The Middle East institute hosted an on-the-record press briefing to discuss the Israel-Hamas war and the risks of a significant escalation across the broader Middle East given the expanded ground operation in Gaza. Recorded Tuesday, October 31, 2023.
Speakers
Charles Lister
Senior Fellow and Director of the Syria and Countering Terrorism & Extremism programs
Firas Maksad
Senior Fellow and Director of Strategic Outreach
Rachel Dooley (Moderator)
Deputy Director of Communications
Transcript
The below transcript was automatically generated and may contain errors.
00:00:07:00 - 00:00:32:01
Rachel Dooley
All right, everyone, welcome. I'm Rachel Dooley. I'm the deputy director of communications at the Middle East Institute. Thanks for joining us today for our on the record briefing on the risk of an expanded conflict in the Middle East. I'm joined by my two distinguished colleagues at MEI, Charles Lister, the director of the Countering Terrorism and Syria Programs. And Firas Maksad, a senior fellow and our director of strategic outreach.
00:00:32:03 - 00:00:54:13
Rachel Dooley
We'll be hearing from both of them on the attacks on U.S. military in Iraq and Syria, opportunities for terrorist activity across the region, and red lines for the so-called resistance axis. When we get to the Q&A portion. You can use the raise hand function on your screen to ask a question. And if you're called on, we will unmute you and you can introduce yourself and direct your question to one of our panelists.
00:00:54:15 - 00:01:13:18
Rachel Dooley
I'll go all over all of this again later. But for now, let's get right into it. I'm going to turn to Charles. Charles, we're following the news from the Israeli military today who say they intercepted several missiles fired by the Houthi rebels in Yemen. What do you make of that? And can you set the stage overall?
00:01:13:20 - 00:01:41:16
Charles Lister
Great. Thank you so much, Rachel. And good morning, everyone. I'll try to be relatively brief, but I wanted to sort of touch on give a bit of a scene setter region wide in terms of what we've seen develop in terms of regional escalation since Hamas attack a little over three weeks ago. I think to begin with, before I get into all of the various incidents that we've that we've witnessed analyzing what they mean.
00:01:41:18 - 00:02:21:03
Charles Lister
I think it's important to sort of acknowledge what's happened over the past three weeks or so is completely unprecedented in scale. Hamas's attack, unprecedented in scale and complexity coming from the ground, the air, the sea at a cyber component, the response from Iranian directed proxies region wide clearly being sequenced and coordinated. Some of the attack tactics utilized or embraced by Hamas on October the seventh are very much in line with what we know the IRGC provides in its training courses in Lebanon, Yemen and Iran proper.
00:02:21:05 - 00:02:49:07
Charles Lister
And obviously, in terms of unprecedented numbers, we've seen over 1400 Israeli citizens killed, massacred, and now, according to the IDF, to at least 240 hostages, is now the new number as of this morning. Equally unprecedented and should not go unacknowledged in today's discussion, for I think fairly obvious reasons, is what we've seen take place as well since October 7th.
00:02:49:09 - 00:03:17:20
Charles Lister
Hamas has launched alongside several smaller groups in Gaza. Now over 10,000 rockets in the space of three weeks. That is a by a significant margin, an unprecedented scale of of rocket fire. To give you a comparison, in 2006, in the war in Lebanon, Hezbollah fired around 4000 rockets and missiles in nearly five weeks. So 10,000 in half that time is a staggering sort of escalation in scale.
00:03:17:22 - 00:03:46:16
Charles Lister
The Israeli air force dropped over 6000 munitions on Gaza in the first six days after October the seventh, so around a thousand munitions a day. That is just completely an extraordinary amount of firepower when the counter ISIS coalition and its most aggressive stages in 2015 and 2016 dropped around 85 bombs a day across all of Syria and Iraq, a territory about 100 times the size of the Gaza Strip.
00:03:46:18 - 00:04:10:05
Charles Lister
So just to give you an idea in terms of scale of the of the response, and according to U.N. data, we now have over 8000 dead in Gaza. 70% of those have been identified. 40% of them are children and 30% are women, according to Save the Children. There are now more children dead in Israel and the Palestinian territories in the past three weeks than in all conflicts worldwide.
00:04:10:10 - 00:04:45:05
Charles Lister
Since 2019, 99% of those casualties have taken place in the Gaza Strip. 1.4 million Gazans have now been displaced. That's nearly two thirds of the entire population, and 15% of homes are now destroyed. I raise all of these things to say that when we are when we're discussing elements like Iranian proxy attacks, the prospects for a heightened terrorism risk, the completely unprecedented scale of violence is the key driver of what is to come, what's happening and has happened over the past three weeks.
00:04:45:05 - 00:05:15:02
Charles Lister
But really what is likely to come in the next months still ahead. So the regional response has been swift and significant from Iranian directed proxies. In Lebanon, we've had attacks by Hezbollah and allied groups, including Hamas, for 21 of the past 23 days. In response to those attacks, at least 48 Hezbollah operatives have been killed in Israeli airstrikes.
00:05:15:08 - 00:05:56:16
Charles Lister
That's about 20% of all of the Hezbollah casualties they took in the 2006 war. So there's really is no understating the scale of the violence we've seen already. And whilst everyone says that that northern front hasn’t opened yet, which I would acknowledge is is true, the scale of the violence nevertheless has been very significant. We've also seen in the last few days an interesting and worrying shift from Hezbollah away from anti-tank guided missile strikes and the occasional mortar launched specifically at IDF frontline posts along the Northern Line towards more use of medium range rockets targeting populated areas, most of which have been evacuated.
00:05:56:16 - 00:06:35:02
Charles Lister
But that is tactically a significant and consequential shift. Across the border in Syria., we've had at least 12 cross-border attacks from the Syrian side of the Golan Heights by Iranian proxies and the Syrian military. We've had an increasingly aggressive IDF response, including very heavy nighttime air strikes two nights in a row on Syrian army bases. So this is the one area of the region where a nation state military has essentially become part and parcel of the violence with Israel, which is, again, no insignificant thing.
00:06:35:04 - 00:07:01:05
Charles Lister
Damascus and Aleppo, international airports are almost entirely out of service after repeated Israeli airstrikes. And Russia, intriguingly, has significantly wrapped up, ramped up its electronic interference and jamming from its Khomeini air base on the Mediterranean coast, which is interfering significantly with commercial air traffic through the region and specifically landing into Tel Aviv. In Yemen, which is, of course, foremost on all of our minds.
00:07:01:05 - 00:07:27:21
Charles Lister
Given news this morning, though, those have launched now three aerial attacks utilizing medium range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and loitering munitions. One was intercepted by the U.S. and allegedly Saudis over the Gulf. One was intercepted by Israel over the Red Sea, resulting in an impact in the town of Taba in Egypt. And one was intercepted this morning. The first time use of the Arrow Air defense system over
00:07:27:23 - 00:07:47:19
Charles Lister
Elad. It's really hard to imagine now with those three very significant waves of attacks there not being an eventual Israeli response, maybe we can come to talk about what that might look like. But we also shouldn't forget the Saudi element here. The Houthis have now launched a cross-border attack into Saudi Arabia around a week ago, killing four Saudi soldiers.
00:07:47:19 - 00:08:15:11
Charles Lister
That has put the Saudi military on red alert and put big significant question marks over the existing ceasefire there. Briefly, I’ve probably taken too much time already, attacks on US forces in Syria, in Iraq, we've had 33 at my count, 33 attacks on U.S. troops in 14 days, 20 in Syria, 13 in Iraq. US military has acknowledged 24 injuries and one fatality from a heart attack.
00:08:15:13 - 00:08:42:01
Charles Lister
We have so far seen only one US Airstrike Response in Dier ez-Zur in eastern Syria on October the 27th. But since then we've had 14 Iranian directed attacks on U.S. troops. So clearly the issue of deterrence hasn't hasn't been set yet in terms of last, sort of closing assessments, I do think we're still walking slowly on a path towards serious regional conflict.
00:08:42:03 - 00:09:11:23
Charles Lister
Iran and its proxies are doing, frankly, what they do best, which is testing red lines, probing enemy defenses, but not too hard. They are coaxing us and the Israelis into into acting in a way that they would be able to present a serious escalation. And in so doing, I think they're undermining, as I said earlier, the issue of deterrence and placing particularly the US in an especially tight corner in Syria and Iraq.
00:09:12:00 - 00:09:43:02
Charles Lister
What we're watching today is Iran's you know, it's clear evidence of the Iranian regional network in action. This is what, you know, terrorism and insurgency and security analysts have been warning about working on the Middle East for the last 20 years. And I think this is really the first time we've seen the complete network in action clearly sequenced, clearly coordinating and measuring their their actions specifically to test our red lines.
00:09:43:04 - 00:10:02:10
Charles Lister
The Lebanon front, which I'm sure Firas will come to speak about in more detail, is clearly, I think, the greatest concern. But we're unlikely to see it spiral until Hamas looks really on the ropes in Gaza. That was always going to be that red line that is eventually crossed. And the decision then will be whether or not Hezbollah steps in.
00:10:02:10 - 00:10:20:17
Charles Lister
But we're not there yet. So the idea that has been presented in recent media coverage that Hezbollah is kind of blinking, it's it's hesitating. I don't think stands up because we're not at that pivotal point yet where it would have felt the need to intervene. So clearly, we're still relatively early days and there's a long way to go.
00:10:20:17 - 00:10:26:10
Charles Lister
But I'll stop there and I'll look forward to questions and discussion.
00:10:26:12 - 00:10:41:02
Rachel Dooley
Thanks, Charles. All right. Turning to you Firas, we're 25 days out. As Charles mentioned, you look to the northern front. How is that looking and what are you expecting to hear from Hezbollah's leader, who is set to speak on Friday?
00:10:41:04 - 00:11:03:03
Firas Maksad
Thank you, Rachel. Good morning, everyone, and thank you, Charles, for a great scene setter and for stealing some of my thunder. You're a tough act to follow always, but at least I will find something to disagree with you. Some nuances and hope to add some value here and put some meat on the table. The question of the second front and whether we have a second front, I think a more nuanced view or a different view, then I think we already do have a second front.
00:11:03:03 - 00:11:29:11
Firas Maksad
We've had an active second front since October eight. I don't think that it's been as violent as most people feared that it would be. It's been relatively under control. However, many of the analysts and certainly many who live in Lebanon or the region are are watching or waiting with great anxiety to the speech that Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Hezbollah, will give this coming Friday, his first public appearance.
00:11:29:11 - 00:12:03:10
Firas Maksad
And commentary since the hostilities began on on October eight. But I step back first and sort of take stock of where we've been 25 days in. There was much fear and consternation that really sort of the A-Team of non-state actors around the world, the most powerful non-state actors, Hezbollah, will will bring that second front to bear. And we would quickly find ourselves in a regionwide war with with Iran's multifaceted proxies from around the region. That hasn’t materialized yet.
00:12:03:10 - 00:12:40:02
Firas Maksad
And we can talk about why that's the case. None of the primary actors involved have an interest in seeing a full on war on that northern front, whether it's the Israelis who have their hands full in Gaza with what will be very difficult urban warfare or Iran and Hezbollah. Hezbollah, obviously, and most Lebanese still very cognizant of the destructive nature of the 2006 war, still struggling with the most painful economic collapse in Lebanon's history since 2019, and really not eager to see this sort of take this to the next level.
00:12:40:02 - 00:13:12:24
Firas Maksad
Not not, of course, meaning that that's still not possible. We'll talk about that. But also Iran and Charles touched upon that slightly. Iran invested in Hezbollah for over four decades, its most precious foreign investment, I would argue, in its first line of deterrence against a possible Israeli attack against the regime and its nuclear infrastructure to see Hezbollah spent in a destructive war against Israel right now, I think would be counter to Iran's interests and not a priority that it would like to see at this point, unless it absolutely feels the need to.
00:13:12:24 - 00:13:36:21
Firas Maksad
And we'll talk about these possible inflection points. So I think the last 25 days to take a quick look back has been marked by Hezbollah's and Israel's general adherence to the tacit rules of engagement since the 2006 war, keeping these skirmishes fairly limited to the border area, about mostly five kilometers or three miles within Israel, with a few exceptions.
00:13:36:23 - 00:13:58:10
Firas Maksad
We've seen a couple of strikes on the Lebanese side go as far as 20 kilometers, but also are largely limited. However, the trend lines have been concerning, have been worrying. We started out first in the in the disputed Shebaa Farms, you know, the piece of territory, the sliver between Lebanon, Syria and Israel, and will not take into the complex history of the Shebaa Farms.
00:13:58:12 - 00:14:16:13
Firas Maksad
But that is sort of largely understood as fair game. And then we've seen the line of fire sort of expand further west along that blue line all the way down to the Mediterranean. And so we've seen the hostilities grow in both geographic scope, but also, as Charles pointed out, the kinds of weaponry that are being brought to bear.
00:14:16:15 - 00:14:43:09
Firas Maksad
And also sort of that general new say the rules of engagement have fairly held. But clearly, Hezbollah has introduced some new elements here with Palestinian groups being operate being able to operate out of southern Lebanon. So whether it's Hamas or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad or also the Lebanese, the Lebanese branch of of of Hamas, of the Muslim Brotherhood, also announcing for the first time a military wing that is that now is operating.
00:14:43:11 - 00:15:18:19
Firas Maksad
And the way that Hezbollah has gone about it is to allow these groups to operate within or under its deterrence umbrella. So when Israel comes back to retaliate against such operations, Hezbollah then retaliates in a localized version in kind and in a proportionate way. So these groups are now operating under the umbrella of Hezbollah, also allowing Hezbollah more freedom and flexibility to keep that border alive, keep that border on fire, but nonetheless, sort of minimizing the chances of a head on collision that would lead to a broader war that none of them want to see.
00:15:18:21 - 00:15:38:00
Firas Maksad
So we are 25 days in, and I would argue Nasrallah now feels compelled to come out and speak for several reasons. One is that it seems that we, as the Israelis have announced, have entered phase two of the war. And so the ground component has has begun. And certainly there's been the swirling question of where is Nasrallah and why hasn't he appeared.
00:15:38:00 - 00:16:07:13
Firas Maksad
So as the Israelis kick this up a notch into gear two in Gaza, there's a there's a stronger need for Hezbollah to sort of clarify where it is, where it stands. But my understanding in the sources on the ground indicate that Nasrallah is going to be focused primarily in the initial part of the speech on on thanking the the 50 plus fighters that have died today as a result of this conflict and sort of to comfort the families and take stock of where we are.
00:16:07:15 - 00:16:36:23
Firas Maksad
And so while this this this border skirmish has been relatively contained, it has had a heavy toll on Hezbollah fighters. And as Charles correctly pointed out, we're about 20 to 25% of all the casualties that Hezbollah took in the destructive 2006 war. So this isn't cost free for Hezbollah. And I think Nasrallah will be very keen in pointing out that Hezbollah is paying the price on behalf of Lebanon.
00:16:36:23 - 00:17:03:01
Firas Maksad
Hezbollah has taken a heavy toll and to thank the fighters and the family of these fighters for for bearing that heavy toll on behalf of Lebanon in an attempt to spare the Lebanon Lebanon the destructive price of that of that possible confrontation. I also think that Nasrallah would want to talk about a path forward. Well, first, I think that he also wants to highlight the successes of what Hezbollah has been able to achieve today.
00:17:03:03 - 00:17:34:01
Firas Maksad
So I would expect that he will highlight that Israel has not launched this massive ground campaign that many feared were coming until now. It seems that Israel has taken a step back. Its ground incursions have been more measured. It's maybe slicing and clearing through Gaza. We've yet to see. But that kind of massive bombardment and occupation of Gaza about land incursion has not taken place and in the most fair way.
00:17:34:01 - 00:18:05:23
Firas Maksad
And I think sort of Hezbollah wants to give itself some credit for it, for being able to distract and divert Israeli resources over 100, 120,000 Israeli troops have to be deployed to the northern border, along with all the military equipment that comes to that. So I think Nasrallah wants to first thank the fighters and their families. Second, portray and highlight what Hezbollah has been able to achieve in terms of deterrent, deterring Israel and coming to the aid of Hamas, perhaps maybe not as much as Hamas and the Palestinians want them to.
00:18:06:00 - 00:18:31:09
Firas Maksad
There's been some vocal criticism from the Palestinian side of Iran and Hezbollah now not doing enough. And then finally also chart a path forward in a very sort of distinct Nasrallah way of warning the Israelis that what are the red lines? Should you cross X, Y and Z? Then you could expect Hezbollah and its and its allies and proxies to be involved in a greater way.
00:18:31:11 - 00:18:54:08
Firas Maksad
So there will be a lot of showmanship. But I think sort of more importantly, because Nasrallah and Hezbollah are not keen on a massive direct war with Israel, I think he will be very keen on presenting himself not just as speaking on behalf of Hezbollah, but speaking on that broader axis of resistance. All these proxy groups of which Hezbollah is the A-Team.
00:18:54:10 - 00:19:16:24
Firas Maksad
And I think sort of Iran moving forward will be perhaps less focused on the Lebanon arena and using the Lebanon arena and using Hezbollah on the northern front. Not that they won't be active, but really bringing sort of the full scope of its militias and proxies to bear. And so we'll be seeing more from Syria. We're already witnessing more from Yemen, perhaps also the Iraqi proxies getting involved.
00:19:17:01 - 00:19:39:11
Firas Maksad
And Nasrallah, I think, will be keen to be sort of highlighting his role as the leader of the A-Team, and that's this being a unified front rather than being just northern Lebanon and just Hezbollah. And it'd be very convenient also to put some of that pressure or some of that burden off Hezbollah in the northern front. So it's a relatively a given the worst case scenarios out there, it's a relatively rosy picture.
00:19:39:11 - 00:20:34:14
Firas Maksad
And I stress relatively I agree with Charles that given unless there are some unforeseen circumstances, it is unlikely that Nasrallah or Iran would want to actively instigate a full on war between Lebanon and Israel. However, there continues to be escalatory pathways. We will have to wait and see whether Israel will, in fact, try to dismantle and destroy Hamas's military infrastructure, as Bebe had sort of highlighted or set out as an objective early on in this war with ongoing negotiations being shepherded by Qatar, but also with with Egypt, with a lot of U.S. oversight here, might there be sort of an a diplomatic off ramp that would get Bibi and Israel to move back from that
00:20:34:14 - 00:20:56:13
Firas Maksad
stated objective of the total destruction and dismantlement of Hamas's military infrastructure? But if they don't back off from that and I agree here with Charles, if we do find our place ourself in a place where this is a full court press on Hamas and Hamas is on its back foot, there'll be very strong, compelling reasons for Hezbollah and Iran to throw their lot in in a more direct fashion with Hamas.
00:20:56:13 - 00:21:22:12
Firas Maksad
I think the view from the Hezbollah and Iran side is that they don't want Israel to pick them off one by one. They'd rather fight as a as a front, as a quote unquote, resistance front rather than allow Israel to pick off Hamas. Still there, there are possible ways in which this would manifest, in which Hezbollah would dial up the pressure, but still try to be short of a full on war with with with Israel, although it would be very tricky and risky.
00:21:22:14 - 00:21:47:13
Firas Maksad
And then I would also say sort of these escalation pathways, the risk of miscalculation, which has always been there and we've already seen some some of that, but a mass casualty event on either side of that border would very quickly then necessitate a response in kind that would see things spiral out of out of control. So I would say let's all keep our eyes on what Nasrallah is going to say on Friday.
00:21:47:15 - 00:22:03:21
Firas Maksad
A lot of people will be tuning in. I doubt that it will be an inflection point, but I think nonetheless, he'll put a lot of food on the table and sort and illuminate the way forward in terms of where Hezbollah is thinking and conducting, how they're thinking of conducting that northern border.
00:22:03:23 - 00:22:30:09
Rachel Dooley
Great. Thanks Firas. At this point. We will welcome questions from our participants. Like I said, please use the raise hand function on your screen. And when I call on you, we will unmute you and then you can go ahead and introduce yourself and your organization and then direct your question to one of our panelists. We see I see we have a first question from Viviane at The New York Times.
00:22:30:09 - 00:22:33:16
Rachel Dooley
Viviane, go ahead.
00:22:33:18 - 00:22:37:02
Vivian Nereim (NYT)
Can you guys hear me?
00:22:37:04 - 00:22:38:11
Firas Maksad
We can hear you.
00:22:38:13 - 00:22:59:23
Vivian Nereim (NYT)
Right. Thanks so much. I just was wondering if you could talk a little bit, given the sort of like timely news today of the Houthis and their claim of this attack on southern Israel. If you could talk a little bit about what to what extent the Houthis actually pose a threat to Israel and how they're sort of viewing this.
00:23:00:00 - 00:23:25:01
Charles Lister
Who wants to go first. Firas, me? I'm happy to say. I think I think strategically what we've seen from the Houthis blows out of the water, what we've seen from anyone else yet, I mean, launching medium range ballistic missiles in a wave with loitering munitions and cruise missiles, far eclipses anything we've seen, frankly, from any of the groups, Hamas included, notwithstanding the scale of Hamas rocket barrage.
00:23:25:03 - 00:23:49:24
Charles Lister
So strategically, what what the Houthis are doing poses the biggest strategic challenge, the fact that we've we've seen the IDF deploy and use the arrow Air Defense system for the first time speaks for itself. I think the strategic element of the weapons used will eventually force and potentially after this third major attack will force some form of of an Israeli response.
00:23:49:24 - 00:24:17:15
Charles Lister
And nobody quite knows what that's going to look like, given the much more international nature here. But of course, there's the broader strategic reality. I mentioned in my opening comments that the Houthis have launched their first major cross-border attack into Saudi territory just about a week ago, killing four Saudi soldiers. It almost got covered up in terms of media attention, but that's very significant in terms of the threat that it poses to the long standing ceasefire there.
00:24:17:17 - 00:24:39:17
Charles Lister
It pulls U.S. forces in from the Gulf. And as we saw with with what we still don't exactly know what happened, but with the impact that hit Taba in Egypt, you know, all of these things present a much more complicated picture in terms of how to enforce deterrence. Who enforces deterrence? Does that come from the U.S. in the Gulf?
00:24:39:17 - 00:25:13:20
Charles Lister
Does it force the Saudis to act? Does it coerce the Israelis into interacting? I think that's kind of the billion dollar question that nobody quite has the answer for. But it is for exactly that reason that the Houthis are part and parcel of this regional network. It is, I guess, you know, it was the reason for so much frustration amongst much of the sort of analyst community over the years that the Houthis were always treated as something different to Hezbollah proxies in Iraq and Syria, Hamas and others, that somehow this was something different and needed to be treated differently.
00:25:13:20 - 00:25:35:02
Charles Lister
But what we've seen is that they are very much part and parcel of the kind of threat picture threat network that is operating largely in concert. So I would say the Houthis have every reason to be confident. They have no reason not to launch another attack as was threatened in the in the response that we heard and in the statement that we heard this morning.
00:25:35:04 - 00:25:59:14
Charles Lister
But it puts the Israelis in an extremely difficult position. It's one thing to take largely unguided rocket attacks and not feel the need to respond every single time. It's a whole thing altogether to know that a medium range ballistic missiles, loitering munitions and cruise missiles are being launched in their tens or twenties at your territory and you're not responding.
00:25:59:16 - 00:26:16:12
Charles Lister
So I think that it's not a perfect answer necessarily to your question. What I mean to say is this poses, I think, the most challenging conundrum that collectively we now face in terms of responding to this regional regional threat picture.
00:26:16:14 - 00:26:43:24
Firas Maksad
Yeah, I would add only very quickly that although that this is sort of the most significant attack in terms of the kind of munitions that were used, the drones and the cruise missiles, very reminiscent of the attack on the Saudi oil facilities in 2019 and the complexity of that and the difficulty of actually trying to guard against all those kind of munitions that are used, multilayer defense systems required for that.
00:26:44:01 - 00:27:07:03
Firas Maksad
It has had arguably the least impact on the ground. We're all focused on what's coming in from Gaza, from Syria, from Lebanon. Those were successfully intercepted. But politically, I think sort of here are the challenges because we know that at least the first time around that these munitions were fired at Israel, perhaps at least one of them or some of them were intercepted by the Saudis, by Saudi air defense.
00:27:07:05 - 00:27:41:14
Firas Maksad
And I think that the Houthis and the Iranians would be very keen to call out the Saudis, as is doing their part on behalf of Israel and all the political challenges that would come as a result of that for the Saudi royal family in terms of domestic public opinion in Saudi Arabia, which I know, Vivian, you are you are very aware of the difficulties of which is reflected in these tough statements, tougher than expected statements from from Saudi Arabia in response to what's happening in Gaza and which rubbed many people the wrong way, perhaps, or took them by surprise here in DC.
00:27:41:16 - 00:28:03:17
Firas Maksad
So politically, I see kind of an effort here by the who is these on the Iranians to put put the Saudi leadership in a difficult spot in terms of whether to come and intercept, come to Israel's aid and intercept a lot of these things transiting through their airspace or not. And then if they don't, that sort of question that Charles very much highlighted, which is what do you do and how to reestablish deterrence?
00:28:03:17 - 00:28:13:18
Firas Maksad
And I think that's something that's probably very actively on the mind of the Israeli leadership right now. How do you respond to these attacks from Yemen?
00:28:13:20 - 00:28:20:11
Rachel Dooley
Great. Thank you both. I see we have Sam Dagher from Bloomberg. Sam, go ahead.
00:28:20:13 - 00:28:58:09
Sam Dagher (Bloomberg)
Yeah, hi. Hey, Rachel, Firas, Charles. Good to be with you again. Greetings from Riyadh as well. So my question is on Syria. I mean, I've spoken to a couple of people and they told me that the Russians appear to want to provoke some sort of an escalation in southern Syria and that they're sitting back and watching the Iranians and their proxies amass on the Syrian-Israeli border. What do you make of that in terms of Russia's motives here?
00:28:58:11 - 00:29:27:08
Firas Maksad
I'm happy to jump in first. And Charles, you certainly follow the details of Syria more closely than I do. But at a broad political level, obviously here, Russia is a beneficiary of the chaos that's that's happening unfolding in the region and America being drawn back into it. We all kind of know where the administration has been since coming into office, which is retrenching away from the region in favor of focusing on great power competition, certainly with an act of war on the European continent, with Russia's war on Ukraine.
00:29:27:10 - 00:29:45:21
Firas Maksad
So it makes complete sense that the Russians now are perhaps very gleefully willing to add fuel to the fire in the Middle East. But that's the broad sort of political picture, as I see it, in terms of what's happening on the ground to turn it over to neutrals.
00:29:45:23 - 00:30:29:05
Charles Lister
Yeah, thanks. Thanks for us and Sam, great to hear from you. I would say, I think to to sort of piggyback on the way that Firas started, Russia is very happy to both stand back and get out of the way and then happily watch chaos unfold. But it's also quite happy to facilitate chaos. I think Russia has a has a obviously a broader strategic game in play at the moment, which is to hope that what we're watching right now puts the United States in a position where it eventually has to conduct a withdrawal from Syria, potentially a draw down or even withdrawal from Iraq.
00:30:29:05 - 00:30:52:05
Charles Lister
And we're seeing a lot of of political statements from across the border in Iraq recently pushing in that direction, too. And in so doing, it doesn't actually have to do a great deal as the Russian military to to watch that path continue to be paved. We're on it. That is where we are headed right now, I think, in the Southwest.
00:30:52:07 - 00:31:13:23
Charles Lister
No question. Well, first of all, that the Russian military has a very limited presence in southwestern Syria. It's been a long running Israeli complaint that the Russians never did what was necessary to abide by what the Russian Ministry of Defense originally promised back in 2018, which was to prevent an Iranian return within a certain band of territory near to the Israeli border.
00:31:13:23 - 00:31:47:23
Charles Lister
They never did that. The most that the Russians have ever deployed to Southwest in Syria was about 150 military police, which is is kind of a meaningless, meaningless presence just to begin with. No question. Iranians have Iranian proxies, have long had an established presence in the southwest of Syria. We have seen visibly the deployment of Iranian proxy forces from eastern Syria to southwestern Syria in close proximity to the Golan since October the eighth.
00:31:48:00 - 00:32:27:15
Charles Lister
They they've been filmed. There's no secret of it. What the Iranians have also done over the past five years or so is shift away from having openly foreign Shia proxies to recruiting local Syrians, mostly Sunnis, to fight within its own proxies that are deeply embedded not as their own separate formations, but within the Syrian army. That's why we've seen three Syrian army bases hit by heavy Israeli airstrikes in the past week, as it's those those bases, including an air defense base where the Iranians have had a very significant presence.
00:32:27:17 - 00:33:04:06
Charles Lister
And so I don't think the Russians are actually actively doing anything to facilitate this. They're just happy not to intervene and to prevent anything from from being done in terms of Iranian linked or Iranian directed movements. I mentioned already the Mediterranean jamming and electronic interference. That's not new at times of greatest tension between Russia and Israel. And with that tension being caused by heavy Israeli airstrikes in Syria against regime and Iranian targets, the Russians have intensified that jamming activity from home.
00:33:04:06 - 00:33:32:00
Charles Lister
I mean, there was a couple media reports a week or two ago claiming that that that recent electronic interference was the result of Israeli activities. That doesn't seem to be the case at all. And the sort of emanation of that is coming directly from from the Romanian base. And this is part and parcel of the way that Russia has operated, particularly after Aleppo International Airport gets hit by Israeli airstrikes.
00:33:32:00 - 00:33:51:24
Charles Lister
I think that is probably the most active thing that the Russians have been engaged in in terms of interfering. And then you can talk about the north east and eastern Syria of the east of Syria, where we've seen a majority of these Iranian directed attacks on US bases. Again, the Russians are not directly involved in those attacks, but are certainly doing nothing to stop them.
00:33:52:01 - 00:34:25:12
Charles Lister
And the only thing additional thing I'd throw out there as context is the last fatal Iranian directed attack on a U.S. base in Syria was in March this year, about a week after I had been in the same base. And a series of more than coincidental developments resulted in that attack. So the base known as RLZ, one of the most significant US bases in Syria, is protected by a network of Avenger air defense systems, which are always online.
00:34:25:14 - 00:34:49:12
Charles Lister
I went in them, I looked at the radar arrays. They are specifically only there to defend against Iranian directed attacks. Those are the entire network in. RLZ was switched off for about 4 hours the morning of that attack in March. It was the first time they've been switched off for maintenance in about six months. There hadn't been an Iranian directed attack on the RLZ base ever until March this year.
00:34:49:14 - 00:35:15:12
Charles Lister
But somehow an Iranian militia in Iraq about 200 miles away knew and decided to launch suicide drones into the base. And it just so happens that a Russian jet buzzed over that base a few hours before. Now, anyone who knows anything about a fighter jet will know that they're instantly aware of that being on on radar systems. And they would have known that for the first time in a long time the RLZ radars were off.
00:35:15:14 - 00:35:51:20
Charles Lister
I am totally convinced that there was some connectivity there and that was not just some miraculous coincidence. So there is, I would argue, the potential for some connectivity between Russian and Iranian actions. We know how closely they've operated vis a vis Ukraine. But when we get to that point, I would say is is is unclear. I think CENTCOM and the US military chose not to make some of those more than coincidental developments public for a reason, because there was great concern about how complicated things would get if we made them public.
00:35:51:22 - 00:36:03:06
Charles Lister
But but I wanted to put that out there as as kind of complicating context. The Russians are not totally innocent bystanders in all of this.
00:36:03:08 - 00:36:13:18
Rachel Dooley
Okay, great. Thank you. And we have a question from Chase Winter Energy Intelligence.
00:36:13:20 - 00:36:46:02
Chase Winter (Energy Intelligence)
All right. Thanks for thanks. It's really interesting. Can you talk a little about I mean. Do you feel like Iran and Hezbollah deterred by the U.S. presence there? I mean, is that working? And, you know, is it your understanding that the U.S., you know, could get actively involved beyond sort of airstrikes on, you know, militia in Syria and Iraq, but directly in the case of, you know, Hezbollah sort of really opening a northern front?
00:36:46:04 - 00:37:21:20
Firas Maksad
Yeah, Thanks for the question and I'll answer by telling you sort of the footage that I've seen of some of the reporting and interview with Hezbollah and being outside very question and he couldn't help but chuckle in response to it. And then so to draw a parallel from 1982, when in fact, the USS New Jersey was deployed off the Lebanese coast in response to the Marine barracks bombings exactly 40 years ago this October, it's very challenging for the U.S. to establish deterrence against asymmetric proxy forces. You know, Charles tracks that very closely in Syria and Iraq.
00:37:21:22 - 00:37:44:03
Firas Maksad
I would argue that much of the retaliatory fire that is come on the heels of attack on American bases has proven insufficient in the in the broader scheme of things. And so I think that continues to be challenging. Now, that does not, in my mind, sort of go to mean that sort of the deployment of very significant military hardware in the eastern Mediterranean.
00:37:44:03 - 00:38:25:09
Firas Maksad
But also in the Gulf does not have an impact. I think at a minimum, as sort of we've seen in the case where there is, whether it's sort of fire from Kuwait, from the Houthis drones and cruise missiles, but also given the possibility of a much broader war between Hezbollah and Israel on the northern front and hence much of that deterrent messaging really from the U.S. side has been focused towards Hezbollah on that northern front, that there is sort of the utility of having the US being able to assist Israel, not only intercepting a lot of that fire coming in, but also perhaps in targeting sources of fire.
00:38:25:11 - 00:38:56:18
Firas Maksad
I don't foresee that that Hezbollah and the U.S. would be in direct confrontation and that these these military resources would be used in a direct fight with Hezbollah. So I do see some utility militarily. I think it's fairly limited. And I think sort of more broadly, Hezbollah and the broader array of proxy forces there have the advantage of asymmetric warfare, which in deploying military assets like that, it wouldn't really sort of have much impact on.
00:38:56:20 - 00:39:21:22
Charles Lister
Yeah, I don't have too much to add really to what Firas said in I would say I don't I agree I don't see U.S. troops getting directly involved. I think particularly given an impending election, I don't see this administration making that decision. I think so far the administration has been extremely risk averse in terms of measuring its willingness to respond to what's happened in Syria and Iraq.
00:39:21:24 - 00:39:52:14
Charles Lister
You know, 30 plus attacks on U.S. troops in two weeks is no small deal. So far, that's drawn one set of air strikes which hit unmanned weapons caches in eastern Syria in the desert. I mean, it is as careful and gentle and measured as you're going to get in terms of some form of a deterrence response. And clearly, deterrence hasn't hasn't been hasn't been established because we've seen 14, at least 14 Iranian directed attacks since.
00:39:52:15 - 00:40:29:11
Charles Lister
So I think the deployments to the region are more than anything intended as a sort of almost, you know, kind of like an indirect threat, an intimidation. Having two aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean doesn't happen every day, but it's not much more than that. And there is concern and there has long been concern and frustration within within DOD and within CENTCOM proper about tighter controls being placed on their ability to respond tactically to attacks like this.
00:40:29:13 - 00:40:56:15
Charles Lister
It's not a coincidence that after that March attack I talked about earlier, CENTCOM commander General Kurilla had his posture hearings in in in in the Congress a couple of weeks afterwards. Not a coincidence that he chose to lay out all of the statistics about Iranian directed attacks on U.S. positions in the Middle East. And he said at the time that they'd been, I think, 84 attacks by Iranian directed militias on U.S. troops since January 2021.
00:40:56:15 - 00:41:19:23
Charles Lister
He didn't say since Joe Biden became president, but that was what was intended. And he then, in a, I think, carefully orchestrated question in his answer, said we've been given permission to respond four times, that it wasn't a coincidence. That was very much a political message chosen to suggest that we don't have the freedom to respond as much as we'd like.
00:41:19:23 - 00:41:44:10
Charles Lister
And we haven't established deterrence all the more so today compared to March this year. We've now had over 115 attacks on U.S. troops in the past two and a half years, and nearly 30% of them have come in the past two weeks. That's not an insignificant thing, but deterrence, as I keep saying, has not been established. Iran and its networks here have to have the free hand almost.
00:41:44:10 - 00:42:15:10
Charles Lister
They certainly have the advantage. And the more this happens, the weaker the US position in the region gets. That's not going to encourage us to act from the Mediterranean, from aircraft carriers. If anything, it's going to force us to take to take measures in the other direction. And so I think that's in part a concern that collectively we should all be having as we're still watching what I think is a sort of slow walk towards more escalation, not the apocalyptic scenarios that some people were painting very early on.
00:42:15:12 - 00:42:31:12
Charles Lister
But clearly the situation regionally is getting worse. It's certainly not getting better. And there is no clear international or U.S. led response to try and to try and put a stop it not.
00:42:31:14 - 00:42:47:18
Rachel Dooley
Thanks, Charles. I'm going to take a question or two from the chat, the first of which being could you speak to the implications of a potential regional escalation and in particular as it relates to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the Gulf overall?
00:42:47:20 - 00:43:31:04
Firas Maksad
Yeah, I mean, these countries are certainly in a difficult place as far as public opinion is concerned. And we can sit here and have the debate whether part and parcel of why Hamas chose to undertake that operation and whether it was, in fact, coordinated with the Iranians and Hezbollah or not is an open question. But no doubt it's had the impact of of putting these countries in the Gulf that had been actively exploring normalization with Israel on their back foot, whether it's through the Abrahamic Accord or the administration's focus and prioritized prioritization of sort of the Saudi Israel track of of of what could have been added on to the Abrahamic accord.
00:43:31:06 - 00:43:55:10
Firas Maksad
And I think that's sort of translated into these tough statements coming from Saudi Arabia, because unlike some of these other countries in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, a country of 35 million people, does have a significant public opinion to to account for and be mindful of and also given its role in the broader realm of Islam, as you know, the home of Mecca and Medina.
00:43:55:12 - 00:44:24:21
Firas Maksad
And so, yeah, it's definitely put the leadership in a more difficult position. But nonetheless, I would say that that hasn't changed. The broader strategic objective of Saudi Arabia and these Gulf countries want to see themselves. So we have seen a lot of sort of rhetorical support for the Palestinians, a lot of condemnation of what's happening in Gaza and the loss of human life in the most tragic way possible, playing out on an Arab television stations, but not not more than that.
00:44:24:21 - 00:45:03:01
Firas Maksad
And I think whether it's Saudi Arabia, the sort of the political heavyweights that also Qatar mentioned playing a very important political role, sort of creating diplomatic off ramps and playing host for hostage hostage release diplomacy, I do think that these countries will be looked to in the coming weeks as we get past the escalatory phase and start to focus more on sort of these diplomatic off ramps and what how we can begin to move past this, that there will be a diplomatic and political role for countries like Saudi Arabia to play, whether it's sort of through the construct of the Arab League or under a U.N. umbrella with U.S. support.
00:45:03:03 - 00:45:38:17
Firas Maksad
The first iteration of that. Again, I want to maybe quickly highlight here is sort of what Qatar is doing really in the driver's seat right now in terms of diplomacy, despite taking it on the chin from a PR standpoint, particularly here in Washington, for its continuous lines of communication and continuing hosting the Hamas office in Doha, but also very clear that the administration with the with the secretary of state almost on the phone on a daily basis with the leadership into how wanting to see that active diplomacy that the Qatar is right now are undertaking.
00:45:38:19 - 00:45:57:13
Firas Maksad
But the challenge is that for now that seems to be limited to just that hostage diplomacy. I mean, we know the head of the Mossad was what it's been reported was in Doha for two days over the weekend. And so the Israelis are also very interested. But there's limits on how far the countries can take that diplomacy right now and if they are at all successful.
00:45:57:15 - 00:46:13:09
Firas Maksad
And I think that there's a broader diplomatic role in the waiting in the weeks and months ahead for countries like Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries to play under the umbrella of the Arab League or also the United Nations.
00:46:13:11 - 00:46:39:01
Charles Lister
Yeah, agreed. I think all I would say, all I would throw out there as somebody who doesn't work as closely on the Gulf is as for us is is is regional wide, not just on the Gulf. The discussion that you hear that we hear from the region about, you know, there will come a time where we're going to have to, you know, place politics back on the on the on the front burner on the Palestinian issue.
00:46:39:03 - 00:47:13:24
Charles Lister
It's a real shame that that language wasn't being used, you know, five years ago. I think if it was and if it with the same level of of urgency and investment, we might not necessarily be where we are right now. Talking about the issues that we're talking about. I also worry a little bit that if what we've seen over the past three weeks continues for all that much longer, I don't know how you going to get started on a peace process with, quote unquote, the Palestinians when Gaza has been absolutely pummeled into rubble.
00:47:14:01 - 00:47:45:03
Charles Lister
Hamas will have been weakened. We've not really seen or heard much from Abbas and the Palestinian Authority. So what constitutes that process? Is it going to be something that, you know, the region just dictates on behalf of Palestinians? While I don't think that's got a great record and is unlikely to go very far and certainly after October the seventh, the Israelis aren't going to be any Israeli government isn't going to be too much in the mind of of of putting any form of balance in that process either.
00:47:45:03 - 00:48:08:09
Charles Lister
So I go back to my sort of gut response, which I had on October 7th, notwithstanding all the horror and the brutality, was that this will have dealt a hammer blow to any prospects for a meaningful Israeli Palestinian political process of any form. I think the most that we can hope for some weeks or months down the line is a cease fire.
00:48:08:11 - 00:48:21:16
Charles Lister
But the idea that somehow this is going to be the impetus for peace in the Middle East, quote unquote, I just don't I don't think stands up to to the realities that we're seeing play out right now.
00:48:21:18 - 00:48:35:11
Rachel Dooley
Great. Thank you. Taking another question from the chat, what threat does Hezbollah pose for Israelis in the north? For the time being? And how might Israeli refugees be affected by proxy involvement in the conflict?
00:48:35:13 - 00:48:59:05
Firas Maksad
Yeah, I mean, I think, listen, the potential threat is is very significant. And that's why we've seen mass evacuations of settlements on the Israeli side of that border, Kiryat Shmona, and some of the other ones, the bigger ones, have been asked to evacuate north. The Israelis have, by and large, limited that evacuation to that five kilometer, three mile zone that I mentioned earlier on in my opening remarks.
00:48:59:07 - 00:49:21:22
Firas Maksad
And I have to tell you, on the Lebanese side of the border, that was also interpreted as Israeli messaging to Hezbollah, that of this being the fair game. Those three miles being the fair game in which they would exchange fire and continue with the tit for tat. Now, as mentioned, sort of the potential or escalation, the for escalations remain there nonetheless.
00:49:21:24 - 00:49:51:05
Firas Maksad
And in one possible inflection point in that speech on Friday, I do not see it if if I wasn't clear enough in my remarks so far, I do not currently see the desire by either of the main parties involved to take this to a full on confrontation. But certainly Hezbollah will be will be pressured to dial up the heat on Israel as that ground incursion into Gaza continues and perhaps picks up steam.
00:49:51:07 - 00:50:18:17
Firas Maksad
The open question, the difficult question for Iran and Hezbollah to answer is what happens if Israel does go full throttle, if Israel does, in fact, try to achieve its stated objective of totally dismantling Hamas's military infrastructure, I currently have doubts that we will get we will get there. I think Netanyahu will have to find a way of climbing down from that tree, climbing down from that stated objective.
00:50:18:17 - 00:50:42:03
Firas Maksad
And I have to tell you, as a Lebanese-American and as somebody who was was there following the 2006 war, when I heard on the whole sort of make these, you know, these threats of dismantling Hamas and destroying Hamas, it was very reminiscent of Ehud Olmert, the prime minister of Israel, in 2006, using almost exactly the same language of what Israel will do to Hezbollah.
00:50:42:05 - 00:51:09:06
Firas Maksad
And we all know the history since that Hezbollah today is exponentially more powerful than it was in the 2006 war. So I have some doubt that Israel will be able to go full throttle and achieve its initial stated objectives. But if we do get to that point, I tend to worry about a full scale war and Hezbollah's involvement in Iran's involvement tipping over to to an all out regional confrontation, or at least a blowout confrontation.
00:51:09:08 - 00:51:30:08
Charles Lister
I know where we're getting towards tight on time, but again, I would agree with Firas, but I would also sort of qualify that. I think Firas is absolutely right to say that at some point Netanyahu and others within the so-called war cabinet will have to climb down a little bit the tree that they had put up over the past three weeks.
00:51:30:10 - 00:51:58:08
Charles Lister
But at the same time, you know, from from a US perspective, we've seen right from day one, a very, you know, strong, solid US position. You know, we stand by Israel no matter what and support for the idea that the Hamas problem has to be essentially eradicated. I would say that even to today that one element of the US messaging is the one that hasn't gone away.
00:51:58:11 - 00:52:49:11
Charles Lister
Everything else has been peeled back a little bit. The idea that there needs to be a measured response, it needs to be calculated. We have to have a plan for the day. All of that has been sort of newly inserted over the past two or three years. But the one thing that still gets repeated is the idea that, you know, Hamas is this cancer, Hamas is ISIS, which, by the way, profound problems in many directions about that messaging and that Hamas must be eradicated. I think so long as US rhetoric continues to stand by that element of of of the policy, I think the Israelis have less of a reason to stand down. We also shouldn't forget that, you know, October 7th, being Israel's 911 moment was far bigger than 911, you know, on a sort of per capita basis.
00:52:49:11 - 00:53:17:11
Charles Lister
This was like 50,000 Americans being killed in a morning on 911. And so this doesn't give the same sort of political grounding for an Israeli government to step down quite to the same extent that a war or festival with Hezbollah, which is far greater challenge militarily than Hamas, is also much more a much more complicated theater for the Israelis to deal with.
00:53:17:13 - 00:53:42:18
Charles Lister
Hamas is something that is much more black and white. I think from an Israeli security perspective, it is perceived as much closer to home. It's perceived as a more manageable objective to eradicate it off the map, although I would also disagree with that. But I think for all of those, we're less likely to see such a significant climbing down the ladder than maybe some some might hope.
00:53:42:18 - 00:54:05:04
Charles Lister
And if that is the case, we are still slow walking on a path towards a place where, at least in theory, Hezbollah would have to do something more than it's already doing right now. The calculation is, I think, always been that the only way Hezbollah would ever see itself get involved fully in a new front with Israel is if a group like Hamas was truly put on the ropes.
00:54:05:06 - 00:54:36:10
Charles Lister
That was the kind of existential moment where the calculus would have to change. And we may still be getting it. No doubt Israel's ground incursion, I think, looks different than what many people expected, but it's not a weaker ground incursion. It's just being accomplished in a different way, slicing through the Gaza Strip doesn't mean that it is not as strategically a significant mission, and it certainly doesn't mean that it won't be as destructive or as deadly either.
00:54:36:12 - 00:55:08:08
Charles Lister
The tunnel network, I think we've seen public messaging from the Israeli security side is something that now has to has to be dealt with and. That is an absolutely extraordinary military challenge. 2 to 300 miles of tunnels, about a third of them far deeper. They can be managed by any of Israel's bunker busting munitions results in an extraordinarily complex, very long and protracted military campaign, which is, I think, what we're seeing just beginning to take shape now.
00:55:08:10 - 00:55:24:14
Rachel Dooley
Okay, great. And thank you all. We're at the end of our time. So if you did not get your question answered, you can email me at communications@mei.edu and I'll share it with the correct person and then we can go from there. But thank you all for joining us today for our on the record briefing.
00:55:24:16 - 00:55:37:10
Rachel Dooley
And if you want to take a look at any of our additional resources, you can find them on our website at mei.edu. And I want to thank our two distinguished panelists, Charles Lister, and Firas Maksad. Thank you both for your insight and thank you all for spending part of your day with us.