On Iran, US restraint could reduce risks

On June 17, President Donald Trump issued a statement declaring that the United States knows the precise whereabouts of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, described him as “an easy target,” and noted that the United States would not “take him out (kill!)” — at least not for now. He coupled that assertion with a demand for Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” written in all caps.

This statement may appear rhetorical or performative, but its implications deserve serious scrutiny. In just a few sentences, the president introduced an unusual degree of personal threat into a longstanding geopolitical rivalry and raised questions about how US adversaries might interpret American intentions. Such language carries risks that cannot be dismissed as merely symbolic.

The dangers of public threats

The United States is not at war with Iran. While the relationship has been marked by hostility since the 1979 hostage crisis, it has remained — often uneasily — within the boundaries of diplomacy, proxy activity, and economic pressure. There has been no declaration of war, no Congressional authorization for the use of force against Iran as a state, and no framework under which a foreign head of state — particularly one with religious authority — would be considered a lawful target.

Since the 1970s, US policy has included a formal prohibition on assassination, most recently codified in Executive Order 12333. That prohibition was a response to a period of covert operations that many believe compromised US credibility and fueled long-term blowback. It remains a cornerstone of how the US differentiates itself from adversaries who routinely use extrajudicial violence as a tool of statecraft.

When a sitting president publicly threatens a foreign leader, it complicates that policy posture and introduces a degree of ambiguity that adversaries may view as intent. Even if not operationally actionable, the message could be interpreted by others, including regional actors, as indicative of future US conduct.

Some may reference the 2020 strike that killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani during Trump’s first term as a precedent. But Soleimani was a military commander operating in a conflict zone, and the strike was framed as a defensive action in response to credible threats to US personnel stationed in the region. That context differs significantly from a public statement threatening the supreme leader of Iran in peacetime, absent any imminent threat or declared conflict.

Escalation risks around Fordow

The recent rhetoric arrives at a particularly sensitive time, as speculation grows about a possible Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities — especially the heavily fortified site at Fordow, near Qom. Several former US officials have pointed out that only the United States possesses the technical capability to fully destroy Fordow with an airstrike and have suggested that Washington may ultimately be drawn into such an operation if it begins.

The strategic risks of this kind of strike remain significant. The capabilities of traditionally the most capable non-state member of Tehran’s so-called Axis of Resistance, Lebanese Hizballah, have been reduced; and its other regional proxies are also not as potent as in years past. But Iran retains cyber capabilities, missile forces, and asymmetric tools that could be deployed in response to an attack on its nuclear infrastructure or political leadership. These could include direct strikes on US forces in the region and other disruptive acts.

Whether or not a strike on Fordow achieves its tactical objective, its broader consequences could be destabilizing. It may eliminate the final disincentives Iran faces in moving toward nuclear breakout, particularly if regime survival is perceived to be at stake. In such a scenario, Tehran might conclude that deterrence — rather than restraint — is its only viable option.

Risks to American security

Beyond encouraging Iran to reassess its nuclear restraint, the aftermath of a US-backed strike could provoke retaliation through asymmetric means. These include:

• Proxy attacks on US personnel or facilities in the region;

• Cyber operations targeting US infrastructure;

• Maritime disruption, particularly in the Strait of Hormuz; and

• Conceivably, limited activity by Iranian-linked operatives inside the United States.

In recent years, the US government has disrupted several Iranian-sponsored plots, including planning for assassinations of former senior American officials and other US persons, involving individuals tied to the Iranian government. While none involved mass-casualty attacks, these networks, and those undertaken by proxies such as Hizballah, have carried out surveillance and targeting operations within the US homeland, including critical infrastructure, law enforcement facilities, and Jewish community centers, among other sensitive locations. The presence of Iranian assets in the US represents a latent risk — one that could be activated in the event of direct confrontation.

Even if no strike is ultimately carried out, President Trump’s statements alone may elevate threat perceptions among adversaries. When senior US officials use language that appears to signal intentions outside legal or diplomatic norms, it increases the risk of miscalculation — not just by Iran, but by other regional actors with their own agendas.

Alliance strain and strategic credibility

America’s influence depends not only on its military strength but also on the credibility of its commitments and the consistency of its signaling. European allies — already uneasy after Washington’s prior withdrawals from multilateral agreements — may now view the United States as less predictable or less committed to coordinated diplomacy. Regional partners like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which have recently sought to reduce tensions with Iran, could hesitate to align with the US if they believe escalation is imminent. And Israel, hearing implicit approval in the president’s language, may move on its own.

The result could be a further erosion of collective strategy, precisely when unity is most essential. Deterrence requires not just will but clarity. Allies and adversaries alike must believe that US statements reflect policy and that this policy is rooted in prudence — not provocation.

A moment for caution, not conflagration

Throughout its history, the United States has not threatened foreign leaders without legal justification, strategic purpose, or moral clarity. It has not demanded the unconditional surrender of countries with which it is not at war. And it should not place American lives at greater risk through rhetoric that amplifies uncertainty rather than resolving it.

Those of us who have served in national security roles understand that words, especially from the highest office, carry weight. The president’s recent statement may not signal a policy shift, but it has added further fuel to an already combustible situation.

In such a moment, restraint is not weakness — it is strategy.

Jonathan M. Winer is the former Special Envoy for Libya and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Law Enforcement and a Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow at MEI. 

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