Arif Rafiq

The multipolar moment has arrived in Pakistan’s backyard. Like China and India, Pakistan too is attempting its own geopolitical rebalancing. It seeks to revive ties with the United States and other Western countries. This pivot to the West comes after an earlier one to the East that began more than a decade ago. But, like the previous pivot, Pakistan’s efforts to rekindle ties with the West are unlikely to succeed unless it embraces the imperatives of economic reform and political stability.

On Aug. 14, Pakistan marked its 75th independence day, like many of the preceding 74, in a state of political and economic crisis. Days later, epic floods would befall the country, submerging a third of it under water. Pakistan can no longer afford business as usual.

Beyond short-term austerity measures, Pakistan’s current federal and provincial governments need to push forward essential reforms — including in agriculture, energy, and local governance — that are key to ensuring the country’s political and economic stability and long-term growth prospects.

Khan’s removal has served to galvanize and perhaps even expand his support base and his opponents among the senior brass of the army and in the political class have unwittingly rehabilitated his public image. As Khan’s political fortunes have improved, the new coalition government is struggling to handle the hot potato of a deteriorating economy and the army is facing criticism unprecedented in recent years.

In a statement released on Feb. 12, the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) distanced itself from international terrorism, declaring that its violence was singularly focused on Pakistan. While the TTP’s recent comments on America are unprecedented, they do fit into its broader rebranding effort under the leadership of Noor Wali Mehsud, who took over the group in 2018.

In September, China and Pakistan convened the tenth session of their joint coordination committee that oversees the CPEC — the largest of the BRI corridors. The long-anticipated meeting ultimately yielded no major breakthroughs. The momentum of CPEC appears to be losing steam once again, but for Pakistan, slower may actually be better.

Right now, Afghanistan is on the cusp of an economic collapse, not some Chinese investment bonanza. Its immediate challenges are existential. And until economic, political, and security conditions stabilize, and legal and regulatory frameworks for investments are in place, Afghanistan’s connectivity and mineral wealth dreams will remain just that.

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is not yet complete, but Afghanistan’s neighbors are already contending with its fallout as they face the immediate spillover of the conflict into their respective territories. The insurgency has reached the borders of all of Afghanistan’s neighbors, who are choosing to both engage the Taliban while also bolstering defensive and deterrent measures to contain the insurgency. While the net loser in all this is the Afghan state, the Taliban may be overplaying their hand. Should they rule most of Afghanistan, they could end up governing an isolated country deprived of the foreign aid it needs to function.

On April 8, the top U.S. diplomat in Pakistan visited the Chinese-operated port of Gwadar — the first such visit by an American official in 15 years. The move appears to be part of a campaign by Pakistan to promote its regional connectivity agenda and simultaneously signal that this effort isn’t solely wedded to China and its Belt and Road Initiative.

After last year’s much-publicized spat between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia — culminating with Riyadh’s demand for early repayment of $3 billion in loans meant to shore up Islamabad’s foreign exchange reserves — tensions between the two countries have since cooled. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia appear to be in the midst of a reset of relations.

In the 1950s, at the onset of the Cold War, Pakistan and Turkey were part of the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO, a pro-Western bloc of Muslim-majority states. Today, the two countries — both with troubled relations with the United States — are Muslim middle powers with a growing entente in a multipolar Eurasia. In recent years, cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey has strengthened not just in the defense, diplomatic, and economic realms, but also in the cultural space, causing geopolitical ripple effects in the Himalayas, the Arabian Peninsula, and the South Caucasus.

Though the war in Afghanistan largely went unmentioned in the U.S. presidential race, the incoming Joe Biden administration must make a major decision in the coming weeks and months on whether to follow through on the U.S. commitment to withdraw all troops from the country by the end of April 2021.

Landlocked Afghanistan has begun using the Chinese-operated Pakistani port of Gwadar for transit trade — a development Pakistani officials see as marking the start of Gwadar’s role as a gateway port through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Pakistan’s hope to develop the Arabian Sea port into a gateway for Afghanistan, Central Asia, and China’s Xinjiang region has been a long-standing one — and it is misguided. Islamabad should instead focus on local drivers to build the port and use it as a vehicle to develop the impoverished, but resource-rich region of southern Balochistan.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Arif Rafiq, Ibrahim Jalal, Michael Sexton and Eliza Campbell, and Alex Vatanka.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region including Imran Khan’s visit to the White House, tensions between President Trump and Congress over Turkey’s new S-400 system, escalation in the Straits of Gibraltar and Hormuz, military restructuring in Iraq, increased collaboration on the region’s power supply, and changes to Egypt’s social safety net, featuring Arif Rafiq, Gonul Tol, Ruba Husari, Robert S. Ford, Dr. Ibrahim Saif, and Mirette F. Mabrouk.