potentially help participating regimes manage their growing security challenges. Additionally, the benefits of such narrow technical or functional cooperation, which would not require deeper information sharing or even legislative changes, would also likely exceed the potential risks; enhancing the likelihood that states would be willing to cooperate. But the potential benefits, even in the longer term, would likely be at the margins. It is unlikely that such narrowly defined cooperation alone would contribute to greater stability across the MENA region. But it would create an entry point for engagement that could, in turn, provide the basis for wider or deeper cooperation in the long-term.

A Long-Term Approach: Security Sector Reform

A more promising approach is to promote cooperation, in accordance with the principles of Security Sector Reform (S.S.R.), to reform and improve the delivery of internal security across the region. Such an approach could create a stable and more secure environment for ordinary citizens and their governments. It could also pave the way for the further advancement and development of the region across the other sectors profiled in this series of studies on regional cooperation.

S.S.R. is a conceptual approach to strengthening, reforming, or (re)constructing the human and institutional capabilities and capacities of the security sector to provide security, maintain the state's monopoly of force, and operate in accordance with democratic principles and the rule of law.[14] The S.S.R. approach is a broad one. It focuses on the security sector as a whole. Its aim is to promote effective and accountable security sector forces and institutions. In other words, its purpose is to improve how the security sector is governed—and how and for what purpose its forces and institutions operate.

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S.S.R., as it has been practiced since the late 1990s, is largely a national endeavor. Within the MENA region alone, there is tremendous diversity of national contexts and S.S.R. challenges. For example, at one end of the spectrum is Libya; a post-conflict state in which there is no monopoly of force and the S.S.R. challenge is not reform, but (re)construction. At the other end of the spectrum are states such as Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, with robust security sectors that are wielded in fundamentally different ways and for different purposes. Further variation derives from vastly different legal and constitutional frameworks across the region's states.

"The story of S.S.R. in the MENA region has not been a positive one."

Given varied regional contexts and legal frameworks, serious political challenges, and the inherent limitations of cooperating in the internal security dimension, regional S.S.R. will be more narrowly constrained than the national variant. What a regional S.S.R. approach can do is build the human capital so essential for the transformation of the region's internal security dimension.

At a practical level, S.S.R. is a framework "through which national and international actors can structure an interlinked series of activities designed to buttress stability in a given state."[15] The central objective of this process is to "create a secure environment…conducive to development, poverty reduction, and democracy."[16] For international donors, like the United States and its allies, S.S.R. can frame and prioritize foreign assistance beyond merely providing training and equipment to support the goals of S.S.R. For MENA governments seeking to strengthen, reform, or (re) construct security sector forces and institutions, S.S.R. provides a "conceptual roadmap" for how to do so.

The story of S.S.R. in the MENA region has not been a positive one.[17] Efforts to promote S.S.R., some of which pre-date the Arab Spring, have been attempted to a greater or lesser extent in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. None of these efforts have produced a "durable consensus" among the leading political actors, or society more generally, about the role of the security sector or how it should be governed.[18]

The hurdles are many and appear almost insurmountable. Authoritarian and patronage-based practices are deeply embedded; public institutions are dysfunctional; and both elites and populations are threatened either by the loss of their privileged status or by the increasing social disorder, rising crime, and the growing threat of terrorism and violent extremism. In the security sector, there are

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real challenges to divesting institutions like the ministries of defense and interior from the economic, security, and intelligence functions that serve as their power base. These institutions have also served to employ significant portions of the population. Divesting these institutions of those functions risks exacerbating already severe unemployment and social discontent. As these S.S.R. efforts have proceeded, faltered, or failed, populations who once demanded reform are increasingly prioritizing stability over democracy, rule of law, or human rights.[19] Within the security sector, the response has been to return to practices of coercion and repression. These "faltering, halfhearted attempts at security sector reform" have prompted some to conclude that "Western models of security sector reform cannot adequately resolve the dilemmas revealed by Arab states in transition and can do no more than alter these sectors superficially." [20]

If not S.S.R., then what is the alternative?

Without an S.S.R. framework to provide a long-term strategic objective for U.S. and allied efforts in the region, such efforts will likely continue to be largely focused on leveraging narrow openings created by gaps in regional states' technical or operational proficiency. Breaking the "vicious cycle of dysfunction" to achieve a more stable and secure Middle East, as Harrison argues, will require addressing the fundamental dysfunctions of the region's internal security sector. Until these can be addressed, stability and prosperity for the broader region will remain aspirational.

Six S.S.R. Principles

There are six guiding principles for S.S.R.[21] These provide the outline of a "roadmap" for promoting more effective and responsive internal security sectors that ultimately can provide a foundation for a more stable and prosperous Middle East. These also suggest some entry points for promoting greater regional cooperation in the internal security dimension across the MENA region.

1. S.S.R. should be locally owned and the region's governments should have a stake in its successful outcome. Local ownership—that the reform process is shaped and driven by local actors—is a foundational principle of the S.S.R. concept.[22] Without it, no reform is possible. Ultimately, the agent of change in S.S.R. is the host nation government. Assistance provided under an S.S.R. framework can only support that reform, provide technical guidance, shore up needed resources, and encourage efforts to implement change.

2. The purpose of S.S.R. should be to enhance the effectiveness, accountability, and transparency of security sector oversight institutions and security forces. Each of these must guide how S.S.R. is designed and implemented. Effectiveness is measured by the capacity and capability of institutions and operational forces to provide security in accordance with human rights standards and the rule of law. Institutional effectiveness means that the institutions that exercise oversight over security forces—such as the ministry of interior, but also the executive and parliamentary committees—have the capacity and capability to oversee, lead, manage, provision, train and control them. Accountability refers to a system of checks and balances through which security institutions and forces are held responsible for their actions to the chain of command, their civilian leadership, and ultimately to the populations they serve. Finally, transparency refers to the open and accessible operation

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of security sector institutions and forces.[23] Together, enhancing the effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of security institutions and forces strengthens democratic institutions and governance.

3. S.S.R. should promote the rule of law. The rule of law requires that all citizens and institutions, including the state itself, are accountable to the law. Furthermore, these laws must be "publically promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated."[24] Legal frameworks must be fairly and impartially applied to all citizens, including minorities and other vulnerable groups. Within the S.S.R. framework, promotion of the rule of law means that judiciaries are independent and impartial, and the police do not act with impunity and uphold the law.

4. S.S.R. should foster and promote the consolidation of democratic practices, placing the security sector under civilian control. The core S.S.R. concept includes a strong normative commitment to democratization and to the principles of human rights

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and good governance.[25] The strong emphasis on norms has generated criticism that S.S.R. is "misleadingly optimistic" or that it is "too… prescriptive and ethnocentric."[26] But, S.S.R. without a commitment to promoting democratic principles and practices is not really S.S.R. If the purpose of S.S.R. is to enhance the effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of security institutions and forces, then doing so requires adopting democratic practices to bring the forces and their oversight institutions under civilian supervision. This does not mean that S.S.R. aims at democratic government; it aims at the consolidation of democratic practices. This distinction is an important one. There will be countries that are not democracies, electoral democracies that are not liberal democracies, and others in transition where democratic government remains a long-term goal rather than a current reality. Promoting democratic practices

and civilian control will increase the likelihood that the purpose of S.S.R.—effective, accountable and transparent security sector institutions and forces—will be realized.

5. S.S.R. should be employed to strengthen the state's monopoly of legitimate force. The monopoly of violence is a foundational concept of the modern, Westphalian state system and the S.S.R. concept.[27] In its S.S.R. variant, this is achieved by bringing the forces and institutions of the security sector under civilian democratic control. In practice, what this means is that all forces that operate within the territorial confines of the state (over which its writ legally extends) should be statutory forces—they are sanctioned by law, and they are led, managed, provisioned, trained, and deployed by the state (ministries of defense or interior, the executive authority, and ultimately, the people they serve).

> **"All forces that operate within the territorial confines of the state should be statutory forces."**

Although somewhat more controversial, this category of legitimate security providers can also include various private security actors provided the state permits them to wield force, but ultimately retains "the sole right to use [or authorize the use of] physical violence."[28] The critical issue here is that the privatization of security is "top down"—it is state sanctioned.[29]

6. S.S.R. should be holistic in its design, although reform activities may not occur simultaneously. Holistic design is another foundational principle of S.S.R. It requires that any reform program should include "activities with multi-sector strategies, based upon a broad assessment of the range of security and justice needs of the people and the state."[30] Although the approach is laudable, it is neither realistic nor practical.[31] A more pragmatic and realistic approach is to require that the conceptualization and design of S.S.R. be holistic, but that the delivery or implementation of reform is prioritized and sequenced to address the most critical security sector dysfunctions first.

S.S.R. is a tall order. At its roots, it is less about technical improvements and changes in Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and more fundamentally about renegotiating the social contract between state and citizen. What is the role of government? What are its obligations toward citizens? What role should the security sector play in the provision of public order? And what, in turn, are the obligations of citizens toward their governments?

It is not surprising, given the enormity of the task, that little progress has been made in the few years since S.S.R. efforts began in the region. Nor should there be an expectation that any subsequent renewal of these efforts will produce rapid results. Timeframes for S.S.R. are measured in decades, if not generations. S.S.R does not require that the entire security sector be dismantled and reconstituted at once. Initially small, incremental steps toward the long-term goal of improving the delivery of public services in the security sector can gradually improve how internal security is delivered; thus contributing to the creation of stability so essential to achieving the goals of prosperity and security across the region.

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A Roadmap for Change

The value of S.S.R. is that it can serve as a framework both for how the international community can promote the goal of building a more stable and secure environment across the region and how regional states can achieve greater security and stability for their governments and citizens. S.S.R. offers both a strategic objective for that regional coordination—improving the delivery of internal security—and a possible roadmap for how to build on existing technical and functional cooperation for the long-term. The following are some recommendations for how to do so:

Recommendation 1:

Create a regional S.S.R. network of security sector officials, senior operational commanders, parliamentarians, civil society organizations, and regional S.S.R. experts to identify, develop, and disseminate security sector best practices.

A useful starting point for implementing Recommendation 1 is to build on recent and ongoing efforts to promote the sharing of best practices across the region. For example, the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace have both implemented regional S.S.R. initiatives in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.[32] The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has similarly focused on S.S.R. for its Mediterranean

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partners and recently completed new guidance for Security Sector Governance. The G.C.T.F. platform and its regional and thematic working groups offer another good starting point for building such a network, and its C.T. law enforcement good practices documents also offer valuable guidance for S.S.R. best practices.[33]

These networks could serve numerous S.S.R. purposes—including identifying the "change agents" in Recommendation 3 (below) and promoting relationship-building among senior security sector officials and commanders from some of the Arab Spring countries where such engagement was previously discouraged or even prohibited. Numerous officials that have attended such events have recognized the value of engagement for overcoming their sense of isolation. "This engagement is so valuable to me," one beleaguered Yemeni security official explained, "because now I know that I am not alone. My regional counterparts are facing the same challenges I am."[34]

Such a network can also be used to raise awareness among those responsible for promoting or implementing S.S.R. about how to do so holistically. Although the focus here is on the internal security dimension, strengthening the capacity of the police will have implications for other segments of the security sector, such as justice and defense. For example, improving police methods for

evidence collection will not improve security if the laws and court processes for handling evidence are not also addressed. Such a network also provides a venue for disseminating best practices for promoting democratic processes, strengthening the monopoly of force (in accordance with S.S.R. principles), and enhancing effectiveness, accountability and oversight.

Recommendation 2:

Through the auspices of the S.S.R. network, other existing platforms disseminate knowledge of S.S.R. best practices through regional workshops and other skill-building activities.

Throughout the region, there are significant knowledge gaps about S.S.R. best practices. After the Arab Spring, many of the new leaders of police units and ministries of interior sought guidance on how to reform their practices. Recommendation 2 suggests addressing those knowledge gaps through targeted skills and building on specific internal security sector functions, such as: appropriate use of force policies; how to create and implement a new mission for the police; best practices

"Workshops should be focused on providing participants with practical guidelines to help inform the design and implementation of new national policies."

for engaging citizens; guidelines for community policing and other policing models; developing new standards for policing and embedding those in recruitment, training, promotion, and sanction policies. The selection of topics can be informed by the activities of network members and should be focused on providing participants with practical guidelines to help inform the design and implementation of new national policies.

In accordance with the principle of local ownership, international efforts to implement Recommendations 1 and 2 should aim at providing a venue and opportunity for engagement, but should defer the content, frequency, and

hosting to regional states to ensure that the network serves the interests of its participants. Over the long-term, such a network could be institutionalized, possibly under the auspices of a regional organization.

Recommendation 3:

Identify "change agents" within the region's security sector institutions and forces, and empower them with targeted assistance and capacity building activities.

Throughout the region, there are individuals—or groups of individuals—in key ministries or security units who are interested in, or committed to, improving how their internal security sector functions. Implementing Recommendation 3 should be weighed against the potential risks of "empowering" these actors. Where conditions are appropriate for implementing Recommendation 3, there are a few ways these individuals or units can be "empowered." One way is to include them in the aforementioned network. A second way is to provide S.S.R. training to likeminded colleagues to build a larger network of change agents in the

> "Over time, efforts to empower "change agents" could seed small centers of reform in key ministries that could promote change from within."

same institution or unit. A third way is to leverage the provision of assistance to enhance the prominence or influence of the individual or unit vis-à-vis detractors (with the important caveat that such assistance could potentially put those change agents at risk). Over time, and under the appropriate conditions, such efforts could seed small centers of reform in key ministries that could promote change from within.

Recommendation 4:

Support and expand nascent regional cooperation efforts in the technical and operational spheres to promote wider and deeper regional cooperation.

Recommendation 4 suggests building on regional initiatives, much of which

pre-date the Arab Spring, for promoting greater professionalism and building the operational and technical capacity of regional police and other specialized internal security forces. These efforts, led by countries like Jordan, Morocco, the U.A.E. and Turkey, have not garnered high-level attention, but have nonetheless impacted hundreds of thousands of internal security forces in the region. In Jordan, for example, this training takes place at the Jordan International Police Training Center, which has welcomed police from Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories. Dubai's efforts have focused on training police to combat drug smuggling. Morocco has promoted the professionalization of security forces across the African continent.

There are numerous technical and functional areas where such efforts could focus. For example, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and antiquities smuggling are important law enforcement challenges that countries across the region have a shared interest in countering and for which platforms like AIM might be well-suited. Other issues where wider and deeper cooperation would be useful include efforts to counter the growing threat of al-Qaeda and ISIS, foreign terrorist fighter (F.T.F.) recruitment and return, and weapons smuggling. In accordance with the principle of local ownership, there is tremendous value in having these efforts delivered by security organizations within the region (often with the support of international donors). Nascent efforts in the region also suggest that, in place of some of the pillar countries Harrison identifies, there might be other countries, like Morocco and Jordan, better

> **"Other issues where wider and deeper cooperation would be useful include efforts to counter the growing threat of al-Qaeda and ISIS."**

suited to initiating such efforts and, given the political complexities of the region, to securing the participation of some of the internal security organizations from pillar countries, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and other important regional states like Algeria. Such efforts also have the benefit of strengthening the capacity of the host organization. In the near- and mid-term, these efforts would likely require funding and support from the United States, its allies, and international organizations like the United Nations.

Recommendation 5:

Explicitly design and deliver regional capacity building activities for operational forces that enhance both their effectiveness and accountability.

The United States and its allies are engaged throughout the region to build the capacity of key partner security forces and institutions. With some important exceptions, the majority of this engagement is bilateral and much of it is focused on enhancing the operational effectiveness of forces, often through the provision of equipment and the training to go with it. Accountability is often viewed as a by-product of

> "The reform and modernization of security force academies is one of the most promising entry points for S.S.R."

force professionalization. Recommendation 5 suggests elevating accountability to an explicit goal of security force training and embedding it in all aspects of operational training. Doing so in a regional context can usefully highlight the progress of national forces that have further advanced the agenda of professionalizing their units and can also serve as another avenue through which to identify the regional "change agents" in Recommendation 3.

Recommendation 6:

Promote the reform and modernization of security force academy curricula through regional workshops on academic management, curricular content, and pedagogy.

Recommendation 6 focuses on another entry point, one that is more likely to be embraced by more risk averse regional governments. The reform and modernization of security force academies is a long-term and costly initiative, which many in the region have deferred in order to address more immediate security threats and challenges. But it is one of the most promising entry points for S.S.R. due to its potential to shape the next generation of security officers region-wide.

Because the institutional and capacity gaps are so urgent, there will likely be interest on the part of the leadership of these academies to engage in workshops that address how to manage security force academies (human capital, assessment of student learning, strategic planning), improve content (modules and courses, teaching materials, classroom technologies), and adapt/adopt new pedagogical tools (instructional methods).

> "Newly elected parliamentarians are struggling to fulfill their new roles, often with little real experience and few institutional resources to support their vital oversight functions."

Doing so in a regional context provides MENA governments that have made strides in academy reforms, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Algeria, and Jordan, with the opportunity to share their achievements and provides resource-constrained governments in the region with valuable tools and curricular content.

Recommendation 7:

Foster the sharing of best practices among parliamentarians for oversight and accountability practices in the internal security sector.

Recommendation 7 highlights another area where regional cooperation can prove beneficial and where engagement at the regional level is more likely to be welcomed. This is particularly true for the region's transitioning states, where newly elected parliamentarians are struggling to fulfill their new roles, often with little real experience and few institutional resources to support their vital oversight functions. Here, regional cooperation is likely best approached through general skill-building activities focused on specific parliamentary oversight processes (how to review a ministerial budget, how to review procurement processes, how to incorporate expert testimony, how to manage a parliamentary inquiry) and through activities that build relationships among parliamentarians (both within and across countries).

RECOMMENDATION 8:

Under the auspices of international centers of excellence for S.S.R. and with regional S.S.R. experts, develop a Blueprint for S.S.R. in the MENA Region with specific guidance for how to implement and sequence S.S.R. activities in the transitioning and post-authoritarian context.[35]

Recommendation 8 seeks to address a critical gap in knowledge about how to strengthen, reform or otherwise improve the delivery of internal security in the region. Much has been written about the challenges and roadblocks to S.S.R. in the region, but little comprehensive guidance exists for how to implement such efforts in the challenging context of transitioning and post-authoritarian states. Developing such a blueprint—essentially a "Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Handbook for the MENA region" would help address this critical gap. The regional S.S.R. network can also serve as a useful venue for identifying and including regional experts and for disseminating the guidance.

These recommendations do not address the full range of internal security challenges across the region simply because many of these challenges can only be dealt with through national efforts. These recommendations are meant to provide entry points for building a wider regional consensus about the need for improving the delivery of security, meeting the security needs of citizens across the region, and disseminating best practices for how to do so. Given the broader political constraints across the region and the inherent challenges of cooperating in the internal security dimension,

> "Of all the potential spheres in which regional cooperation can be promoted in the MENA region, the internal security dimension is likely to be the last to deliver meaningful results."

these recommendations center on building the human capital necessary to achieve the long-term goal of a more stable and prosperous Middle East.

Of all the potential spheres in which regional cooperation can be promoted in the MENA region, the internal security dimension is likely to be the last to deliver meaningful results, and success in doing so will most likely hinge on

the successful implementation of regional cooperation in the political, defense, and economic sectors. Indeed, greater cooperation in these other spheres may well be prerequisite for wider and deeper cooperation in the internal security dimension. However, as the development experts who first proposed the S.S.R. approach discovered, meaningful and sustainable development is not possible without security. They are inextricably linked. Economies cannot flourish if ordinary citizens cannot safely conduct business or transport their goods between cities. Investment will flounder if impunity persists. Repression cannot overcome regional governments' legitimacy deficits. Stability—not just across the region, but within each society—is essential for the broader advancement of the Middle East and North Africa. And stability cannot be achieved if the dysfunctions of the internal security dimension are not addressed. Although the goal is an ambitious one, the better provision of internal security across the region is a foundational building block for the broader advancement of the region and the achievement of stability and prosperity for the next generation.

Endnotes

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