The United States is now at war with Iran, or at least something dangerously close to it. The June 21 US strikes on key Iranian nuclear infrastructure, including the underground Fordow facility, marked a dramatic escalation. Yet Washington has carefully avoided calling this a full-scale war.
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, speaking during a press conference at the Pentagon on June 22, made clear the US strikes were limited in scope and narrowly focused on preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. “This mission was not, and has not been, about regime change,” Hegseth said. But President Donald Trump later muddied the waters by floating that very idea on social media the next day, posting, “If the current Iranian Regime is unable to MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN, why wouldn’t there be a Regime change???” Trump has not made any hints about the kind of broader military mission that would doubtless require, including a potential US occupation, a term still haunted by America’s experience in Iraq. So what, exactly, is unfolding?
The clearest indication of strategic intent lies in a shift in messaging. Inside the Trump administration, the phrase “regime change by the Iranian people” is gaining traction. Israeli officials are now openly promoting Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s late shah, as the preferred successor to the Islamic Republic. While Washington has stopped short of an endorsement, the growing focus on Pahlavi is no accident.
What will Trump do next?
Trump’s early hesitation during the opening days of the conflict was widely interpreted as strategic confusion. But recent moves, including suggestive support for opposition figures and rhetoric about regime transformation, point to a broader ambition: not just dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, but catalyzing long-term political change in Tehran.
The problem is Trump has none of the foundations necessary for a major war. He has no domestic mandate: There is no congressional authorization, no mobilization of public opinion, and no budgetary planning for a conflict of this scale. There is no international coalition: Unlike in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war, Trump has not assembled global or even regional support. Only Israel has endorsed the campaign. Europe, Russia, and China all oppose escalation, and Moscow and Beijing vehemently reject regime change. Nor is there an exit strategy: There is no roadmap for post-conflict Iran, nor is there a plan to manage retaliation, instability, or unintended escalation. Trump is gambling not on victory through force but on the idea that Iran might implode from within.
Regime change, or endless quagmire?
Some draw comparisons to Iraq in the 1990s, but those analogies mislead. Today’s Iran is not Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Tehran retains considerable military capabilities and still has some regional proxies, but it also has a population that is deeply angry, disillusioned, and ready to organize itself for a political transformation of power. The bigger question is whether cracks will appear inside of the regime itself. Would Iran’s security forces continue to suppress unrest if the public blames the leadership for bringing war to the homeland?
Geopolitically, Iran also enjoys a different position than Iraq did. China and Russia have strategic interests in preserving the Islamic Republic, not necessarily out of love for the regime but to prevent an expansion of US influence. An America victorious in Tehran would be a strategic setback for both Moscow and Beijing.
And yet, Tehran’s deterrence is eroding. Israeli strikes are degrading core military and nuclear assets. For the first time in years, some in Washington believe the regime could collapse — not due to street protests, but rather from elite fracture. This is not 2009, and it’s not 2022 either. The West is no longer just watching for crowds in the streets. It’s also watching for a change of heart among the regime’s rank and file.
Could the regime change from within?
There are mounting signs of internal dissent. Reports suggest former President Hassan Rouhani has met with leading Shi’a clerics in Qom, urging them to press Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to accept a cease-fire and halt uranium enrichment. The goal: prevent further escalation and preserve the core of the state. The credibility of these reports remains uncertain, but what is undeniable is that internal pushback is growing.
Figures tied to the pragmatic or moderate camp are warning against treating the Iranian people as a fifth column amid growing reports of arrests of political dissidents. Instead, they are calling for a reset in how the regime engages with its own citizens. Ali Rabiei, a senior advisor to President Masoud Pezeshkian, has urged state media to open space for “all lovers of Iran.” In a strikingly nationalistic message, Rabiei declared that Israel’s goal is to fragment Iran and that “war is a time for unity.” That call may be too late, but it hints at a broader shift among the rank and file: a desire to recalibrate, not surrender.
Within the regime, there seems to be a growing sentiment that only a managed internal transition can avert collapse. This is where Reza Pahlavi’s relevance comes into focus. His path to power, if one exists, is not through the street or exile networks but through quiet alliances with disaffected elements inside the system. If he can offer guarantees, symbolic continuity, and a vision that reassures parts of the ruling elite, he might become a transitional figure rather than a foreign imposition.
Alex Vatanka is a Senior Fellow at MEI.
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