The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing titled 'Will the Israel-Hamas Truce Be Extended?' on Wednesday, November 29, 2023, featuring former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and MEI Distinguished Senior Fellow Amb. Gerald Feierstein as well as MEI Vice President of Policy Brian Katulis. The briefing delved into the evolving dynamics arising from the temporary pause in fighting between Israel and Hamas, along with the potential for an extended truce and the release of more hostages and prisoners.
Speakers
Gerald Feierstein
Distinguished Senior Fellow, MEI
Brian Katulis
Vice President of Policy
Rachel Dooley (Moderator)
Deputy Director of Communications
Transcript
The following transcript was automatically generated and may contain errors.
00:00:00:00 - 00:00:32:07
Rachel Dooley
All right. Welcome, everyone. I'm Rachel Dooley. I'm the deputy director of communications at the Middle East Institute. Thanks for joining us today for our on the record briefing on the evolving dynamics from this pause in fighting. I'm joined by my two distinguished colleagues at MEI, Ambassador Gerald Feierstein, a former principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and MEI senior fellow on U.S. diplomacy, as well as Brian Katulis, MEI’s vice president of policy.
00:00:32:09 - 00:01:02:18
Rachel Dooley
They'll both discuss the new considerations from the cease fire, including the tough decisions facing Israel between expanding the pause until all the hostages are freed and achieving its military objectives, and whether this pause gives Hamas the time to regroup. They'll also offer insight into negotiations to extend the cease fire, which is set to expire tomorrow morning, as well as CIA Director William Burns trip to Doha for a new series of talks with Mossad and others in order to secure the release of more hostages.
00:01:02:20 - 00:01:26:00
Rachel Dooley
When we get to the Q&A portion, you can use the raise hand function on your screen to ask a question. And if you're called on, we will unmute you and you can introduce yourself and direct your question to one of our panelists. I'll go over all of this again later, but for now, let's get right into it. I'm going to turn right to Ambassador Feierstein first. Jerry, where do you see things as they stand now, both in the short term and the long term?
00:01:26:02 - 00:02:10:04
Gerald Feierstein
Thanks, Rachel, and thanks for everybody who's on the call for for joining us this morning. And I think, Rachel, that that is exactly the the framework that we should be thinking about this problem right now that that the Biden administration, along with the Israelis, the Palestinians and the intermediaries, Qatar and Egypt, are all trying to work through some of the short term challenges that are either already on the ground or potentially going to be facing us in the near future as Israel possibly returns to the the fighting.
00:02:10:06 - 00:02:43:06
Gerald Feierstein
And so and so we know that Tony Blinken is traveling from Brussels, will be in Jerusalem later this week as well as in Ramallah. Bill Burns is, as Rachel mentioned, is is already in Doha, meeting with the Qataris who are certainly passing messages from us to Hamas to try to figure out where we're going to go. And there are three separate issues that are on the table.
00:02:43:06 - 00:03:47:03
Gerald Feierstein
One, of course, is trying to define if if it's possible to extend the truce, what the terms might be. Would there be something that would be more permanent or at least longer term, that would allow for more hostages to be released, that would also provide greater respite and a greater opportunity to get sufficient humanitarian supplies into the Palestinian population that's primarily in southern Gaza right now? And and if not, then what might be the parameters of a return to the fighting, particularly as the Israelis continue to say that they're thinking about thinking about going into southern Gaza, remembering that their initial position right after October 7th was to encourage Palestinians to move from northern Gaza to southern Gaza, because that would be a safe haven.
00:03:47:05 - 00:04:26:15
Gerald Feierstein
Now, of course, they're talking about expanding the conflict. There are approximately one and a half or more million Palestinians, displaced persons, primarily in the south. And so the administration is desperate to try to ensure that we don't see another huge number of Palestinian innocent women and children and other casualties as a result of these expanded military operations, recognizing the impact not only in the region, but more broadly internationally on the U.S., on U.S. foreign policy objectives, as well as humanitarian considerations.
00:04:26:17 - 00:05:18:21
Gerald Feierstein
So all of those things are on the are on the table right now. They're all being negotiated. The Israelis have their requirements. Hamas has its requirements and the ability of the intermediaries to find some common ground that allows us to go forward is is in question. But then beyond that, I think, you know, one of the one of the key issues, if not the key issue, is how do you move from from this moment of conflict, this, you know, this period that we're in right now to keep the door open to some kind of a of a political process that hopefully can move us away from this cycle of violence that we've been in and
00:05:18:21 - 00:05:48:19
Gerald Feierstein
get back towards the opportunity, the possibility of finding a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And so the other part of Tony Blinken's travels will take him to Ramallah, where he presumably will be having that kind of a conversation with Abu Mazen and with the other Palestinian Authority leadership to try to figure out how to move forward with a with a political process.
00:05:48:21 - 00:06:23:05
Gerald Feierstein
We know that there has been some discussion that the Palestinian Authority, perhaps might be the vehicle that can re retake responsibility in Gaza for security, for governance. This is something that they lost over 15 years ago or about 15 years ago. And whether they can reestablish their legitimacy and their credibility among Palestinians in Gaza as a ruling authority, what that would require.
00:06:23:11 - 00:07:07:00
Gerald Feierstein
And we also know from the comments of Mohammed Shtaya and other Palestinians that they won't accept this responsibility in the absence of some commitment from the from the Israelis that they will then move on to something that as, again, a return to a negotiation, a return to some kind of a political process. And that, of course, would require not only addressing the Gaza issue, but also talking about the West Bank and returning to the possibility of a two state solution or something similar that would leave Palestinians under one unified governing structure.
00:07:07:02 - 00:08:02:09
Gerald Feierstein
The I think we've all recognized we've all commented on the reality that that, you know, one of the big obstacles to getting to that situation will be the the lack of credible leadership both in Jerusalem and in Ramallah. Big question about whether Bibi Netanyahu's government can survive this crisis and also a recognition that for many, if not most Palestinians, the Palestinian Authority has long since lost its credibility and that that we need to move on beyond Abu Mazen to find new and perhaps younger leadership, next generation that has never really been given an opportunity to to provide leadership or governance in the Palestinian territories.
00:08:02:09 - 00:08:24:10
Gerald Feierstein
So that I think those are the key questions. I think that that's the dilemma that the Biden administration is trying to work through right now and working with our partners, and also, of course, with a very difficult situation between Israel and Hamas. So let me stop there and hand over to Brian for his comments.
00:08:24:12 - 00:08:44:02
Brian Katulis
Great. Thanks. Thanks, Jerry. And I'll be brief and I'll cover three topics. One is these cease fire talks. Second, to some comments about the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, which I don't think is getting enough attention. And third, maybe just a few comments to build on what Jerry said on the longer term. Where does this all end?
00:08:44:02 - 00:09:04:21
Brian Katulis
Which is, I think, a central question that no one is answering or answering clearly. First, on the cease fire talks, I was just got off the phone with some people who are involved with this and have been in regular touch. It's hard to tell what's exactly going on, but it seems we'll have some more news of a two day extension.
00:09:04:23 - 00:09:34:24
Brian Katulis
That seems quite likely. I think they were driving for a four day extension. I know there's some discussion about a long term cease fire. It's my own assessment based on briefings I've received from the Israel Defense Forces and my understanding of where some of the factions of Hamas are is that the possibility of a long term cease fire seems about as likely as the goal that the Biden administration had for a longer and stronger JCPOA, which which means not very likely.
00:09:34:24 - 00:10:13:04
Brian Katulis
Right. If anyone remembers that and I don't I don't think that's because there aren't parties who who would like to see that. It's just that there are a number of countervailing forces pushing against a cease fire, including, first and foremost foremost the Israeli government and and many in the Israeli security establishment. If you saw Prime Minister Netanyahu's statements over the last few days, including during his visit to the troops, that we're going to continue to the end, they've set a goal for eliminating Hamas, which U.S. policy still backs
00:10:13:06 - 00:10:36:12
Brian Katulis
According to their own metrics - this is Israeli metrics - there were 30,000 Hamas fighters. They claimed to have killed more than 5000 since October 7th. But it seems like the plans are afoot for Israel to continue its campaign in the south and go south. And that presents a lot of complications. We can probably get into.
00:10:36:12 - 00:11:07:21
Brian Katulis
The hostage negotiations. They started with women and children. They're moving to some more elderly. And I think the toughest ones will be the Americans and then the Israel Defense Forces members. And that that could go on for some some time. A big question mark if Israel initiates its military campaign, what that does to those efforts to they're not quite halfway there out of the 240 or so that are left.
00:11:07:23 - 00:11:40:18
Brian Katulis
And there's still unconfirmed reports about how many of those who remain are actually alive or not. So the cease fire talks, I think we'll probably continue in my assessment for the next few days. People will try to extend it. But the structure of things makes it seem unlikely. The discussion that you see China raising today at the UN for a long term ceasefire seems a bit disconnected from the reality of the stated positions of the combatants, Hamas and Israel.
00:11:40:20 - 00:12:07:06
Brian Katulis
And and hopefully, you know, I hope that there's not mass casualties, but it seems like if I were to guess, combat could begin again quite soon after another couple of extensions. Second point on the Palestinian Authority. I talked to some friends. I used to live out in Ramallah. Jerry served out there around the same time many moons ago. I've been in touch with a lot of folks.
00:12:07:08 - 00:12:44:14
Brian Katulis
My understanding is that the United States has and the P.A. has begun a discussion about what might be possible in terms of sort of how does this all end and what might be the arrangements in Gaza. It's still unclear because there are big challenges with the PA’s capacity and also because of the will in the arrangements. If it's if some sort of short term arrangement is attempted here about the PA’s role, it will likely fail because I think there's an understanding among many Palestinians that there needs to be a broader long term plan.
00:12:44:20 - 00:13:12:03
Brian Katulis
And my take said this before is that the Biden administration really deprioritized the U.S. relationship with the Palestinians, even though it certainly tried to correct for the mistakes in the Trump administration. But we're still trying to build back those relationships. The bigger challenge and we still have ongoing programs, including the US security support to the Palestinian security services in the West Bank.
00:13:12:03 - 00:13:45:11
Brian Katulis
But as we see in Jenin and other places, the fragility of those institutions in the West Bank alone is is quite worrisome. And then you also see dynamics where the level of attacks and deaths in the West Bank against Palestinians is quite high. I mean, with the prisoner releases from the West Bank that are part of these hostage negotiations, it's interesting to keep track of how many more Palestinians have been arrested since October 7th because of concerns about Hamas's presence there and a broader security crackdown.
00:13:45:13 - 00:14:13:24
Brian Katulis
Last point on on the longer term. I was in some briefings recently with Israeli Defense Forces delegation and and people in town, and some had briefed senators. I have to say there's I think a lot of concern about the long term. Jerry mentioned this, but what's the bridge to the long term when it comes to Gaza? It's quite unclear what the plan is right now.
00:14:13:24 - 00:14:42:01
Brian Katulis
So assume that a cease fire is extended, but then that some more combat continues from from Israel to try to eradicate the military threat that Hamas poses. It's not clear the answers to questions that Israeli officials publicly and privately provide about phase four or what comes next is is really unclear and quite worrisome. And it's I would say, the same for U.S. policymakers as well.
00:14:42:03 - 00:15:04:00
Brian Katulis
You've seen a range of options discussed like an international force, a regional force. It all seems mythical to me because it's all obviously dependent on what happens in now and then in the coming days. It's hard it's hard to sort of plan for the day after when when the parties don't agree on sort of the terms of the day of.
00:15:04:02 - 00:15:26:22
Brian Katulis
And there's no clarity about how this connects to, you know, the re-stated goal of a two state solution and things like this. And I think the thing I'd close with here is that the real sort of tricky part is the handoff from whenever Israel finishes operations at some point. And it's anyone's guess. It could be a matter of weeks, months.
00:15:26:22 - 00:15:56:04
Brian Katulis
It could go even longer if if you infer from the briefings that Israel gives to some folks that this could go well into 2024. But the main point here is that there's a very big gauzy notion of who actually then would be responsible for internal security. Some have raised the point that Israel may be inadvertently setting himself itself up in its stated goals of actually producing a scenario that's not unlike Somalia.
00:15:56:04 - 00:16:24:00
Brian Katulis
Or another comparison is al-Hol detainee camp for ISIS in Syria, where in essence, if there's no plan for actually policing, there's no viable force. The PA is not ready, willing or able to do it. Regional actors aren't. You could see a situation unfold when Hamas military leaders are eliminated, but then a next generation rises up in Gaza.
00:16:24:00 - 00:16:38:16
Brian Katulis
If Israel's goal is simply to defeat the current leadership and then try to isolate the threat. But then it's a threat that then can grow over time. So I'll close there. Rachel, Happy to take any questions you have.
00:16:38:18 - 00:17:03:00
Rachel Dooley
All right. Thanks, Brian. As you said at this point, we'll welcome questions from any participants. You can go ahead and use the raise hand function on your screen when I call on you we’ll unmute you and then you can go ahead and introduce yourself and your organization. And it would be great if you could direct your question to one of the panelists, and I'll start out with a question that was sent to me from Ian Marlow at Bloomberg.
00:17:03:02 - 00:17:25:20
Rachel Dooley
“Assuming the newer policy, the newer U.S. policy of trying to extend a humanitarian truce that's getting hostages out and aid in, is this purely transactional for the U.S. in terms of extricating hostages and getting aid in while understanding that Israel will continue to go in with operations that might lead to many more casualties?”
00:17:25:22 - 00:17:29:17
Rachel Dooley
Brian, I'll go to you first and Jerry, if you want to chime in after that.
00:17:29:19 - 00:17:54:10
Brian Katulis
It seems to me that it's a short term transactional policy because I don't get much clarity from the White House beyond sort of the broader platitudes of restating a two state solution and general principles of what their actual medium to long term action plan is. And given that, look, the Biden team, I think, has set out several goals, some of which are in tension with each other.
00:17:54:12 - 00:18:13:14
Brian Katulis
They want to back Israel's right of self-defense and has backed its goal of eliminating Hamas. At the same time, they want to avoid a regional war. At the same time, we want to get hostages out. At the same time they want to provide humanitarian aid. And then lastly, they want to set some sort of framework with Arab states and others for what the long term looks like.
00:18:13:18 - 00:18:38:19
Brian Katulis
And there's some tensions between all of that. And I think in the short run, there's, you know, beyond sort of trying to advise Israel if the next phase of a military campaign is upon us pretty soon, the White House's advice, the Pentagon's advice is to try to be more targeted and limited. I used to live in Gaza. Hard to imagine now with people who have been uprooted and now packed into southern Gaza, how that actually works out.
00:18:38:20 - 00:19:04:07
Brian Katulis
I'm not a military planner, but I don't I don't see sort of I see this more as short term transactional. And I think a key question in the hostage negotiation is how much value Israeli, American or American citizens who have dual nationality have been captured in the numbers or 7 to 10 remaining. How much Hamas what what's the negotiating price for them as well?
00:19:04:09 - 00:19:21:20
Brian Katulis
Because I think President Biden has stated sort of, you know, high priority to get these people home, as he should. But the question is then, if Israel then initiates next week or the week after a new military campaign, what happens to those people if they're still alive?
00:19:24:08 - 00:19:49:02
Gerald Feierstein
Yeah, I agree with with that. The point that I think that the administration is in crisis management mode, they are basically trying to get, you know, from from one day to the next that we know that there is tension within the administration, different ideas about what to do, how to go forward with this, not to introduce domestic politics into it.
00:19:49:02 - 00:20:12:15
Gerald Feierstein
But I think one of the one of the things that will be very much on the president's mind and on the administration's mind is they don't want this issue to drag on into the election year. They do want to see it end, recognizing that that there is a great deal of debate within his base about about all of these issues.
00:20:12:17 - 00:20:52:04
Gerald Feierstein
And they would like all of this to be well behind them before people start voting. So so I think that that also introduces another calendar element that we all need to keep in mind as we go forward. But but I absolutely agree that, you know, that recognizing that there is no clear understanding or idea either within the administration or between the administration and the government of Israel, they are simply trying to manage the problem, get the American hostages out and and then figure out what to do next.
00:20:52:06 - 00:21:11:05
Rachel Dooley
Great. Thank you both. I should I should make a note. If you have a question, you have your hand raised. Feel free to leave it raised if I don't get to you first. That's very helpful for me. Anne Paterson, former State Department, I see your hand is up. Go ahead.
00:21:11:07 - 00:21:15:14
Anne Patterson
No, I'm sorry. I put it up by accident.
00:21:15:16 - 00:21:43:15
Rachel Dooley
No problem. Well, then, to that end, I have a second question sent in from Ian, who can't be with us today from Bloomberg: “For the U.S. and for Israel, is there a risk that a truce extended multiple times moves closer to the cease fire that Washington has been trying to avoid? And is that what many people hope will come of this?” Maybe, Jerry, to you first, but I think you probably both have thoughts.
00:21:43:17 - 00:22:22:08
Gerald Feierstein
Thanks, Rachel. And thanks, Ian. I mean, I must say that that the longer the truce goes on, the harder it becomes to to justify returning to the conflict. And I think that that is exactly the conversation that Bill Burns is having in Doha right now, which is if you're going to extend the truce and Brian made reference to two days, four days, perhaps longer than that, what what additional measures are you going to request that would justify putting putting off the the return to the conflict?
00:22:22:08 - 00:23:11:11
Gerald Feierstein
And I think that that's going to be the hard part for both Hamas and the Israelis. What is acceptable? What does Bibi Netanyahu need to achieve in order to declare victory, accepting that the idea of eliminating Hamas is probably beyond reach? It probably was always beyond reach. So what does he actually need? What's his bottom line. And what can Hamas offer that that would allow them to survive in some format, but presumably not in a position of authority within Gaza, something that would give the the Israelis the level of security that they want, that this October 7th incident won’t be repeated.
00:23:11:13 - 00:23:31:02
Gerald Feierstein
So so that's the question. But but yes, inevitably, if you keep extending a truce over and over and over again, we've had a truce in Korea since 1954, then eventually it becomes more or less permanent.
00:23:31:04 - 00:24:07:05
Brian Katulis
Yeah. Maybe add to that is that Netanyahu's current government, he's facing pressure already today from Ben-gvir and Smotrich and other voices not to extend the cease fire. That's why it's one of the reasons why I think it's unlikely that we'll see this longer term cease fire, the political dynamics in his own coalition. It's hard to imagine this current government in Israel, the one that was put together after the the attack, standing if if some additional sort of military action is not taken.
00:24:07:07 - 00:24:35:05
Brian Katulis
And that's no value judgment on it, I'm just trying to assess sort of the reality of Israel's internal politics. I think the polls are off the charts in terms of the support for the military actions. Now, there is the countervailing force, military actions amongst Israelis against Hamas, that there's the countervailing pressure of the families and of hostages who some of whom don't don't want to see some of the military action to proceed.
00:24:35:05 - 00:24:59:20
Brian Katulis
So that's the tough, I think, question here. I mean, to me sort of the longer term questions of what Hamas's role might be. I mean, that's it's it's a bit academic and long term and seems unlikely. But I noted in some of my discussions with friends in Ramallah that there have been in recent days discussions about Hamas's possible inclusion in the PLO again.
00:24:59:20 - 00:25:37:06
Brian Katulis
And the discussions are not going anywhere. There aren't any contacts. And it was just basically amongst the PLO agreed upon that the condition that Hamas would need to agree to all signed agreements between Israel and the PLO and including a two state solution. That's a condition longer term from the Palestinian Authority itself on Hamas. And these Palestinian Authority officials essentially say, look, Hamas is certainly not abiding by that and wouldn't agree to those conditions and doesn't recognize the two state solution right now.
00:25:37:06 - 00:26:00:17
Brian Katulis
So given those realities, I deem it unlikely that we're going to see the end of this conflict, that I think this is maybe a temporary pause. It's not what I would hope to see, but I think it's just the political calculations of the two main combatants, Israel and Hamas, don't seem to align towards a sustainable long term cease fire agreement.
00:26:00:19 - 00:26:07:20
Rachel Dooley
Thanks, Brian. Thanks, Jerry. Nahal Toosi, Politico. I see your hand up.
00:26:07:22 - 00:26:31:04
Nahal Toosi (Politico)
Hi, guys. Hope you're doing well. I think this is probably best directed at Jerry. But Brian, if you want to weigh in, that'd be great. I was really struck by the fact that the president has has ordered a potential sanctions and potential visa bans on Israeli settlers in the West Bank to be drawn up.
00:26:31:06 - 00:26:59:02
Nahal Toosi (Politico)
This is just a threat, from what I can tell, I don't know if they have any names or anything. I mean, it's it's questionable to me, but I was really struck by it because I don't think I can recall this administration taking any other steps to hold Israel accountable on anything like in the past three years. I mean, I just like I was kind of shocked that they even took this step.
00:26:59:04 - 00:27:23:18
Nahal Toosi (Politico)
And so I was curious, you know, like from your conversations, how serious are they about actually imposing costs on some of these extremist settlers who have been attacking Palestinians, but also, like, what does it mean about broader accountability? And just to be clear, like they have been imposing sanctions on Hamas. I mean, they've been going after the other side.
00:27:23:18 - 00:27:42:07
Nahal Toosi (Politico)
But this idea of Israeli war crimes, potential war crimes, these things, they have been coming up and there's you get these ridiculous answers from like Jake Sullivan and others who, like, won't say they're like, “Well, that's a legal question and we're not going to talk about that.” And it's like, well, actually, ultimately, as you guys well know, the lawyers can say whatever they want.
00:27:42:07 - 00:28:12:04
Nahal Toosi (Politico)
The politicians are the ones who make to make the call and sign off and delay and whatever. So, I mean, anyway, it's a long way of asking like, you know, do you see any possibility of the U.S. doing doing anything to to really make sure that Israel is also held accountable for any alleged atrocities or war crimes or whatever? And I know it's a very sensitive question, and I'm kind of scared even asking it. But let me know you think.
00:28:12:06 - 00:28:51:01
Gerald Feierstein
Well, you know, there are two separate questions. Of course, the whole I mean, one one is, you know, potential fingering of individuals, extremists in the West Bank who are responsible for attacks on Palestinians versus the other one. Presumably what you mean is the IDF and whether whether the administration would would consider, for example, invoking the Leheigh Act or other kinds of of legal measures if if individual units of the IDF are considered to have been responsible for war crimes.
00:28:51:03 - 00:29:21:24
Gerald Feierstein
And that that I think neither this administration nor any other administration would would touch. And it's going to be the same kind of debate that we've had for a long time about Saudi Arabia and Yemen, which is it's very difficult to identify what a war crime is. Sometimes, you know, you look at it on a very superficial level and say, well, they hit a mosque or they hit a they hit a hospital or a school, and that must be a war crime.
00:29:21:24 - 00:30:00:19
Gerald Feierstein
Well, not necessarily. And it depends on the context. And all of that is, you know, is the result of an investigation. And and nothing would be decided in the heat of the moment. That would be something that would come well afterwards as a result of whatever investigation is done. In terms of the individual settlers, though, I think that probably there are individuals who are known to the embassy in Jerusalem as being very much involved in these kinds of of violent acts against Palestinians in the West Bank.
00:30:00:21 - 00:30:24:01
Gerald Feierstein
Many of them have been known to the embassy or what used to be the consulate general for many, many years. And I think that it would certainly be possible to identify them and to sanction them. What that would mean other than, you know, their inability to travel to the U.S., if any of them are in fact, people who who do travel to the U.S. in any event.
00:30:24:01 - 00:30:47:02
Gerald Feierstein
But but I would say that that it would certainly be something. We did, as you remember, ban Meyer Kahana from coming to the United States, I think we even I think he was a U.S. citizen and we stripped him of his citizenship over his anti Palestinian activities. So it's been done in the past and I wouldn't rule it out again.
00:30:47:02 - 00:31:21:24
Gerald Feierstein
And I think that it would be a way for the administration to show that, in fact, they this is not simply an anti-Palestinian or Islamophobic kind of initiative, but it is evenhanded. And we do call call out violence and extremism wherever it occurs. I think politically it would be something that the Biden administration might use to demonstrate, particularly to the Arab audience, that we are trying to be more or less evenhanded here.
00:31:22:01 - 00:31:41:05
Brian Katulis
Yeah. So I would just add to what Jerry said on that last bit. It's not just about the diplomacy or the optics. There's a very practical reason why I think they might consider it. It's it's almost the least that they can do to to help preserve the modicum of stability in parts of the West Bank. Again, you can go through the numbers.
00:31:41:05 - 00:32:23:19
Brian Katulis
Our our colleague Khaled Elgindy who runs our Palestine program had a program on this right before Thanksgiving, just the rising instability in the West Bank. And it's something that I know personally concerns not just people who live in the West Bank or U.S. policymakers, but next door in Jordan, there's extreme concern about where all those trends are going. So now I actually think this is one case where and I'll add to it, as I know that some in the administration have been studying options even before October 7th, as I understand, because there was concerns about the rise in extremist violence coming from from Israelis living in the West Bank before October seven.
00:32:23:19 - 00:32:46:04
Brian Katulis
So people have been looking at different options here. Ultimately, though, as you your own question noted, it's not a legal question. It's a political question. And we've got a new ambassador out there, Jack Lew. We've got a team that, to be generous, I think has been extremely cautious in terms of how it plays the politics on on questions like this, as you note, are sensitive.
00:32:46:06 - 00:33:22:00
Brian Katulis
But certainly I think there's just my main point would be that there's a practical, pragmatic that not only the optics of politics here back home, but in the region, but also there have been just multiple actions that have upset the stability, which is quite fragile in parts of the West Bank. And if the U.S. policy can actually impose a cost on that and send a message, I think that would be a worthwhile thing to do. Will they do it? It comes up to the how they manage the politics and the optics of this here at home.
00:33:22:02 - 00:33:29:08
Rachel Dooley
Great. Thank you both. Dan, I see you have your hand raised. Please go ahead, introduce yourself and then ask your question.
00:33:29:10 - 00:34:12:11
Dan diBartolomeo (Northfield)
Yeah. Dan diBartolomeo, Northfield. I have a pretty simple question. The initial Hamas attack was unusual in its focus on civilians rather than military targets. That's not the way military actions normally occur. What is the U.S.’s, the administration's, rationale or understanding as to why Hamas chose to put such a focus on attacking civilians as opposed to attacking any sort of military target?
00:34:12:12 - 00:34:37:17
Dan diBartolomeo (Northfield)
Was that a matter of convenience or is was there some more specific rationale in terms of trying to get more attention or what. Why focus on attacking civilians as opposed to what military actions are normally focused on, which is other militaries?
00:34:37:19 - 00:35:04:14
Brian Katulis
Well, I'll start, Dan, I think part of it was it wasn't an either/or in this attack. If you look at the planning and the training and a lot of this has come out in the open source and the fact that this threat targeted both civilians as well as infiltrated military camps, IDF camps, and as the toughest part, I think, the hostage negotiations.
00:35:04:16 - 00:35:27:08
Brian Katulis
If if these people are still alive, will be those who were acting serving members in the IDF. And that was a huge intelligence and military failure for which I think the Israeli government at the time will pay a big political cost. Look, my own take on this and this sort of gets into a very sensitive and I think emotional issues.
00:35:27:08 - 00:35:59:22
Brian Katulis
But I think there were certain parts of the terrorist groups in in Gaza and certain factions that simply saw utility and in the shock value of going after civilians and including innocent children. And, you know, it has propaganda value, perversely, in my view, that it gets attention for them. And every day that these negotiations about extending the cease fire go on,
00:35:59:24 - 00:36:20:09
Brian Katulis
It's sort of a form of psychological warfare on the Israeli public, Some many of whom it's a small society, have some either direct connection or one step or two step removed from people who are still held. So I think this is not unlike what we've seen from other terror groups. And that's where those who, you know, want to say,
00:36:20:09 - 00:36:47:22
Brian Katulis
Okay. Well, Hamas and these groups, if we should just treat them as political actors, they should look carefully at the tactics that they've used here. As your question notes and the in addition to the military facilities they targeted, they went after kibbutzes. And if you know some of the people I know, I have some dear friends who are one who survived this attack, the nature of sort of people who live there, they were very much, you know, many were peace activists.
00:36:47:23 - 00:37:13:07
Brian Katulis
So these these sorts of actions, I think, were intended to send a message to to people in in Gaza, to the Palestinian public at large. It was it was seen as trying to seize the narrative. I think Jerry mentioned that the Palestinian Authority's it looks like it lacks a lot of political legitimacy. And I was in the region right before Thanksgiving.
00:37:13:07 - 00:37:36:18
Brian Katulis
And what I heard from people from across the region was this worry that violent actors, part of Hamas and others, had seized the narrative once again in the way that ISIS did. And I don't like the comparison between Hamas and ISIS for for several reasons. But there's one similarity in that the shock value of what they've done here and how they've manipulated the media and the confusion that they
00:37:36:18 - 00:38:11:03
Brian Katulis
sew even in our own debate for policy and political debates here, I think are complicated by the propaganda wings of these terrorist movements. So, you know, there's no easy answer here. I find it very perverse. But they've they've basically these groups, Hamas and others have used innocent children and women and others from Israel, but then also from their own population as shields, as props, as tools to actually punch far above what their weight is in Palestinian society.
00:38:11:05 - 00:38:35:06
Gerald Feierstein
Yeah, I think that's right. The only thing I would add to Brian's comment is, you know, the fundamental flaw in your in your question is, you know, suggesting that Hamas is a military organization and therefore should be operating as a military organization, targeting military. They're not. They're not a military organization. They're a terrorist group. And they operated as a terrorist group.
00:38:35:06 - 00:38:54:07
Gerald Feierstein
They operated in the same way that we've seen, you know, in other in other instances. And we need to we need to keep that in mind as we consider, you know, what kind of of an organization they are.
00:38:54:09 - 00:39:18:06
Rachel Dooley
All right. Thank you both. Thanks for the question. I'm going to pose a question sent to me from Jay Solomon at Semafor. “U.S. and Arab officials both say in private that both Israel and the Palestinians will need new leadership when the war in Gaza ends, as we've discussed. Do you think Marwan Barghouti is a possible candidate for leading a Palestinian governing body?”
00:39:18:08 - 00:39:50:02
Gerald Feierstein
Yeah, I'll go. You know, the the basic issue with Marwan Barghouti is one, he's he's been in an Israeli prison for decades and and no indication that the Israelis intend to let him out. So so the idea that he would be in a position to to to take on a leadership role is is purely theoretical at this point without Israeli acquiescence.
00:39:50:02 - 00:40:16:18
Gerald Feierstein
And I doubt that there are very many Israelis, particularly in this government, who would see Marwan Barghouti as a potential potential Nelson Mandela figure. I don't think he is. I don't think they see him that way. And then the other thing is that because he has been in Israeli prisons all of these years, nobody actually knows what he thinks, where he stands, whether he has any credibility.
00:40:16:18 - 00:40:39:19
Gerald Feierstein
The vast majority of Palestinians would not have been alive the last time Marwan Barghouti was a free man. So, you know, whether he has any credibility in the eyes of this, you know, modern Palestinian population is a big question mark.
00:40:39:21 - 00:40:59:05
Rachel Dooley
All right. Thank you. And then another question sent in to me from Michelle Cumbo at NBC, very simply asked, “Does the ceasefire and ongoing negotiations give Hamas time to regroup? How much of that is a concern both to the public and U.S. administration as well?”
00:40:59:07 - 00:41:34:00
Brian Katulis
I think that's a concern. I I think it's interesting to look at what the damage assessments are on Hamas and its infrastructure beyond the numbers, because I mentioned these numbers. I've heard in briefings of upwards of 5000 Hamas killed, fighters killed out of 30,000. So there's a concern there. But there's also the countervailing point to that would be that there's a bit of disarray and a morale problem in certain pockets of the Gaza Strip.
00:41:34:02 - 00:42:12:22
Brian Katulis
All of this, again, the big question overhangs all of this that is not adequately answered by Israelis, by Americans, by Palestinians, by leaders in the region, is what then comes after all of this. You know, assume that the cease fire is extended and you still have 25,000 Hamas fighters in the assessment. Then what? Assume the other option, that a campaign continues in December and goes on for quite some time that eradicates half of the Hamas leadership, but then it changes political dynamics inside of Gaza.
00:42:12:24 - 00:42:33:15
Brian Katulis
So it's the right question here of whether they regroup. But it's not just Hamas. I would add to it, there's Islamic Jihad and then there are factions of Hamas. I think when the after actions are done in all of this, what we'll find is that you see that Hamas probably had splintered into different militant wings.
00:42:33:15 - 00:42:55:03
Brian Katulis
And there always was an armed wing. But but here's the key point, is that military action, war, like we've seen from Israel, has a devastating human and physical cost, but it also has a political impact and it has an impact on power dynamics. So I think the question is an interesting one. I think, yes, quite likely Hamas will use the time to regroup.
00:42:55:05 - 00:43:19:15
Brian Katulis
But the bigger question for me is then, what does this do to the nature of who actually has guns and weapons, who will be seen as the defenders of security and order inside of Gaza? And that's a question that no U.S. or or Israeli policymaker I’ve talked to in recent days has a clear answer to. And that's that's a big problem.
00:43:19:17 - 00:43:28:14
Rachel Dooley
Great. Thank you both. I'm going to go to Jared Szuba from Al-Monitor. Jared, go ahead.
00:43:28:16 - 00:44:17:01
Jared Szuba (Al-Monitor)
Hi, all. Thank you for doing this. I'd be curious as to your take as the latest signaling from the Biden administration. How should we read that as as to how long the administration thinks this campaign can and should go on? You know, on the one hand, administration officials are saying they're telling the press that the IDF is doing everything it can to preserve civilian life. And on the other hand, they're now more recently saying that, you know, a repeat of what was done in northern Gaza, in southern Gaza is not going to be acceptable. So wondering your what you guys see as some sort of red lines for the administration. What could cause this to have the administration, you know, not say pull the plug, but see this as enough is enough here.
00:44:17:03 - 00:44:56:10
Gerald Feierstein
Yeah, I would say and then and then, Brian, you will add for sure. I mean, you know, basically what I would say is that, you know, the big concern right now, assuming that that what we understand is the context of the current discussions between Washington and Jerusalem regarding the potential expansion of the conflict into southern Gaza. We know, you know, that that a large percentage of the Palestinian population is now squeezed into that very tiny area.
00:44:56:12 - 00:45:31:18
Gerald Feierstein
Huge amount of concern, as we understand from both public as well as what we understand in private conversations, that that we may be facing a situation if the Israelis unleash their full military capability in southern Gaza. You know, in this search for Hamas leaders or Hamas foot soldiers or whatever, that we may see additional thousands or maybe even tens of thousands of Palestinian casualties, especially women and children and others noncombatants.
00:45:31:20 - 00:46:18:22
Gerald Feierstein
And that would create an intolerable situation for the administration, both domestically here in the U.S., where there's already a strong push, particularly the Democratic Party, for a cease fire, as well as internationally, U.S. relations with our partners and internationally. It's already doing damage to U.S. foreign policy interests. And so if you see a big sharp increase in the number of Palestinian casualties, I think that that would be a moment where the Biden administration would have to come out more forcefully and say this needs to to be wrapped up.
00:46:18:24 - 00:46:47:14
Gerald Feierstein
So, again, I go back to that point. I think the part of the negotiation and if you look at you know, if you look at 1973, if you look at, you know, 1980s in Lebanon, you know, we always have this this dialog with Israel and it's always a give and take between between what, you know, Washington would like to see happen and what the Israelis think that they need to accomplish.
00:46:47:16 - 00:47:10:23
Gerald Feierstein
And and you always try to find some, you know, acceptable situation for both for both sides, you know, to go forward. And I think that that's where they are right now. The U.S. does not have the capability, regardless of what people think, the U.S. cannot get on the phone, Joe Biden cannot get on the phone and tell Benjamin Netanyahu to stop.
00:47:11:00 - 00:47:35:00
Gerald Feierstein
It just doesn't work that way. We can we can present concerns. We can try to to advise and direct as best we can. But at the end of the day, the Israelis are going to do what the Israelis are going to do. And we need to figure out how to make sure that it doesn't get out of control in ways that make the whole situation worse.
00:47:35:02 - 00:47:58:18
Gerald Feierstein
And the other the other issue and I think Brian mentioned this early on, and that is, you know, that one of the big concerns that the U.S. had at the beginning was the idea of expanding the conflict beyond Gaza. And if you get into a situation where, you know, right now Hezbollah has stayed out of it. Iran has stayed out of it.
00:47:58:20 - 00:48:29:23
Gerald Feierstein
The Houthis have done some symbolic stuff, but nothing that -- well, except for the ship seizure -- nothing that really has serious implications. But if you start seeing thousands more Palestinian casualties, that may increase the pressure on Hassan Nasrallah and on Tehran to do something more. And that, of course, is the last thing that this administration wants, is to get into a shooting war in the region.
00:48:30:00 - 00:48:48:17
Brian Katulis
Jared, thanks for joining. Great to hear your voice. Just three quick points to build on what Jerry said. First one obvious red line, which has been out there and I don't think will be a problem in an issue in reality, but the forcible displacement of Gazans from Gaza into Egypt has already been thrown out there as a red line.
00:48:48:17 - 00:49:12:09
Brian Katulis
And I'm glad because it's crazy to me, but it's part of the conversations you see certain members of this Israeli government implying this certain language that was used by some Israeli officials in this government calling this Nakhba 2023. Right. All of that is not it's a road to nowhere, right? It's a road to disaster. So I think that's one clear red line.
00:49:12:09 - 00:49:35:19
Brian Katulis
But the fact that people are talking about this notion of forcible displacement of millions of Palestinians as it's as if it's a policy option. Second, I think I mean, Jerry covered it, but one name we didn't mention in the briefing, we mentioned Bill Burns and Anthony Blinken. I think a key figure in this, a former colleague of Jerry's, David Satterfield, he's part of the key negotiations on humanitarian aid.
00:49:35:24 - 00:49:59:11
Brian Katulis
That sounds tactical and short term, but actually, I think it's important if if Israel continues its military campaign in the south, there are serious questions about what that next phase would look like, because there's already basic human security concerns: water, food, sewage in particular diseases, people and then health care. Right. And there's certain Band-Aids that have been put out there.
00:49:59:11 - 00:50:31:02
Brian Katulis
The Jordanian field hospital, the Emiratis have a field hospital. More aid going in is good, but it's not nearly enough for people who are packed into southern Gaza. So it's not a clear as clear of a point as highest numbers of civilian civilian casualties. But I think it relates is that I think the administration wants to ensure that if a military campaign continues, that it doesn't present even more human costs beyond those who died under rubble, those who then die more slowly because of the security costs.
00:50:31:03 - 00:50:55:09
Brian Katulis
Last point, Jared and Jerry sort of mentioned this, but I think I do think it's an interesting political point that certainly the Biden administration does not want to see this go well into 2024. My impression, though, is that the clocks aren't synchronized here between what the U.S. wants and what I infer from what Israelis are saying, both publicly and privately about the nature of this campaign.
00:50:55:11 - 00:51:17:05
Brian Katulis
My inference, again, that they don't state a or timeline, but when I look at what they say they want to do in a four phase plan, the IDF, my inference is this goes well into 2024 or 2025, which would be deeply problematic for a number of reasons. Imagine the DNC convention in Chicago and remember the one they had in 1968.
00:51:17:07 - 00:51:43:07
Brian Katulis
And that's just the politics of this. The real issue is then, where does this all lead to? So I do think that's another red line is that at a certain point there will be a tipping point where this has gone on far too long. We've seen this in previous instances of Hamas, Israel conflict in Gaza and Biden himself and others have stepped up in those previous instances in the Obama administration and tried to exercise leverage.
00:51:43:09 - 00:52:03:02
Brian Katulis
As Jerry said, there's no magic button here that you can tell the Israelis what to do. They're going to do what they do in reaction to security threats, as well as the political pressure they feel at home. But it's a very good question. Jared, nice to hear from again.
00:52:03:04 - 00:52:12:12
Rachel Dooley
All right. Thank you. And then we have two final questions. First, I'll go to Senator Norm Coleman and then Nahal, I'm coming to you next.
00:52:12:14 - 00:52:31:15
Sen. Norm Coleman
So we haven't heard much about Iran in this discussion. You know, Jerry, you talked about Hezbollah may feel compelled, Iran may feel compelled to act. I’d love your assessment of whether, you know, Iran is the one pulling the strings. Can they control what Hamas does? Can they control what Hezbollah does? Can they control what the Houthis do?
00:52:31:17 - 00:53:06:07
Sen. Norm Coleman
And then second, kind of tied into that, a report today about the Saudis working with the Iranians, with economic incentives for them to hold back their proxies. What's your read on that? And the last Iran related question is the president has certainly made it clear that he sees the timing of Hamas’s actions here tied to his efforts to work with the Saudis, you know, for some greater integration in the region. Is that dead as a result of this? Talk to me a little about the cause that Iran has to play as this thing plays out.
00:53:06:09 - 00:53:48:20
Gerald Feierstein
Yeah, You know, my my own sense, I mean, certainly I think people who who look most carefully at the whole issue of the Iran Hezbollah relationship look at them more as equal partners than as a as a, you know, a dominant, you know, subservient relationship. You know, I but, you know, I think that that generally speaking, what Iran knew about the Hamas plan in advance is a question a lot of people speculated about.
00:53:48:20 - 00:54:26:16
Gerald Feierstein
I haven't seen anybody who's come in one way or the other with, you know, clear, definitive evidence of of, you know, Iran's knowledge or lack of knowledge about about the Hamas plan. You know, with Hezbollah. I think that there obviously is a conversation between Hassan Nasrallah and the leadership in Tehran about what to do. But the Iranians so far and Hezbollah so far appear to have wanted to avoid getting drawn into this.
00:54:26:16 - 00:55:02:16
Gerald Feierstein
They don't want to pay the price of of actually engaging on this unless they have to and unless the pressure on them becomes so intense that that they really have no alternative except to come in in support of Hamas. So that's kind of where we are right now. But it could change. And again, my own concern and Brian is absolutely right, if there's a big effort on the part of the Israelis to push Gazans into Sinai, that would be a big problem.
00:55:02:16 - 00:55:39:01
Gerald Feierstein
If there's a big spike in casualties, that would be a big problem that may draw those guys in off the sidelines. The Saudis the Saudis, you know, the normalization agreement from from last year. You know, basically the Saudis have made a decision that their interest is in trying to reduce tensions in the region. I mean, that was the the policy that they were pursuing, obviously trying to resolve their engagement in Yemen, normalizing the relationship with Iran.
00:55:39:01 - 00:56:28:19
Gerald Feierstein
It's not a warm relationship, but I think that the Saudis recognize that Iran's greatest need is on economic issues and that they could they could help address those and that that would reduce the Iranian threat to regional stability. So they've done that. And frankly, their conversations with Israel fall into the same category that Mohammad bin Salman wants to be able to reduce Saudi Arabia's external engagements in order to focus on what he sees as the biggest threat to al-Saud leadership, Saudi Arabia, and that is the internal economic and demographic issues that the country is going to confront over these coming years.
00:56:28:21 - 00:56:59:21
Gerald Feierstein
And so and so, you know, when when the Saudis had their conference a few weeks ago that brought in everybody in the Arab and Islamic world, the Iranians were there. I think that the Saudis will do everything that they can to try to prevent this conflict from expanding in ways that threaten their own security interests, their own their own position in the region.
00:56:59:23 - 00:57:25:00
Brian Katulis
Maybe just very quickly, I think, Norm. Thanks for joining us, Senator. I don't know if you went to the conference that Jerry just mentioned, that the Saudis still held their investment conference as this war was going on. And that that, I think, demonstrates that the though they're concerned and deeply concerned about where this war is going, their main action plan is to transform their economy and their society, as Jerry just said.
00:57:25:00 - 00:58:04:10
Brian Katulis
On the question of Iran controlling these different groups, I would use the word influence. And Jerry knows the Houthis a lot better than I do, though I've met them in Oman and other places. These are quasi independent actors that get support and backing, but they they'll call their own shots. And I think the evidence I think I'm glad President Biden finally said something that I think I've thought for a long while is that any time you've seen steps forward in trying to promote peace and integration and things like this, you'll have retrograde, regressive actors who oppose the two state solution take action to undercut this.
00:58:04:11 - 00:58:27:07
Brian Katulis
We saw this in the in the 1990s when I lived out there. It continued into 2000. And first and foremost among them is the regime in Tehran. Right? People often try to disaggregate the Iran problem from this challenge of Israel-Arab. The nature of our discussion in D.C. often keep to treats them, treats them in terms of stovepipes.
00:58:27:09 - 00:58:50:02
Brian Katulis
And, you know, we put out a study, Jerry was part of this earlier this year, and I joke it was about the escalation. I joke now, sadly, it's a grim joke. But if only people had read our report, Jerry, about the de-escalation in the region. But what was most interesting about it to me and Jerry and I talked about this a lot in the report and the briefings on it is those two files, Iran, Israel-Arab.
00:58:50:04 - 00:59:15:22
Brian Katulis
There's very much interesting complexities in trying to deal with that at a strategic level these days. Many of the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, have been on a de-escalation track themselves with Iran. I'm certain that the Biden administration has used those those connections as a way to send signals to send back to Tehran to look, you know, do not escalate this further.
00:59:15:22 - 00:59:34:05
Brian Katulis
We don't want to see a regional war, and it's in the Saudi self interest, given that they want to build their own economy. Where this all adds up to, again, this question of where does this all end? Is is a question in that I don't think the Biden administration is yet fully discussed with some of our close Arab partners, including Saudi Arabia.
00:59:34:10 - 00:59:59:22
Brian Katulis
Yes, they've had the short term tactical discussions about how to manage the crisis. Yes, they've talked about the next few weeks or months, but how do they connect? What's going on right now in their response plan to the vision they had pre 10/7, those discussions on Israel-Saudi normalization, those discussions on the India-Middle East-Europe corridor, that's I think going to be a task if they get to some sort of sustainable cease fire in Gaza.
00:59:59:22 - 01:00:18:06
Brian Katulis
And it's a but it's one that I'm of the expectation that it won't likely come to fruition before the end of 2024. I wish it were sooner, but I think it takes a lot of diplomatic spadework in the region and political work here at home to to see that go forward.
01:00:18:08 - 01:00:25:21
Rachel Dooley
All right. Thanks, everyone. And not to keep us here too much longer, but I'll go to Nahal at Politico for one more question, then we'll wrap up.
01:00:25:23 - 01:00:42:21
Nahal Toosi (Politico)
Okay. Well, the senator stole my Iran question. So well-played, Senator. But I will ask you guys this. I've been using this, I've been hearing this phrase lately a lot, “political horizon.” And the administration was like, “The Palestinians need to have a political horizon.”
01:00:42:21 - 01:01:06:17
Nahal Toosi (Politico)
And other people are picking this up and I'm seeing it. And I don't know how old this is or if it's like an old talking point or I, I don't know. But I was just wondering, does that strike you guys as a smart talking point? Because a horizon is something you can never really actually reach. So why would we use the phrase political horizon? And if you were advising the State Department, would you tell them to keep using that phrase?
01:01:06:19 - 01:02:02:16
Gerald Feierstein
Well, Nahal, you know, an admission of guilt here. I use it myself. I mean, you know, with a simple meaning, your point is well taken that you never actually arrive. Tomorrow never comes, does it? But but, but the reality is that you know that when you say political horizon, it means that, you know, the people have something to look forward to optimistically, that it's something that, you know, that that gives them reason to believe that rather than continuing this cycle of violence that we've been in for so many years, that that there is some aspiration that they can achieve through political engagement. So that's all I mean, and the State Department doesn't ask me for my my views on their their jargon anymore. But I would say that it's still it's still correct.
01:02:02:18 - 01:02:21:00
Brian Katulis
Yeah. You know, I would say it's a it's a it's a good point on the horizon point that Jerry just noted as well. What I think when I look at this, I wouldn't parse the language so much. What I see is the weakness in US strategies. There actually isn't, and there hasn't been serious work to help Palestinians produce that.
01:02:21:02 - 01:02:49:05
Brian Katulis
And and that's a function of several administrations de-prioritizing the US Palestinian relationship. I think essentially since talks collapsed under Kerry Secretary Kerry in 2015, the US in a sense unilaterally disarmed itself in its engagement with Palestinians. Now, of course, as our colleague Khaled Elgindy says in his book, it was always thus that the US Palestinian relationship was treated as a subsidiary of the US Israel relationship.
01:02:49:07 - 01:03:06:01
Brian Katulis
My point, and I made this point in the talk in the run up, you know, before the war about all the talk about an Israel Saudi normalization deal. One weak link in that is, you know this, Nahal, is that the team that works on these issues at State and other places is not as thick as it used to be.
01:03:06:01 - 01:03:38:01
Brian Katulis
It's not as strong as it used to be back in the 1990s or pre second intifada. That and especially under the Trump administration, we unilaterally disarmed our ability to engage with partners in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. And, you know, there's all sorts of reasons for that. But now while you have this empty jargon of political horizon, it's sort of covering up the fact that successive administrations, including the first two and a half years of the Biden administration, didn't really prioritize this issue.
01:03:38:03 - 01:04:17:05
Brian Katulis
They didn't I mean, I have argued they didn't really prioritize the Middle East relative to China and Ukraine and other things, and started to in 2022. My point being this is that it's not just the closing of the consulate under Trump. It's been the steady progressive erosion of U.S. diplomatic engagement with Palestinians. And that engagement needs to be stepped up if people want to be serious about whatever you call it, a political horizon, a two state solution, whatever it is. The US needs to build coalitions here. And the last thing I'd say on this build coalitions at home to support more active U.S. engagement with Palestinians across the spectrum like we had in the 1990s during the Oslo period.
01:04:17:07 - 01:04:44:16
Brian Katulis
Last thing I'd say here is a bit of a political point, but a lot of those people who framed themselves as the most pro-Palestinian in our advocacy and political debates quite often aren't about building coalitions with others. They're about fracturing them and fragmenting and offering very useful criticisms of current policy. But it's it's not towards the end of, okay, how does this all end with producing a sustainable settlement between Israelis and Palestinians?
01:04:44:16 - 01:04:58:18
Brian Katulis
But political horizon or not? Like I think there needs to be at least some sense of hope for Palestinians, and that's something that's been sorely lacking for a decade plus.
01:04:58:20 - 01:05:15:18
Rachel Dooley
All right. Thanks, everyone. This seems like a good place to wrap it up. And if you have any additional questions, you can go ahead and email me at rdooley@mei.edu. I'll share it with the correct person and we can go from there. But thanks everyone for joining us for this on the record briefing.
01:05:15:20 - 01:05:29:04
Rachel Dooley
Our additional resources are on our website at www.mei.edu. And thanks to our two distinguished panelists, Ambassador Gerald Feierstein and Brian Katulis. It's been great having you and thank you everyone for spending part of your day with us.