US President Donald Trump was back in his comfort zone this week, fulminating online and ranting to journalists about Russia’s continued war against Ukraine. As a candidate, Trump infamously promised that he could end the war in Ukraine in “24 hours,” and the early weeks of his foreign policy prioritized following through on that promise — efforts that have fallen short as the conflict rages on.
This efficacy crisis in American foreign policy is not new — all recent US presidents have, to some extent, not lived up to their stated global ambitions. But repeated failures on multiple fronts can have negative externalities in other areas. As Russia’s President Vladimir Putin continues to thumb his nose at Trump, America’s adversaries and competitors across the world will watch closely to see what the US president does next.
Since the Middle East is a key arena for global competition and two major strategic challenges — Iran and the Israel-Palestine question — still loom large, Trump’s shortcomings on other foreign policy issues could affect how seriously America’s friends and foes alike take his efforts in the region.
No major US foreign policy gains as yet in Trump 2.0
Trump’s frustrations about his inability to produce a cease-fire and bring the Russian leader to heel have been spilling out in public in recent weeks. He told reporters last weekend, “I don’t know what the hell happened to Putin,” and later posted online that the Russian president had “gone absolutely crazy.” When all else fails, Trump turns to his use of “troll power” against Russia in provocative statements to the media and in online posts. Troll power, a form of negative soft power, uses the scathing mockery and grandstanding rhetorical gamesmanship common in online feuds in interactions between states and world leaders — and Trump is a master at this.
But the main problem with Trump’s troll power is that though it serves to distract the public and seize the media spotlight, it often fails to produce tangible gains or clear results in the real world. His provocative statements do nothing to address the underlying issues of wars or disputes that continue to drag on unresolved, as we are seeing in Ukraine but also in the trade wars Trump has initiated. Trump has blinked on the trade front, pressing the pause button for the moment on tariffs against the two other main engines of the global economy, China and Europe, even as the specter of price increases continues to hang over America.
Trump’s domestic political standing improved in May after dipping sharply in April, likely the result of the time out he announced in the trade wars and favorable coverage of his Middle East trip. One key factor that helps define Trump’s base is that many of his strongest supporters do not follow news stories or the details too closely, according to recent research. Over time, however, those details will begin to promulgate more broadly in the public consciousness, and Trump’s political standing will be shaped by whether his approach produces results. The next major event to watch is the fate of the tax and budget bill he is currently attempting to push through Congress.
Trump’s foreign policy approach, at times harkening back to the age of “spheres of influence” wielded by major powers in the 19th century, is hampered by an erratic approach to statecraft, something veteran US diplomat Dennis Ross discussed earlier this month on my podcast, Taking the Edge Off the Middle East. Trump’s recent cuts to the National Security Council staff, the main body that coordinates interagency policy, could further impact how effectively and efficiently his administration manages foreign policy in his second term.
Iran and Israel-Palestine: The two major unresolved variables in the Middle East equation
The lack of significant outcomes on the Russia diplomacy front sends signals across the world, including the Middle East, about just how effective Trump 2.0 is in achieving its stated goals. Trump’s first three months in office produced a mixed record on the Middle East; and though his May visit to the region was replete with business and commercial announcements, there were no major advances for regional stability. In the complex math of today’s Middle East, the two major variables that remain unresolved are Iran and the Israel-Palestine front, yet it remains to be seen what course the administration will take on both issues.
On Iran, talks continue over a possible deal. The head of the United Nations nuclear agency said this week that “the jury is still out” on those talks, noting that the fact they continue is a good sign. Trump currently appears to prefer some sort of a deal over military action, and he reportedly warned Israel not to take steps that could upset a possible agreement. These discussions do not appear to include long-standing concerns about Iran’s destabilizing actions in the region, as Israel continues to face threats from Iranian partners like the Houthis in Yemen — even after Trump struck a separate deal this spring with the militant group to get them to stop attacking US targets.
The Israel-Palestine file is the weakest link in Trump 2.0’s overall Middle East approach. Trump came into office with a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas in place, but that collapsed more than two months ago. Israel announced its intention to seize control of 75% of Gaza in a two-month military operation that began in mid-March, and has reportedly taken out another top Hamas leader. But the human costs and humanitarian impact of these operations continue to escalate, as flawed efforts to get more food and supplies to Palestinians in Gaza fail to meet the needs that have only grown after months of a complete Israeli blockade of all assistance. Talks over a new cease-fire and hostage-release deal continue; however, it is not yet clear whether Trump’s team can produce a lasting outcome that ends the fighting and brings the remaining hostages home.
It is still early days for the second Trump administration, but the lack of clear, positive results from the president’s efforts to end Russia’s war against Ukraine does not bode well for his ambitions to resolve conflicts in the Middle East in a way that makes America and its partners more secure and prosperous.
Brian Katulis is a Senior Fellow at MEI.
Photo by Ukrainian State Emergency Service/Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images
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