Anton Mardasov is an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Institute. He is also a non-resident military affairs expert at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) focusing on Syria, Iraq and extremist organizations. Anton is the author of numerous articles in the Russian media, several studies and chapters of books on Russian strategy in Syria and the Syrian opposition, as well as Moscow’s relations with Iran, Lebanon, and Egypt. His articles and commentary have appeared in Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera, Asharq Al-Awsat and others. In the past, Anton has been a consultant to the analytical departments of the security services of two oil companies. He is based in Moscow.
Rebalancing Russia’s Mediterranean strategy: From showing the flag to retreating to the gray zone
Either maintaining Russia’s military bases in Syria or finding an alternative outpost in the Mediterranean will prove extremely difficult for Moscow. And part of the problem with pursuing the latter option, particularly if in Libya, is that it would require a full-on transformation of Russia’s military presence model — from more traditional bases designed to establish deterrence by showing the flag in the region to building up a military and logistical operation inside a security “gray zone.”
Why Russia has been openly critical of Israel's war on Gaza
There are many signs of a deterioration of relations between Russia and Israel since the start of the war in Gaza, and they have stoked concern about potential flashpoints between the two countries, not least in Syria, where both have a military presence.
Representatives from both sides have been openly bickering at various diplomatic meetings in clashes that have become almost commonplace.
In Israel-Hamas war, Russia's leverage erodes, outflanked by US naval power
Russia, historically viewed as a major stakeholder and player in the Middle East since the Cold War, is seeing its leverage eroding as the Hamas-Israel war enters its third week, and the Kremlin is absent despite attempts to mediate the conflict.
Keeping up appearances: The Ukraine war’s effect on Russian deployments in Syria
As Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine turned into protracted positional and attrition warfare, often speculative reports emerged about the imminent reduction of the Russian military presence in Syria. Several factors may explain the changes in the Russian military presence in Syria and its future.
Is Russia prepared for an open-ended conflict in Syria?
Russia’s key foreign policy dilemma is the tension between its aspirations of retaining its Soviet-era geopolitical clout and its lack of ideological and economic tools to achieve that goal. From a strategic standpoint, Russia’s campaign in Syria seems like an open-ended story that bears some resemblance to the situation in Ukraine. These similarities in Russia’s methods are not accidental. The Kremlin lacks the ability to impose its foreign policy blueprint on the West and can only leverage its power to stir up trouble in unstable regions.
Strategic pause: What explains Russia’s inertia in eastern Syria?
Moscow has been scaling down its activities in eastern Syria and the most likely reason for this inertia lies in Moscow’s reluctance to be associated with actors seeking to erode the quasi-autonomy of the Trans-Euphrates region. Instead, Russia prefers to stand to the side and watch events unfold, while contemplating the right moment to jump in as a mediator and reap the political rewards.
How Russia made Hemeimeem air base its African hub
The satellite images published on May 26 by AFRICOM appear to confirm reports that Russian MiG-29 jet fighters had flown to Libya. In fact, the MiG-29s travelled to Libya via Russia’s Hemeimeem air base in Syria, and as this latest episode makes clear, Hemeimeem plays a central role in Russia’s growing involvement in both the Mediterranean and Africa.
As the May 26 AFRICOM statement makes clear, Russia’s strategy is fraught with the risk of new sanctions and its geopolitical maneuvers may not come for free.
