President Donald Trump’s first official foreign policy trip, as in his first term, was to Saudi Arabia earlier this month, with additional stops in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. A series of investment announcements followed from companies and Gulf governments, including for the export of US semi-conductor chips and co-investments in new data centers in the US and the Gulf states. As hosts, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar emphasized their bilateral relationships with the United States and their eagerness to secure access to artificial intelligence and defense technologies. They also expressed interest in securing stakes in US energy infrastructure assets, relying on their national energy companies and sovereign wealth funds to deploy capital in the US and at home to massively expand their portfolios of energy assets (especially in liquified natural gas [LNG]), grow domestic electricity generation capacity, and incubate the ecosystem for supercomputing.
This Q&A explores some key financial commitments made by the Gulf states and compares them to other sources of US investment. It explores why the domestic energy and power sectors of these states make them in some ways ideal for technology innovation in artificial intelligence. And it poses the question of why, in geopolitical terms, the Gulf states are positioning themselves as points of connection between US technology, global finance, and growing markets and as a central node in US-China competition. The answers will shape not just the future of artificial intelligence innovation but broader geopolitical and economic dynamics.
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