Amid a long, hot summer, Israel finds itself in uncharted territory

It’s been a long, hot summer in Israel, not only because of the multiple heat waves, but also due to the domestic political developments that have been heating up throughout 2023 and are now reaching a boiling point. With the Supreme Court gearing up to make highly consequential decisions in September and the Knesset in recess until mid-October, it is a good time to look back at all that Israel has gone through since the beginning of the year. For some on the Israeli right, it is a midsummer night's dream come true, but for a large number of Israelis, it seems like more of a nightmare.

The context

Since Dec. 29, 2022, Israel has been governed by the most right-wing coalition in its history. Its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, remains on trial — ongoing since March 2020 — for multiple corruption charges. These two are interlinked. The composition and conduct of Netanyahu's current coalition is dictated to a large extent by his desire to avoid being sentenced or cancel his trial altogether.

In the previous coalitions he led, Netanyahu made an effort to include centrist parties and was generally successful in doing so. But such parties are no longer willing to join his government, due to the corruption charges he faces and the way he treated his previous centrist coalition partner, Benny Gantz, in 2020-21.

Now, Netanyahu prefers to partner with parties to his right, which support his aim of overhauling the judiciary. Some in his coalition have even more far-reaching aspirations than Netanyahu, who is most interested in three concrete legal changes that could steer the trial process in his favor. These are:

1. Ensuring he cannot be declared unfit for office by the attorney general (so he remains in power throughout the trial);

2. Cancelling the Supreme Court's ability to overrule government appointments and actions on the basis of “unreasonableness” (so he can fire the attorney general or redefine her authority); and

3. Changing the composition of the committee for the selection of judges to ensure government control of upcoming appointments (so he can be better positioned for a possible future appeal).

The legislation

Of the three changes Netanyahu is interested in, two have already been approved by the Knesset as bills, each in the final days of a Knesset session: The bill related to the "unfit for office" issue was passed in March 2023, while the bill related to the "reasonableness standard" was passed in July 2023.

It is not by chance that out of the entire judicial overhaul package initially introduced by Minister of Justice Yariv Levin in early January 2023, the only two bills that were actually passed were the ones vital for Netanyahu's trial. This underscores the fact that Netanyahu is in control of the legislative process and his coalition partners, even if it is often convenient for him to create the perception that he is held politically captive by them.

The Knesset is currently in recess until after the Jewish holidays in mid-October. Until then, there will be no new legislation, but once it reconvenes, Netanyahu's third priority — changing the composition of the committee for selecting judges — is set to come to the forefront, alongside a bill that will formally exempt ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) men from military service, which is an ultimatum by the two ultra-Orthodox parties in the coalition.

In the meantime, the Supreme Court is set to decide whether and how to intervene regarding the two laws that were already passed. This may be the first time in Israel's history that a Basic Law will be cancelled, and the decisive hearing in mid-September on the “reasonableness standard” bill will include all 15 Supreme Court judges, another first for the country. On the "unfit for office" bill, the Supreme Court will discuss in late September whether to postpone its implementation until after the next elections, to prevent it from being a personalized bill, designed to serve Netanyahu's needs.

Time and again, Netanyahu has refused to say that he will accept a Supreme Court ruling striking down the new legislation. Instead, his minsters are trying to delegitimize the court, saying it does not have a mandate to change Knesset decisions on Basic Laws — while the judges clearly claim the opposite — and publicly attacking the judges and their motivation. In early August, far-right Minister of Heritage Amichai Eliyahu said that should the Supreme Court strike down a Basic Law, this should not be respected and will indicate that the judges are "lawbreakers in suits."

All of this is creating the risk of an unprecedented constitutional crisis, where the Supreme Court makes a decision that the government will refuse to accept. This has led to much concern in Israel and speculation about worrying scenarios. When asked about this in a closed meeting, Mossad Chief David Barnea reportedly said that should a constitutional crisis unfold, he will be on "the right side of history."

In parallel to the judicial overhaul, the government is steadily advancing its ideological agenda in other areas as well. It is taking dramatic measures to increase its control over the media, civil society, schools, universities, and more; limit freedoms there; and increase tensions with the Palestinians. The recent decision by Minister of Education Yoav Kish to ban the Israeli-Palestinian Bereaved Families Forum, a grassroots pro-peace group, from appearing in schools is just one example.

The pushback

Since day one of the current government, Israelis have been taking action to safeguard their democracy. After several weeks of sporadic measures, mostly led by concerned citizens from all walks of life (and not by political parties or major non-governmental organizations), a widespread pro-democracy movement began consolidating and has been continuously growing and evolving ever since.

For more than 30 consecutive weeks now, protests have taken place every Saturday night all over Israel. At least a quarter of a million people regularly participate in the protests, and in some cases, many more do. Similar protests have been organized in cities worldwide, by Israelis and Jews residing there. The scope and magnitude of the protests is unprecedented in the country’s history, and is a source of inspiration in Israel and abroad.

Beyond the regular weekly protests, additional demonstrations and resistance activities have taken place around key events, such as the spontaneous nighttime opposition to Netanyahu's intention to fire Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant in March and the massive pro-democracy march from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in July. Such events mobilize and engage Israelis from a variety of different backgrounds — left and right, secular and religious — and include many who have never been politically active before, and who now fear for the future of their country.

This process is creating new alliances that transcend previous dividing lines in Israeli society. This is perhaps most evident in the diverse weekly protests taking place in Jerusalem, in front of the President's House, where a unique mix of Israelis gather and take the stage. But these same developments are also leading to dramatic polarization between those who support and oppose the government’s actions — and have already resulted in violent acts against pro-democracy protesters.

While Netanyahu seeks to downplay the importance of the legislation that has already been approved, the pro-democracy camp is highlighting how dramatic the changes really are. As a result, a large number of Israel Defense Forces reservists have stopped volunteering to serve; high-tech companies are gradually shifting their businesses elsewhere; physicians are collectively and individually looking into options to relocate; consumer boycotts are gathering momentum; foreign investments are declining; and more.

The protest movement, which is decentralized in nature, has led to the emergence of new leaders from unusual backgrounds. For example, Prof. Shikma Bressler, a physicist from the Weizmann Institute, has become a leading figure (and was recently profiled by The New York Times). Others, including those from the high-tech sector, rose to the occasion, changing their life course and career plans to help safeguard democracy. This will eventually lead to a political renewal in the Israeli liberal camp, the first signs of which will become evident in the upcoming municipal elections, set to be held in October.

In parallel to their domestic work, pro-democracy Israelis are also seeking international support. They are learning from peers in Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, who experienced gradual yet dramatic democratic decline. They are warning of a "Lebanonization" of Israel, seeking to raise awareness abroad of domestic developments, working to create joint liberal networks with like-minded partners in other countries, and mobilizing international politicians and leaders to voice concern and take action. The struggle in the international arena has already produced tangible results. For example, after a long campaign by Israelis in the U.S., Arthur Dantchik, the major donor to the right-wing Kohelet Forum, decided to stop funding the think tank that catalyzed the judicial overhaul.

Diplomatic developments

Everything that has happened in recent months inside Israel and in its troubled relations with the Palestinians is also taking a toll on Israel's ties abroad.

When responding to Israel's new government, the U.S. initially invested energy in pursuing Israeli-Palestinian de-escalation, especially around Ramadan and Passover. It convened two regional security summits in Jordan and Egypt, and has voiced concern and opposition to settler violence and the expansion of settlements. Over time, President Joe Biden has become increasingly vocal in his criticism of the judicial changes in Israel. He did so while also highlighting his commitment to and friendship with Israel, as exemplified by President Isaac Herzog’s visit to Washington.

Biden called upon Netanyahu to refrain from pursuing one-sided legislation and to reach a broad understanding. He emphasized the importance of democracy in the Israel-U.S. special relationship, and the damage caused by domestic turmoil to efforts to improve and broaden Israel-Arab relations. Biden has refused to invite Netanyahu to the White House as long as he does not change course, and has been making his concerns and positions public by speaking with both U.S. and Israeli journalists.

To date, Biden has not succeeded in moving from words to deeds, and his repeated interventions have not affected the course of events in Israel. One-sided legislation has passed despite the U.S. administration's opposition. In response, Netanyahu conducted a series of interviews with U.S. media outlets, in which he painted a rosy and inaccurate picture of developments in Israel, which were rebuked in a viral video produced by former Knesset member Stav Shaffir.

Beyond the U.S., criticism of Netanyahu's policies has also been voiced in Europe, but in a low-key manner, and mostly by European member states, rather than by the European Union as a whole. This is due to internal divisions among EU member states (some of which are experiencing democratic backsliding of their own), to differing foreign policy priorities in Europe (such as the Ukraine war), and to interest by some in maintaining close relations with the Israeli government.

Closer to home, Arab countries have been slowing down their cooperation with Israel in recent months, a trend made clear by the repeated postponement of the Negev Forum meeting in Morocco, originally scheduled for March and meant to convene ministers from Israel, the U.S., and several key Arab countries. Arab leaders have regularly sent messages of concern about Israeli policies regarding the Palestinians, while refraining from taking actions that would jeopardize the essence of their existing ties with Israel.

Efforts are underway to advance the implementation of previously agreed projects, such as the Israel-UAE-Jordan electricity and water swap deal. Some Arab countries seem to be willing to make strides forward with Israel, even under the current circumstances, provided their key demands are met. This is the case with Morocco, around Israel's acceptance of its position regarding Western Sahara, and this also seems to be the case with Saudi Arabia, should the U.S. be willing to accept its far-reaching demands for security guarantees and assistance in developing its civilian nuclear program, and should the Israeli government be willing to make some concessions on the Palestinian issue.

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In sum, Israel is in uncharted territory and the crisis is only likely to continue in the months ahead. The government is eager to carry on with its judicial overhaul, and pro-democracy Israelis are determined to not let that happen. This could lead to several potential options, ranging from an unprecedented constitutional crisis with deep societal polarization to a change in government composition due to domestic chaos, a major security escalation with the Palestinians or Hezbollah, or a dramatic diplomatic breakthrough with Saudi Arabia. Forecasting political developments in Israel is difficult in normal times. In the midst of this long, hot summer, it has become almost impossible. But what is easy to predict is that either way, the coming months will be decisive for Israel's identity and future.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is the Senior Fellow for Israeli Affairs at the Middle East Institute, President of Mitvim - The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and Co-Founder of Diplomeds - The Council for Mediterranean Diplomacy. 

Photo by Eyal Warshavsky/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images