U.S. Senator James Risch (R-ID) delivered keynote remarks on the state of U.S. foreign policy at MEI's conference, "Israel, the Abraham Accords, and U.S. policy in the Middle East," held in Sun Valley, Idaho on August 20, 2021.The below text of his speech was transcribed by computer and lightly edited, but may contain errors. The complete video recording of his talk, including moderated Q&A session, may be found here.
[00:00:04] Thank you so much. What an opportunity here in Idaho. This state is not as engaged as some other states are in foreign relations matters. So I don't get a chance to talk to audiences that are as up to speed as you are on these kind of issues. But nonetheless, I greatly appreciate it. Say hello again, to Idaho's former first lady. For those of you who aren't familiar, hello, welcome to our beautiful state. For those of you who are from California, I know you've noticed that our air quality leaves a lot to be desired. When you go home, feel free to pack your suitcase with as much smoke as you can to your wonderful state. I'm going to have a stern talking to with Dianne Feinstein. I'm going to get back to you. This is not a personal thing.
[00:00:57] Well, thanks again so much for the privilege to talk to you today. And I am a partisan, as you know. I'm a Republican and I do serve on the Foreign Relations Committee, which is not the most nonpartisan or bipartisan thing to do. That's on the Ethics Committee, and that is really nonpartisan, bipartisan. This particular committee, Foreign Relations Committee, comes close. You know, the Founding Fathers, when they put the government together, they were very clear making three lanes from the three branches of government. In most instances, for instance, only the first branch of government can get appropriated funds. Then when it comes to other things, like executing, only the second branch of government can execute, of course we've been litigating that for 200 and some years since then. But nonetheless, the lanes are relatively clear, with few exceptions. And one of them is foreign relations.
[00:01:58] Foreign relations. There were there was authority given to both the first branch and the second major government. And we we robustly exercise our view in the first branch of government. And sometimes that causes issues with our friends and with our enemies. Just a short story, I was coming out of the hearing and after we were talking about JCPOA and one of my [inaudible] media there, and of course they're all shouting things at you. But anyway, it was one from Europe. And she said to my opponent, she says, "Are you going to vote for the JCPOA?" And I said, no, I'm not. And she said, well, how can you not vote for that? President Obama's for it. And I said, "Ma'am, President Obama is merely the head of the second branch of government, he doesn't control my vote." You know, her eyes glaze over like "branches of government?" You know, he's the president. So in any event, that our form of government in that regard is is somewhat confusing because like I say, those of us on the committee engage robustly with people from other countries. We have a constant parade all day, every day of ambassadors and ministers and heads of state and number two heads of state through our offices and through the committee to testify or excuse me, to meet with the committee. So in any event, we are robustly engaged in addition to the first branch, and we try to work as closely as we can with the State Department, with first and second branch of government. Sometimes that becomes a competitive sport. It shouldn't be, but we're all human beings and those things happen.
[00:03:50] But anyway, I'm here today. I've been asked to share my perspective on the current trajectory of U.S. policy in the Middle East. The region remains shaped by old, seemingly intractable challenges. Old ones like the Sunni Shia divide, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and dysfunctional relics of colonialism, the formation of the state of Israel and the ensuing Arab-Israeli conflict, the Islamic revolution in 1979 and continued export of Iranian terrorism and more recently, the fallout from the Arab Spring. Regional dynamics have been further complicated by growing Chinese encroachment, Russian intervention at odds with U.S. policy objectives, and the impacts of a very troubling, expansionist Turkish foreign policy that is increasingly aligned with Russia. Against this backdrop, the United States national security interests in the Middle East have not changed. Our goals are to promote regional stability, prevent terrorist threats against the United States and our partners, and preserve stable international markets and foster governance that address the needs of their citizens.
[00:05:05] However, it's increasingly clear that the United States has reached another strategic crossroads in Middle East policy. This dilemma stems from greater focus on competition with China, a growing debate on the importance of U.S. engagement in the Middle East, and some policy failures of our own design. I'm concerned that the current administration's approach fails to strike the appropriate balance, and runs the very real risk of ceding the region to other malevolent powers.
[00:05:35] First and foremost, current policy is sending the wrong message of American disengagement in the region. It started with the ill advised announcement that the U.S. was going to pivot from the Middle East to Asia. Words matter. I don't know who is the genius who came up with the term 'pivot,' but when one thinks about pivot, one thinks about turning its back on something and looking in another direction. We cannot pivot away from the Middle East. We have to continue to focus on the Middle East. That does not mean we shouldn't increase our focus on Asia. We certainly should. But the word pivot was was ill advised and it was the beginning really of what I think was a real deterioration of the world's belief of our commitment to the Middle East.
[00:06:40] The administration's precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan has been a strategic unforced error. The potential abandonment of our Afghan allies has tarnished U.S. credibility and seriously jeopardized our ability to recruit partners in the future. Additionally, it's the administration's diplomatic embrace of the Iran regime, a lack of focus on the Abraham Accords, increased barriers to conventional arms transfers, and the chilling of relations with our traditional Mideast partners that all send a message of American disengagement. This is the wrong direction.
[00:07:20] To be sure, the pendulum swings in U.S. policy between successive administrations, and they have caused some in the region to doubt American coherence in continuing to confront shared challenges. Worse, these swings in policy open the door to closer relationships with Russia and China by those in the region.
[00:07:42] While this period of uncertainty has risks, there are also opportunities. A historic signing of the Abraham Accords is a defining moment and has the potential to fundamentally change and improve the security, economic and diplomatic environment in the Middle East. I can't stress enough the potential importance of this development. If you stop and think about it, if someone would have told you such an event was going to occur even 10 years ago, they would have been viewed as delusional. Its significance is further underscored by the reaction of Iran and Palestine to the signing of the Abraham Accords. Obviously, they were enraged. Because of the Abraham Accords long time formal rivals have increasingly joined hands to address the shared challenges posed by Iran, radical extremism, sometimes even extremists from their own ranks, covid-19, and struggling economies. Most importantly, these Accords have the potential to create new multilateral security constructs and present a rare, a rare opportunity to significantly transition the order in the Middle East.
[00:09:08] It's vitally important that we don't miss this opportunity. It's clear to many of us that the current administration rejects much of the accords as a Trump legacy, in Washington, D.C. these days a cardinal sin. Nearly seven months into the new administration, the obvious lack of commitment to expand and strengthen the Abraham Accords is a very real concern. It's disconcerting to note that the administration and its actors never, ever mention or refer to the Abraham Accords even though everyone else does. I suspect that they are afraid that somehow the Abraham accords are going to lead to a award of some kind, perhaps a Nobel Peace Prize for Donald Trump. They have nothing to fear in this regard. That's a laugh line. [laughter]
[00:10:10] The administration must ensure it has an appropriately resourced and empowered team to drive further normalization with Israel. This should remain a primary diplomatic priority. For those of you in this audience who have touches with and interaction with the administration, I hope you would encourage them to embrace the Abraham Accords, not reluctantly, but to do so robustly. This is a good thing. It's not a bad thing. And the fact that it was done on the watch of President Trump certainly in no way denigrates the importance of those agreements.
[00:10:51] On our Middle East, our Middle Eastern partners and the issue of human rights, we all agree that we've always, always bring American values to our relationships with other countries. However, we must ensure that new policies aren't so restrictive that they make a relationship with the United States impossible. As we've seen time and time again if we truly care about human rights, these countries are better off when they're engaged with America. Additionally, the Department of Defense additionally, as the Department of Defense reduces its missions in the Middle East, it's incumbent on the State Department to redouble its efforts. Far too long, foreign policy in the Middle East has only been viewed in military terms. And too often our regional partners, and indeed many in the world, view American commitment as boots on the ground. We should ensure they appreciate the full weight of our diplomatic and economic commitments.
[00:11:54] The State Department continues to fill a vital role in post-conflict stabilization, economic development, reducing corruption, security cooperation and improved governance that contribute to lasting stability. On Iran policy, Iran is a primary cause of instability in the region. Much like this administration's failure to see the Taliban as they are, we must have a clear eyed view of the Iranian regime. On a personal standpoint, I can tell you I do not feel that clear eyed view of the Iranian regime is there. Iran and its proxies strike in Israel, attack international shipping, prop up the Assad regime in Syria, contribute to the world's most humanitarian disaster in Yemen, attack our troops and diplomats in Iraq and Syria, and have driven, driven Lebanon to the brink of, if not over the brink of collapse. The administration's efforts to rejoin the nuclear deal have failed to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions or address the growing threat of Iran's regional terrorism, isolate our ally, Israel, and our Gulf partners, and threaten to provide a windfall in sanctions relief that will for a second time supercharge Iran's terror activities.
[00:13:20] In order to effectively confront Iran, the United States requires a holistic strategy that incorporates all instruments of national power. The administration's Iran policy must encompass more than a nuclear negotiation. We need consensus on the strategic aims of U.S. Iran policy, and should allocate resources accordingly. Specifically, we must not only halt the Iran regime's nuclear ambitions, but also end its destructive and destabilizing activities in the region and beyond, and require compliance with all U.N. resolutions, including missile development and testing. The United States remains in a position of leverage in the discussions with the Iranian regime. We cannot squander this leverage for a deal that does not advance American interests.
[00:14:21] So where are we right now on those Iranian negotiations. When the new administration took over, obviously, all the appointees paraded through the office promising great, glorious things, which we're used to, and I understand that and wish them very well in doing so. But from the very beginning, I've had real reservations about how and what they're going to with the JCPOA. They have consistently said they want to get back in the JCPOA. And as time has gone on, more and more, they have embraced the idea of just getting back into the JCPOA the way it was in the first place. Originally, they said they were going to be it was going to be stronger and longer. I said, that's a bumper sticker. It doesn't mean anything to me. And when you're talking about the nuclear power of Iran, longer means nothing. It needs to be permanent. It needs to be such that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon.
[00:15:23] At this point, what they are saying is they want to get back into the agreement, but then they want to negotiate follow-on agreements. I looked him in the eye and I told them, you people are delusional. If you think that you're going to get back into the JCPOA and then they're going to sit down at the table and they're going to negotiate an agreement on missile testing, on support for terrorist groups and what have you, it is absolutely delusional thinking. They are not going to do that. At the present time, the negotiations of course stalled with the Iranian elections that took place. And now there's still they're still getting their feet under them in Iran. But the United States negotiators are moving, or will move when they get back to negotiations again, to get back to the JCPOA or something very, very similar to it. At the present time, Iran will not sign that agreement to go back to the JCPOA. To that I say "Thank you, Iran. Thank you, Iran." I never thought I'd say that, but we have no business getting back into JCPOA because it is a road to a nuclear weapon, not a road to keeping Iran from having a nuclear weapon.
[00:16:41] To be successful, Iran policy should be combined with efforts to expand the Abraham Accords to ensure sufficient U.S. deterrence in the region against further attacks, continue to build partner capacity to address the Iranian threat, and explore multilateral security arrangements built around like-minded partners. I meet regularly with the actors in the region and they are anxious for us to do those things. When it comes back to the JCPOA for a minute, and I say to the administration and I tell them this daily: Toughen up. Toughen up. These people are tough and you got to be just as tough and you've got to be willing to walk away rather than sign a bad agreement.
[00:17:23] We can do all of these things. In order to reach our partners, to expand the Abraham Accords, and American goals of the Middle East, we, in order to do so without a large commitment of U.S. troops--and no one wants to go there again--we must rely on sometimes imperfect partners. We should work closely with our regional allies in an effort to make it better rather than pushing them away. As we all know, there is significant imperfections in some of the partners that we have. It's important to note that if we do push them away, with competition with China will come to our disadvantage because China will fill the vacuum. We should not allow a focus only on the Pacific to erode our position in other important regions. Through a smart allocation of resources and embrace of our partners and the right messaging, we should be able to walk and chew gum at the same time.
[00:18:24] Finally, across the Middle East, while there remain serious risks, there are also unique opportunities to improve the region. The time is appropriate for the United States to reinforce that we stand with our partners and we are up to the challenge. With that, I look forward to engaging with you with some questions and appropriate challenges, I hope. Thank you so much.