The Middle East Institute hosted an on-the-record press briefing to discuss Israel’s military strategy in Gaza, including the IDF’s successes and challenges in northern Gaza, the ramifications of a ceasefire versus a pause in fighting, and the growing humanitarian crisis. Recorded Tuesday, November 14, 2023.
Speakers
Lt. Gen. Michael K. Nagata
Distinguished Senior Fellow on National Security
Mick Mulroy
Non-Resident Senior Fellow
Rachel Dooley (Moderator)
Deputy Director of Communications
Transcript
The following transcript was automatically generated and may contain errors.
00:00:00:17 - 00:00:31:14
Rachel Dooley
Welcome, everyone. I'm Rachel Dooley, I'm the deputy director of communications at the Middle East Institute. Thanks for joining us today for our on the record briefing on Israel's military strategy in Gaza. And I'm joined by my two distinguished colleagues at MEI, Lieutenant General Michael Nagata, the former Special Operations Command Central Commander and an MEI distinguished senior fellow, and Mick Mulroy, the former deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East and also an MEI senior fellow.
00:00:31:14 - 00:01:14:18
Rachel Dooley
We'll be hearing from them on the IDF's successes and challenges in northern Gaza, as well as their current position as they advance on the al-Shifa hospital complex, the implications of a tactical pause in fighting for aid, and the growing humanitarian crisis. And when we get to the Q&A portion, you can use the raise hand function on your screen to ask a question. If you're called on, we will unmute you and you can introduce yourself and direct your questions to one of our panelists. I'll go over all of this again later. But for now, let's get right into it. I'm going to turn to General Nagata first. Sir, can you attempt to set the stage but through a military lens?
00:01:14:20 - 00:01:53:11
Michael Nagata
Thank you, Rachel, and good morning to everyone or good day, wherever you happen to be. As you've already heard, I've been retired from the U.S. military for about four years now, and it's been about five years since I've been in the Middle East or from my occasional visits to speak to some of my Israeli military colleagues. So my perspective is a little dated, but I'll try to provide at least some perspective and value as I've watched the the conflict unfold ever since the attacks into Israel on the 7th of October.
00:01:53:17 - 00:02:22:12
Michael Nagata
First and foremost, this is urban combat, in its most classic sense. Urban combat is one of the most difficult forms of war fighting imaginable and made even more so by the strictures that have been placed on warfare, going all the way back to at least the original Geneva Conventions, whereby far more legal and prosecutable emphasis has been placed on the use of force when it comes to civilians and environments within which civilians live, especially urban areas such as Gaza is.
00:02:22:12 - 00:02:50:20
Michael Nagata
In urban combat, the stark realities that combatants face are things such as the range of ground combat engagements is often not measured in miles or even hundreds of meters. Instead, the distance between combatants is often measured in a few feet or just a few yards. Combatants generally fight in very close quarters, whether it be inside a high rise building within a deeply buried tunnel or structure, or a schoolhouse or a shopping mall, or even a place of worship.
00:02:50:22 - 00:03:19:09
Michael Nagata
In many cases, it is literally hand-to-hand fighting of the most gruesome kind. Casualty rates are enormously high because it's often impossible to miss one's target or avoid injury at such close fighting ranges. And both purpose built and improvised explosive devices usually abound in such environments. Also, all of these things can dramatically harm civilian structures, activities or the civilian themselves in the process.
00:03:19:11 - 00:03:53:08
Michael Nagata
Also, retrieving and effectively treating wounded military casualties in such an environment is often extremely difficult all the way to being impossible. So even those without immediately life threatening wounds or injuries often die because of no effective medical or emergency care can be provided in such chaotic environments without hours of delay. Now, at the risk of oversimplifying what the combatants in Gaza now face, I'd like to focus on a few of the most important military dimensions of this struggle from my personal point of view.
00:03:53:10 - 00:04:23:03
Michael Nagata
First of all, the imperative for Israel now is to close with and destroy the enemy, both as an act of retribution for the attacks on seven October and as Israel's chosen method for trying to eliminate Hamas as a future strategic threat. Strategically Hamas is on defense and Israel is on offense. But at the tactical level, both sides must confront the challenge of doing maximum lethal harm to the opponent while minimizing the amount of lethal harm received from that opponent.
00:04:23:05 - 00:05:09:10
Michael Nagata
If that sounds like classic attrition warfare, in large measure, that is precisely what this is. In a densely packed urban environment, other classic military notions such as sweeping maneuver to outflank an enemy are completely inapplicable in a densely populated and heavily built up place like Gaza. In the case of the Israelis, they have the ability to employ significant overmatch over Hamas in terms of the range and lethality of their weapons, the significant training and professionalism of their military forces, clear technological superiority in everything from command and control to sophisticated targeteering to complete dominance in terms of airborne attack by both manned and unmanned platforms and beyond.
00:05:09:12 - 00:05:48:02
Michael Nagata
Fighter for fighter, platform for platform. Simply, Hamas simply cannot win on the basis of sheer firepower, precision, logistical support, or professional military skill. However, this is not a symmetric fight. Despite Hamas clear inferiority and such things, they have a powerful advantage nonetheless. The ability to convey a highly persuasive, regional and global narrative regardless of how factual or deceptive it may be, of extraordinary human suffering caused by what they are characterizing as Israel's wanton and reckless use of force in Gaza.
00:05:48:04 - 00:06:17:10
Michael Nagata
As most of you are probably aware, this contributed directly to the recent Arab-Islamic summit convened by Saudi Arabia, where they called for a quote, complete investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Israel, against Palestinians, unquote. Just this accomplishment alone, without the use of any force whatsoever by Hamas, substantially levels the playing field in Gaza in the ongoing fight between the two factions.
00:06:17:12 - 00:06:40:16
Michael Nagata
Also, both sides are relying on substantial outside help, which means that to one degree or another, what is happening between Hamas and Israel is also being characterized, whether rightly or wrongly, as a proxy fight where external actors are trying to help one side or the other to triumph because they are because of the advantages that accrue to those who support the winning side.
00:06:40:18 - 00:07:05:02
Michael Nagata
In the case of Israel, their external support is primarily coming from Western sources, and particularly the United States, in the form of things like intelligence support, munitions, air defense systems and the like. In the case of Hamas, they seem to be primarily benefiting from less direct forms of help, but powerful forms nonetheless. One is the political support I've already mentioned from the Arab Islamic Summit.
00:07:05:04 - 00:07:41:23
Michael Nagata
Another is the peripheral attacks being sponsored or conducted by Iran, wherein Iranian actors themselves or Iranian proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis, are launching a relatively small but widely publicized attacks on both Israel and on U.S. forces in the region. While these rather indirect forms of Iranian help to Hamas are nowhere near the scale or cost of what the West is providing to Israel, I would argue that they are nonetheless, in many cases achieving either parity or in some cases superiority in terms of the help Hamas is receiving when compared to Israel.
00:07:42:00 - 00:08:11:04
Michael Nagata
Last couple of comments. Regarding progress or advantage by either side, it's impossible for an observer like me to characterize this from the outside with any precision. My overall impression is that the combination of Israel's clear military advantage and the fact that Hamas finds itself contained in a relatively small urban area means that so long as Israel can maintain unrelenting pressure, Hamas will find itself gradually ground down into smaller and smaller elements with less and less sanctuary.
00:08:11:06 - 00:08:41:07
Michael Nagata
Whether it can eventually recover from all this damage over time remains to be seen. But I certainly wouldn't dismiss the possibility. On the question of what's the difference between a ceasefire versus a pause in the fighting, in my experience, this is often a distinction without a difference. But if there is a difference, it is generally that a cease fire is mutually agreed to by both sides, whereas a pause in the fighting can be initiated by one side unilaterally. Whether or not the other side reciprocates can be highly variable.
00:08:41:09 - 00:09:13:01
Michael Nagata
On the humanitarian crisis, again, it's hard for an outsider to see this clearly, but it's pretty clear that the scale and volume of human suffering is immense and growing and will probably create, in my view, generational consequences for both Israel and Palestinians well into the future. Given the enormous international media attention this is receiving, the scale of that suffering is clearly problematic for Israel and its supporters like the U.S., though I suspect the Israeli calculus is that they have no choice but to continue current efforts.
00:09:13:03 - 00:09:39:10
Michael Nagata
Finally, regarding Iran and the implications of the recent U.S. strikes on Iranian supported actors, my current expectation is that the war in Gaza has opened a new and rather unpredictable phase of the decades old confrontation between U.S. and Iran. Right now, Iran is doing whatever it can to create strategic problems and distractions for the U.S. and for Israel, but without being pulled into a direct armed conflict with either.
00:09:39:12 - 00:10:01:21
Michael Nagata
I expect Iran will try to cement or expand the existing strategic fruits this war has created for them, such as the complete derailing of what most were starting to herald as an imminent and long sought after official recognition by Saudi Arabia of the State of Israel. That alone is an enormously profitable outcome for Iran, and I'm sure that it's headed their appetite for more.
00:10:01:23 - 00:10:30:23
Michael Nagata
Said more simply, the conflict between Israel and Hamas has now led to a kind of undeclared war between Iran and the United States that, while at relatively low levels at presence, is occurring within a region that is now awash with uncertainty and the rekindling of decades old grievances that had previously seemed to be on the ebb. That's all I have for you in terms of prepared remarks. I'll turn it back over.
00:10:31:00 - 00:10:39:00
Rachel Dooley
Thanks, General Nagata. Let's turn it over to Mick. Mick, where do you see things as they stand now?
00:10:39:02 - 00:11:02:05
Mick Mulroy
So greetings from Montana, and thank you for MEI for hosting this, and great to be with my friend Mike Nagata and everyone else. I think I'll start by just a very brief background. I was in the Marine Corps. I was what's called a paramilitary officer in the agency, CIA, which is our special operations component. And in that, I spent most of my career in conflict areas.
00:11:02:07 - 00:11:28:03
Mick Mulroy
And then lastly, I had the privilege of serving as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East, Undersecretary Esper, or Secretary Mattis, and then Secretary Esper. So I bring that up because a lot of my experience really is practical. It was the last part that was in the policy realm. And so I thought I'd hit a few things, you know, past some present and then some of the future and leave obviously enough time and time for you all to ask questions of me and Mike.
00:11:28:05 - 00:11:49:09
Mick Mulroy
So to start this, I think it's I think it's very clear, as somebody who used to be in the CIA, that this this was a pretty substantial intelligence failure. I point that out not to pour salt in the wounds. It's obvious and it's obvious that the United States have had our own, so I can certainly see this from the perspective of how do we correct it in the future.
00:11:49:11 - 00:12:12:22
Mick Mulroy
To me, it looked like there was a lot of indicators--again, hindsight being 2020--that this was coming and there's a lot of intelligence professionals that looked at this and trying to determine whether we have gotten too far away from human intelligence in relying too much on other forms of seeking it or, you know, basically communications intercept.
00:12:12:24 - 00:12:37:18
Mick Mulroy
The other part I'd say is it wasn't just an intelligence failure. It seems to be it's also a security failure. So, again, going on technology, which I think definitely has a place in all of this, but to be overreliant on it is not always the best case. There's many reports that they relied on remote cameras that could be taken offline and probably were either by direct attacks by drones, electronic warfare.
00:12:37:20 - 00:13:03:19
Mick Mulroy
They have remote weapon systems that if you don't have a camera, you can't see and can't be used. And then there was a long period of time between certainly that the Israelis would think this between when this attack happened and when support and the force started showing up. So, again, that's not to pour salt in the wounds, but it's it's part of what I think is going to be needed to ensure that this doesn't happen again.
00:13:03:21 - 00:13:47:08
Mick Mulroy
Is having a good defense. And I think that that fell short and perhaps the United States can help with that going forward. It is also important to point out just the depravity of the level of assault on the Israeli citizenship on October 7th. If you're not familiar with it, I don't imagine you'd be watching us right now. But it's it's worth knowing because it's it's so it's to such a level that I haven't seen, quite frankly, many other places that I think it was not only intended to terrorize, of course, civilian population in Israel, but potentially provoke an overreaction by the IDF because it just a level of of just atrocities.
00:13:47:10 - 00:14:11:23
Mick Mulroy
And then so I do think it's important to point out that just about every country on earth, certainly the United States, after an attack like that, would have as their stated objective, the destruction of the group that carried it out. I can't imagine anybody, including every country at the summit that Mike just referenced, wouldn't have that as their objective and wouldn't seek to do that to defend their citizenship in the future.
00:14:12:00 - 00:14:39:18
Mick Mulroy
But how you fight matters and I do think, you know, we've seen and you know, Mike and I and I'm sure plenty of people watching and a lot of my colleagues have fought in urban environments. And I everything that Mike said is 100% true. But before they went in there, they did a shaping operation that I think many will look back and try to determine whether there was accurate proportionality in the response to valid military targets.
00:14:39:20 - 00:14:59:09
Mick Mulroy
There was 9000 you know, correct me if I'm wrong, I know there's a lot of reporters out there should do about 9000 airstrikes prior to the ground invasion and just over a month. That's that's the same amount that we dropped in Afghanistan over the course of a year. And that was done in a place it's only 25 miles long and seven miles wide.
00:14:59:11 - 00:15:23:04
Mick Mulroy
Again, I'm not I don't want to be I'm not a general, but I'm not going to share general. But I'm familiar with the problems of that. And I think the United States in many of those cases, would have elected not to take to do the airstrike personally. Again, I'd say it's 2020, but I do think that is something that needs to be looked at so we can move forward and how this is going to happen in the future.
00:15:23:10 - 00:15:52:05
Mick Mulroy
Every country, regardless of what happens to them, is responsible for their own actions under the international rules of armed conflict. And now we're in a situation that the ground the major ground offensive has started. It is good. And I think early on, a lot of the people that were familiar, whether they're military intelligence or human rights, people that were familiar with urban fighting, were pushing hard for the civilians to leave northern Gaza.
00:15:52:07 - 00:16:27:19
Mick Mulroy
I think those groups that tried to say that was impossible did not help the situation. And we can see that hundreds of thousands, if not a million, have left. And that's a good thing. That is a good thing because in urban environments, distinguishing friend from foe is incredibly difficult, especially if your foe refuses to wear a uniform as is required and hides in in which is mostly non fire lists, places like hospitals and then hides behind civilians, it is incredibly difficult and everybody that helped to get civilians out of the north should be commended.
00:16:27:21 - 00:16:48:12
Mick Mulroy
I do think in this humanitarian catastrophe that's happened, we need to set up a safe zone. There needs to be field hospitals and we need to have an uninterrupted supply of humanitarian aid into southern Gaza, even if some of that aid ends up in Hamas. You cannot you cannot take out this on civilian populations.
00:16:48:13 - 00:17:23:16
Mick Mulroy
This could go on for a substantial period of time. If you look at Mosul in 2016, which a lot of people referenced, they had 9000 ISIS fighters. It took us nine months. That was with the Iraqi security forces, the Peshmerga, and a lot of support by the U.S. military, particularly special operations. Nine months. So it's estimated that Hamas has around 40,000 troops and over 300 miles of tunnels, which completely changes the the military problem, if you will.
00:17:23:17 - 00:17:47:08
Mick Mulroy
So this could take a substantial amount of time if their objective is still to destroy Hamas. But part of destroying Hamas would be also a plan to prevent them from reconstituting themselves, because this will all be for nought if that doesn't happen. And I think this gets into the broader issues that we might be covering here today. First, Iran.
00:17:47:10 - 00:18:11:19
Mick Mulroy
Iran is the common matter denominator in all of this. 90% of the military support to Hamas comes from Iran. They obviously support Hezbollah. They obviously support the Houthis. The groups in Syria and Iraq that are attacking our positions are backed by Iran. I know you all know this, but it seems to be lacking part of the public conversation of just how culpable they are in this.
00:18:11:21 - 00:18:30:06
Mick Mulroy
I understand why they had a summit. I think it was important they have a summit. I don't know why in many cases they brought the arsonist to watch the fire and talk about how to put it out, quite frankly. That just seems completely illogical to me. But we're going to have to deal with Iran starting with them.
00:18:30:08 - 00:18:47:19
Mick Mulroy
To Mike’s point, this is not new. We've seen our places attacked in Syria and Iraq certainly was happening when I was in the Pentagon. But if we have this concept of military deterrence, the one thing about the concept is it's a self created homework assignment. If they keep striking us and they keep intensifying the strikes, that deterrence isn't working.
00:18:47:21 - 00:19:07:15
Mick Mulroy
There's no other way to put it. I wish it was. We are going to have to come up with another way. If it if this is not working. We have an ultimate duty to protect our men and women that are serving in harm's way and their force protection is paramount. And if we're not deterring these attacks, and the only reason why they haven't been many more killed is because the effectiveness of our defense.
00:19:07:17 - 00:19:29:15
Mick Mulroy
Let's just be clear about that. So that could change rapidly if any of those fail and we take a lot of fatalities. So I would say when it comes to deterrence and I know we're doing what we can, but we're going to have to look at other ways if that doesn't effectively work. The other two points before I'll stop and open up for questions is we're going to have to look at what the way ahead is.
00:19:29:17 - 00:20:00:15
Mick Mulroy
You know, Israel is going to in their best to destroy Hamas. And if there's not an alternative to a long term occupation of the IDF, then they'll likely stay. And I don't think it's in their interest. I don't think it's in the region's interest excuse me or ours, but there has to be an alternative. So what is the international peacekeeping force going to look like that can go in there and be acceptable. And if we're not going to set it up and just criticize the IDF for staying there, then we're not really part of the solution here. We're more part of the chorus of critics.
00:20:00:17 - 00:20:11:03
Mick Mulroy
The other part I would say is what's the long term political solution? Obviously, Hamas should never be in control of any territory, but how are we going to get the Palestinian Authority back in charge?
00:20:11:08 - 00:20:28:20
Mick Mulroy
What is it going to look like? How are we going to support it? What's the international fund to be to rebuild Gaza so we can change the situation in the future and not just have the Palestinian people play a part of everybody else's politics? Because I think that is what we all would be better for, and particularly the Palestinian people.
00:20:28:21 - 00:20:32:14
Mick Mulroy
So I'll stop there and turn it back over to you, Rachel.
00:20:32:16 - 00:20:51:04
Rachel Dooley
Thank you, Mick. All right. As you said at this point, we will welcome questions from our participants. You can use the race hand function on your screen. And then when I call on you, we will unmute you and you can go ahead and introduce yourself and your organization. And then please direct your question to one of our panelists.
00:20:51:06 - 00:20:58:07
Rachel Dooley
So it looks like we have a question from Missy Ryan from the Washington Post. Missy, I'll let you go ahead.
00:20:58:09 - 00:21:00:24
Missy Ryan (Washington Post)
Hi there. Can you hear me okay?
00:21:01:00 - 00:21:02:09
Mick Mulroy
I can hear you, Missy.
00:21:02:11 - 00:22:11:03
Missy Ryan (Washington Post)
Thanks so much for for doing this and for taking taking the time. I just wanted to ask both of you in regard I think you lay out such a compelling case about the difficulty of these kind of operations inherently. But I'm wondering, you know, if you were in the US military right now or the administration, what kind of information do you think that the Biden administration should be asking for from the Israeli military to get a better sense of how the whether they're conducting the operations in as prudent a manner as the Biden administration says that they hope is happening? You know, what is what is reasonable to expect in terms of sharing rules of engagement or information about procedures to protect civilians in this kind of scenario, munitions, etc.. What do you think they should be doing sort of as specifically as possible to get the information that they need to make their own decisions? Thanks.
00:22:11:05 - 00:22:14:17
Mick Mulroy
Mike, do you want to start and then I'll follow?
00:22:14:19 - 00:22:45:11
Michael Nagata
Hey, Missy, Excellent question. But the answer is going to be awfully tricky for somebody who is not in government to effectively answer. But I'll give it my best shot. The first thing I thought of as I was listening to your question is that the United States is going to have to strike a very tricky balance here. You know, we are allies of the state of Israel, and obviously we are supporting Israel in a variety of different ways and have for many decades now.
00:22:45:13 - 00:23:14:08
Michael Nagata
But the reason it's tricky is because the degree to which we at we try to get deeper and deeper into Israeli policy strategy and tactical calculations, the more of a burden we become for them. And that can not only hamper what our allies are trying to do, it can actually damage the relationship we need to sustain with them.
00:23:14:10 - 00:23:58:05
Michael Nagata
So my own experience with things like this, although I never had to operate on Israeli territory, is that this is a very delicate this is a very delicate balance that one has to strike in terms of, on the one hand, as an important ally, we deserve to know what our ally is trying to do, the way they're going about it, the risks they're running, particularly if those risks could potentially blow back on us, but balanced against the fact that we could become more of a hindrance to them than a help to them if we get too deep into their knickers, get too deep into the weeds with them, we could actually end up damaging our
00:23:58:05 - 00:24:22:11
Michael Nagata
relationship with them, which is the last thing we want. So that's a long winded way of saying I'm sure that people in the Pentagon and the administration, in the Department of State are trying to both, on the one hand, understand better what the Israelis are trying to accomplish and the ways in which they are trying to go about it, but on the other hand, not get so deep into the weeds that we end up slowing them down.
00:24:22:11 - 00:24:35:15
Michael Nagata
We end up making them less effective or we actually end up breaking some part of our relationship with them. So it is it is the art of compromise is fundamentally my answer.
00:24:35:17 - 00:24:55:13
Mick Mulroy
So Missy, I certainly would agree with Mike on that point. I think one of the reasons why we saw fairly early on, Lieutenant General Glenn, the three star Marine general, former MARSOC commander who was involved in the fighting in Mosul that I referenced, go over there, was to do, you know, part of a red teaming, if you will.
00:24:55:13 - 00:25:17:05
Mick Mulroy
But also, I think there was already some indications that the proportionality when it came to these strikes were a little problematic. And some people had questions. And I think that's one of the reasons why he went over there. You know, I don't know how well that was received, but it certainly is something I think the United States is a role that we should play.
00:25:17:07 - 00:25:44:00
Mick Mulroy
We provide an incredible amount of security assistance to Israel. I think everybody knows that. And we are and we often are their voice other than them in the U.N.. So I think we do have the responsibility and quite frankly, the right to know how this is going to be conducted. Maybe not to get into the weeds and tell them how to conduct it, but certainly to provide, I think, feedback on this is important for the United States.
00:25:44:02 - 00:26:14:00
Mick Mulroy
They’re our partner where we are going to answer those questions regardless of whether we have input or not. And I think it's important that we do. I would also say that addition to everything that is difficult about this urban environment, these tunnels are incredibly difficult to deal with. So if you use these and I'm no expert on it, perhaps Mike could jump in on this, but I've talked to some of these ground penetrating munitions that are effective against tunnels.
00:26:14:02 - 00:26:57:19
Mick Mulroy
They can be very difficult to use in urban environments because they generally penetrate up to 100 feet before the secondary explosion happens, which can collapse a tunnel, which, of course, if it's in a crowded area, could collapse a building. So those are kind of things that I think that our experts, our uniformed experts, not the policy people, but the uniformed actually should really help at how to employ some of these weapon systems are very effective in certain environments and certainly not in others. I'm not saying that that this would cause all these casualties, but certainly those types of advice by our uniformed military coming out of the Pentagon can be helpful if they haven't been used before or if a new version. You know, I know that's pretty specific, but it is very important.
00:26:57:19 - 00:27:16:06
Mick Mulroy
I think the United States does, without becoming in an interference, as Mike said, or becoming overburdened to them, does have have, I think, the right and responsibility to have at least an input of how this is being executed, particularly since we provide so much of the security assistance and weapons systems is being used.
00:27:16:08 - 00:27:34:01
Michael Nagata
Missy, before before you go, I do want to add one thing that Nick's comments just brought to mind. I've already talked about the fact that if we if the U.S. tries to probe too deeply into what the Israelis are doing at the tactical level, we could end up causing more harm than we end up being helpful to them.
00:27:34:03 - 00:28:00:08
Michael Nagata
But there's there's also the possibility and this has actually happened to me in other arenas where because the U.S. decided it wanted to know even greater levels of detail of what a partner was trying to accomplish, they stopped talking to us, and that's the last thing we can afford. We go from limited awareness of what our partner is doing to no awareness.
00:28:00:08 - 00:28:11:15
Michael Nagata
In other words, it backfires on us. And that's something that I'm sure Mick and my former colleagues are having to be mindful of these days.
00:28:11:17 - 00:28:18:13
Rachel Dooley
Great. Thank you both. It looks like we'll turn to Courtney Kube, NBC.
00:28:18:15 - 00:28:47:02
Courtney Kube (NBC)
Hi thank you so much, Rachel. A couple of things. So, Mick, when you said that about the the idea that the strikes in Syria don't appear to be deterring these attacks against bases in Iraq and Syria, because we’ve already seen a number more of them since the last ones, what do you think the U.S. could or should do that would be effective as a deterrent? Do you think it would be strikes inside Iran? And what about strikes inside Yemen with the Houthis who have been super active since all of this started?
00:28:47:04 - 00:29:30:13
Courtney Kube (NBC)
And then to either of you, I'm just curious. I know you're not in government anymore, but there's been so much talk about al-Shifa and the U.S.. What? And what, if any, intelligence the United States may have about whether there actually is a command and control center underneath the hospital? And I'm wondering if you think there's any possibility that the U.S. would have independent intelligence about that, because it seems like a lot of the stuff that we've been hearing that is, you know, a U.S. assessment is really just stuff that they're getting from the IDF but they believe to be credible, but it's not actually gathered by the U.S. So I'm wondering if you think it's even possible the U.S. has intelligence about what's actually under al-Shifa. Thank you very much.
00:29:30:15 - 00:29:52:13
Mick Mulroy
Sure. And I can start. So, first of all, it's no easy answers. I don't want to act like there is when it comes to deterring Iran. I do think that they and I'm sure General Kurilla at CENTCOM has has a laundry list of targets. I hope that they're available, that he does have the ability to intensify the reaction and potentially expand it.
00:29:52:15 - 00:30:16:01
Mick Mulroy
Obviously, we don't don't want to go to war with Iran. There should be no desire to start taking strikes into Iran. But certainly to your point, Courtney, we have a lot of IRGC officers that are located not just in Syria, but also in countries like Yemen. And they're there to also assist their proxy forces in attacking Israel as well.
00:30:16:02 - 00:30:36:06
Mick Mulroy
We've seen that with the Houthis recently with their cruise missiles and their long range drones. So I do think we have to have a list that's increasingly more significant when it comes to IRGC officers lives in not just their proxies, because, you know, the IRGC has no problem fighting to the last man when it comes to their proxies.
00:30:36:12 - 00:30:57:13
Mick Mulroy
They need to feel the pain, too. And then if we have to expand it, then unfortunately, I think we should look at that. I would be very hesitant to start taking strikes in Iran, but I also wouldn't take it off the table either, because I don't think that does anything for us when it comes to strategic clarity. I think we should leave that on the table because we don't know where they're going to go with this.
00:30:57:15 - 00:31:17:02
Mick Mulroy
And I think that's important. Also like to point out it's not just military responses, right? There's obviously economic responses that we could do to intensify the pain and diplomatic responses which we were on the road when it comes to normalizing a lot of the relationships with Israel. I think that was a substantial thing. Mike brought it up during the opening comments, I should have.
00:31:17:04 - 00:31:31:00
Mick Mulroy
That was another thing I think Iran wanted to do. They wanted to disrupt that and they did. And I think that's something else that could be a way to try to isolate Iran. So that was deterrence issue. The second issue, if you could just...
00:31:31:02 - 00:31:33:06
Courtney Kube (NBC)
Al-Shifa, if you think that the...
00:31:33:08 - 00:31:54:07
Mick Mulroy
Yeah. Yeah, I totally got it, Courtney. Okay. So I do I do think it's a couple of things to remember. The Israelis were there before. Right. So they have they're familiar with a lot of the the facilities, what’s there, what’s not there. I don't know that they did this, but most smart militaries would have some kind of stay behind capability.
00:31:54:09 - 00:32:15:12
Mick Mulroy
Again, nongovernment. I have no idea. This is just me as an analyst speculating. So there's potentially they had some stay behind capability to determine who was in these tunnels, who was in these facilities. I also don't think, you know, the United States, we should have some intelligence capability there to determine whether it's true, whether it's intercepts. But I don't I don't know what it is.
00:32:15:14 - 00:32:35:20
Mick Mulroy
Hopefully, somebody has some human assets there. We should have the capacity to determine some of these things. And if I do believe that if our intelligence community came out in support of the fact that they're using this hospital, you know I'm biased, of course, but I do believe that that's that's likely the case. And we should look at it as such.
00:32:35:22 - 00:33:00:11
Mick Mulroy
And I don't see why if you were looking at it from Hamas's perspective, why would they have showed complete, uncaring of their own civilian population? They've I don't think they just had hid behind them. I think they tried to maximize casualties for their own really for political gain. So I don't think I think it's likely if you look at it from their perspective, I think the Israelis probably have some way of knowing this.
00:33:00:12 - 00:33:10:22
Mick Mulroy
If I if I was there before and I left, I would. And I do think the United States would not have issued that judgment if it wasn't something they believe was true.
00:33:10:24 - 00:33:13:14
Courtney Kube (NBC)
Do you agree, General Nagata?
00:33:13:16 - 00:33:38:11
Michael Nagata
I do. I'll add a little bit. I'll start with the hospital part first. The I don't I have no idea whether or not the U.S. intelligence community, the Israelis or anybody else has verifiable, valid data about a command and control center under that hospital. But I will also say from my previous experience elsewhere, my hunch is it doesn't matter very much.
00:33:38:13 - 00:34:09:23
Michael Nagata
My impression of Hamas is that it operates as a networked guerrilla style organization, and it really doesn't have a central nervous system. It doesn't have a brain stem that if you destroy it, the whole thing just falls apart. That that's not the way these kinds of organizations function. You may recall a book that was very fashionable several years ago called The Spider and the Starfish, where it made this argument that you can kill a spider by just chopping off its head, but a starfish has no head to chop off.
00:34:09:23 - 00:34:35:02
Michael Nagata
You can cut off a limb and it will just regrow the limb and be just fine. If that's an applicable analogy here. Hamas is far more a starfish than it is a spider. So even if there is a some sort of command and control structure, and even if the Israelis can effectively attack it or strike it or destroy it, I my personal opinion is that Hamas will be just fine without it.
00:34:35:04 - 00:35:00:07
Michael Nagata
They've had years to get ready for this kind of conflict. They don't operate in a centrally directed, classic military operating style where if you kill the head, the body withers. That's just not what this organization is. It is a very resilient, adaptive organization, and it will survive a strike on such a command and control center just fine. And then finally, going back to your question about Iran.
00:35:00:09 - 00:35:48:24
Michael Nagata
There's a big difference between U.S. strikes that that that seek to deter Iran from continuing attack U.S. forces in the region versus U.S. strikes or other military operations or frankly, any other kind of government operation that changes Iranian behavior. The first is tactical, the second is strategic. We're very good at identifying the source of a strike on an American outpost somewhere in the Middle East and then very rapidly, very accurately, very effectively responding in kind in a way that prevents that particular system, that particular instrument, from attacking us again.
00:35:49:01 - 00:36:26:11
Michael Nagata
We're excellent at that. What we're not good at is changing Iranian behavior. I'm sure you can remember over multiple presidential administrations now with one of our one of our most common strategic talking points, as has been, we we must change Iran's strategic behavior. We have not. And, in fact, I would argue that, unfortunately, the current circumstances around Israel and Hamas have created a much more fertile ground for Iranian misbehavior than existed before seven October.
00:36:26:13 - 00:36:28:11
Courtney Kube (NBC)
Thank you. Thanks, Rachel.
00:36:28:13 - 00:36:50:17
Rachel Dooley
Great. Thank you both. I have a question from Ellen Knickmeyer at the Associated Press. And you've touched on this both a little bit, but Mick I’ll go to you first. Has the U.S. confirmed? Do you have any idea of the U.S. has confirmed to its own satisfaction that Hamas has military headquarters and other targets under hospitals, as Israel says?
00:36:50:19 - 00:37:15:24
Mick Mulroy
So I don't I don't know that that's the case. I imagine they have they have fighters potentially, you know, ammo storage sites, all the stuff in places that is least likely to be struck. And that is things that are traditionally on the no strike list. So hospitals, schools, U.N. facilities, you know, religious establishments. I do. I do think to Mike's point, they're going to be dispersed.
00:37:15:24 - 00:37:43:19
Mick Mulroy
They're not going to they're not going to have a situation where you kill, kill the head and they're all there. It's over. But I do think they're going to try to preserve the things that matter to them most, and that would include the things I already referenced, plus a hostages, of course, they're going to be somewhere in those tunnel systems, probably. But I do think that that's likely. But I have no information on that specifically.
00:37:43:21 - 00:37:53:08
Rachel Dooley
Thank you. And I'm going to go to Bilal Saab from MEI.
00:37:53:10 - 00:38:12:13
Bilal Saab (MEI)
Right. Can you guys hear me? Mick, Mike, you guys are always terrific. You're going to hate me for that question. But I have to ask it. I was actually asked that question yesterday on Meet the Press. I'm not sure I did a good job with that. So they showed me a clip of Bibi Netanyahu saying that they have two goals behind this campaign.
00:38:12:13 - 00:38:38:20
Bilal Saab (MEI)
One is to demilitarize the Gaza Strip and the other is to de-radicalize it. Those were the words of Bibi Netanyahu. So as Americans, as United States government, should we stand behind these lofty goals or is this does there come a point where we say, well, there's a limit to how much we can support this because we feel like this is getting a little bit too unrealistic?
00:38:38:22 - 00:39:08:11
Mick Mulroy
Sure. Thanks Bilal. I think take them separately. The demilitarize. That's something that the United States can help, of course, because so much of their weapons, munitions, advanced technology comes from outside, likely Iran. And I think that the international community can perhaps do a better job of preventing that from getting in there. And if it is in there that there's that there's a way a security force they can confiscate it, destroy it, etc., much easier said than done, of course.
00:39:08:16 - 00:39:56:14
Mick Mulroy
But I do think that's plausible. You know, from a practical experience, the deradicalisation, let's face it, you know, look at the United States experience of that 20 years from where, for example, ISIS, you know, starting in one, two countries and now it's in over 30. So I think that is a much more lofty goal. And quite frankly, it goes to the, but what I think we've talked about already, the proportionality, how one conducts an offensive matters. You know, I don't know how many military units, including my own paramilitary unit, that had on the wall, you know, “Be careful that this operation doesn't cause more terrorists than it takes out.” And so it does matter how you conduct these operations to the extent that that this you know, it'll it'll to be determined.
00:39:56:16 - 00:40:13:03
Mick Mulroy
But I think there's indications that it was pretty heavy handed and the proportionality wasn't there. And if that's the way that's going to be conducted, you're never going to de-radicalize Gaza or any other place that went through this level of conflict.
00:40:13:05 - 00:40:42:24
Michael Nagata
I probably don't have much to add here, although it went up when I was listening to the questions you got asked, my immediate reaction was like probably similar to what I imagine your reaction was. When somebody uses the word demilitarize or de-radicalize, what does that mean? You can define either those terms or a dozen different ways. And without knowing what Netanyahu or anybody else means when they say words like that, there's almost no way to effectively analyze or even respond to it.
00:40:42:24 - 00:41:37:07
Michael Nagata
But I will I'm taking a leaf a little bit out of Mick's book here. But the what's the difference between demilitarization and societal oppression? What's the difference between deradicalization and societal oppression? There is a difference, but it's a bit of a in my view, it's a bit of a sliding scale. And without knowing where on that scale the Israelis intend to land, it could be a distinction without a difference. It could just be perceived by not just the inhabitants of Gaza, but by all the nations of the Middle East as just a new way of describing what they have always perceived as unjustifiable Israeli oppression.
00:41:37:09 - 00:41:46:21
Rachel Dooley
Thank you both. I'm going to turn to Brad Dress at the Hill.
00:41:46:23 - 00:41:48:19
Brad Dress (The Hill)
Hi. Can you hear me?
00:41:48:21 - 00:41:49:21
Rachel Dooley
Yes, we can.
00:41:49:23 - 00:42:18:07
Brad Dress (The Hill)
Right. Yeah. Thank you for doing this. So I just wanted to build on the other questions about the fighting around the hospitals. So if Hamas is operating out of these hospitals and technically makes them a legitimate military target, but it sounds like you raise questions about going after Hamas at these sites. Do you think Israel can destroy Hamas, as it has vowed to do, if it doesn't go after them in every base of operations? So, in other words, can these hospitals be avoided? Thank you.
00:42:18:09 - 00:42:45:09
Michael Nagata
I'll start. I'm going to broaden your question a little bit. I don't think it's actually feasible for Israel to completely destroy Hamas, regardless of circumstance. They can certainly inflict grievous injury on Hamas and they are doing so right now. But whether or not they are, they are willing to go after command and control or other important sites that are hidden within hospitals or religious sites or what have you.
00:42:45:11 - 00:43:03:22
Michael Nagata
Even if they do, they the notion that they're going to completely destroy Hamas, from my point of view, is unachievable. Some elements of Hamas will survive. They will live to fight another day. They may have to do it from somewhere other than Gaza, but they're not going to go away. There are too many of them. They're too committed.
00:43:03:24 - 00:43:47:04
Michael Nagata
And no matter how adept the Israelis are in applying military force, some of the problems I have with with Hamas defy military solutions. Now, having said all that, the other thing that the Israelis have to factor in, and I'm sure they are, is that as long as this struggle continues and the reports of increasing volumes of human suffering and innocent civilian casualties continue to compound themselves, this is going to become much more difficult for the Israelis to sustain, no matter how politically committed they may be to their goals.
00:43:47:06 - 00:44:13:08
Michael Nagata
External criticism and external support matter to Israel. And eventually they're going to have to there's going to have to be a reckoning between their aspirations to completely purge Gaza of Hamas versus the fact that if they lose enough international support, all of this becomes impossible.
00:44:13:10 - 00:44:35:06
Mick Mulroy
So I agree it's going to be extraordinarily difficult to destroy Hamas. And it's also really depends on your definition. I know there's a military definition, but Hamas is obviously much more than just a military entity. So that's another part of the difference. And also also incorporate the idea that they have to consider diplomacy as one of their one of their ways to do so.
00:44:35:07 - 00:45:04:17
Mick Mulroy
And that goes to how they conduct this war as well. And they have a very substantial covert capability, I would say. And I think I can say that. And I think they should look at all of those all of those ways to do so. It'd still be very difficult. But specifically for the for the hospital, it the use of a hospital by a combatant force is against the law of international combat, not that anybody is holding Hamas to any standard here, but they're obviously not meeting any standard as well.
00:45:04:20 - 00:45:25:12
Mick Mulroy
So they've created the idea that the hospital itself is a valid military target because they're in it. They're the valid military target and they're in it. If they left, it would no longer be a valid military target. So this makes it extraordinarily difficult for these young soldiers to be able to go and fight people that are obviously don't care about the civilians that they're surrounded by.
00:45:25:14 - 00:45:51:21
Mick Mulroy
But they have to and they are legally required to. So it is it it makes it everything that, you know, Mike and I've said so far about about warfare plus this, plus the massive amount of scrutiny of trying to fight in and around something that normally would be protected. You know, you have newborns that are in ICU and you're trying to defeat the enemy, trying not to get killed and trying to limit any kind of civilian casualties to the best of your ability.
00:45:51:23 - 00:46:17:24
Mick Mulroy
So it is ultimately Hamas who's caused this, but it is the IDF, because everybody is responsible for their own actions. It has to do everything they can to avoid these civilian casualties. That's why I think these tactical pauses should be used to, you know, bring ambulances, whatever is needed to get as many people out of these hospitals who potentially could not have gotten out before because they just didn't have the technology, the you know, the medical equipment to be able to do it.
00:46:18:01 - 00:46:33:07
Mick Mulroy
And I think that's something that should be pushed for. But also, they are creating a situation where things that traditionally aren't valid military targets are becoming because they're in those facilities.
00:46:33:09 - 00:46:41:09
Rachel Dooley
Thank you both. Now we'll go to Jay Solomon at Semafor.
00:46:41:11 - 00:47:10:03
Jay Solomon (Semafor)
Thanks for doing this. I'm curious what you guys think should be done with Qatar in this, in the sense that even if Israel destroys Hamas's, you know, leadership in Gaza, you still have a big part of this leadership in Qatar sort of protected, having material support, diplomatic support. I'm just curious, because this conflict is in some ways beyond just the Gaza Strip.
00:47:10:05 - 00:47:32:18
Michael Nagata
All right. I'll take the first crack at it, although this is obviously more a political question, than it is a military one. But I'm a retired military, so what the heck? The I mean, you're pointing at something that is an enormously complicating factor, both for the Israelis as well as those that support Israel like the United States. And the fact, as I already alluded to, Hamas is a network.
00:47:32:20 - 00:47:58:12
Michael Nagata
It doesn't really have a central nervous system. It really doesn't have, you know, a set of core organs that if you somehow can eliminate them, the whole thing just goes away. And there is nothing more networked about Hamas than the dispersal of both their leadership as well as their benefactors around the region and frankly, around the world. So what can be done about that?
00:47:58:14 - 00:48:33:11
Michael Nagata
There are there are things that the international community could, if it is willing to do so, do to hamper that network, that network. I don't think it's conceivable to eliminate that network, but it would be rather predictable. Things like restricting travel, denying visas and passports where there is some legal justification for confiscating finances or limiting travel or hampering communications, what have you, all that theoretically could be done.
00:48:33:13 - 00:49:12:09
Michael Nagata
But given how riven public opinion is internationally about the causes and the justifications and and the and whether or not anybody's following the rule of law in this current conflict, the idea that the international community could stitch itself together well enough to take apart this network leadership that Hamas has, whether it's in Qatar or anywhere else, sounds to me rather fanciful at this early juncture. Maybe it'll be possible in the future. Right now, I can't see how it's feasible.
00:49:12:11 - 00:49:35:21
Mick Mulroy
So I would say I recently talked to somebody fairly senior, no longer in government who said essentially all the relationships they have or most of them are done at our request. So I do think sometimes they get grief for doing something that we ask them to do. And what I point out is, you know, if you were if you were against the Doha agreement that led to the withdrawal of our forces from Afghanistan, it wasn't their fault.
00:49:36:01 - 00:49:55:04
Mick Mulroy
We asked them to host to host a conference. And then we are the ones who made the decisions, not not them. And I think it's important if we want them to do this valuable service in the future, that we start recognizing that. They're not responsible for the decisions we make while we hold a conference and they're in their city because they're there, have the only city that both sides will go to.
00:49:55:06 - 00:50:14:24
Mick Mulroy
Right. Or whether it's trying to get back in the JCPOA because they have the relationship with Iran to talk about it. Whether we do or don't is a policy decision on our side. The fact that they facilitated I think we should all appreciate because now we're going multiple--I don't do politics. I stick to the easy things like war and peace--of going through multiple administrations here.
00:50:15:03 - 00:50:35:23
Mick Mulroy
So Trump administration Doha agreement, trying to get back in the JCPOA. Right. The Biden administration. And now there's a reason why the director of the CIA per news reports and head of Mossad was in Doha last week. Right. Because they have to have the ability to talk to people that could do things like get all the hostages relief.
00:50:35:23 - 00:50:59:01
Mick Mulroy
And I would say everybody agrees with that one, that we need all the hostages released. So I point that out because sometimes I think they and other partners, but they're the ones you asked about Qatar, that they do things at our request and then they get criticism based on what we decided to do. Right. And so, yes, I think it's, you know, the idea that there's some Hamas leader living in luxury in Qatar is not a good thing.
00:50:59:04 - 00:51:31:21
Mick Mulroy
But that might have been the whole reason, because they are there, that we had that meeting last week where we might get hostages out because maybe they wouldn't have that level of connectivity. So that's that's what I would I would throw that there. Also, when it comes to humanitarian aid in Gaza, I am pretty sure that that's completely coordinated and it's in everybody's best interest that the humanitarian aid--and I'm talking pre-October 7th, but certainly now too--gets into Gaza to people that need it. Around 67% is the stat that I saw, of people living in Gaza rely on food aid.
00:51:31:23 - 00:51:54:09
Mick Mulroy
So it is important that countries do provide humanitarian aid to people in need. If you want to create a even worse situation, cut that off. So I would suggest that those two points, and not just specifically Qatar, who is playing a valuable role in the hostages, obviously, but partners that have the ability to talk to our adversaries are significantly important to U.S. national security policy.
00:51:54:11 - 00:52:08:16
Mick Mulroy
And I think that's what should be looked at. Criticize the policy for sure if you want to, but focus on who actually made the policy decision.
00:52:08:18 - 00:52:28:03
Rachel Dooley
All right. Thanks, everyone. Without any more questions, we're going to wrap it up here. And if you have any additional questions, you can go ahead and email me at rdooley@mei.edu, and I'll share it with the correct person and then we can go from there. But thank you all for joining us for this on the record briefing.
00:52:28:03 - 00:52:41:23
Rachel Dooley
And if you want to take a look at any of our additional resources, you can find them on our website at mei.edu. And I want to thank our two distinguished panelists, General Michael Nagata and Mick Mulroy. Thank you both for your insight and thank you all for spending part of your day with us.