Morocco-Algeria: The case for ambitious reconciliation

On October 31, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution centering Morocco’s autonomy plan as the basis for resolving the Western Sahara conflict. Of Rabat’s recent diplomatic victories on the issue, this is the most significant. It follows a statement a few weeks earlier from United States Special Envoy Steve Witkoff on the TV news program "60 Minutes" that his team was working on a Morocco-Algeria deal that he hoped to have hammered out within 60 days.

The UN vote and Witkoff’s timeline suggest President Donald Trump wants another headline foreign policy “peacemaking” win. But the opportunity for the Trump administration is bigger than just resolving the Western Sahara issue. It could unlock an opportunity for Morocco-Algeria reconciliation that could integrate the wider Maghreb economy, reduce migration into Europe, expand energy cooperation, and enable stronger Sahel counter-terrorism coordination. Doing so would be a huge win for Trump. It would advance US interests in burden-sharing with Europe, counter Russian and Chinese influence, and facilitate foreign investment in a region bridging Europe and sub-Saharan Africa.

Successfully resolving this long-standing dispute requires understanding that Western Sahara is one facet of a bigger issue and drives the deeper competition for regional leadership between Morocco and Algeria. This rivalry, rooted in both states’ post-colonial origins, has flared up periodically and has notably intensified in recent years.

Two histories

Morocco and Algeria fought a brief border war in 1963 that was sparked in part by Rabat’s effort to regain territory it lost access to during decades of arbitrary border delineation. The war was short and did not alter the borders of the newly independent countries. But the political systems of the two states evolved to represent opposing visions of the world. Morocco has been pro-Western, anti-communist, and mostly aligned with free trade. In contrast, Algeria stuck to its revolutionary credentials and notions of Third World solidarity. These positions have softened over the decades, but their legacies still drive mutual animosity. Algeria fears Morocco’s expansionism and denounces what it views as Rabat’s unprincipled diplomacy and politics selling out to the West. Morocco resents Algeria’s meddling in the Western Sahara and its willingness to prop up the Polisario Front national liberation movement for decades. The animosity has ebbed and flowed over decades but has intensified since 2020, spilling beyond diplomacy into cultural battles over North African heritage claims, mutual delegitimization campaigns, accusations of political meddling, and even sports rivalries that inflame popular anger on both sides.

Today, the rivalry appears in competing models for regional order. Morocco positions itself as a bridge between Africa and Europe, pursuing economic diplomacy and infrastructure development through projects such as the Morocco-Nigeria gas pipeline and the Atlantic Initiative, a trade zone that allows landlocked Sahelian neighbors access to the Atlantic Ocean. Algeria’s leadership claims lie in its support for sovereignty principles and Sahel security through cooperation mechanisms like the now defunct Joint Military Staff Committee, or CEMOC. Morocco and Algeria compete diplomatically in Africa, the Arab World, and the European Union for commercial access, as well as through an arms race. A solution to the Western Sahara dispute unlocks the process of achieving a larger settlement but alone will not end the rivalry.

Negotiating positions

The October 31 UN resolution caps years of diplomatic momentum in Morocco’s favor, the highlight of which was US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara in 2020, followed by Spanish, French, and British support for its autonomy plan. Each brought investment commitments for the Western Sahara that further legitimized Morocco’s control of the territory. Morocco’s defense partnerships, and especially its adherence to the Abraham Accords with Israel, provide technological advantages and political leverage in Washington and European capitals. Time is on Rabat’s side. Every month brings more diplomatic victories cementing Morocco’s position. Morocco’s main — and perhaps only — incentive to negotiate with Algeria is likely to be Washington’s pressure to give the Trump administration another foreign policy win.

Meanwhile, Algeria has faced mounting pressures. Since severing diplomatic ties with Morocco in August 2021, it has rejected mediation offers. But that position might be shifting after US Senior Advisor Massad Boulos flew to Algiers in July 2025. Boulos was well met in the Algerian capital, where his visit was perceived as an opportunity for the leadership to access the Trump administration. Moreover, Algiers worries that the US Congress will sanction the country for its purchases of Russian weapons under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Moreover, Algeria has become increasingly isolated in its own Sahelian neighborhood as its relationship with Mali declines. Algiers opposes the presence of Russian Wagner and Africa Corps fighters in Mali and in the Sahel. As a result, Algeria’s relationship with the Alliance of Sahelian States has deteriorated while Morocco’s remains strong.

Still, Algeria has leverage. It remains Europe’s crucial gas supplier, and its importance has only increased since the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war and the resulting reduction in Russian supplies. And although isolated, the Algerian military is still an important player with significant capabilities and can obstruct or facilitate regional security cooperation. While it is unlikely to do so, Algeria does retain the option to increase its military support of the Polisario. This would in turn raise conflict risks that could destabilize the western Mediterranean by stoking European fears over migration, energy security, trade, and security cooperation.

While Morocco continues to advance its objectives in the Western Sahara and beyond, Algeria and the Polisario are in an unfavorable position. Algeria’s stance has been reactive — defined more by countering Moroccan regional influence than by articulating its own positive strategic goals.

Taking into consideration Algeria’s strategic interests, negotiations could address the country’s efforts to modernize its economy and attract investment while maintaining the stability of the current regime. Algeria possesses robust counter-terrorism capabilities and Sahel security expertise, but there is a larger opportunity to build toward a treaty-based North Africa security architecture. Gradually integrating Algeria into Western defense partnerships would allow the US to develop stronger defense ties with the Algerian military and reduce its dependence on Russia. This outcome would require decades of trust-building, planning, and cooperation to achieve. The immediate step, however, is modest: laying the foundation by increasing trilateral coordination around a range of mutual regional threats, from terrorism to disaster management to migration pressures.

On energy, Algeria’s advantages rival Morocco’s and include value not only as a global gas supplier with potential for renewables, but also as an energy transit hub from West Africa. In addition, Algeria faces potential concerns about managing the Polisario’s future, including the uncertain (and highly politicized) number of Sahrawi refugees it has hosted for decades in Tinduf. Resolution of this issue will require international support.

Still, the current situation shows a lopsided negotiation dynamic. Morocco is advancing its Western Sahara interests at the UN, and its broader interests in Europe and Africa, with or without a deal. For Algeria current trends are unfavorable, and a deal should not only offer a “face saving solution” on the Western Sahara but substantial offsetting gains.

Algeria needs investment and economic reform without sacrificing stability. The Trump administration’s transactional approach and Europe’s pragmatic cooperation create space for Algeria to pursue Western engagement without the political compromises it has always rejected. The country’s energy industry is another area where the US could secure strategic gains by negotiating a more ambitious deal — one that would entail cooperation on energy infrastructure that benefits both Rabat and Algiers by increasing their access to European markets.

Finally, Algeria faces the practical problem of Sahrawi refugees in Tinduf camps. International support for repatriation schemes, negotiated with the Polisario, would be crucial, and Algeria could uphold its commitment to this population by taking the lead on the issue. This combination of security, economic, and political incentives can transform Algeria from regional spoiler into viable negotiating partner.

Constraints

Both Algeria and Morocco face political constraints that are not merely negotiating positions, but domestic and regional realities that limit what leadership in both countries can accept. Each has created and hardened domestic political red lines that it will struggle to overcome. The Moroccan monarchy has built legitimacy on territorial integrity. The Moroccan public has been told that the issue of the Western Sahara is settled; it is considered Moroccan territory, known locally as the southern provinces. The autonomy plan is Rabat’s maximalist offer, so any potential proposals will have to toe a careful line by preserving Moroccan sovereignty while providing enough incentives to draw in the Polisario without contradicting the kingdom’s governance model, which still by and large limits decentralization.

Algeria’s military rule is built on its role as defender against external risks, and the most prominent of those is Morocco’s perceived desire for expansion beyond the Western Sahara. This is a feature of domestic discourse: disciplined support for self-determination and a push against what Algerians see as an existential threat next door. Algeria’s long-held anti-Morocco stance deflects attention from its own governance challenges and political dissent. Therefore, the two countries need a dual narrative that enables both sides to claim victory domestically from the same agreement, and from the reality of an autonomy deal.

The arms race creates another structural challenge. In 2025 Morocco allocated $13 billion for its defense budget. Rabat is pursuing F-35s, upgrading F-16s, acquiring the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), and other precision-strike capabilities. Morocco’s deepening relationship with Israel increases Algeria’s sense of threat regardless of Morocco’s actual intent. Algeria’s own military spending dwarfs Morocco’s, with an allocated and approved defense budget of $25 billion for 2025. This includes eventual acquisitions of Russian Su-35 and even Su-57 stealth fighters, Iskander-M missiles, and advanced radar systems. While neither wants a war, both sides appear to be preparing for worst-case scenarios. This is the classic security dilemma, and any agreement needs to address it. Confidence-building measures and arms-control mechanisms must be provided, regardless of any potential settlement regarding the Western Sahara.

Recommendations

The Trump administration can achieve an ambitious comprehensive settlement that integrates the Western Sahara and expands to address regional tensions through a phased approach.

Phase 1: Framework Agreement

The first step of a US-negotiated deal between Morocco and Algeria should create a framework that lays out principles and timelines, leaving a final resolution to a later phase. The US should include the following in its first step:

1. An immediate commitment to de-escalation:

   • The US should secure a commitment from the Polisario to halt attacks and agree to a cease-fire.
      

   • In return, Morocco should commit to a defensive posture only, including a prohibition against military operations beyond current lines — which Morocco denies, despite contradictory evidence, that it has conducted.
      

   • The US should allow the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to establish an incident notification and deconfliction monitoring mechanism.
      

   • The MINURSO mandate should be revised to include cease-fire verification, and the mission should be properly equipped and financed to manage it.

2. A roadmap for Western Sahara autonomy negotiations:

   • The US should insist on a process that addresses the detailed requirements of the autonomy plan and ensure that Morocco and the Polisario anchor it in clear deadlines and milestones to keep the process on track.
      

   • US negotiators should insist on a consultative process involving not only the Polisario but also representatives from the camps, the diaspora, and leadership from Morocco-controlled territories. Political leadership extends beyond the Polisario, as Morocco has long argued, and both the Polisario and other groups should be integrated into the governance structure.
      

   • To that end, the US should support a UN effort to create a camp repatriation framework: this step must be in lockstep with the autonomy negotiations and utilize EU mechanisms that provide economic integration assistance.
      

   • Finally, the US should also insist on a Polisario disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program concurrent with autonomy negotiations, including incentives for leadership and rank-and-file members. US and EU funding can support existing mechanisms.  

3. A mechanism for Morocco-Algeria direct dialogue: Establish a formal bilateral channel under US facilitation. The initial focus should be on avoiding hostile statements, lowering the domestic temperature around mutual threat perceptions, and establishing communication protocols while identifying areas for cooperation, starting with technical issues like border management.  

Phase 2: Implementation

The second phase of the agreement would expand on the above by creating space for deeper structural changes:

1. Security confidence-building measures: Establish Morocco-Algeria military-to-military dialogue for border zone transparency and incident prevention. Include notification protocols for military exercises and acquisition transparency.

2. Regional integration initiatives: The EU is well positioned to lead this initiative with a focus on the following key areas:

   • Energy cooperation: Concentrate on infrastructure consolidation that can facilitate access to conventional and renewable sources of energy, incentivized with financing through Mediterranean partnership programs, many of which already exist and can house these initiatives.
      

   • Sahel security coordination: Create a multilateral (US, EU, Morocco, Algeria) counter-terrorism coordination mechanism. This would allow Algeria to play the leadership role it seeks, while giving Morocco a more prominent position in Sahel security and granting the US more effective cooperation partners. The EU could fund a corresponding development component to provide a more comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism.
      

   • Migration management framework: Adopt a collective approach to information sharing for regional coordination. This would help prevent fragmentation and eliminate the regional political pressure of “migrant dumping.” It would provide the EU with a more effective approach to the Maghreb region, although it would ultimately be beneficial to both.

Intissar Fakir is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute.

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