Building Syria’s new army: Future plans and the challenges ahead

After leading the lighting campaign that toppled Bashar al-Assad’s regime on Dec. 8, 2024, Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s interim president, quickly began working to form a unified national army, dismantle the existing factions, and centralize all weapons under the authority of the state in an effort to address one of the most pressing challenges facing his administration.

While several initial moves have been completed, important steps in this complicated process are still pending. This article highlights the current developments surrounding the formation of the new army, including progress achieved to date and key challenges going forward.

The military landscape after the fall of the regime

With the collapse of the Assad regime and the disintegration of the Syrian army and intelligence services, which had long constituted the backbone of the state’s military power, the military landscape came to be dominated by several armed blocs. The following are groups Damascus will need to either incorporate, in part or in whole, or reckon with as it builds Syria’s new army.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Sharaa, emerged as the primary force managing military operations. It is organized into six brigades, along with special forces and elite units known as the “Red Bands.” Supporting HTS is the National Liberation Front (NLF), a coalition of various Islamist factions and remnants of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), originally established by defecting Syrian Army officers. Its largest formation is Faylaq al-Sham (the Sham Legion), whose fighters are mostly drawn from the countryside of Hama, Idlib, Latakia, and Aleppo. Together, HTS and its allies command an estimated 40,000 fighters and were the main force that toppled Assad’s regime and seized control of most of Syria, excluding the eastern regions (held by the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF) and the south (Suwayda and Daraa). Most NLF fighters chose to remain in their native areas after control over the country was consolidated.

HTS also includes a significant number of foreign fighters, most of whom are part of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), which has around 3,500 members living with their families in Jisr al-Shughur in Idlib Governorate. They have been joined by a small contingent of Chechen fighters who were once part of the now-defunct Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (Army of Emigrants and Supporters), the majority of whose members had previously pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS). Another foreign contingent is the Balkan Battalion, composed of 200-300 fighters from Europe and the Balkans. Many foreign fighters have also joined Hurras al-Din (Guardians of Religion), an al-Qaeda-linked group that announced its dissolution in January 2025.

The Syrian National Army

The Syrian National Army (SNA) consists of a wide spectrum of factions with diverse backgrounds. Some have Islamist leanings, others are former FSA units, and a portion of the forces are ethnically Turkmen. Turkey shaped the SNA’s structure and finances it through its own defense budget. SNA factions are currently participating in the “Dawn of Freedom” offensive targeting the SDF in eastern Syria. Some of these factions previously fought fierce battles against al-Nusra Front, HTS’s predecessor, such as Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam) in Damascus’s Eastern Ghouta and Ahrar al-Sham (Free Men of the Levant) in Idlib and rural Aleppo. Tensions remained high between these groups and HTS up until just days before the regime’s fall and the seizure of Damascus. Notably, a significant portion of Jaysh al-Islam’s leadership has since returned to Eastern Ghouta.

Unlike HTS, the SNA regards the SDF as its primary adversary. In contrast, President Sharaa is attempting to pursue a more independent approach from Turkey in dealing with the Kurdish fighter issue — an approach that is currently hindering the integration of SNA factions into the army he seeks to build.

Syrian Free Army

The Syrian Free Army (SFA), formerly Maghawir al-Thawra (Revolutionary Commando Army), is the smallest faction in terms of size and manpower. It is primarily situated at al-Tanf base, with its main mission being the fight against ISIS. The group’s decision-making is closely aligned with the priorities of the United States, and its leadership prefers to wait and see how developments in Damascus play out before deciding whether to join the new army. However, the US command may push for its eventual integration into the new force, while maintaining its mission at al-Tanf base. The SFA’s leadership has already met with Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra in Damascus, and the two sides agreed to establish military and security coordination.

Syrian Democratic Forces

The SDF represents the largest military faction on Syrian soil — so large, in fact, that it could be described as an army by itself. The SDF consists of more than 50,000 fighters, approximately 40% of whom are Kurdish, while the rest are Arab. The SDF controls roughly one-third of Syria’s territory and enjoys strong support from the United States and, to a lesser extent, France. This international backing has made the group more uncompromising in its conditions for joining the new national army. Although the fall of the Assad regime and the Turkish-backed offensive by the SNA put the SDF in a weakened defensive posture, the group still holds significant leverage in negotiations with the new government in Damascus thanks to its well-trained military force and explicit international backing.

The Eighth Brigade

The Eighth Brigade is one of the largest military formations in Daraa, with around 1,200 fighters under the leadership of Ahmed al-Awda. It is considered an extension of the “Youth of Sunna Brigade,” formed in 2012 to combat the now-ousted regime’s forces and allied militias in Daraa. After the 2018 Russian-brokered reconciliation agreement, the brigade was incorporated into the Syrian Army’s Fifth Corps, though it largely retained operational independence. In April 2025, the brigade announced its dissolution and handed over all its personnel and military assets to the Ministry of Defense.

The Suwayda Bloc

This bloc comprises five main Druze factions with several thousand fighters in total. The largest of these is the “Men of Dignity Movement,” led by Yahya al-Hajjar and made up of members from most of Suwayda’s prominent families. Other groups include the “Mountain Brigade,” led by Shakib Azzam; the “Free Mountain Assembly,” a faction with long-standing ties to HTS and led by Suleiman Abdel-Baqi; and the “Sheikh al-Karama Forces,” a small but elite unit led by Laith al-Balous.

Former Alawite military personnel

According to Syrian military sources, there were approximately 70,000 Alawite officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in the Syrian armed forces, most of which were volunteers. A high percentage of them are unlikely to be reintegrated into the new army due to accusations of war crimes, and most Alawite officers are now on wanted lists. What makes this issue particularly sensitive is that a large number of Alawites were employed across the military, intelligence services, the Ministry of Defense, and affiliated militias. They are all still on government payrolls. The new administration is considering cutting off these salaries, according to information gathered in discussions with government officials. This would have a significant impact on the Alawite community, traditionally the most deeply integrated into the Syrian state and heavily reliant on its wages and privileges, and would likely have broader economic consequences. So far, this group remains unorganized. Most of its ranking officers and members have taken refuge in the Alawite mountains, and some analysts expect they may regroup and launch attacks against the new Syrian administration, just as occurred during the unrest in the Syrian coastal region in March. The current leadership seems ill-equipped to manage this volatile issue without resorting to sectarian retaliation.

The Victory Conference and the Syrian army formation plan

On Jan. 29, 2025, Damascus hosted a national dialogue dubbed the “Victory Conference.” During this event, Sharaa was formally appointed president of Syria’s transitional government by the commanders of the factions that participated in the takeover of Damascus, along with Turkish-backed groups. Notably absent from the conference were the SDF, Suwayda factions, and the Eighth Brigade, raising questions about their future stance and how the new administration intends to deal with them.

Prior to the conference, on Dec. 25, 2024, the transitional Syrian government announced that it had reached an agreement with all armed factions to dissolve their forces and integrate them under the Ministry of Defense. This move followed a meeting between Sharaa and faction leaders, after which key individuals close to him were granted military ranks and appointed to senior positions in the new ministry. Murhaf Abu Qasra, for example, was given the rank of major general and appointed minister of defense, while Ali al-Na’san received the same rank and was made chief of staff.

Sharaa and the transitional government aim to establish a new national army with a centralized command structure and formal military hierarchy, modeled after conventional state armies. The force would be composed of fighters from more than 60 different factions and formations, as well as former Syrian army officers, both those still in the country and those in exile. The army formation plan is structured into at least three phases, according to an official in the Ministry of Defense who spoke privately with the author.

The first phase includes equipping military bases, building the organizational structure, promotions, appointments, and the geographic deployment of forces. It also involves forming military divisions across all Syrian regions and integrating factions, along with their weapons, into these new formations. Each faction leader would remain in command of his or her unit, which would in turn be overseen by a defector officer previously affiliated with the SNA or the Military Operations Command, all under the authority of the Ministry of Defense. Notably, no official documents have been released outlining the exact nature of this new army, apart from the abolition of mandatory conscription, which suggests that Syria’s new leadership is aiming to create a force with guaranteed loyalty. The military doctrine, including the designation of a common enemy, has yet to be defined, likely to avoid conflict among factions with divergent affiliations and loyalties.

In the second phase, specialized military formations such as air-defense, infantry, and armored units will be created. Select fighters from existing factions will be reassigned to these specialized formations and merged into them, a move designed to prevent cohesive faction-based blocs from forming within the army — something the administration is keen to avoid.

The third phase will be contingent on negotiations with the SDF, as the integration of the SNA into the new national force is tied to this outcome. Despite Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s announcement that Turkey has instructed SNA factions to join Syria’s Ministry of Defense, Syrian sources confirmed to the author that this directive does not currently apply to Turkmen factions (namely, al-Amshat, al-Hamzat, and the Sultan Murad Division), although their leaders attended the Victory Conference. The full integration of the SNA may be deferred until the SDF issue is resolved.

Syrian Defense Minister Maj. Gen. Murhaf Abu Qasra announced on May 17 that “all military units in the country have been merged under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defense, in a move aimed at unifying the military structure within a single institutional framework,” an achievement that would not have occurred, he added, “without the collective efforts of everyone involved.”

In the same statement, Abu Qasra emphasized the need for “all remaining” small military groups to join the ministry within 10 days and warned there would be legal consequences for failure to comply. The SDF was explicitly exempted from this deadline, as negotiations are still ongoing to integrate both its military and civil structures into the Syrian state. This process follows an agreement signed on March 10, 2025, between President Sharaa and Gen. Mazloum Abdi, the head of the SDF.

Meanwhile, the military blocs in Suwayda appear to be outside the ministry’s current integration framework and timeline. No agreement has been reached with them yet, and their status remains linked to broader political negotiations between the central government and the people of Suwayda.

On May 30, the Ministry of Defense issued a “Code of Military Conduct and Discipline” for members of the Syrian army and defense ministry personnel. According to the ministry, the code “aims to regulate the behavior and performance of military personnel” across all ranks and duties, both in peacetime and during war, and is founded on the principle that “being a soldier is not just a profession.” The code stresses that soldiers bear “a national responsibility to defend the homeland and its citizens” and to safeguard Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The code is anchored in core values including discipline, rule of law, protection of rights and freedoms, adherence to deeply rooted Syrian ethics, and the recognition of the army as a national institution that serves as “the country’s shield and a cornerstone of its stability.” Key duties outlined in the document, according to the Ministry of Defense, include defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity, protecting civilians (especially women and children), obeying lawful military orders, and “adhering to military and humanitarian standards when dealing with enemy combatants during military operations.” The code strongly emphasizes respect for laws and regulations, protection of public and private property, and treating all citizens with dignity and respect, “without any form of discrimination.”

Prohibitions listed in the code include disobeying military orders, assaulting civilians or their property, engaging in discriminatory behavior, or using slogans that undermine “national unity.” It also bans the abuse of authority, mistreatment of detainees, leaking military information, photographing sites and operations without prior approval, giving media statements without official clearance, and violating public decency in areas where forces are deployed.

The newly issued code reflects commendable values and principles. If implemented properly, it would ensure that the army does not infringe on individual freedoms or serve as a tool of repression but rather acts as a guarantor of rights and liberties, while fulfilling its primary mission of protecting the nation from any threats.

Turkey’s push to establish air bases in Syria

Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Ankara and Damascus have been negotiating a joint defense agreement. Under the proposed pact, Turkey would provide air cover and military protection for the new Syrian government, which currently lacks a functional air-defense system.

Turkey has already begun taking steps to assume control of the Tiyas airbase, also known as T4, and the Palmyra airbase, both of which are in Homs Governorate and were heavily damaged by Israeli strikes, before as well as after Assad’s ouster. Turkey’s plans include reconstructing the bases and equipping them with air-defense systems.

An official in Syria’s Ministry of Defense told the author Turkey plans to “deploy the Hisar air-defense system at T4 to establish aerial coverage. Once the system is operational, the base will resume activity. Ankara also intends to deploy surveillance drones and armed UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], including long-range strike-capable aircraft.”

Some analysts also point to the possibility of deploying Russia’s S-400 air-defense system in Syria as part of the emerging Turkish-Syrian defense pact. According to military analyst Abdelnasser al-Ayed, “Turkey might transfer the S-400 system to Syria temporarily, until one of the airbases is fully operational. However, no final decision has been made regarding the deployment of this system, as ultimate authority remains with Moscow, the system’s primary supplier. Still, Ankara is banking on Russia’s approval to reinforce mutual trust with Syria’s transitional president, Ahmed al-Sharaa.”

Turkey’s ambitions to secure airbases in Syria have raised alarm in Israel, which views the growing cooperation between Ankara and Damascus, as well as the prospect of Turkish military expansion deep into Syrian territory, with concern. An Israeli security official told The Jerusalem Post that the establishment of a Turkish airbase in Syria would constitute a “potential threat” to Israel. The unnamed source warned, “If Turkey sets up an airbase in Syria, it would undermine Israel’s operational freedom and pose a threat that Tel Aviv opposes.”

The 84th Division of foreign jihadis

Since the fall of the Assad regime, the issue of foreign fighters within HTS has resurfaced, especially as its former leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, now leads Syria’s transitional phase from the Presidential Palace. The continued presence of foreign fighters in Syria and potential integration into a new national force has raised domestic and international concerns that they may pose a future threat to national and regional stability.

In response to these concerns, the US included the status of foreign fighters as a core requirement within its sanctions relief proposal, which was delivered to Syrian Foreign Minister As’ad al-Shibani in March, according to a ministry employee.

During his visit to the United States in late April, Shibani met with senior US State Department officials. According to a senior Syrian official who spoke to this author, the two sides agreed the foreign fighters should be integrated into the new Syrian army. The official described Shibani’s visit to New York as a major turning point in US policy toward Syria’s political transition. He called the visit “very successful,” noting that it helped enhance international acceptance of the new Syrian leadership and contributed to the lifting of sanctions, thanks in part to pressure from Arab leaders.

As for the foreign fighters who fought alongside the opposition factions and played a role in the Deterrence of Aggression campaign, which toppled the Assad regime in December, an agreement between the US and Syrian officials was reached to merge them into the Syrian army within a single division. Strict screening and integration procedures would apply not just to them but to any fighter seeking to join the army who is classified by Washington as a “jihadi.”

The Syrian Ministry of Defense official confirmed to this author the details reported by Reuters regarding a statement by US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack, saying, “I would say there is an understanding, with transparency.” The official added, “It is better to keep the fighters, many of whom are very loyal to Syria’s new administration, within a state project rather than to exclude them.”

Following its agreement with Washington, Damascus promptly began organizing foreign fighters in Syria by forming a new military division specifically for them. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, the Syrian presidency has assumed direct oversight over the structure of what is now known as the 84th Division. According to the same senior Syrian official, the division will consist primarily of commanders and fighters from the Turkistan region (Xinjiang), Chechnya, and East Asian countries, following the dissolution of the TIP and Ajnad al-Qawqaz. The division will also include Syrian nationals.

The 84th Division is now classified as a special forces unit under the joint command of Abdul Aziz Dawood Khodabardi (also known as Abu Muhammad Turkistani and Abu Muhammad Zahid), Omar Muhammad Jiftchi (known as Mukhtar al-Turki), and Dhul-Qarnayn Zannur al-Basr Abdul Hamid (also known as Abdullah al-Daghestani), former leader of Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, according to the military official in Syria’s Ministry of Defense.

This division will effectively replace the now-defunct 4th Division. It is expected to be stationed in the coastal mountains, given its fighters’ extensive experience in mountain warfare. The unit is projected to grow to 30,000 fighters, with its headquarters based at the Naval Academy in Latakia Governorate and its deployment focused on northwestern Syria. The division will be composed of six specialized brigades: an armored brigade, two infantry brigades, a raid brigade, an artillery brigade, and an urban-warfare brigade.

Damascus is aiming to integrate foreign fighters into Syrian society, on the condition that they pose no internal or external threat and abide by Syrian laws and regulations. It is expected that President Sharaa will soon issue a decree granting citizenship to non-Syrian fighters under specific conditions. Observers suggest one such condition may be marriage to a Syrian citizen. Another may involve a minimum residency period in the country, estimated at between five and seven years.

Challenges facing the formation of a unified army

Despite HTS’s considerable leverage, including Turkish support for Syrian stability, initial international recognition of Sharaa as the country’s de facto leader, and a growing monopoly over state resources, its efforts to build a unified Syrian army continue to face major challenges. These challenges persist amid the absence of external support for the Alawites in the coastal region and the factions in Suwayda, as well as the lack of a full agreement with the Kurds and the SDF. The most significant of these challenges are as follows:

First: the challenge of maintaining the unity of HTS itself. This comes amid Sharaa’s rapid political shifts and his willingness to make concessions in an effort to adapt to external conditions and pressures and to gain international legitimacy. These moves have clashed with the group’s hardline base and factions within HTS that believe there are limits to what can be conceded. The tension could become particularly acute if domestic and international pressure succeeds in pushing Sharaa to exclude foreign fighters from the structure of the new army. The hardline base would regard this step as unacceptable and a betrayal of the sacrifices made by those fighters. US Special Envoy Barrack voiced concerns that Sharaa could be assassinated because of his willingness to work with the West.

Second: the divergence in ideological influences and external affiliations. The armed factions draw on a wide range of ideological and political foundations, which poses a fundamental challenge to their integration. Some factions, such as Faylaq al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham, are rooted in Islamist ideology. Others, like the Turkmen Sultan Murad Division, are driven by nationalist motivations. There are also factions with sectarian identities, such as the Druze in Suwayda, and groups with ethnically driven agendas, like the Kurdish-led SDF.

Third: the divergence in visions and perceptions regarding the nature of threats and the identity of the enemy. Is the threat internal or external? Is the enemy Israel or Turkey? This lack of consensus reflects the absence of a unified military doctrine, which is typically shaped by the threats facing the state and derived from constitutional principles. The result is a growing sense of skepticism about the national character and inclusiveness of the new army, which is seen by some as being founded on a Sunni Islamist basis. Certain factions, particularly the SDF, view the emerging army as a vehicle for HTS’s project, aiming to impose its own vision for Syria, rather than one grounded in a national framework. This raises concerns that the new army will revolve around the Sunni Arab perspective on external threats — an outlook that is at odds with the views and security priorities of Syria’s ethnic and religious minorities.

Fourth: the entrenched factionalism. Over the past years, factionalism has been a defining feature of the Syrian armed opposition. Each faction believes it played a pivotal role in toppling the regime, and this perception directly shapes its expectations regarding its status within the new army, its position in the proposed hierarchy, and the share of resources it anticipates receiving. These expectations are particularly prominent among the leadership of these factions.

Fifth: the factor of time. The process of integrating various factions into a cohesive military structure, with a unified combat doctrine, standardized training methods, and coordinated operations within an organized hierarchy, is likely to be prolonged. Persistent disputes over procedural details and leadership appointments may further delay the process. Additionally, the question of experience will play a critical role in managing a large army — an area in which the current Damascus administration falls short, as running independent factions is not comparable to commanding a professional, multi-disciplinary military force.

Sixth: the scarcity of resources and funding. The new administration has inherited a dire military situation, especially following Israel’s destruction of a large portion of the Syrian army’s assets. Given the country’s ongoing economic crisis and the immense financial needs required to address humanitarian demands, it is difficult to generate a surplus that could be allocated to building a modern, well-equipped army. Furthermore, any international actors potentially involved in Syria’s reconstruction are likely to impose conditions that restrict military spending.

It remains unclear which party would be willing to arm the new Syrian army. Sharaa may prefer to establish a Western-style military, especially since Jordan has offered to train Syrian forces and provide access to Western weapons and systems. However, this issue ultimately depends on whether the West (namely, the United States and Europe) approves of Sharaa’s policies. It appears that Sharaa is trying to keep communication channels open with Russia as a potential alternative arms supplier in the event of Western refusal. Turkey may also play a significant role in this area, and there is a possibility that Qatar could finance the new army.

The obstacles to Sharaa’s goal of rebuilding the Syrian army are numerous, and resources are scarce. The direction his government is taking is not the ideal path to building a military institution, particularly due to the exclusion of defected officers, the marginalization of their role, and the reliance on HTS fighters. Continuing this experiment and failing to address mistakes will lead to the failure of the project to build a national Syrian army that represents all Syrians. Therefore, correcting these mistakes and maintaining regional and international support, especially from the Gulf states and the United States, will be essential to the project’s success.

Mohammed Hassan is an Associate Fellow at MEI. He holds a bachelor's degree in international law from al-Furat University in Syria and is a master's student in the Department of International Relations at the Higher School of Journalism in Paris. He writes regularly for several Arab newspapers and Western websites. His work focuses on Islamic groups and tribes in Syria, as well as non-governmental entities, in addition to the Iranian-Russian file in Syria. His work has been previously published by the newspapers Al-Hayat and Al-Modon, the Daraj website, the Al-Jumhuriya group, and Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Program.

Photo by Asaad Al Asaad/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images