Past foreign-led efforts to bring about regime change in the Middle East have all too often unleashed instability, extremism, and enduring strategic risk. A different future with Iran is possible — if we try a different approach.
Historical caution: Lessons from the region
Foreign-led regime change in the broader Middle East has, time and again, produced poor outcomes. In Afghanistan in 2001, the ouster of the Taliban ended one regime but unleashed two decades of guerrilla warfare, state collapse, and humanitarian crisis. In Iraq in 2003, removing Saddam Hussein shattered the state and created the conditions in which both al-Qaeda and ISIS flourished. Libya in 2011 followed a similar trajectory: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-backed intervention toppled Muammar Gaddafi — only to leave a fractured country overrun by militias and jihadists. Even Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, which aimed to reshape governance in Beirut, led instead to a bloody quagmire that lasted for nearly two decades.
These examples suggest that it may be easier to bomb a country into regime change than it is to create stability afterward. This is not a defense of despotic governments. It is a caution: Successful regime change requires planning, multilateral support, a population in the target country ready to embrace change, and serious attention to what comes next. Without a viable political plan to back-stop military action, the result may lead to power vacuums, violence, and unintended consequences.
Iran’s moment: Navigating between conflict and collapse
Iran today presents a rare moment of both danger and opportunity. Its nuclear advances and proxy activities have posed real threats to regional stability. Yet the prospect of further Israeli and even possible further American military action following the recent strikes on Iranian facilities and explicit threats against Iranian leaders raises the specter of the mission creeping from countering Iran’s nuclear capabilities to engaging in a gambit to bring about regime change.
Such a goal, however, may be more elusive than its proponents suggest. Toppling Iran’s government from outside — without large-scale military intervention or internal elite rupture — is not a credible near-term proposition. For decades, the clerical regime has proved remarkably resilient, drawing strength from its security institutions, political networks, and longstanding ability to suppress dissent. External pressure may destabilize, but it rarely displaces. Even if the regime were to collapse — as happened with Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria in 2024 — it would more likely result from domestic fragmentation, not foreign orchestration. And it would bring with it the same risks seen elsewhere: civil war, internal repression, and potentially the empowerment of factions as or even more dangerous than those now in control.
Regardless of further attacks by Israel, or by Israel and the US, or some other constellation, Iran’s government remains under great pressure. The domestic population was dissatisfied and restless even before the Israeli and US attacks. The Iranian economy is in crisis. Its international isolation continues. The moment is ripe not for collapse but for renewed diplomacy. There is an opportunity to change not the regime, but the regime’s behavior — and to do so in a way that avoids the catastrophe of unplanned upheaval.
A multilateral framework for sustainable change
Rather than focusing solely on Iran’s nuclear capabilities, the United States and its partners should pursue a comprehensive diplomatic initiative that encompasses all of the long simmering problems Iran has had with its neighbors and with the West.
To begin with, these negotiations must provide a framework that bars Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons while providing credible assurances that neither the United States nor Israel will pursue regime change. Achieving this type of dual-track deal would be difficult but it is not necessarily unachievable, given Iran’s weakened situation, and the possibility that Israel might conclude that such an agreement presents the best option to stop Iranian nuclear efforts for the long term. It would require verified limits on Iran’s uranium enrichment and a credible inspection regime. In return, Iran would receive phased sanctions relief and normalization of commercial relations.
But a durable accord must go further. It should include commitments from Iran to scale back its support for proxy groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and armed elements in Iraq and Syria. It should encourage incremental steps toward de-escalation in the region, with mechanisms for dispute resolution, verification, and enforcement. Crucially, it should not be a US-Iran bilateral agreement alone. Regional and global stakeholders — including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Iraq, the European Union, China, and Russia — should be invited to shape, guarantee, and support the process.
This approach does not require moral endorsement of any government’s existing internal or external policies beyond that framework. It merely would recognize a shared interest in avoiding Iranian collapse, war, and the spread of extremist violence. By creating new diplomatic channels — and repairing those that have frayed — broadened diplomacy could offer a way forward that is based not on coercion or magical thinking, but on realism and restraint.
What’s in it for Iran?
For diplomacy to succeed, the benefits to Iran must be concrete and credible. Phased sanctions relief is a starting point, but not sufficient. A viable agreement would need to offer a path toward economic normalization: access to frozen assets, restored oil exports, and reintegration into global financial systems — all tied to verifiable compliance, not trust.
Equally important are security assurances. Iran would need to hear clearly that so long as it adheres to the terms of an agreement, there will be no effort to bring down its government. This would not prevent continued criticism of Iran’s human rights abuses or regional actions, but it would take regime change off the table as a strategic objective.
Diplomacy must also address the deeper psychological drivers of Iran’s behavior. Tehran’s reliance on proxy groups — from Hezbollah and Hamas to the Houthis and militias in Iraq — has long been shaped by its isolation and its perception of hostile encirclement. A framework that restores international legitimacy and reduces that sense of threat could shift Iran’s calculus. It may not transform the regime, but it could give it reason to engage — and to let go of the fight it has maintained for decades.
The alternative, should talks fail, is straightforward: continued isolation, deepening economic distress, and the constant risk of further Israeli or US strikes on Iranian military assets deemed threatening and public infrastructure like electrical grids that Israel has — tellingly — to date chosen to spare. A diplomatic accord that resolves these pressures in exchange for verifiable Iranian limits on its nuclear program, missile development, and proxy activity would not be a concession. It would be a strategic bargain — one that benefits both sides.
Reviving the diplomatic architecture
In the weeks leading up to the June 21 strike, this type of diplomacy had begun to stir. European leaders — particularly France, Germany, and the United Kingdom — were actively working to convene talks aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missile development, and regional proxy activities. President Emmanuel Macron proposed a comprehensive framework combining phased sanctions relief with strict verification mechanisms. Prior to the strike, parallel channels brokered by Qatar and Oman facilitated indirect US-Iran exchanges. Following the strike, Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, expressed cautious support for a diplomatic reset. Though still tentative, these efforts offered a fragile but functional scaffolding for negotiations. The airstrikes disrupted — but did not destroy — this architecture, which European leaders are now trying to revive. If the goal remains to avoid collapse, chaos, and unintended escalation, these multilateral tracks should be revived with urgency and reinforced with realistic timelines, regional guarantees, and clear thresholds for compliance and response.
A well-crafted diplomatic framework could benefit all parties. For Iran, it could provide a path to economic stabilization and international legitimacy. For the region, it could reduce proxy conflicts, missile threats, and sectarian polarization. For the United States and Europe, it could offer a means of managing the Iranian challenge without war — and without inadvertently empowering more extreme actors through regime collapse.
Such diplomacy would not impede internal change in Iran. On the contrary, it could enable it, by reducing external threats that the regime uses to justify repression and securitization. Over time, that could create space for Iranians to shape their own political future.
The current trajectory is unsustainable. Something has to give. A new diplomatic framework — multilateral, inclusive, and realistic — still offers the chance to reduce risk, reshape behavior, and avoid another Middle East disaster. Could it succeed? Maybe. Could it fail? Of course. The initiative may fall short — but without it, Washington may find itself left behind and forced to react to decisions made elsewhere.
Jonathan M. Winer is a Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow at MEI.
Photo by Office of the Supreme Leader of Iran via Getty Images
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